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Abstract 
119 Brigade, 40
th
 Division, had an unusual origin as a ‘left-over’ brigade of the Welsh Army 
Corps and was the only completely bantam formation outside 35
th
 Division.  This study 
investigates the formation’s national identity and demonstrates that it was indeed strongly 
‘Welsh’ in more than name until 1918.  New data on the social background of men and 
officers is added to that generated by earlier studies.  The examination of the brigade’s actions 
on the Western Front challenges the widely held belief that there was an inherent problem 
with this and other bantam formations. The original make-up of the brigade is compared with 
its later forms when new and less efficient units were introduced.  Training is identified as key 
to success in battle. 
 
The controversial Frank Percy Crozier commanded the formation for most of its active service 
and the study examines the often-quoted books by Crozier, putting them into context and 
concluding that they must be used warily as source material.  The study advances the view 
that Crozier, while not an easy man to like, was an efficient and effective commander during 
the Great War and not simply the ‘callous and overbearing martinet’ often portrayed. 
 
Dedication 
This thesis is dedicated to the men of all ranks who served in 119 Infantry 
Brigade during the Great War 
 
 
It is the infantry with rifle, bomb and bayonet that both takes and holds, endures 
the greatest and the longest strain, and suffers by far the heaviest losses 
 
The Times, 25 June 1917 
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NOTE ON STYLE 
 
Throughout this thesis the current convention of referring, for example, to ‘119 Brigade’ 
rather than ‘the 119th Brigade’ has been followed except within contemporary quotations.  
‘Brigade’ rather than ‘Infantry Brigade’ has been used for brevity throughout, again with the 
exception of quotations. Other types of brigade are clearly distinguished in the text.  
 
‘Welsh’ rather than the arcane ‘Welch’ was used in the official names of regiments during the 
First World War and is used here.  Regimental names are usually written in an abbreviated 
form and the word ‘regiment’ is also usually omitted.  The eighteenth battalion of the Welsh 
Regiment, for example, is given as ‘18th Welsh’. 
 
Spelling and punctuation within original sources are as close to the original as possible and 
sic has been used only where an error might otherwise be inferred by the reader. Editorial 
interventions are given within square brackets [ ] and editorial omissions from original 
sources are indicated by an ellipsis (…). 
 
Maps are readily available within the divisional, regimental, battlefield and official histories 
cited in the bibliography and are not included in this thesis. 
  
ABREVIATIONS 
 
 
2iC  Second in Command 
A&Q  Adjutant and Quartermaster 
A&SH  Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders 
ADC  Aide-de-Camp 
AG  Adjutant General 
AOD  Army Ordnance Depot 
APM  Assistant Provost Marshall 
BEF  British Expeditionary Force 
BGRA  Brigadier-General Royal Artillery 
BM  Brigade Major 
CinC  Commander in Chief (in this case, of the BEF) 
CO  Commanding Officer 
CWGC Commonwealth War Graves Commission 
DAAG  Deputy Assistant Adjutant General 
DIM  Deputy Inspector of Musketry 
DSO  Distinguished Service Order 
DT  Director of Transport 
FGCM  Field General Court Martial 
FP  Field Punishment 
FSR  Field Service Regulations 
GHQ  General Headquarters 
GOC  General Officer Commanding 
GQG  Grand Quartier Générale (French equivalent of GHQ) 
GSO1  General Staff Officer Grade One 
GSO2  General Staff Officer Grade Two 
GSO3  General Staff Officer Grade Three 
HQ  Headquarters 
HLI  Highland Light Infantry 
IBD  Infantry Base Depot 
IGC  Inspector General of Communications 
KORL  King’s Own (Royal Lancaster Regiment) 
KOSB  King’s Own Scottish Borderers 
KOYLI King’s Own Yorkshire Light Infantry 
MGC  Machine Gun Company 
MC  Military Cross 
MS  Military Secretary 
MT  Motor Transport 
NAM  National Army Museum 
NCO  Non-Commissioned Officer 
NEC  National Executive Committee (of the Welsh Army Corps) 
NLW  National Library of Wales 
OC  Officer Commanding 
ORs  Other Ranks 
POW(s) Prisoner(s) of War 
psc  passed Staff College 
Q  Quartermaster General’s Branch of the General Staff 
RA  Royal Artillery 
RAP  Regimental Aid Post 
RC  Railhead Commandant 
RE  Royal Engineers 
RIF  Royal Inniskilling Fusiliers 
RIRifles Royal Irish Rifles 
RWF  Royal Welsh Fusiliers 
SDR  Special Despatch Rider 
SWB  South Wales Borderers 
TF  Territorial Force 
TMB  Trench Mortar Battery 
TNA  The National Archives 
WAC  Welsh Army Corps 
WO  War Office  
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Introduction 
On 20 November 1916 the newly promoted Brigadier-General Frank Percy Crozier (1879-
1937) took command of 119 Infantry Brigade, one of three brigades that made up the 40
th
 
Division (119, 120 and 121 Brigades).  This formation remains one of the most obscure in the 
burgeoning historiography of the Great War and this thesis will bring overdue focus on the 
brigade and on aspects of its better-known GOC.   
 
Raised in 1915 and originally intended as a formation of the Welsh Army Corps, the brigade, 
consisting of four battalions of Welsh bantams, had crossed to France in June 1916 - more 
than a year after it was formed - and was a part of the last of the New Army divisions to go 
overseas. It had then spent an undistinguished few months in the Loos sector.
1
  According to 
Crozier, on his arrival at divisional headquarters, the GSO1 made it clear to him that the 
brigade was “very bad – quite the worst in the Division”. Crozier, firmly believing, he says, 
that there were no such things as bad soldiers, only bad colonels, claims to have transformed 
the brigade in six months and in the process removed “a brigade-major, a brigade signalling 
officer, nearly a dozen commanding officers in turn, a few seconds in command, three 
adjutants, several doctors, quartermasters and transport officers and one or two sergeant 
majors”.2  Certainly the brigade seems to have performed well in April 1917 around Villers 
                                                 
1
 ‘Bantams’ were recruits who were between 5ft and 5ft 3 inches in height. Given Crozier’s own lack of height 
(he was 5ft 3½ inches tall) it is tempting to speculate that someone in high command was indulging their sense 
of humour by posting him to command a bantam brigade.  The entire Division merits just one line in the Official 
History volumes for 1916 and 119 Brigade is not mentioned at all.   
2
 F.P. Crozier, Impressions and Recollections (London: T. Werner Laurie Ltd, 1930), p. 184.  The GSO1 at this 
time was Lieutenant-Colonel Henry Alexander Walker (1874-1953), later Brigadier-General H.A. Walker CB 
CMG DSO HP.  Crozier had also used the ‘no bad soldiers, only bad colonels’ maxim in Brasshat in No Man’s 
Land (London: Jonathan Cape, 1930), p.131 where he ascribed it to Napoleon Bonaparte.  There does not seem 
to be any evidence for this attribution.  It is not referred to in L.E. Henry, Napoleon’s War Maxims (London: 
Gale and Polden Ltd., 1899) yet the attribution of this popular maxim persists. H.R.H. The Prince of Wales used 
it in a eulogy in 2006 see http://www.princeofwales.gov.uk/media/speeches/eulogy-hrh-the-prince-of-wales-
memorial-service-zaki-badawi accessed 1/1/2015. 
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Plouich and later, most famously, at Bourlon Wood in November 1917.  After the major army 
reorganisation of February 1918 the brigade was reconstituted with a majority of new 
battalions in time to be severely mauled in the German Spring Offensives but, reconstituted 
once again (largely with men considered unfit for front line service), it nevertheless seems to 
have performed creditably in the final months of the war.   
 
Despite these upheavals Crozier remained as GOC until after the end of the war and was one 
of just twenty-seven New Army brigadier-generals to remain in command for more than two 
years.
3
  Was he simply lucky or was he doing a good job?  This key question has not been 
posed or answered in any previous work. Of the divisions of the Fifth New Army the 40
th
 
Division has received no academic attention and the spotlight has, for example, been directed 
on the 35
th
 Division as the example of a bantam formation or on the origins and development 
of the 36
th
 (Ulster) and 38
th 
(Welsh) Divisions as examples of formations with distinct 
national identities and a political dimension to their creation.
4
  The story of 119 Brigade is 
unique. As a ‘left-over’ brigade of the Welsh Army Corps the story of its development sheds 
light on recruiting during the creation of the last of the volunteer army formations.  The 
examination of its ‘national’ identity will show how this may have affected its morale and 
performance while the determination of the social and geographic origins of its officers and 
other ranks will give new insight to changes taking place within the ‘sharp end’ of the BEF 
during the final two years of the war.   
 
                                                 
3
 Figure derived from A.F. Becke, Order of Battle of Divisions, Part 3a -  New Army Divisions (9-26) (London: 
HMSO, 1938) and Part 3b – New Army Divisions (30-41) and 63rd (R.N.) Division (London: HMSO, 1945) 
4
 For the  most recent detailed examination of bantam  units see Peter Simkins, “Each One a Pocket Hercules”: 
The Bantam Experiment and the Case of the Thirty-fifth Division in Sanders Marble (ed.), Scraping the Barrel: 
The Military Use of Sub-Standard Manpower (New York: Fordham University Press, 2012), p.p. 79-104.  For 
36
th
 (Ulster) Division see Phillip Orr, The Road to the Somme (Belfast: Blackstaff  Press, 1987). For 38
th
 (Welsh) 
Division see Colin Hughes, Mametz: Lloyd George’s ‘Welsh Army’ at the Battle of the Somme (Norwich: 
Gliddon Books, 2
nd
 Edition, 1990). 
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The key questions that this thesis will address are: what were the origins of 119 brigade? 
What were the backgrounds of the men who were its officers and other ranks in its three 
incarnations? How good was the brigade and did it evolve? How crucial was Crozier’s 
leadership and what was his command style? Did Crozier do what he said he did in dismissing 
ineffective officers and assembling an effective group of subordinates? 
 
In addressing these questions it is essential not only to describe the history of the brigade and 
to examine how it developed but also to form an objective view of its GOC.  When writing 
his own accounts in the 1930s Crozier had an agenda.  He had failed to gain post-war 
employment in the regular army and had a bitter dispute with the establishment in the 
aftermath of his resignation from the Auxiliary Division of the Royal Irish Constabulary in 
1921.  By the time that his last and most controversial book, The Men I Killed, was published 
in 1937 he was an active and passionate advocate for the Peace Pledge Union.  As an author 
he courted controversy and he can still generate emotional, intemperate and it must be said 
irrational criticism, much of which is sparked by his own descriptions of his part in the trial 
and execution of Rifleman James Crozier in February 1916, his ‘confession’ to at least one 
summary execution during the German Spring offensive on the Lys in April 1918 and his 
involvement in Ireland in 1920-21.  The late Richard Holmes noted how his copy of Crozier’s 
A Brass Hat in No Man’s Land (1930) had been re-titled by an anonymous previous owner as 
‘A Fat Arse in No Man’s Land’.5 A one-time subordinate in the Royal Irish Rifles also 
reported how the then Lieutenant-Colonel Crozier was regarded as a “callous and overbearing 
                                                 
5
 Richard Holmes, Tommy: The British Soldier on the Western Front 1914 – 1918 (London: Harper Collins, 
2004), p.642. 
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martinet”.6  Yet when Lieutenant H.A.J. Lamb took over as brigade signalling officer in April 
1918 he noted that he had “taken over a good section.  Brig. Gen. Crozier most awfully 
nice”.7  After Crozier’s death Basil Liddell Hart wrote in The Times, “I have had the 
opportunity of questioning many who served with or under him, both war-time and 
professional soldiers, and have heard on all sides the most fervent admiration expressed for 
his qualities as a fighting leader.  Some who had wide experience considered that he was the 
best brigade commander they saw in action”.8  Whatever his own character, Crozier gathered 
around him a group of senior officers in whom he had confidence.  An examination of the war 
diaries of the brigade and its constituent battalions shows that the brigade major at the time of 
Crozier’s promotion to the brigade was replaced within a month.  The CO of the 17th Welsh 
was relieved of his command in January 1917 following 113 cases of trench foot in his 
battalion during a single tour of duty in the front line.  The 19
th
 Royal Welsh Fusiliers had 
three COs between January and May 1917 and when Lieutenant-Colonel B.J. Jones returned 
in June having recovered from wounds sustained in the previous year he was replaced within 
two months.  The replacement for the wounded CO of 12
th
 South Wales Borderers also lasted 
two months before being replaced himself.  There is enough substance in Crozier’s claims of 
wholesale officer replacement to warrant further investigation. 
 
Previous Research 
The study of infantry brigades and brigade-level command has received little attention to date. 
The most common higher formation for study remains the infantry division and histories of 
                                                 
6
 J.L. Stewart-Moore, quoted in Timothy Bowman, Irish Regiments in the Great War: Discipline and Morale 
(Manchester: MUP, 2003), p. 30.  This description has now been quoted (out of context) more than once and will 
be discussed later in this study. 
7
 Imperial War Museum (IWM), Department of Manuscripts: 01/9/01. H.A.J. Lamb, Lieutenant RE, Diary 1915-
18, 27 April, 1918. 
8
 The Times, 4 September 1937. 
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just a handful of New Army infantry brigades were published in the immediate post-war 
period: one of these is effectively a collation of four battalion histories; two are of brigades of 
30
th
 Division and two of brigades of 34
th
 Division.
9
  The same two brigades of 34
th
 Division 
are the subject of one of a clutch of more recently written accounts as are 89 Brigade (30
th
 
Division) and 92 Brigade (31
st
 Division). 90 Brigade (again) and 91 Brigades (both 30th 
Division) are covered in a one volume study of the Manchester Pals.
10
 It can be argued that, 
while shedding light on the formation and activities of particular battalions and particular 
soldiers, none of these accounts illuminate the world of the brigade and its functions. In 2004 
Peter Simkins put infantry brigades firmly into the academic spotlight when he identified 
them as the ‘building blocks’ of the BEF’s offensive operations while military administration 
and the role of the brigade staff was the focus of Aimée Fox’s 2010 dissertation.11 Most 
recently, the role and function of brigadier-generals during the Battle of Arras in 1917 has 
been examined by Trevor Harvey who concluded that “their most significant contribution was 
to ensure, despite the unglamorous treadmill of building and rebuilding their brigades, that 
they retained the capacity of their brigades for battle”.12 This has gone a little way to 
addressing the point made by Simkins that “[Brigadier-Generals] have remained individually 
                                                 
9
 J. Keating and F. Lavery, Irish Heroes in the War: The Story of the Tyneside Irish Brigade (London: Everett, 
1917); Anon, History of the 50
th
 Infantry Brigade, 1914-1919 (London: 1919); F.C. Stanley, The History of the 
89
th
 Brigade (Liverpool: Daily Post, 1919); H.L. James (ed.), Sixteenth, Seventeenth, Eighteenth, Nineteenth 
Battalions, the Manchester Regiment: A Record 1914-1918 (Manchester: Sherratt and Hughes, 1923); T. Ternan, 
The Story of the Tyneside Scottish (Newcastle: Northumberland Press, 1919); E.W.J. Rowan, The 54
th
 Infantry 
Brigade, 1914-1918: Some Records of Battle and Laughter in France (Aldershot: Gale and Polden, 1919). 
10
 J. Sheen, Tyneside Irish: A History of the Tyneside Irish Brigade Raised in the North East in World War One  
(Barnley: Pen and Sword, 1998); G. Stewart and J. Sheen, Tyneside Scottish: A History of the Tyneside Scottish 
Brigade Raised in the North East in World War One (Barnsley: Pen and Sword, 1999); D. Bilton, Hull Pals: A 
History of 92 Infantry Brigade, 31
st
 Division (Barnsley: Pen and Sword, 1999); M Stedman, Manchester Pals, 
16
th
, 17
th
, 18
th
, 19
th
, 20
th
, 21
st
, 22
nd
 and 23
rd
 Battalions of the Manchester Regiment: A History of the Two 
Manchester Brigades (London: Leo Cooper, 1994). 
11
 Peter Simkins, ‘Building Blocks: Aspects of Command and Control at Brigade Level in the BEF’s Offensive 
Operations, 1916-1918’ in Gary Sheffield and Dan Todman (eds.), Command and Control on the Western Front: 
The British Army’s Experience1914-18 (Staplehurst: Spellmount, 2004), pp. 141-171. 
12
 Trevor Gordon Harvey, ‘‘An Army of Brigadiers’: British Brigade Commanders at the Battle of Arras 1917’, 
University of Birmingham, PhD Thesis, 2015, abstract. 
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and collectively unknown to the general public” with just a few, including Crozier, leaving 
published memoirs or biographies. 
 
While Crozier has attracted the attention of several authors 119 Brigade has attracted almost 
none. F.E. Whitton’s History of the 40th Division (1926) was for many years the only military 
study of the formation and is far from probing or analytical.
13
  Whitton evidently had access 
to the war diaries of the division and its formations and units along with accounts from a few 
individuals but it seems simply assembled them into a rather gentle narrative history which 
ignores the origins of all of the division’s constituent brigades.  The 119 Brigade is not 
singled out for any particular attention within the narrative although it is possible to detect 
contributions that probably came from James Frederick (Freddy) Plunkett (see Chapter 
Four).
14
   Crozier certainly submitted his own comments to Sir James Edmonds on the content 
of the volume of the Official History that dealt with the German Offensive on the Somme in 
March 1918 and the Battle of the Lys in April 1918 but the volume that dealt with Cambrai 
was not published until after Crozier’s death and so the description of Bourlon Wood contains 
no obvious contribution from him.   
 
Troop morale and discipline are two military factors which are intimately related.  Timothy 
Bowman has defined morale as an internal factor that can be influenced by external factors 
and discipline as a largely external one.
15
 J. G. Fuller, quoting S.L.A. Marshall on his 
experience of Second World War combat, states that “one of the oldest myths in the military 
book [is] that morale comes from discipline … The process is exactly the reverse … true 
                                                 
13
 F.E. Whitton, History of the 40
th
 Division (London: Gale &, 1926). 
14
 See for example Whitton, History of the 40
th
 Division, p. 143. 
15
 Timothy Bowman, Irish Regiments in the Great War: Discipline and Morale (Manchester: Manchester 
University Press, 2003), p.10. 
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discipline is the product of morale”.16  Good discipline and good morale are key to combat 
success and have been the focus of several studies that have attempted to use quantitative data 
to gauge the level of both in particular units and formations. This study will extend that 
methodology to 119 Brigade.  In 2003 Timothy Bowman presented data from the courts-
martial records for the units and formations of the 16
th
 (Irish) Division and the 36
th
 (Ulster) 
Division during their service while training and when on the Western Front.  Similar data sets 
were published by Stephen Sandford for the 10
th
 (Irish) Division and compared with 
Bowman’s data.17  However, the context for the 10th (Irish) Division’s overseas service was 
different as it did not serve on the Western Front and cannot therefore be used as a comparator 
in this study. Sandford also uses data on the 13th (Western) Division which fought at 
Gallipoli alongside the 10
th
 (Irish) Division. Data from these studies will be compared with 
data relating to the units of 119 Brigade to form a view of the relative levels of discipline both 
within the brigade and in comparison with other brigades of the New Armies.  The 
presentation of this data increases the number of comparators available for future studies. 
 
40
th
 Division’s part in the battle of Cambrai during which it distinguished itself in the attempt 
to take and hold the wooded ridge at Bourlon and the adjacent village has now been described 
in several works, including William Moore’s A Wood Called Bourlon (1988), Jack Horsfall 
and Nigel Cave’s Bourlon Wood (2002), Alexander Turner’s Cambrai (2007) and Bryn 
Hammond’s Cambrai 1917 (2008).18 
                                                 
16
 J.G. Fuller, Troop Morale and Popular Culture in the British and Dominion Armies 1914-1918 (Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 1990), p.52. Marshall (1900-1977) was a US Army combat historian in WW2 and Korea and 
author of Men Against Fire: The Problem of Battle Command (New York: William Morrow, 1947). The validity 
of his work on ‘ratio of fire’ values in this work has since been challenged. 
17
 Stephen Sandford, Neither Unionist Nor Nationalist: The 10
th
 (Irish) Division in the Great War (Sallins: Irish 
Academic Press, 2015). 
18
 William Moore, A Wood Called Bourlon: the cover-up after Cambrai (London: Leo Cooper, 1981); Jack 
Horsfall & Nigel Cave, Bourlon Wood (Barnsley: Leo Cooper, 2002); Alexander Turner, Cambrai (Oxford: 
8 
 
 
The actions of the brigade before Cambrai have largely escaped attention but Bill 
Mitchinson’s Villers-Plouich (1999) is an exception.  The time after Cambrai has no detailed 
study but the actions of 40th Division on the Lys in April 1918 feature in Chris Baker’s The 
Battle for Flanders (2011).
19
  There is no previous account of the reconstituted division’s part 
in the final stages of the war. 
 
The units which made up the 40
th
 Division were described, along with other bantam units, in 
the 1980s by Sidney Allinson in his wider ranging study of The Bantams (1981) but, although 
he had contact with surviving veterans of the division and of the 119 Brigade, his work is not 
rigorous and the book is not referenced.  Mr Allinson’s notes and correspondence with 
survivors have been disposed of and are not available for further study.
20
  Stephen McGreal’s 
Cheshire Bantams (2006) is a detailed history of the 15
th
 and 16
th
 Battalions Cheshire 
Regiment (105 Brigade, 35
th
 Division) and 17
th
 (Reserve) Battalion of the Cheshire Regiment 
that also includes some basic information on the raising of the 40
th
 Division for the sake of 
completeness as it was the only other bantam formation in the New Armies.
21
 Caroline Scott’s 
recent work The Manchester Bantams (23
rd
 Manchester Regiment, 104 Brigade, 35
th
 
Division) is a detailed account of another bantam unit of 35
th
 Division which, although 
                                                                                                                                                        
Osprey, 2007; Bryn Hammond, Cambrai 1917: the myth of the first great tank battle (London: Wiedenfeld & 
Nicolson, 2008). 
19
 K.W. Mitchinson, Villers Plouich and the Five Ridges (Barnsley: Leo Cooper, 1999); Chris Baker, The Battle 
for Flanders: German defeat on the Lys 1918 (Barnsley: Pen & Sword, 2011). 
20
 Email from Sydney Allinson 15 April 2010. Sydney Allinson, The Bantams: the untold story of World War 1 
(London: Howard Baker, 1981). The book has been reprinted with minor revisions and no sub-title (Barnsley: 
Pen & Sword, 2009). 
21
 Stephen McGreal, Cheshire Bantams: the 15
th
, 16
th
 and 17
th
 Battalions of the Cheshire Regiment (Barnsley: 
Pen & Sword, 2006). 
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reprising the origin of bantam formations generally, makes no mention of the bantam and 
part-bantam formations of 40
th
 Division.
22
 
 
Much has been written on the history of the 38
th
 (Welsh) Division and its origins in the 
movement to create a Welsh Army Corps (see Chapter One) but useful general context for 
Wales in the Great War is now available through the work of Chris Williams and Robin 
Barlow.
23
 This will be used, particularly in Chapter One, as a baseline for the Welsh aspects 
of the current study and Williams’ work in particular will be used to provide comparative 
data. 
 
Crozier (rather than his later command) is referred to in several works on the Great War, most 
of which cite his actions whilst an officer of the 36
th
 (Ulster) Division and in particular his 
roles in the court martial mentioned above and on the first day of the Somme.
24
  The 
repercussions of his description of the collapse of the Portuguese 2
nd
 Division on the Lys have 
been examined as a small part of A.D. Harvey’s Muse of Fire (1998), which is a literary and 
not a military study.
25
  His later actions as commander of the Auxiliary Division in Ireland in 
1920-21 are noted in studies of that episode.
26
  Professor Brian Bond included a chapter on 
Crozier in his study of memoirs of the Western Front Survivors of a Kind (2008).  This has a 
                                                 
22
 Caroline Scott, The Manchester Bantams: The Story of a Pals Battalion and a City at War; 23
rd
 (Service) 
Battalion The Manchester Regiment (8
th
 City) (Barnsley: Pen & Sword, 2016). 
23
 Robin Barlow, Wales and World War One (Llandysul: Gomer Press, 2014) contains useful social background 
that will be used for comparison, as does Chris Williams ‘Taffs in the Trenches: identity and military service 
1914-1915’ in Matthew Cragoe and Chris Williams (eds), Wales and War: Society, Politics and Religion in the 
Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries (Cardiff: University of Wales, 2007), 126-164. 
24
 See for example Phillip Orr, The Road to the Somme (Belfast: Blackstaff  Press, 1987); Myles Dungan, Irish 
Voices from the Great War (Dublin: Irish Academic Press, 1995); Stephen Walker, Forgotten Soldiers: the 
Irishmen shot at dawn (Dublin: Gill and Macmillan, 2007); Richard Grayson, Belfast Boys (London: Continuum, 
2009).  
25
 A.D Harvey, A Muse of Fire: Literature, Art and War (London: Hambeldon Press, 1998). 
26
 See for example Richard Bennett, The Black and Tans (Stroud: Spellmount 2006 - first published 1959); 
Ernest McCall, Tudor’s Toughs (Newtonards: Red Coat Publishing, 2010); David M Leeson, The Black & Tans: 
British Police and Auxiliaries in the Irish War of Independence, 1920-1921 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2011).  
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strong biographical thread at its core but is based largely on Crozier’s own publications. As 
we shall see, Crozier was economical with the truth about his own life in his books and great 
care must be taken when using them as sources of fact but again Brian Bond’s study of 
Crozier is set within a literary rather than military context. His analysis of Crozier as “not an 
easy man to like” leaves room to exercise one’s own judgement.27  
 
Until recently the main source of information on Frank Crozier was Crozier himself- which is 
probably exactly what he intended.  This situation has now been improved by publication of a 
biography by Charles Messenger.  Broken Sword (2013) at last gives an account of Crozier’s 
life and travails including much hitherto unpublished personal detail which allows a more 
rounded picture of the man to emerge.
28
  The book was produced while the current study was 
under way and necessitated a change of emphasis in research away from Crozier’s life and 
towards the brigade that he ultimately commanded.  This proved to be a positive 
development.  As only fifty-five of 230 pages of Messenger’s book are given over to 
Crozier’s career during the First World War (and only seventeen of these cover his period of 
command of the Welsh units of 119 Brigade) there proved to be ample scope for new and 
additional research focussed on the period 1914-1919.  It also allowed further examination of 
some aspects of Crozier’s life and character in more detail in so far as they affect the context 
of his writing, his activities as a senior officer and the rise and fall of his reputation.  
Messenger’s book is a chronological narrative of Crozier’s life.  The narrative is restricted in 
its scope by the same problem that has assailed every researcher on Crozier’s life to date, 
namely the lack of impartial sources.  The main source of information on Crozier remains 
Crozier himself via his published works.  As the present author has confirmed, the discovery 
                                                 
27
 Brian Bond. Survivors of a Kind (London: Continuum, 2008), p.129. 
28
Charles Messenger, Broken Sword: The Tumultuous Life of General Frank Crozier 1879-1937 (Barnsley: 
Praetorian Press, 2013). 
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of any new information beyond these sources involves the investment of large amounts of 
time with no guarantee of a favourable outcome.  Messenger has explored a wide range of 
possible sources with varying degrees of success.  New information has emerged for example 
about Crozier’s time in Canada in 1909 – 1911 and Lithuania in 1919 – 1920, and, for the first 
time, his family background has been described but the detail is uneven and patchy. At the 
core of the narrative still lie Crozier’s book’s, although Impressions and Recollections, which 
is the least extreme of Crozier’s works in content and style, is Messenger’s preferred source.  
This reinforces the need for more information about the context of the books and Crozier’s 
motives for writing them – this will be addressed in Chapter Three of this thesis.29  
 
The brigade does not feature in any detail in academic work or research papers and the 
sources for this study are largely unpublished.  Absolutely key to the study of the brigade and 
its battalions are the war diaries (WO 95 series) in The National Archives (TNA), Kew.  As is 
always the case, these vary in detail and in legibility but examination shows the brigade 
headquarters diary to be reasonably detailed and with a considerable number of appendices 
containing operational orders.  The battalion diaries are much more variable in the quality of 
their content and many of their appendices are lost.  TNA also contains the correspondence 
generated during the compilation of the official histories, which contains letters from Crozier, 
his subordinates, and representatives of divisional and corps command. At least one of 
Crozier’s letters to Edmonds has found its way into Crozier’s personal file although this 
potentially key source has suffered from substantial ‘weeding’.  The files of several of the 
brigade’s senior officers have also been located within TNA although again they have been 
‘weeded’. Unfortunately, several key figures concerned with the 119 Brigade continued to 
                                                 
29
 Timothy Bowman, ‘Review of Broken Sword by Charles Messenger’, History Ireland, 22 (July/August 2014), 
p. 63 also identifies this issue.  Messenger’s errors in certain matters of detail relating to the focus of this thesis 
will be pointed out at the appropriate point. 
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serve with the army after 1920 and their files have not been released to the public.
30
  James 
Frederick Plunkett stands out as the only one of the senior officers of the brigade to leave a 
written account of his service albeit written up in the 1920s from his wartime notes.  Rather 
strangely, Crozier rarely features in this account.
31
 In order to build a picture of the origins 
and character of the brigade a considerable number of more junior officers’ personal files 
have been examined and as many soldiers records as can be traced have also been studied.  
These will be described in detail in Chapter One (men) and Chapter Two (officers). TNA 
Series WO 86 and WO 213 contain valuable data on courts martial during the Great War, 
including information relating to 119 Brigade’s units, which will be presented in this thesis.32 
 
Outside TNA the records of the Welsh Army Corps (WAC) at the National Library of Wales 
(NLW), Aberystwyth, provide a detailed and, to date, under-utilised resource containing 
detailed, critically important information on the formation of the Corps and on the origins of 
the units that would comprise 119 Brigade.
33
 The Public Record Office of Northern Ireland 
(PRONI), Belfast, contains key sources relating to the 36
th
 (Ulster) Division and Crozier’s 
time with the 9
th
 Royal Irish Rifles. 
 
Several other repositories contain documents generated by individuals who served with 40
th
 
Division.  Sir John Ponsonby, one of the three commanders of 40th Division during the Great 
                                                 
30
 For example Anthony Muirhead (Brigade Major), Reggie May (Staff Captain), James Plunkett (Battalion CO) 
31
 NAM: 1994-05-398. Crozier often expresses his approval of Plunkett in his books but it is possible that, as a 
regular soldier, Plunkett deferred to his GOC and avoided openly criticizing.  
32
 TNA: WO 86. Judge Advocate General’s Office: District Courts Martial Registers; WO 213. Judge Advocate 
General’s Office: Field General Courts Martial and Military Courts Registers.   
33
 The WAC records at NLW, Aberystwyth have been little used being for many years both geographically 
inaccessible and poorly arranged.  The latter problem was dealt with by the production of a catalogue in 1993.  
Attention was drawn to the existence of the records by Clive Hughes in ‘The Welsh Army Corps, 1914-15: 
shortages of khaki and basic equipment promote a ‘national’ uniform’, Imperial War Museum Review, No.1, 
1986, pp. 91-100.  Since the completion of the current author’s researches the WAC records have been digitised 
and are now available online at http://cymru1914.org/en/view/archive/3992732.  
13 
 
War, left a very patchy diary which is at the National Army Museum (NAM).  His 
predecessor in divisional command, Harold Ruggles–Brise, is also represented in the NAM 
collections, while his letters to his wife are in the Blair Castle archives, Perthshire.  The 
regimental museums of the various units that made up the brigade also contain items created 
by officers and men of those units, although these are not numerous.  They will be cited where 
appropriate in the chapters that follow. 
 
The 119 Brigade did not apparently harbour notable literary talents.
34
  The post-war output of 
Frank Crozier is well known but the only other publication by a member of the brigade seems 
to be Ar Orwel Pell (1965) a short account in Welsh of his wartime service by Evan Beynon 
Davies who was commissioned from the 15
th
 Royal Welsh Fusiliers (London Welsh) to be a 
second-lieutenant in the 19
th
 RWF in March 1915.
35
 
 
Some sources are still in private hands.  An unpublished (and incomplete) biography of 
Crozier by his second wife has been traced and further ephemera are with descendants traced 
in Canada.  The diary of Lieutenant H.A.J. Lamb, RE, Brigade Signals Officer from April 
1918, has a poor quality copy in the Imperial War Museum (IWM) while the original remains 
with his family. The IWM also contains Private David Starrett’s account of his time as 
Crozier’s servant throughout the war.  Starrett’s typescript is a particularly useful source 
giving a view of events that to some extent balances the extremes of Crozier’s own 
                                                 
34
 The poet Isaac Rosenberg (1890-1918) enlisted in the 12
th
 Suffolk (121 Brigade, 40
th
 Division) in October 
1915, was transferred to the 12
th
 South Lancs (120 Brigade, 40
th
 Division) and then the 11
th
 King’s Own (120 
Brigade) until that battalion was disbanded in February1918.  He was killed while serving with the 1
st
 King’s 
Own (12 Brigade, 4
th
 Division). 
35
 Evan Beynon Davies, Ar Orwel Pell (Llandysul: Gomer Press, 1965).  I am indebted to Clive Hughes for all 
the translations from this work which appear in this thesis. The title translates as ‘On a Distant Horizon’ – part of 
a line from war poet Hedd Wyn’s poem ‘Rhyfel’(War). 
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descriptions.  The IWM also holds the papers of Captain B.D. Gibbs, 18
th
 Welsh, and 
Lieutenant C.L. Morgan, 21
st
 Middlesex, as well as a few short memoirs by ORs. 
 
The relative paucity of original sources about Crozier and his command have led in the past to 
an over-reliance on his own books as reference material.  This has led to a repetitive ‘churn’ 
of facts about him a situation that has only recently been improved by Charles Messenger’s 
biography.  The lack of obvious additional sources has also resulted in a dearth of published 
references to or assessments of 119 Brigade and the 40
th
 Division.  This thesis will address 
that issue for the first time and augment the limited historiography of infantry brigades and 
brigadier-generals. 
 
Structure 
While it would be possible to adopt a subject by subject approach to the study of a brigade 
which examined, for example, recruiting, training, equipment, discipline and other key areas 
in relative isolation, there is no existing history of the brigade to give such studies context. In 
order to address this, the detailed examination of specific areas of interest in this thesis will be 
set within a broadly chronological framework; starting with the brigade’s origins and 
composition, moving through its activities in Flanders and its later restructurings in the last 
year of the war.  It will examine the arrival of Crozier as GOC Brigade, his military 
background, his writing - on which so much history has previously been based - and his 
methods.  
 
Chapter One will describe the origin of the brigade within the twin contexts of the drive to 
recruit Lloyd George’s vision of a Welsh Army Corps of at least two divisions and the 
15 
 
extension of New Army recruiting across Britain to include men who would previously have 
been rejected on the grounds of their modest stature.  The chapter will develop the picture of 
the brigade as originally formed by examining the social background of the other ranks in the 
light of previous work on recruiting Welsh units, the progress of recruiting and the effects of 
the weeding of unsuitable individuals from the constituent battalions.
36
  It will also include 
such information as is available on the training of the battalions.  
 
Chapter Two will move on to examine both the senior and junior officers of the brigade and 
how they may have influenced its internal culture as it prepared for service overseas.  Data on 
the social background of officers will be compared with previous work on other formations.
37
  
The chapter will include the actions and operations of the brigade once on active service in 
France and show how it adapted to conditions there up to the arrival of Frank Crozier as 
GOC.  Comment on and analysis of the effectiveness of the unit at this time will be made to 
compare with the later period of Crozier’s command and a view will be presented of the 
success or otherwise of this element of the bantam ‘experiment’ by comparison of the 
experiences of the wholly bantam 35
th
 Division with 119 Brigade. 
 
Chapter Three will briefly examine Crozier’s career up to the date when he joined 119 
Brigade.  In order to do this effectively it will include a summary of his active service with the 
36
th
 (Ulster) Division with observations on his character, reputation and modus operandi as a 
                                                 
36
 Robin Barlow, Wales and World War One (Llandysul: Gomer Press, 2014) contains useful social background 
that will be used for comparison, as does Chris Williams ‘Taffs in the Trenches: identity and military service 
1914-1915’ in Matthew Cragoe and Chris Williams (eds), Wales and War: Society, Politics and Religion in the 
Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries (Cardiff: University of Wales, 2007), 126-164. 
37
 Comparisons of the social and military background of officers in the New Armies are facilitated by the work 
of Timothy Bowman, ‘Officering Kitchener’s Armies: A case study of the 36th (Ulster) Division’, War in 
History, 2009 (2), pp.189-212. 
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CO.  Given its continuing impact and the effect it had on his reputation, his post-war literary 
output will be examined in detail. 
 
Chapter Four will examine the impact that Crozier made on the brigade, the operations of the 
brigade in the area around Villers-Plouich / La Vacquerie in the spring of 1917 and how it 
responded to the challenge of its first offensive actions.  The larger part of the chapter will 
then examine the actions of the brigade at Bourlon Wood during the Battle of Cambrai in 
November of that year.  This intense woodland fight saw the virtual destruction of the 
brigade. Observations on training, command and control will be made. A comparison of this 
attack with the 38
th
 (Welsh) Division’s well-documented attack on Mametz Wood during the 
previous year is presented as Appendix One of this thesis. 
 
The period of rebuilding the brigade after Bourlon Wood was curtailed by the major 
reorganisation of BEF divisions in February 1918.  Chapter Five will examine the effects of 
this on the 40
th
 Division and the 119 Brigade in particular.  The performance of the ‘new’ 
brigade in the German offensives on the Somme in March and the Lys in April will be 
examined. Both of these battles involved the brigade in holding actions and fighting retreats 
in the face of sometimes overwhelming odds and the actions of the GOC and other senior 
officers of the brigade and division will be examined.  The chapter will show how the losses 
on the Lys necessitated the temporary replacement of the traditional brigade structure with ad 
hoc arrangements in an attempt to hold back the German offensive. The chapter will then 
move on to look at the period of near-dissolution of a much diminished brigade and its 
reconstitution with men of supposedly poor quality.  A view of the effectiveness of the 
brigade in its final incarnation as part of the British Second Army in the Advance to Victory 
17 
 
will be presented along with an assessment of the effectiveness of Crozier at a crucial 
moment. 
 
Finally, these threads will be drawn together in a conclusion which will present a view of the 
brigade, its development and effectiveness and the role of Brigadier-General Frank Percy 
Crozier as its GOC. 
 
This introduction has defined the scope and structure of this thesis and examined the relevant 
historiography and the sources to be used in its construction.  A context has been established 
demonstrating the absence of previous detailed studies of 119 Brigade, of 40
th
 Division and of 
Frank Percy Crozier.  Despite the recent publication of a biography of Crozier there remains a 
need to examine his career during the Great War in more detail.  With few published studies 
of brigadier-generals or of infantry brigades there is a clear need to assemble and consider 
information that might illuminate Peter Simkins’ view of brigades (and their commanders) as 
the ‘building blocks’ of the BEF’s offensive operations. 
 
Recent work on Wales in the Great War and the geographical and social affiliations of its 
soldiers will be enhanced by this study of 119 Brigade as will existing work on 36
th
 (Ulster) 
Division and 38
th
 (Welsh) Division. While these previous studies contain quantitative data on 
the social and geographical make up of infantry battalions and their discipline and morale 
they are few in number and, in answering key questions about 119 Brigade, that number will 
be augmented and material presented that will inform both this thesis and potential future 
studies.  The presentation here of data derived from the service records of officers and men 
gives a detailed picture of this brigade at different stages of the war and highlights the contrast 
18 
 
between the volunteers of 1915 and the ‘B1’ men used to keep the formation in the front line 
in 1918. A detailed examination of the brigade’s record in action will present information 
absent from the general works on battles and campaigns noted above. And demonstrate the 
utility of the brigade on the battlefields of the Great War. 
 
Crozier’s record and reputation, so often influenced by his books, will be examined using 
contemporary sources and, given the continuing uncritical use of his published work as source 
material, the context of their publication will be developed and a view formed of their 
usefulness as sources of historical information.   
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Chapter One 
THE ORIGINS OF THE BRIGADE 
 
The brigade that Frank Crozier would eventually command had an interesting and 
complicated birth.  F.E. Whitton described in his divisional history how the 40
th
 Division was 
formed in September 1915 as its constituent units and staff assembled at Aldershot but the 
119 Infantry Brigade had a longer history than the division to which it was ultimately 
allocated.  This gestation period is not described at all by Whitton and is here described in 
detail for the first time.   
 
The genesis of the brigade is intimately connected with two developments within the growth 
of the New Armies.  The first was the ambition to form a Welsh Army Corps of at least two 
divisions given momentum by the energy of David Lloyd George in September 1914.  The 
second was the extension of recruiting from November 1914 to include men who would 
previously have been considered too short for army service in new ‘Bantam’ battalions.  The 
brigade’s origins were apparently quickly forgotten.  The 1920 account of the formation of the 
38
th
 (Welsh) Division stated with startling inaccuracy: 
 The Division [sic] originally comprised four battalions of Bantams …they were the 
18th and 19
th
 Royal Welsh Fusiliers, the 12
th
 South Wales Borderers and the 17
th
 
Welsh.  These Battalions were left behind in North Wales when the [38
th
] Division 
moved to Winchester and formed part of another Division.
38
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
38
 J.E. Munby (ed), A History of the 38
th
 (Welsh) Division (London: Hugh Rees Ltd, 1920), p. 12.  The correct 
make up of the brigade and its location(s) are given elsewhere in this thesis. 
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The Welsh Army 
 
The background to the creation of the Welsh Army Corps has been described by several 
authors but is elaborated here as it gives important context to the development of the 119 
Brigade.
39
   
 
At the end of August 1914 the War Office, struggling to administer the growth of the New 
Armies and the flood of recruits into existing units, was content to sanction the formation of 
locally-raised battalions that drew on men’s sense of community -  whether community of 
geography or of workplace.  Against the burgeoning of these ‘Pals’ battalions it was 
inevitable that there would be pressure  to recruit regionally or nationally-badged formations 
that embodied a higher level sense of identity.  After the 36
th
 (Ulster) Division was given War 
Office approval on 3 September it was not long before the idea of a national army from Wales 
found a champion: 
 I should like to see a Welsh Army in the field.  I should like to see the race who faced 
the Normans for hundreds of years in their struggle for freedom, the race that helped to 
win the battle of Crecy, the race that fought for a generation under Glyndwr against 
the greatest captain in Europe – I should like to see that race give a good taste of its 
quality in this struggle and they are going to do it.
40
 
 
 
Lloyd George’s inspiring speech at the Queen’s Hall, London, on 19 September 1914 fostered 
a positive image of the Welsh people’s martial past and reprised their historical role as 
‘freedom-fighters’ now moved to defend a fellow small nation (Belgium) from the ravages of 
                                                 
39
 See for example Colin Hughes, Mametz: Lloyd George’s ‘Welsh Army’ at the Battle of the Somme (Norwich: 
Gliddon Books, 2
nd
 Edition, 1990); Peter  Simkins, Kitchener’s Army (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 
1988) and, most recently, Robin Barlow, Wales and World War One (Llandysul: Gomer Press, 2014). 
40
 David Lloyd George quoted in Welsh Army Corps 1914-1919, Report of the Executive Committee (Cardiff,: 
Western Mail Ltd, 1921), p. 3. 
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an oppressive invader.
41
  A follow-up public meeting in Cardiff on 29 September set the 
target of a two-division corps and established a National Executive Committee (NEC) to 
administer the project.  
 
The NEC received official approval for the raising of the WAC in a letter from the War Office 
dated 10 October 1914.  It was not without caveats. The most potentially restricting of these 
stated that “every effort must be made to complete existing Welsh units to establishment 
before recruits are encouraged to enlist in the new units of the Welsh Army Corps” and 
resulted from Kitchener’s “cautious attitude towards semi-nationalist formations”.42  Keith 
Grieves has pointed out that the appointment of officers via sponsors was “a social cost 
Kitchener had to pay for the benefits which were derived from the local affiliation of the 
recruit” and one factor in the great man’s opposition to the establishing of the WAC.43   
 
Even before the War Office letter had been received, the Secretary of the NEC was writing to 
Lloyd George in response to a telegram from the War Office that spoke in a similar vein: 
 Mr Owen has discussed the wire with Ld Plymouth who thinks that the proposal of the 
War Office to include Welsh recruits in any Army Battalion is fatal to the scheme for 
raising a Welsh Army Corps.  Lord Plymouth asked Mr Owen to wire all the Lords 
Lieutenant to cancel all recruiting meetings for the time being but Mr Owen on 
reflection thought this ought not to be done until he had brought the matter to your 
notice.
44
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 See report of meeting in the Western Mail, 21 September 1914.      
42
 See Simkins, Kitchener’s Army, pp. 94-100 
43
 Keith Grieves, The Politics of Manpower, 1914-18 (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1988), p.10. 
44
 NLW WAC: C12/14.  Memo to Chancellor of the Exchequer, 7 October 1914.   Owen William Owen (1863-
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By 30 October Lloyd George had confronted Kitchener on more than one occasion and had 
removed any hindrance to recruiting for the WAC.
45
 The one thing that Kitchener would not 
concede was the allocation of already existing battalions to the WAC and huge numbers of 
recent recruits were therefore denied to it.  The Secretary of the NEC noted that between 2 
August and 30 September 1914 47,697 Welsh volunteers had joined up and that a further 
20,000-30,000 had joined the Territorial Force and the Special Reserve. He also highlighted 
one problem in recruiting Welshmen from outside the principality: “Lord Derby strongly 
objects to any recruiting being done in Liverpool for the Welsh Army Corps … [he] is raising 
a new Territorial Battalion, and apparently he thinks we are encroaching.”46 
 
Kitchener did however grant the allocation of four ‘Pals’ battalions that were currently 
recruiting to form the nucleus of the WAC.  They were the 13
th
 Royal Welsh Fusiliers (1
st
 
North Wales), 10
th
 Welsh Regiment (1
st
 Rhondda), 13
th
 Welsh Regiment (2
nd
 Rhondda) and 
14
th
 Welsh Regiment (Swansea). By the end of October 1914 the WAC had responsibility for 
3,000 men; by the end of November approximately 7,000 and by the end of the year 10,000. 
In November a start had been made on raising a further five infantry battalions and another 
two would be formed in December. The first and (as it turned out) only division of the WAC 
was completed with the addition of a further infantry battalion plus a pioneer battalion in 
January 1915.  The process had not been easy. “In the first couple of months by reason of 
difficulties not connected with the movement [to form a WAC], the recruiting seemed slow, 
but by December these had disappeared and the recruits were presenting themselves in large 
numbers.”47 Some of these recruits would form the first battalion of what became 119 Brigade 
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when the Army Council gave permission for the formation of a bantam battalion of the Welsh 
Regiment on 15 December 1915. 
 
The Bantams 
 
The story of the creation of bantam battalions has, like the story of the Welsh Army Corps, 
been described in several works.
48
 It is often surrounded with a degree of patronising 
sentimentality not found in the descriptions of the history of other less vertically challenged 
units and is debatably inherited from contemporary press accounts, which often contrast the 
height of recruits with their cheeky nature and fighting spirit.
49
 
 
Presented at the time to the public as an opportunity for men under the normal regulation 
height to ‘do their bit’ for King and Country the creation of  bantam units was in reality a 
practical response to the falling levels of voluntary enlistment during the autumn of 1914. 
Grieves describes how the highest figure of 30,000 recruits per day in early September 1914 
had fallen to 15,000 per week by mid October.
50
  He also notes how the fluctuating height 
requirement acted as a disincentive to recruiting.  The original minimum height for recruits of 
5′4″ was raised to 5′6″ in September to slow down the intake of recruits.  As recruiting slowed 
it was lowered to 5′3″ in November and yet again to 5′2″ in July 1915.51  His work ignores the 
creation of the ‘bantam’ standard in November 1914.  The History of the Cheshire Regiment 
in the Great War identified the catalyst for the creation of the bantams as the rejection on 
grounds of height of four miners who had travelled from Durham to Birkenhead to enlist in 
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the Cheshire Regiment.
52
  This supposedly led Alfred Bigland MP, the member for 
Birkenhead East, who was already engaged as vice-chairman of the local recruiting 
committee, ‘to raise a battalion of short men’53.  However, according to Bigland himself, his 
initiative was prompted by the case of a single, keen, rather ferocious, recruit who had been 
ejected from more than one recruiting office because he was one inch below the regulation 
height of 5′ 3″. The recruit had been encountered by Alfred Mansfield, the Honorary 
Secretary of  Bigland’s recruiting committee, who reported the incident to Bigland with the 
words “this is a serious business, when we only wanted a small army a regulation height of 
five feet three inches might be good, but now every available man is wanted and the subject 
should be reconsidered”.54  Bigland approached Lord Kitchener who confirmed his interest in 
the idea via Sir Henry McKinnon, CinC Western Command, who met with Bigland in early 
November 1914.  
 He informed me [Bigland] that the War Office was interested in the idea of bantam 
battalions but were too much pressed to undertake the formation of a new type of 
regiment.  However, he had authority to say that if the Birkenhead Recruiting 
Committee would undertake the whole service we should have every assistance from 
the War Office.  For specially raised battalions, regulations had already been drafted 
fixing a definite amount of so much for housing, a ration allowance, and payment for 
uniforms and equipment.  The War Office would provide rifles, baggage wagons etc., 
but all other matters must be undertaken by the parties raising the battalion.
55
 
 
It appears then that the bantams were benefiting from the regulations that had been developed 
by the War Office for the ‘Pals’ battalions.   
 
Unfortunately, the Birkenhead Recruiting Committee bridled at the financial liability involved 
in administering the new unit and, after the Town Clerk had pointed out that the Town 
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Council must not put itself in a position where deficit funding was a possibility, Bigland 
himself took on the financial risk.  By 18 November 1914 Bigland could confidently 
announce the creation of his unit in the local press and over the next two weeks potential 
recruits indicated their willingness to serve by submitting a postcard to the recruiting 
committee.  Information about the opening of recruiting for the battalion was circulated to 
recruiting offices across the country on 24 November:  
 
  24 Nov 1915 Circular from Major P Allan, Chester to OC 24
th
 RD Brecon 
 Recruiting 
Men applying to join the Birkenhead Battalion can be medically examined and 
attested at all Recruiting Stations.  Standard:  height minimum 5′ 0″maximum must 
be under 5′ 3″. 
Chest: 5′0″ to 5′1″ 33 inches 
  5′1″to 5′2″  33½ inches 
  5′2″ to 5′3″ 34  inches 
These to be normal measurements without expansion.  With expansion 2 inches 
more. 
Enlistment for the Battalion is not to commence until Monday next, November 30
th
, 
and will continue until further notice.  All men passing the test, and after attestation 
will be given a warrant to Birkenhead and told to report themselves at the Town Hall 
… Inform all sub areas.56 
 
The exact physical requirements were: 
 
  Height     Chest 
  5′ to 5′ 1″  33 inches (plus 2 inches expansion) 
  5′ 1″to 5′ 2″  33½ inches (plus 2 inches expansion) 
  5′ 2″to 5′ 3″  34 inches (plus 2 inches expansion) 
 
Attestation officially commenced on 30
 
November and the unique status of the battalion 
ensured that it was almost up to strength in less than two days. The formation of a second 
bantam battalion was quickly sanctioned by the War Office.
57
  Recruits who had previously 
stood no chance of acceptance at recruiting offices flocked to Birkenhead from across the 
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industrial north but also included men from Scotland, Lincoln and one group of fifty from 
London.
58
  Some came from Wales. 
 
The Welsh Bantams 
 
The developments in Birkenhead did not go unnoticed by the WAC, which was striving to 
advance its own recruiting.  On 25 November 1914 the NEC’s secretary wrote to the 
Treasury: 
 Recruiting - I enclose a recruiting circular issued by Major Lucas, Cardiff, from which 
you will see that recruiting in Wales is about to be started for the Birkenhead ‘Bantam’ 
Battalion.  If recruiting for such a battalion is to be allowed in Wales, I fail to see why 
we should not have a Battalion of ‘Bantams’ here, and I wired to General Mackinnon 
this morning for his authority. 
 Lord Derby, you will remember, strongly objected to our recruiting in Liverpool, 
which was ‘his area’, for the Liverpool Welsh: now we have Birkenhead, which is also 
in ‘his area’ recruiting in Wales for a Birkenhead Battalion.59 
 
On the same day and certainly at the instigation of Owen, Sir Ivor Herbert, Chairman of the 
WAC’s Recruiting Committee, wrote to Western Command: 
Please authorise reduction of standard for Welsh Army Corps to five feet as for 
Birkenhead Battalion in order that Welsh Army Corps may retain first call over 
Welshmen as indicated by War Office instructions … Recruits have been daily 
rejected, failing to attain the standard of 5 feet 3 inches, and there is no doubt that the 
units of the Welsh Army Corps would rapidly be completed if the lower limit of five 
feet were allowed. 
 Pending authority for the alteration of the standard, I request that recruiting for the 
Birkenhead Battalion in Wales be discontinued.
60
 
 
While the predicted swift completion of the WAC through bantam recruiting was undoubtedly 
an exaggeration, any move which would boost recruiting to the WAC was eagerly pursued.  
Western Command responded quickly to the complaint about the Earl of Derby’s recruiting 
activities by confirming on 26 November that “men in Welsh areas are not to be enlisted in 
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the Birkenhead Bantam Battalion”.61  This move was reinforced on 30 November by a 
reminder from Cardiff to local recruiters “that the Birkenhead Bantam Battalion is CLOSED 
in this area”.62 
 
The request from the WAC to Western Command to approve the formation of a Welsh 
bantam battalion inevitably met with a bureaucratic response. On 28 November Western 
Command responded: “Bantam Battalions treated on same lines as local battalions and each 
application from responsible individual or community received here is considered separately.  
Please send your application in writing through this office.”63  Owen responded formally: 
 
 Sir – I have the honour to bring to your notice the probability of our being able to raise 
a ‘Bantam’ Battalion for Glamorganshire, provided that the height is reduced from 
5′3″ to 5′. 
 Major Lucas [Recruiting Officer, Cardiff] states that he has turned away many 
hundreds of men between these measurements, and he has not the slightest doubt but 
that a ‘Bantam’ Battalion could be raised in Glamorganshire, if the necessary authority 
were given, and I beg to apply that this should be done.
64
 
 
Western Command probably forwarded Owen’s request to the War Office which responded 
asking: “[Regarding] application for Bantam Battalion in Wales.  Is it proposed to be included 
in Welsh Division now being formed or an extra battalion?  If the latter who is responsible for 
raising it”.65  Owen’s reply followed a meeting of the NEC on 9 December when the 
committee was informed by Brigadier-General Ivor Philipps DSO that the GOC was not 
favourably disposed towards the inclusion of a ‘Bantam’ battalion in the 3rd Brigade.66 
Western Command was told that the “Bantam Battalion would be additional to First Division 
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and raised by Welsh Army Corps Committee”.67  Not knowing that this reply had been sent, 
the officer in command of troops at Porthcawl on the South Wales coast contacted the WAC 
Secretary about another matter but mentioned “[Western] Command wants your decision as to 
whether Bantam Battalions are to be included in first division.  Command considers 
application to include would be favourably considered moreover General Philipps is anxious 
for inclusion.”68  Owen retracted the previous response with indecent haste: “Cancel my 
previous wire and include Bantam Battalion in first division in accordance with General 
Philipps wishes”.69 
 
Still the questions came from the War Office via Western Command: “Can you please say 
which Battalion is selected as a Bantam Battalion.  Please furnish the information to this 
office early.”70 This question must have produced some head-scratching within the WAC.  
Brigadier-General Sir Ivor Philipps telegraphed Lord Plymouth the Chairman of the NEC: 
“[I] Believe if Welsh Army Corps Committee approves General Mackinnon would sanction 
Colonel Wilkie raising Bantam Battalion of 17
th
 Welsh Regiment [sic]. I strongly recommend 
to concur”.71  Plymouth did concur with Philipps’ suggestion and passed his approval on to 
the Secretary of the NEC who in turn contacted Western Command: “Bantam Battalion will 
be 17
th
 (Glamorganshire) Service Battalion Welsh Regiment of 3
rd
 Brigade, Welsh Army 
Corps subject to your approval”.  Finally the long-awaited approval came via Western 
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Command on 15 December: “Army Council approve of Bantam Battalion for 
Glamorganshire.  Chest measurement 34 and a half inches same as regular infantry.”72 
 
The first element of what was to become the 119 Brigade was about to come into being. 
 
The 17
th
 (Service) Battalion Welsh Regiment (1
st
 Glamorgan) 
Following War Office approval for the creation of a bantam battalion of the regiment, 
recruiting was officially declared open on 18 December.
73
 By that time however, there had 
been a ‘Glamorgan Service Battalion, Welsh Regiment’ recruiting since 26 November as a 
battalion in the 3
rd
 Brigade of the 1
st
 Division of the WAC.
74
 The county identification was 
transferred to the new bantam unit but evidently caused some confusion.  A note to recruiting 
officers reminded them that: “the Glamorgan Service Battalion is now the ‘Bantam’ Battalion.  
Cease recruiting therefore any men over ‘Bantam’ height for this Battalion”.75  When 
recruiting opened, the Cardiff Recruiting Office “hoped that every R.O. [Recruiting Officer] 
and Recruiter in the County of Glamorgan will spare no efforts to get recruits for the Bantam 
Battalion now in course of formation.  If this is done there should be no difficulty in getting 
the 1,100 men required in a month”. 76 
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While there were other bantam battalions recruiting elsewhere in Britain by this time there 
was undoubtedly a backlog of short men who were keen to enlist.  The day after recruiting 
opened the Western Mail noted that: 
Brisk recruiting has already commenced for the Glamorgan Bantam Service Battalion 
[sic] which is to form part of the Welsh Army Corps.  Sir William Mackinnon 
happened to be present when the first recruit was sworn in at Cardiff on Friday [18 
December 1914] and heartily shook the Cardiff patriot by the hand, remarking that the 
army had room for many more men of his stamp.  Not only at Cardiff but at the 
various sub-recruiting stations in the county, good reports were being made throughout 
the day of the opportunity being seized.
77
 
 
The proximity of Christmas seems to have influenced some men to hold back from enlisting, 
at least for the moment: 
Recruiting for the Bantam Battalion in the Rhondda is very satisfactory.  Colour-
Sergeant Jones at Tonypandy has enrolled a large number and the outlying stations 
Tonyrefail and Llantrisant are also doing well … many men have made arrangements 
to join but do not desire to leave their homes until after Christmas.
78
 
 
By 1 January 1915 the WAC officially reported that the battalion had attracted 250 recruits.
79
  
This figure seems to have been quickly exceeded as a newspaper account stated that on the 31 
December 1914 the 17
th
 Welsh consisted of six subalterns, four trumpeters and 530 men
80
.  
This rush to the colours is confirmed by another enthusiastic report from the same newspaper: 
 On Thursday [7 January 1915] the Bantams paraded at Porthcawl 769 strong and with 
the staff and the number of recruits pouring in by each train the strength at nightfall 
was well over 800. These figures are the more remarkable when it is borne in mind 
that the first batch of 50 men was received as recently as Dec 29
th
.  Captain D. Watts 
Morgan, who is in temporary command of this and other units, has been kept busily 
occupied, with his colleagues, in dealing with the rush of recruits.  The battalion has 
already been formed into four companies each of which is being added to daily, and 
everything is in complete order to close the moment full strength is reached … 
Colonel Wilkie will take over command directly the battalion is at full strength.
81
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The man placed in command of the battalion was Lieutenant-Colonel Charles Joseph Wilkie 
(1869-1916). Wilkie had seen active service on the North-West Frontier of India but had been 
invalided home sick and did not serve in South Africa.  He was an experienced trainer of men, 
had been adjutant with the volunteers before he retired from the army in 1907 and became 
secretary of the Glamorgan Territorial Force Association in 1909.  He assisted with 
mobilization at the start of the Great War, was promoted major in the 9
th
 (Service) Battalion, 
Welsh Regiment, on 8 Oct 1914 and was given command of the 17
th
 Welsh on 26 November 
when it only existed on paper and before it was designated as a bantam unit.
82
  
 
On 19 December 1914 the Western Mail reported that Wilkie “(Commander of the Glamorgan 
Bantam Battalion) is at present acting as officer commanding the Welsh Army Corps units at 
Porthcawl”.83  Porthcawl had been a pre-war camp site for the Territorial Force but had 
developed as a training area for various WAC units.  The 16
th
 (Cardiff City) Welsh had been 
formed there in November 1914 and it was a temporary home for part of the 13
th
 Welsh.  Both 
of these units moved to North Wales in December making room for the 17
th
 Welsh.  The 
crowded camp and organizational confusion were probably the cause of a telegram from the 
WAC to Western Command when the formation of the 17
th
 Welsh was being contemplated: 
“[the] situation at Porthcawl may have bearing on Bantam Battalion proposals”.84 Wilkie 
confirmed his move to Porthcawl in a telegram to the WAC that hints at some of the issues at 
the camp: 
Shall take over command Porthcawl troops Monday [14 December].  Command 
Headquarters consider it is of utmost importance that arrangements shall be made by 
you under which the troops and others shall have no cause to complain of non-receipt 
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of pay and billet money this week.  I strong[ly] endorse this view and advise issue of 
necessary funds to existing authority.
85
 
 
Wilkie would seem to have been an excellent choice to raise and organise a new battalion and 
to control the busy camp at Porthcawl but the appointment would bring him not a little anger 
and frustration.
86
 He later wrote to the Secretary of the WAC: 
My seven weeks at Porthcawl very nearly laid me out – no one knows what I had to 
take on there or the fearsome strain it was.  It was a nightmare and everyone’s hand 
was against me but what can be said.  I have the satisfaction of knowing that I saved 
the Welsh Army Corps Scheme from a most serious calamity although I know others 
will never recognise the fact.
87
 
 
 
The main assembly area for the WAC was in North Wales and most new infantry units moved 
there to begin their serious training.  Accordingly, on 15 January 1915, 551 men and four 
officers of A and B Companies, 17
th
 Welsh, left Porthcawl.  The arrival of the ‘Welsh 
Gurkhas’, as the press dubbed the battalion, at Colwyn Bay the next day was widely 
reported.
88
 C and D Companies followed on 30 January.
89
 For the next six months billets in 
the resort of Rhos on Sea would be home to the battalion and battalion HQ would be the Rhos 
Hydro.  By 1 February 1915 the establishment of the battalion was noted as ninety-one 
officers [either a mistake or the battalion was massively over establishment] and 1,298 NCOs 
and men.
90
  The goal of forming a complete battalion in less than a month had not been 
realized – but it was close.91 
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The 18
th
 (Service) Battalion Welsh Regiment (2
nd
 Glamorgan) 
When the idea of the WAC was conceived, the corps was planned to consist of at least two 
divisions. Although this two-division concept had been approved by the War Office, the GOC 
Western Command, Sir W.H. Mackinnon, expressed his reservations at an early stage, “For 
the present I have confined the question to the formation of one division only, as I am of the 
opinion that it is probable that difficulty may be expected in raising a second division.”92 With 
the successful raising of the 17
th
 Welsh well under way, the Secretary of the NEC was 
obviously keen to press on: “the 1st Division is now practically full … I have already written 
to the General Officer Commanding-in-Chief, Chester – without the authority of the [National 
Executive] Committee I may say - asking that official sanction for the formation of the 2
nd
 
Division be given, but no reply has yet been received”.93   
 
Sanction for a second division would not be forthcoming but the development of the corps 
with additional units proceeded following a meeting of the NEC on 22 January. On the 29 
January 1915 recruiting officers were told that: 
A second Battalion of the ‘Bantams’ has been authorised and it is hoped you will do 
everything in your power to encourage enlistment into this unit.  In all probability the 
Battalion will be known as the ‘18th (Service) Battalion, Glamorgan, Welsh Regiment’ 
and in the meantime this designation had better be entered on the attestation 
documents.
94
 
 
The press reported on the formation of the new battalion just two days later, “General W.H. 
Mackinnon … has authorized the raising of a second ‘Bantam’ Battalion to be known as the 
18
th
 Welsh (Service) Battalion, and it is hoped that the full strength will be reached by the end 
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of February”.95  The battalion was founded with men surplus to the needs of the 17th Welsh.  
It was listed in the Weekly Return of the British Army at Home as consisting of one officer, 
one sergeant and 140 other ranks on 23 January 1915 before it even officially existed.
96
  There 
seems to have been no serious issue (yet) with the numbers of bantam-sized men offering 
themselves up at recruiting offices despite a newspaper referring to the previous week’s 
recruiting at Cardiff being ‘disappointing’.  It reported that on 3 February there had been 
seventy bantams on parade but there was “nearly a full company of about 240 men” just two 
days later.
97
 By 16 February the Western Mail could report: “Good progress is being made 
with the formation of a second Bantam Battalion in Glamorgan, between 400 and 500 recruits 
are in training at Porthcawl”.  The same title had previously reported on the appointment of 
the CO of the battalion.
98
 
 
Herbert Richard Homfray JP VD (1864-1940), who was given command of the 18
th
 Welsh on 
4 February 1915, was a member of a prominent Glamorgan county family with substantial 
financial interest in the South Wales coalfield.  The third son of the family, he had been 
educated at Eton and then followed the same route as his elder brother into the militia (3
rd
 
Berkshire Regiment) and from there into the 1
st
 Life Guards via a commission in the 1
st
 Royal 
Irish Rifles .  He resigned his subaltern’s commission in 1889 and operated as a land agent in 
Cowbridge, Glamorgan, near the family seat at Penllyn Castle.  In 1891 he became major in 
the 2
nd
 Volunteer Battalion, Welsh Regiment and was the Lieutenant-Colonel Commandant of 
the unit between 1895-1905 when he resigned.  He was a member of the Glamorgan 
Territorial Force Association and would have known C.J. Wilkie from his post as secretary. In 
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1910 he was elected a county councillor and between 1906 and 1914 he was master of the 
Glamorgan Foxhounds.
99
  At the start of the war he was active in promoting recruiting, 
speaking at meetings and opening recruiting offices.
100
  As a well known county figure that 
had strong links with the coalfield he would have been a logical choice to raise a new unit in 
the area.  The history of the WAC credits him with recruiting and training the 18
th
 Welsh.
101
 
 
There seems to have been some confusion about the role of the new unit.  The NEC had 
approved the formation of a pioneer battalion for the WAC at its meeting on 6 January but 
had put the matter into abeyance at the next meeting.
102
  The 18
th
 Welsh though remained 
designated as ‘Pioneers’ in the Weekly Return of the British Army until mid-March 1915.103 
This may indicate a simple clerical error or an insight into the War Office view of the 
capabilities of bantams. 
 
After the promising start, recruiting for the battalion did not proceed as quickly as it had for 
the 17
th
 Welsh.  The five returns for the month of March 1915 were 518, 567, 576, 652 and 
733 all ranks and it was not until 26 April that the total reached four figures (1088). Some of 
the issues around recruiting will be explored later in this thesis. 
 
The initial success of bantam recruiting that led to the formation of the 18
th
 Welsh spurred the 
NEC to approve the formation of two further bantam units at its meeting on 22 January “as 
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soon as it is considered desirable by General Mackinnon”.  The first of these to be brought to 
the attention of the public was the 19
th
 Royal Welsh Fusiliers (RWF). 
 
The 19
th
 (Service) Battalion Royal Welsh Fusiliers 
Bantam recruiting in Wales had thus far been targeted at the coal mining communities of the 
south of the country while the WAC was concentrating in the seaside towns of the north.  On 
1 February 1915 it was reported that: 
 It is now proposed to raise a battalion for the Welsh Division of men ranging in height 
from 5 ft to 5ft 3in on the lines which have proved so popular in Lancashire and South 
Wales.  The recruiting for the ‘North Wales Bantams’ will probably be  started 
immediately and the headquarters will be at Deganwy, at which charming resort … the 
men will be billeted for training.
104
 
 
The RWF, the local regiment, had eighteen numbered battalions of all types by February 
1915.  The ‘North Wales Bantams’ were number nineteen.  Although no doubt inspired by the 
success of bantam recruiting to date, the creation of this battalion was marked by a degree of 
caution not seen before in the growth of the WAC.  It was observed that, “So far however, 
authority has been given to form one company only and it depends on the success with which 
that is got up whether North Wales is to have its own ‘Bantam’ battalion”.105  The caution was 
certainly justified.  North Wales had not been a particularly fruitful recruiting ground for the 
WAC. The RWF was the ‘local’ regiment but samples show that during the Great War just 49 
per cent of its ranks were born in Wales. Of these, the majority came from Anglesey, 
Caernarvonshire, Denbighshire and Flintshire with the single largest contingent (18.1%) 
coming from Denbighshire.  South Wales provided a further 22 per cent of Welsh born 
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recruits.
106
  The Welsh-speaking, nonconformist and largely un-industrialized (the exception 
being slate quarrying) lands of the north were a particularly difficult nut for recruiters to 
crack.  Clive Hughes has noted how the people of what is now the (modern) county of 
Gwynedd had “small town and rural values and [a] strong nonconformist bias, had little 
sympathy for the military and [the county] was no great peacetime source of recruits”107 One 
strategy developed by the WAC to try and improve the situation was to employ men known to 
their local communities in raising the new battalions.  Perhaps the best known of these was 
Colonel Owen Thomas of Brynddu, Anglesey, a member of the NEC and a keen recruiter, 
who in October 1914 had recommended a scheme to improve recruiting: 
Thomas believed that farmers and farm labourers, two classes largely hitherto untouched, 
would provide strong, healthy recruits of the best type. Upon enlistment they should not 
be drafted into distant depots but trained locally, and every effort made to secure staff 
officers fluent in the Welsh language or else with Welsh connections.  Emphasis was 
placed on local route marches as another incentive to recruitment.  To boost the ranks, 
they could also appeal to the strong Welsh element exiled in London, Liverpool, 
Manchester and other English cities.
108
 
 
Unsurprisingly, Thomas shortly afterwards found himself propelled by the influence of David 
Lloyd George to the rank of Brigadier-General in command of 1 Brigade, WAC. 
 
Further discussion on the subject of recruiting and the geographical make up of battalions will 
follow below but the principle set out by Owen Thomas surely affected the choice of CO for 
the 19
th
 RWF?  The press made the announcement six weeks before the appointment appeared 
in the London Gazette: “Colonel Lloyd Evans, JP, DL, of Broom Hall, Chwilog, has accepted 
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a commission with the rank of Colonel  in the Welsh Army Corps … Colonel Evans will 
probably be gazetted to the 18
th
 or 19
th
 Battalions of the Royal Welsh Fusiliers, stationed at 
Llandudno”.109  The press confirmed his command two weeks later by reporting that he would 
“shortly” assume command of the 19th RWF.110  The London Gazette finally reported on 25 
May that “Lieutenant-Colonel and Honorary Colonel Owen L.J. Evans, retired, late 4th Militia 
Battalion to command the battalion (19
th
 RWF) and to be temporary Lieutenant–Colonel”.111 
 
Owen Lloyd Jones Evans (1856-1928) was later described as “a large property owner in 
London and North Wales”.112 A Welsh speaker, he had graduated MA from Magdalen 
College, Cambridge in 1883 but had already started his service with the Royal Carnarvon 
Militia as a ‘sub-lieutenant’ in February 1877.  He progressed steadily through the ranks 
becoming lieutenant in November 1878, captain in May 1881 and major before 1886. In 1899 
he took command of the battalion.  His only active service seems to have been when the 4
th
 
(Militia) Battalion RWF (the successor to the Royal Carnarvon Militia) was embodied in 
1900 and briefly garrisoned the defences of Plymouth.  He was an active contributor to county 
life, a magistrate, Deputy Lord Lieutenant and High Sherriff in 1901.
113
 In May 1915 his 
name was used to boost recruiting in newspaper advertisements: “Colonel Lloyd Evans of 
Broom Hall calls for strong men between 5ft and 5ft 3in to join the 19
th
 R.W.F. now training 
at Deganwy”.114 
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Recruitment for the battalion had been steady but did not demonstrate the enthusiasm evident 
in the growth of the 17
th
 and 18
th
 Welsh.  The first official return of the battalion’s strength 
was on 15 February when it was composed of one officer and thirty men. One week later it 
had one officer and ninety-eight men and by the end of March 442 all ranks. By 26 April, just 
before Owen Lloyd Jones Evans officially took command, the battalion had a total strength of 
783 but this had taken eleven weeks.
115
  The battalion reached full strength at some time over 
the summer months.  On 6 September 1915 it could muster 1145 all ranks.
116
  At that date the 
final battalion of the four that made up the 119 Brigade was still struggling to reach its target 
establishment. 
 
12
th
 (Service) Battalion South Wales Borderers (3
rd
 Gwent) 
The creation of the 12
th
 South Wales Borderers (SWB) was approved by the NEC at its 
meeting on 22 January 1915 and received War Office sanction in time for the next meeting on 
3 February, again with the proviso that just “one company only for the present” would be 
formed.  The press, obviously following the proceedings of the NEC closely, broadcast the 
news, “New Gwent Battalion – The War Office has sanctioned the addition to the Welsh 
Army Corps of the 12
th
 Battalion (3
rd
 Gwent) South Wales Borderers which is to be raised in 
Monmouthshire and is to be confined to men of height 5ft to 5ft 3ins”.  The same report 
described how men would be billeted at their own homes wherever possible and the raising of 
the first company would be undertaken by “Mr C Phillip [sic], the Honorary Secretary of the 
Newport Defence Committee”; both moves indicating the thoughts of the NEC on the likely 
source of the first recruits.  The first men were reported as enlisted on 8 February 1915 and 
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the town of Newport, Monmouthshire would be the base for the unit.
117
  The first official 
return gave the strength of the battalion as two officers, one sergeant and sixty other ranks on 
15 March 1915 and on 8 April the Liverpool Daily Post reported that the battalion had “made 
a good start”.  By 20 April the adjutant could report that, “our first company is nearing 
completion, being now up to a strength of 209”.118  With the completion of the first company 
and a start about to be made on a second, it was time for a CO to be appointed.  
 
Once again the local press was the first to break the news of the appointment. The new CO 
was to be Edward Alexander Pope (1876 -1919) who was promoted from major and 2iC 3rd 
(Reserve) Battalion Welsh Regiment.  While it was noted that he was “not a Welshman by 
birth”, the fact that he had “held a commission in the Welsh Regiment for fifteen years” 
seemed to make up for his English roots.
119
 Pope was born in Dorchester into a family of 
brewers. He was educated at Dorchester Grammar School and Winchester College before 
receiving a commission in the Dorset Militia in 1894 and becoming a Director of Eldridge 
Pope and Company in 1898.  He became a captain in the 3
rd
 (Militia) Battalion Welsh 
Regiment and, after the battalion was mobilized in 1899, sailed to South Africa where he 
acted as Provost-Marshal at Vryburg, Cape Colony, and commanded the armoured train 
Spitfire for seven months.  Sciatica caused his return to Britain where he arrived in October 
1901.  He took his army career seriously, passing his ‘C’ and ‘D’ examinations in 1909 and 
‘Tactical Fitness to Command in’ 1914.  He was promoted major in 1913 and at the outbreak 
of war rejoined the 3
rd
 Welsh.  In common with the other three battalion COs described 
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above, he was active in his county, becoming a County Councillor in 1904 and a JP in 1915.  
His promotion to command the 12
th
 SWB was dated 21 April 1915 and was apparently due to 
the recommendation of Brigadier-General H.J. Evans.
120
 Evans (1861-1932) had been OC 
No.4 District, Western Command, which included the Welsh Regiment Depot, and would 
have known Pope.  In February 1915 Evans had taken over command of 43
rd
 (Welsh) 
Division’s 115 Brigade (then known as the “3rd Brigade”) from Ivor Philipps on the latter’s 
promotion to command the division and acted as divisional commander during Philipps’ 
absence while attached to the Ministry of Munitions.  The 12
th
 SWB were nominally attached 
to this brigade. A word from Evans to Philipps in connection with Pope’s advancement would 
surely have been likely. 
 
Pope lost no time in publicizing recruitment to his battalion, writing to the local press urging 
on recruits and stating that “we now have about 220 men and require at least 1250”.121  This 
battalion though would not benefit from any rush to the colours.  Recruitment figures for the 
summer of 1915 are missing from both the TNA records and the NLW. However, by 15 May 
471 greatcoats and 475 pairs of puttees had been issued to the men of the battalion, so a mid-
May battalion strength of approximately 470 can be inferred.
122
  By the end of September, 
when the other three battalions were up to establishment, the 12th SWB were struggling with 
strengths in the mid-900s.  The battalion would not reach full strength until the end of the 
year.
123
 By then the position of both the battalion and the brigade in the British Army’s Order 
of Battle had been settled. 
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The Brigade emerges 
In January 1915 the WAC still aspired to recruit a second division as had been envisaged at 
the formation of the corps.  The War Office position was more practical: 
 On the assumption that all the units of the 1
st
 Welsh Division [43
rd
 Division] are, or 
shortly will be, completed. One reserve company of 250 all ranks will first be added to 
each battalion ... if other recruits are forthcoming after all units and their reserves are 
completed, two battalions may be formed per Brigade ... and the army Council will 
then decide whether the additional battalions thus formed are considered reserves or 
whether they will form part of a second Welsh Division.
124
 
 
This move put a damper on the ambition of the NEC, which had resolved at its 22 January 
meeting: “To transfer 17th Bat WR (Glam) to a new 4th Brigade (from 3rd Brigade).  To raise a 
4
th
 Brigade consisting of the 17th WR, 18
th
 WR, 19
th
 RWF, 12
th
 SWB.  The 4
th
 Brigade to be 
recruited at the ‘Bantam’ standard.”125   The resolution at the NEC meeting of 3 February that 
“The three new battalions to form the nucleus of 4th Brigade, if agreed, to otherwise to go to 
18
th
 Batt. (Bantam) WR” seems to show that the high level of enlistment was not expected to 
continue. 
 
As the four battalions expanded and completing them to establishment looked more likely, 
they needed to be slotted into the structure of the WAC.  For some reason, perhaps because 
the WAC or the War Office did not wish to be seen to embark on the creation of the WAC’s 
2
nd
 Division, the ‘bantam brigade’ seems not to have been officially created despite the NEC 
decisions noted above.  The oldest of the four battalions, the 17
th
 Welsh, was already one of 
the four battalions of the 43
rd
 Division’s “3rd Brigade” (officially 130 Brigade, later 
renumbered 115 Brigade) but, in absence of the hoped-for WAC 2
nd
 Division, what was to be 
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done with the three other bantam battalions?  The solution was simply to ‘attach’ them to the 
existing structure.  A list dated 15 February 1915 has the 19th RWF attached to 128 Brigade 
(which consisted entirely of RWF battalions) and the 12
th
 SWB and 18
th
 Welsh attached to 
130 Brigade (which contained a mix of battalions from the Welsh, RWF and SWB).
126
 This 
arrangement was repeated in a War Office letter of 24 March.  With one bantam battalion a 
part of the division’s structure and three ‘attached’ how did the WAC view their future?  In 
February Major-General Ivor Philipps had started a letter to the WAC secretary by writing, 
“Now that the whole of the 43rd Welsh Division of the Welsh Army Corps is concentrated in 
North Wales”.127 With two battalions still recruiting in South Wales this was obviously 
incorrect but may indicate a view of the status of the bantams as within the WAC but 
additional to its first division.   
 
The fulfillment of the concept of a WAC demanded the creation of a second division.  As late 
as June 1915 Ivor Philipps was keen to press on: 
 It seems to me most necessary that the Second Division should be commenced now in 
order to furnish, in the first instance, reinforcement for the First Division, the 
organization then being on the same lines as that adopted with T.F. Divisions.  When 
the Second Division is complete, it would then become a first line Division and a 3
rd
 
Division to supply reinforcements for the 1
st
 and 2
nd
 Divisions would be initiated.
128
 
 
Taking up this argument, the NEC tried one final push: 
 Some members of the Committee urged that steps be taken to lay before the Army 
Council their conviction that it was only by keeping together the unity of the Welsh 
Army Corps, and forming a Second Division … that recruiting could be successfully 
continued … On the other hand it was admitted that General Sir Henry Mackinnon 
had, on more than one occasion, since January 1
st
, informed the Committee that 
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providing Drafts for Battalions at the Front, and Reserve Companies for the new army, 
were of greater importance than the forming of new battalions.
129
 
 
The WAC’s second division was never raised.  The creation of the four bantam battalions was 
as far as its development progressed but the official designation of a bantam brigade had been 
finally approved by the War Office on 27 May 1915: 
 I am commanded by the Army Council to inform you that the extra battalions and 
reserve companies of the 38
th
 (Welsh) Division will be organised as follows: 
 The 17
th
 (S) Battalion, Welsh Regiment (1
st
 Glamorgan) will be replaced in the 115
th
 
Brigade by the 17
th
 (S) Battalion Royal Welsh Fusiliers (2nd North Wales). 
 A ‘Bantam’ Brigade will be formed consisting of: 
 17
th
 (S) Battalion Welsh Regiment (1
st
 Glamorgan) 
  18th (S) Battalion Welsh Regiment (2nd Glamorgan) 
 19
th
 (S) Battalion Royal Welsh Fusiliers 
 12
th
 (S) Battalion South Wales Borderers 
 Any of these battalions which has not yet raised its extra company may do so.
130
 
 
Any suggestion of what would happen to the bantam brigade is conspicuous by its absence 
from this instruction.   
 
The creation of a brigade required the appointment of a Brigadier-General to command it.  
From the start of recruiting for the Welsh bantams the continued expansion of the WAC had 
opened up more opportunities for those wishing promotion.  Colonel Mainwaring “late of the 
1
st
 RWF and OC 23
rd
 RWF Recruiting District” speculated, “Perhaps if they also add a 12th 
Battalion [of the SWB] they will form and add an additional Welsh Brigade in which case I 
should very much like to get the Brigade command”.131  Mainwaring was too well ahead of 
the game and it was not until July that the press suggested that Lieutenant-Colonel Homfray 
(CO 17
th
 Welsh) was appointed to command a brigade.  Two days later the same newspaper 
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“was officially informed that pending the appointment of a brigadier-general to command the 
Welsh Bantam Brigade of the 38
th
 Welsh Division, Brigadier-General P. E. Buston is 
appointed to the temporary command of this brigade”.132  The author has been unable to trace 
any other evidence of this appointment and Buston was in any case supplanted just one week 
later by Rodney Charles Style. 
 
R.C. Style commanded the bantam brigade from 22 July 1915 to 7 May 1916 and was 
appointed just after the four battalions concentrated in one place for the first time.  During the 
week beginning 12 July 1915 the battalions moved from Colwyn Bay (17
th
 Welsh), Porthcawl 
(18
th
 Welsh), Deganwy (19
th
 RWF) and Newport (12
th
 SWB) to the new hutted camp at Prees 
Heath near Whitchurch, Shropshire. The 38
th
 (Welsh) Division had meantime started its own 
concentration at Winchester and the bantam brigade was, for the moment at least, effectively 
unattached to a division.  At this time the administrators of the WAC did not, it seems, regard 
the bantam battalions as anything but their own.  A printed list of the 38
th
 (Welsh) Division 
establishment dated 28 July recognises the move of the bantams to Prees Heath but lists the 
four battalions under “Supernumerary Welsh Infantry Brigade”.133  However, the future of the 
bantams was decided on 27 August 1915 when the military authorities took over the 
administration of the 38
th
 Division and of the bantam brigade which for the first time was 
listed as 119
 
Brigade in 40
th
 Division.
134
  This may have annoyed the WAC administration 
who continued to address correspondence to the GOC “Supernumerary Welsh Brigade” or “ 
GOC, 119
th
 Infantry Brigade, 38
th
 Welsh Division” well into November 1915.135  
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At Prees Heath the unit started to train under its new GOC.  Rodney Charles Style (1863-
1957) was the fourth son of the 9
th
 Baronet Style of Wateringbury, Kent.  He started his army 
career as a lieutenant in the 3
rd
 (Militia) Battalion of the Queen’s Own (Royal West Kent 
Regiment) in October 1882, transferring to a regular battalion of the regiment in February 
1883. In January 1893 he was promoted to captain, became major in January 1903 and 
lieutenant-colonel of the 1
st
 Battalion in March 1908. He retired in March 1912.  He had seen 
action in the Sudan, and in India where he was wounded in September 1897.  His Welsh 
connection was through his mother Rosamond (née Morgan) who was a daughter of Lord 
Tredegar. We do not know what he thought of his new command when he saw it at Prees 
Heath.  
 
Whilst having the four battalions of the brigade in one place was a great improvement, 
conditions at Prees Heath were not good.  Captain B.D. Gibbs of the 18
th
 Welsh wrote to his 
sweetheart to tell her, “It’s been raining here every day since the 15th of July and the place is 
just one big bog and I think very unhealthy”.136  The brigade remained at Prees Heath for two 
months before moving to Aldershot where the other two brigades of the 40
th
 Division were 
also assembling.  Becke describes how “in early September 1915 the first divisional staff 
officer reached Stanhope Lines, Aldershot, and within a short time the remainder of the 
divisional staff assembled. Units also began to arrive …”137 As the battalions arrived, not all 
went smoothly.  Captain Gibbs arrived ahead of his battalion and reported, “we are sharing 
these barracks [Salamanca Barracks] with the 17
th
 [Welsh] and I found on ‘taking over’ that 
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there is insufficient [accommodation] for all the chaps in our battalion so I have had to 
arrange tents for one company and it was some job I can tell you to fix this up”.138 
 
Now, with the division assembled, it was necessary to appoint a commanding officer for the 
new formation.  In September 1915 Brigadier-General Harold Goodeve Ruggles-Brise was in 
Britain recovering from a severe shoulder wound received at Ypres on 2 November 1914 
while GOC 20 Brigade, 7
th
 Division.  On 14 September Sir Archibald Murray, the Deputy 
Chief of the Imperial General Staff, wrote to him, “My Dear Ruggles – I want to get you a 
division of the New Army.  Are you medically fit now or is it ‘light duty only’?  I have 
sounded Robb and he is very good about it”.139  This enquiry must have met with a positive 
reply as just a week later Ruggles-Brise wrote to his wife, “I went before my medical board 
and I think they passed me fit for general service but that does mean that I shall go abroad.  
They thought that I had made a wonderful recovery.  Murray is not coming down now so I 
shan’t hear about a division.  I am afraid it is too good to be true”.140  Ruggles-Brise was 
being too pessimistic.  He was appointed to command 40
th
 Division just four days later. 
 
So far the text of this thesis has established a previously absent chronology in order to define 
just how 119 Brigade came into being as part of the WAC and how, in the eyes of the WAC 
at least, it was regarded as a ‘Welsh’ unit.  In moving on to discuss various aspects of the 
brigade, including the geographical origins of its officers and men, a view will be formed of 
how ‘Welsh’ it actually was. 
                                                 
138
 IWM: Gibbs Papers. Letter, 9 September 1915. 
139
 Blair Castle, Perthshire, Blair Papers: Bundle 880 (Ruggles-Brise correspondence). Letter from Sir Archibald 
Murray, 14 September 1915.  Major General (Later General) Archibald James Murray (1860-1945) had been a 
controversial choice of Chief of Staff, BEF in August 1914 and was replaced becoming DCIGS from 10 
February 1915 to 25 September 1915.  ‘Robb’ is Major-General Sir Frederick Spencer Robb (1858-1948), 
Military Secretary to the Secretary of State for War 1914-1916. 
140
 Ibid. Letter from H.G. Ruggles-Brise to his wife Dorothea, 21 September 1915. 
48 
 
 
The Men 
An assessment of the character and state of the Welsh bantams appeared in an article by a Mr 
T. Andrew Richards in March 1915 under the headline “The Bantam Collier-Soldier”: 
 I have tried to sketch the collier soldier as he is.  He has been billeted in our homes 
and I want people to see him as we have found him, not without faults, but at heart a 
gentleman and a hero. The European War has produced many unique things, nothing 
perhaps of greater uniqueness than the ‘Bantam’ soldier of the Rhondda Valley.  
Distinctly collier in type, he is a sort of hybrid creature in a chrysalis state, putting off 
the collier and putting on the soldier, and his destination in common with that of all 
other Tommies, is Hell. His patriotism, for such it truly is, has made him leave the hell 
of the mine for the greater hell of the battlefield.  In the ranks of the first Bantam 
Battalion (sometimes called the Welsh Gurkhas [sic] but officially known as the 17
th
 
Welsh) are men who, at first sight, are the roughest specimens of humanity, yet no-one 
would say rough as they admittedly are, that they are not in their proper setting; for in 
roughness – or call it what you will – no class of Britisher can out-collier a certain 
class of collier - especially a Welsh one. In a word the Bantam Battalion, which was 
brought up to strength in the incredibly short period of 16 days is composed of 
exceedingly raw material.  As them what they are going to do and nine out of ten will 
readily answer that they are going to kill Germans … His business is purely that of 
fighting, and when he arrives at that magical place called the front, he may be relied 
upon to deliver a good account of himself. 
 
 [When asked] “Why on earth did you join the army?”, “Because we want to fight the 
Germans” came the somewhat amazed answer, “and because our butties (a distinctly 
collier word) were joining.  In appearance he strongly resembles our brave Allies the 
Japanese.  Of an average and almost uniform height of five feet and with a chest 
measurement of 37 to 40 inches, coupled with strength, and accustomed to face daily 
the horrors of the mine, he will not feel out of place in his new sphere.  His striking 
disregard for his personal safety when others are in danger was admirably shown at the 
time of the Senghenydd explosion, when the men formed themselves into search 
parties, took leave of their wives, and in cold blood made their wills before descending 
the fiery shaft to rescue their stricken comrades.  We must excuse their innate 
roughness, and overlook the fact that the men who are billeted in our houses do not 
shave every day, for they are in process of transit; they are growing every day into 
soldiers … The collier-soldier, from his childhood, has learned the supreme business 
of soldiering, he knows how to die, and he knows nothing of euphemism.  To him a 
spade is a spade, though he likes you better if you call it a nice shovel.  Indeed, the 
whole business of soldiering comes so naturally to him, that he has a sort of feeling, in 
retrospect, of having been in the line before, and in a sense, he has.  Perhaps his 
attitude to the war cannot be better set down than the word ‘keen’. His one aim is to 
serve his country on the battlefield and to do so by becoming efficient in the quickest 
possible time.  He does not quite understand why he should spend so many months in 
preparation; he could do long marches before; to and from the pit was equal to any 
49 
 
route marches he has since accomplished, and he could do a bit of useful shooting on 
the mountainside.  He considers that a man who can bag a hare on the wild slopes of 
the Welsh hills can bag a modern Hun, and in this he is probably correct.  Yet he 
allows that his officers know more about these things than he does, and is content to 
wait.  So far as his spirit is concerned, he is quite ready for the trenches and no amount 
of military training can improve it.  He is a hard worker, and on results to date his 
officers are more than proud of him. 
 
But of the several Rhondda battalions which have been formed at Porthcawl, the 
Bantams have been the most misunderstood.  Because they occasionally go on parade 
with black eyes, they have been called uncomplimentary things, quite regardless of the 
fact that a man must, to a certain degree, return to the primitive state before he can 
successfully meet the Hun in a bayonet charge.  Still, there is a lot of difference 
between having that indefinable fighting something in one’s make up and being a 
primitive pure and simple, and I will show that the term, as applied to the Bantam 
Soldier, is quite undeserved.  Little men are said to be more pugnacious than their 
bigger brothers, and the Bantam Soldier certainly does not prove the exception.  It is 
quite common to see him ‘squaring up’ to men of other battalions who are bigger and 
heavier than himself.  He does so because he cannot help it.  Presently he is going to 
‘square up’ to the big, stocky Germans … 141 
 
 
The article above has been quoted at length because it gives a detailed contemporary view of 
several aspects of the bantam recruits to 119 Brigade: recruiting, background, health, 
motivation, courage, officers, discipline and training are all touched on.  Some of these will be 
examined in detail in the remainder of this chapter while others will be dealt with in 
subsequent chapters in relation to specific events. 
 
Peter Simkins has described how volunteering peaked in September 1914 and then slumped 
with a continued decline through 1915. There were variations within the overall picture 
relating to the age, employment type or even geographical location of potential volunteers but 
the overall trend in 1915 was downwards.  Simkins relates this to several factors, not all of 
which necessarily apply to each individual.  They are: confusion over the level and 
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administration of separation allowance for married men resulting in a reluctance for these men 
to join up; increasing demand for labour due to rising levels of war-related orders and loss of 
manpower to the army resulting in employment opportunities increasing; rising wages in 
sectors where labour was needed making the army less attractive; ‘political factors’ such as 
nationalism in Ireland (or indeed Wales); international worker solidarity or an adherence to a 
pacifist or anti-militarist doctrine and personal factors such an increasing reluctance to 
abandon a family business or dependants.
142
  Sometimes the employers would try and stem 
the flow of men who were volunteering.  Simkins mentions that “as early as 4 September 
1914 the Railway Executive Committee … decreed, with War Office backing, that 
railwaymen who wished to volunteer had first to obtain the written consent of the company 
employing them”.  In the coalfields of South Wales a telegram was issued on 20 March 1915 
referencing an earlier restriction on the recruitment of miners from specific collieries, 
“Reference Glamorgan Recruiting Orders No 112 dated 13th Nov 1914.  As collieries 
mentioned are supplying coal for Admiralty purposes their men should not be enlisted without 
written approval of firm”.143  Against this backdrop of declining recruiting how did the units 
of 119 Brigade fare? 
 
The descriptions of the formation of the four original battalions of the brigade given earlier 
shows how the formation of the 17
th
 and 18
th
 Welsh was relatively quick with the 18
th
 
benefitting from the initial ‘backlog’ of men who stature had previously stopped them from 
being accepted for service.  Just slightly later in the year the 19
th
 RWF and, particularly, the 
12
th
 SWB had difficulty filling their ranks. On 10 Oct 1915 Western Command wrote to the 
Secretary of the NEC: 
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 I am directed to forward the attached copy of War Office letter AG.2.B/083 of 8
th
 
October, 1915, for the information of the Welsh Army Corps Committee. 
 The General Officer Commanding-in-Chief would be glad of their opinion as to the 
points made as early as possible please. 
 [The WO letter reads:] I am directed to request that you will be good enough to report 
as to whether there is any prospect of the 12
th
 Battalion, South Wales Borderers, being 
brought up to full establishment at an early date, and also whether any special efforts 
could not be made in counties other than Cardigan, Brecknock and Monmouth to assist 
this battalion in raising the necessary number of recruits. 
 [Signed] R.A. Montgomery, Maj.Gen., Director of Recruiting.
144
 
 
There was obviously a problem but what was it and was it anything more than the factors 
noted by Simkins?  Certainly the general fall off in the numbers of men enlisting would have 
had an effect, particularly in the late spring and summer of 1915. However, in the case of 
bantam units further factors came into play. The first of these was highlighted in April 1915: 
“By order of No4 District I have to call your attention to the large number of men who have 
been sent back from the Bantam Battalion as medically unfit, and to instruct you to ask 
Medical Officers to take every care that men are properly examined before being passed as 
fit.”145  The issue did not go way and a further order was issued in September: 
 It has been brought to my notice by the Officer Commanding 18
th
 Glamorgan 
Battalion (Bantams) that many recruits for this unit are being passed though medically 
unfit.  No less than 45 have been discharged during the past month for this reason. 
 Recruiting Officers must insist on a most careful medical examination of the recruits 
 and should personally see them before they are dispatched so that this may not occur 
 again as it is a useless waste of public money and unnecessary trouble to all 
 concerned.
146
 
 
The level of unfit recruits is confirmed by an analysis of surviving service records.  The 
digitized versions of these were searched and 260 records of men of the four original 
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battalions of the brigade were found.
147
 106 of these men were discharged before the brigade 
left for foreign service. 
Table 1: Discharges due to ill health or poor fitness 
Battalion Surviving 
records 
Discharged 
Unfit/Illness 
17
th
 Welsh 126 62 (49%) 
18
th
 Welsh 67 35 (52%) 
19
th
 RWF 49 6 (12%) 
12
th
 SWB 18 3 (17%) 
Total 260 106 (41%) 
   Source: Analysis of records at www.ancestry.co.uk 
 
Although this is a very small sample it does indicate that a problem existed with men who had 
what were sometimes obvious disabilities such as flat feet, deafness, hammer toes or poor 
eyesight that should have been spotted at enlistment. Some problems such as old injuries, 
tuberculosis, syphilis, arthritis or mental deficiency may have taken longer to identify but 
most were spotted well before the battalions went to war.  In the 17
th
 Welsh, the battalion with 
the largest number of surviving records, 45 out of 62 discharges took place in two batches in 
March and June 1915 with a further small peak (7) in February/March 1916.  In the 18
th
 
Welsh a similar pattern emerges with 15 out of 35 discharges taking place in March/April 
1915 with a further small peak (7) in March/April 1916.  Such peaks of activity may 
correspond with visits from a higher authority such as that reported in the press in April 1915 
when the Medical Inspector of Recruits, Western Command, visited the 18
th
 Welsh and 
inspected 900 men “individually”. Some men “referred to the Medical Inspector were slightly 
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under the minimum height for bantams but they all seemed good material for the army and 
Col. H.R. Homfray … was most anxious to retain them in his battalion.  As a result of a close 
examination the inspecting officer was able to form the opinion that they would, with 
increased time and physical training reach the required standard …”148 
 
While bearing in mind that the number of surviving records is very small, the information 
contain therein seems to show that in units of 119 Brigade unfit/ill men were, with a few 
exceptions, weeded out within a month or two of enlistment.  Moreover the problems that 
caused their discharge were, in the majority of cases not linked to their stature but to their 
working conditions and environment - as they would have been for any labouring man at that 
time.
149
  
 
There was one other problem though that may have plagued the bantams because it was less 
easy to detect amongst a large group of small men.  Welsh Recruiting Offices were alerted to 
it in early September 1915: “It has been brought to my attention that in the case of enlistment 
for Bantam Battalions, instances have occurred in which ‘Boys’ have been enlisted as 
‘Bantams’ … This practice is not permissible and shall not be continued”.150  Evidence of 
under-age enlistment is contained in the service records described above and outlined in Table 
2 below. 
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Table 2: Discharges due to under-age enlistment 
Battalion Surviving 
records 
Discharged 
under-age 
17
th
 Welsh 126 14 (11%) 
18
th
 Welsh 67 8 (12%) 
19
th
 RWF 49 0 
12
th
 SWB 18 5 (28%) 
Total 260 27 (10%) 
Source: Analysis of service records at www.ancestry.co.uk 
 
Again, the small sample size makes generalisation impossible and the sample consists only of 
those soldiers whose real ages were detected but some inferences can be drawn. The first is 
that the under-age soldiers in the 17
th
 Welsh managed to last longer in the ranks before 
discharge than those in the other three battalions with 50% of them serving for more than ten 
months before discharge.  The youth with the longest time in their ranks was 25613 Private 
James Clifford, who enlisted in December 1914 and chalked up twenty months service and 
eleven disciplinary charges before his discharge in August 1916. Another December 1914 
recruit, 25346 Private John Glyn Samuel, enlisted aged 16 and was discharged eighteen 
months later not because he was under-age but because he was “a potential criminal”.  In 
contrast only two of the 18
th
 Welsh’s under-age soldiers managed to serve more than eleven 
months and only one man of the 12
th
 SWB had eleven months service at discharge.  Under-
age enlistments peaked in January 1915 (9), March (6) and May (5) with only three thereafter.  
By contrast the discharges are less clustered but with slight increases in May 1915 (3) and 
June (3) with a major grouping in October/December (9), and January 1916 (5). The small 
sample will self-evidently not include a record of those under-age youths who successfully 
evaded detection and it is impossible to determine an accurate figure.  Some did get as far as 
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the front line.
151
 Captain Eric Whitworth, 12
th
 SWB, recalled how “he had come across a 
tearful seventeen-year-old who could no longer stand the trials that overseas service 
presented.  Whitworth managed to find the boy a ‘cushy job’ with the military police”.152 
Whitworth added: 
 But we ought not to have these boys with us … the genuine bantam is a fully 
developed man of small height and most are very fine men; the Bantam was never 
meant to be growing boys, as 40% or 50% of ours are, in the eagerness to join up at 
the beginning of the war.  One can only blame the authorities.
153
  
 
He was certainly exaggerating the number of youths in the battalion to make his point. He 
also wrote:  
 
 The men were all volunteers, many from the mines in South Wales, and they were 
men who, but for this concession as to height, would not have been accepted for 
service.  Subsequent events amply justified the decision of the War Office, and the 
Bantams proved themselves in France equal to all that was demanded of them in 
trench warfare and later in offensive operations.
154
 
 
 
In making this assertion he is, in effect contradicting his statement about the preponderance of 
youths who would surely not have acquitted themselves so well under fire if present in large 
numbers? Some support for his view of enthusiastic youths joining up does come from an 
analysis of surviving service records.  While the average age of recruits to three battalions of 
the brigade varies from 23 years to 25 years the most common stated age at enlistment is 19 
years.
155
 This same over-representation of nineteen year-olds was noted by Clive Hughes in 
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the 16
th
 RWF, a standard-height battalion, so the phenomenon may not have been restricted to 
bantam units.
156
 The loss of so many of 119 Brigade’s service records during the Blitz on 
London means that no conclusive answer can be forthcoming. 
 
The problems that 119 Brigade had with its manpower were as nothing compared with the 
other two brigades in 40
th
 Division that were also composed of bantam battalions. The 120 
Brigade was originally made up of 11
th
 King’s Own (formed August 1915), 13th Cameronians 
(formed July 1915), 14
th
 Highland Light Infantry (formed July 1915) and 12
th
 South 
Lancashire (formed June 1915). The 121 Brigade was originally made up of 12
th
 Suffolk 
(formed July 1915), 13
th
 Yorkshire (formed July 1915), 18
th
 Sherwood Foresters (formed July 
1915) and 22
nd
 Middlesex (formed June 1915).
157
  All of these units were formed well after 
the initial rush of bantam men to enlist and it obviously led to difficulties.  Whitton described 
the result in the divisional history: 
 Several of the units were under strength, but more contained a large proportion of unfit 
men; and the divisional and brigade commanders too realized that a drastic weeding-
out would be necessary before the Division could proceed overseas.  This weeding-out 
began almost at once and was continued through the winter of 1915/1916 and into the 
early spring of the latter year, as it became more and more evident that many of the 
men were unfit to undergo even the training to which they were submitted at home. 
How drastic this weeding-out process ultimately became may be shown by quoting the 
case of one battalion, which joined the Division at Aldershot over 1,000 strong, and 
later was reduced by medical rejections to little over two hundred.
158
 
 
There was obviously a major problem with the quality of bantam recruits in the battalions 
formed in mid-1915.  Whitton notes that the “wastage was not being made good from 
ordinary sources of supply” and that a staff officer was dispatched to Lancashire, Glasgow 
and Edinburgh to trawl for recruits.  In December 1915 the War Office raised the maximum 
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height for bantam recruits to five feet four inches.
159
  The divisional commander wrote to his 
wife: “I am also much bothered about my Divn.  I was told to get the infantry ready for 
service and I have not been given the men to get ready.  I am going over first thing tomorrow 
to see Sir A. Hunter and shall ask him if I can go to see Lord French’s staff and try to get the 
matter put right”.160 Three weeks later he wrote, “I have been so worried over my miniature 
bantams that I have not had a minute to write”.  In February 1916 Sir John French inspected 
the division. 
 Our inspection went off very well. Ld French said that the bantams were much better 
than he expected and that he was very much pleased with the whole turn-out, that it 
was bad luck having such immature men, and that he would do all he could to help us 
get more seasoned men and get rid of the wasters.  He also said it was very creditable 
having trained them up to their present standard.
161
 
 
The solution was eventually found: “We got a message yesterday that the 118th Bde is to 
come to our Divn, but we have not yet got it in writing.  This will fill us up in men and we 
shall probably go abroad in May … However, don’t say too much about it until it is 
accomplished fact”162. 
 
118 Brigade (a brigade of normal height battalions) was indeed taken from 39
th
 Division and 
broken up.  In 120 Brigade the 12
th
 South Lancashire was absorbed by the 11
th
 Kings Own 
and the 13
th
 Cameronians were absorbed by the 14
th
 HLI. They were joined by the 13
th
 East 
Surrey and the 14
th
 Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders from 118 Brigade.  In 121 Brigade the 
18
th
 Sherwood Foresters were absorbed by the 13
th
 Yorkshire and the 22
nd
 Middlesex was 
absorbed by the 12
th
 Suffolk. They were joined by the 20
th
 and 21
st
 Middlesex from 118 
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Brigade.  The 40
th
 Division was now complete but the loss of four of its bantam battalions 
made it a strange amalgam of eight bantam battalions and four standard height battalions. The 
introduction of new units also meant that the identity of two out of three of the brigades was 
very different, and debatably weaker, than the identity of 119 Brigade which had ridden out 
the storm of reorganization intact.  Throughout the period beginning September 1915 to the 
end of May 1916 the individual establishments of each of 119 Brigade’s battalions never 
dropped below 939 and for most of the period were well over 1,000.
163
  
 
How ‘Welsh’ was 119 Brigade? In his important paper, ‘Taffs in the Trenches’, Chris 
Williams has explored the concept of national identity in Welsh regiments during the First 
World War using ‘Soldiers Died in the Great War 1914-19’ (SDGW) as a source of 
quantitative data on the national origins of the men who enlisted.  His results will be 
compared with data relating to the men of 119 Brigade in the paragraphs that follow and 
additional data will be presented.
164
  The data used in this thesis differs slightly from that 
extracted by Williams as the information from SDGW was supplemented by data from 
surviving service records and from the war dead database of the Commonwealth War Graves 
Commission (CWGC) so that almost all identified fatalities of 119 Brigade can be given a 
geographical origin using their birthplace or their place of residence at the time of 
enlistment.
165
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Table 3: Soldiers of Welsh Birth (Williams, 2007) 
Battalion Sample size Welsh birth 
17
th
 Welsh 223 62% 
18
th
 Welsh
166
 406 44.3% 
19
th
 RWF 222 36.5% 
12
th
 SWB 218 28% 
Total 1,069  
 
Williams’ data show that, based on the county of birth of recruits, some battalions of Welsh 
regiments were more ‘Welsh’ than others. Williams made a decision not to use the place of 
residence of recruits as an indicator of national origin because the place of residence in SDGW 
is often not given and yields a smaller sample size for analysis.
167
 The level of mobility within 
the workforce at the time also confuses the picture of national affiliation with, for example, 
men from the Somerset, Yorkshire and Lancashire coalfields moving to take up work in South 
Wales and subsequently enlisting in the ‘local’ regiment.168 The distinction between ‘true’ 
Welsh nationals and ‘economic migrants’ is felt to be of less importance for this study and 
data relating to the birthplace and residence of recruits will be presented for comparison. 
While Williams’ study was designed to examine national identity the present work is more 
concerned with unit identity.  If a man who was born in Lancashire but who moved to work in 
Glamorgan enlisted in a Welsh Regiment battalion along with others from his work 
community did his presence dilute the sense of ‘belonging’ within the battalion?  As a 
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member of a Welsh community (and a tight-knit one at that) would his presence make the 
battalion less ‘Welsh’?  The evidence described in the previous part of this chapter suggest 
strongly that to outsiders at least the brigade was regarded as ‘Welsh’ and it is tentatively 
suggested here that this identity was reflected back on to the brigade’s four battalions, even 
those where the non-Welsh elements were in the majority.  
 
Using the data gathered for this study a similar picture to that outlined by Williams emerges 
confirming the differences in degrees of ‘Welshness’ between battalions but the use of 
residence data introduces some subtle but important variations (see Table 4). 
Table 4: Soldiers of Welsh Origin 
Battalion Welsh 
Birth 
Welsh 
Residence 
17
th
 Welsh 62.7% (225) 73.0% (156) 
18
th
 Welsh 44.7% (409) 52.3% (350) 
19
th
 RWF 38.4% (232) 41.6% (219) 
12
th
 SWB 27.6% (232) 36.1% (210) 
Source: SDGW and CWGC 
 
The 17
th
 Welsh had the greatest percentage of Welsh-born and Welsh-resident soldiers and it 
may have been even higher than these figures indicate.  An analysis of the 125 surviving 
service records of men from this battalion shows that 114 of them (91.2%) gave addresses in 
Wales and of these ninety-three (74.5% of the sample) were living in Glamorgan. 
 
The counties of origin of the men have been analysed for each battalion of 119 Brigade. Three 
samples for each battalion are given.  One is based on the total fatalities of the battalion; the 
second is based on fatalities up to 31 May 1917 (after the brigade’s first offensive action) and 
the third is based on total fatalities to 30 November 1917 (after the fierce fighting for Bourlon 
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Wood) after which the influx of new drafts is likely to have obscured the original composition 
of the brigade. 
 
Table 5: 17
th
 Welsh – Origins169 
County Whole sample To 30/11/1917 To 31/5/1917 
 Birth 
(225) 
Residence 
(156) 
Birth 
(190) 
Residence 
(137) 
 
Birth 
(89) 
Residence 
(64) 
Glamorgan 40.0% (90) 51.9% (81) 41.6% (79) 51.8 (71) 36.0% (32) 51.6% (33) 
Lancs 6.7% (15) 4.5% (7) 4.8% (8) 2.1% (3) 5.6% (5) 3.1% (2) 
Monmouth 6.2% (14) 9.0% (14) 6.8% (13) 10.2% (14) 7.9% (7) 10.9% (7) 
Gloucs 4.9% (11) 1.3% (2) 4.7% (9) 0.0% (0) 2.2% 2) 0.0% (0) 
Middlesex 4.9% (11) 4.5% (7) 5.3% (10) 5.1% (7) 7.9% (7) 6.2% (4) 
Pembroke 4.0% (9) 3.2% (5) 3.7% (7) 3.6% (5) 2.2% (2) 3.1% (4) 
Hereford 2.7% (6) 0.0% (0) 3.7% (7) 0.0% (0) 4.5% (4) 0.0% (0) 
Somerset 2.6% (6) 0.6% (1) 3.2% (6) 0.0% (0) 3.4% (3) 0.0% (0) 
 
While acknowledging the potential weaknesses in the dataset, such as the small sample size 
for the earliest date, the table does show some interesting points.  Firstly, it confirms 
Glamorgan as the major source of recruits for the battalion, dwarfing the contribution of other 
Welsh counties. Secondly, it highlights the role of the industrial county of Lancashire as a 
source of recruits and shows a marked difference in the number of soldiers born in the county 
and the numbers resident there at the time of enlistment (the small samples for Somerset and 
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Gloucestershire show a similar situation) indicating an outward migration. Thirdly, it shows 
how the residence figures for Glamorgan and Monmouthshire show a larger residence than 
birthplace percentage indicating inward migration prior to the Great War. Fourthly, it shows 
the position of Middlesex (and by inference London) as a source of recruits. Finally, it shows 
how little the character of the battalion (as expressed in the origins of its men) had changed by 
the time of the losses at Bourlon Wood. 
 
Table 6: 18
th
 Welsh – Origins170 
County Whole sample To 30/11/1917 To 31/5/1917 
 Birth 
(409) 
Residence 
(350) 
Birth 
(213) 
Residence 
(173) 
Birth  
(88) 
Residence 
(73) 
Glamorgan 29.0% (119) 39.1% (137) 30.5% (65) 42.2% (73) 29.5% (26) 45.2% (33) 
Lancs 16.9% (69) 17.1% (60) 11.7% (25) 12.1% (21) 6.8% (6) 5.5% (4) 
Cheshire 5.6% (23) 6.3% (22) 6.1% (13) 7.5% (13) 5.7% (5) 6.8% (5) 
Middlesex 5.1% (21) 3.1% (11) 5.6% (12) 3.5% (6) 9.1% (8) 4.1% (3) 
Staffs 4.2% (17) 3.7% (13) 4.7% (10) 3.5% (6) 6.8% (6) 5.5% (4) 
Monmouth 3.9% (16) 3.7% (13) 3.8% (8) 2.3% (4) 2.3% (2) 2.7% (2) 
Carmarthen 2.9% (12) 2.6% (9) 3.3% (7) 2.9% (5) 3.4% (3) 4.1% (3) 
Surrey 2.7% (11) 3.1% (11) 1.9% (4) 2.3% (4) 0.0% (0) 0.0% (0) 
 
The tabulated fatalities from the 18
th
 Welsh (Table 6) show a slightly different picture from 
that of its sister battalion.  Though designated ‘2nd Glamorgan’ the number of recruits from 
that county had fallen significantly – although it was still the largest source – with Lancashire 
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again being the next most important.  Cheshire, Staffordshire and Middlesex (mainly districts 
of London) also provided significant numbers of recruits.  This seems to confirm that the pool 
of small Glamorgan miners had already been reduced by the creation of the 17
th
 Welsh (1
st
 
Glamorgan) and that the battalion had to be made up by recruits from elsewhere.  However 
another contributory factor to this increased diversity may be that recruits from outside South 
Wales took a little more time to organise their affairs and travel to South Wales.  This is 
supported by the analysis of place of enlistment which shows that 51.3% of the battalion 
enlisted in Glamorgan with just 10% in each of Lancashire and Cheshire.
171
 
 
Clive Hughes has stated that “the six counties of North Wales had not been a fertile recruiting 
ground before 1914” and Chris Williams has shown how the Royal Welsh Fusiliers, whose 
recruiting area was centred on North Wales, continued to look beyond the Principality  in 
order to fill its ranks.
172
  Table 7 (below) confirms Williams’ general statements in respect of 
the RWF although in the case of the 19
th
 Battalion the nickname ‘Birmingham Fusiliers’ 
would more appropriately be the ‘Lancashire Fusiliers’ as 25% of the battalion’s total dead 
were from that county – a significantly larger proportion than from anywhere else.  This high 
figure did fall as the war progressed, as did the proportion of men from Staffordshire, while 
numbers from the important recruiting area of Glamorgan rose.  The percentage of Welsh-
born men in the battalion’s dead over the course of the war was 38.4%, a considerable 
increase on the 24.4% represented in the fatalities to 31 May 1917.   
 
The key areas for recruiting for the 19
th
 RWF are confirmed by the account of Captain Evan 
Beynon Davies, 19
th
 RWF, who noted “the Bantams were a pretty mixed lot linguistically, 
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and the proportion of Welsh soldiers was less than in the other units at Llandudno. Some of 
them came from Liverpool and Manchester, from the coal districts of Staffordshire, and from 
the Potteries [Stoke-on-Trent]”.173  While it is tempting to emphasise the battalion’s lack of 
‘Welshness’ the number of Welsh-born men in its ranks was still substantial (Table 7). 
Table 7: 19
th
 RWF – Origins174 
County Whole sample To 30/11/1917 To 31/5/1917 
 Birth 
(232) 
Residence 
(219) 
Birth 
(177) 
Residence 
(165) 
Birth 
(86) 
Residence 
(77) 
Lancs 25.4% (59) 25.6% (56) 26.0% (46) 27.3% (45) 31.4 (27) 35.1% (27) 
Staffs 10.3% (24) 10.5% (23) 9.6% (17) 11.5% (19) 14.0% (12) 18.2% (14) 
Glamorgan 9.0% (21) 9.6% (21) 6.8% (12) 7.3% (12) 4.7% (4) 2.6% (2) 
Caernarfon 7.8% (18) 8.7% (19) 6.8% (12) 7.9% (13) 4.7% (4) 6.5% (5) 
Denbigh 6.9% (16) 7.3% (16) 7.9% (14) 8.5% (14) 8.1% (7) 9.1% (7) 
London 6.9% (16) 6.8% (15) 6.8% (12) 5.5% (9) 4.7% (4) 3.9% (3) 
Cheshire 3.9% (9) 4.6% (10) 5.1% (9) 6.0% (10) 1.2% (1) 2.6% (2) 
Yorkshire 3.0% (7) 0.9% (2) 2.8% (5) 1.2% (2) 5.8% (5) 2.6% (2) 
 
The South Wales Borderers whose 12
th
 Battalion made up the final unit of 119 Brigade has 
been identified by Chris Williams as the “least Welsh of all the Welsh Regiments”.175 The 
analysis of the 12
th
 SWB’s war dead seems to confirm Williams’ conclusion (Table 8).  The 
regiment’s recruiting area centred on Monmouthshire, Breconshire and Radnorshire and while 
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Monmouthshire supplied the largest proportion of men the very low contribution of the latter 
two counties (less than 1% in both cases) may be explained by the ‘pull’ of the 
Monmouthshire Regiment (the local Territorial Force unit that Williams identifies as 62.9% 
Welsh-born), the active recruiting that had occurred in the counties before the formation of 
the 12
th
 SWB and the relatively small number of large industrial communities in the two 
counties. 
Table 8: 12
th
 SWB – Origins176 
County Whole sample To 30/11/1917 To 31/5/1917 
 Birth 
(232) 
Residence 
(210) 
Birth 
(211) 
Residence 
(191) 
Birth 
(111) 
Residence 
(98) 
Monmouth 12.1% (28) 16.2% (34) 11.4% (24) 15.2% (29) 12.6% (14) 17.3% (17) 
Yorkshire 12.1% (28) 12.9% (27) 11.8% (25) 13.6% (26) 11.7% (13) 14.3% (14) 
Glamorgan 8.6% (20) 12.9% (27) 8.1% (17) 12.0% (23) 7.2% (8) 8.2% (8) 
Lancs 7.6% (18) 7.1% (15) 8.1% (17) 12.0% (23) 8.1% (9) 6.1% (6) 
London 6.5% (15) 6.7% (14) 5.7% (12) 6.8% (13) 8.1% (9) 10.2% (10) 
Staffs 5.2% (12) 3.3% (7) 5.2% (11) 1.6% (3) 5.4% (6) 5.1% (5) 
Gloucs 4.7% (11) 1.0% (2) 5.2% (11) 1.0% (2) 3.6% (4) 1.0% (1) 
Durham 3.4% (8) 2.6% (6) 3.8% (8) 3.1% (6) 3.6% (4) 4.0% (4) 
 
The number of men from Monmouthshire in the 12
th
 SWB is matched by the number of men 
from Yorkshire with Glamorgan, Staffordshire and London again making substantial 
contributions.  Twenty-nine counties (plus Ireland) were represented in the battalion by May 
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1917 while the number rises to forty (plus Ireland and the Channel Islands) over the course of 
the war.  This could indicate that the battalion would have struggled to establish a coherent 
identity (one outbreak of collective indiscipline that will be described later in this thesis may 
indeed have originated within a group of disgruntled Yorkshiremen) but the fact that the 
number of Welsh-born men in the battalion seems to have stayed steady at around 27% (over 
30% for Welsh residents) plus the very strong regimental bond within the regiment (the 
heroes of Rorke’s Drift, January 1879) would surely have mitigated this effect?  Alexander 
Watson states that the regimental tradition is less important in unit cohesion than local 
connections and that these are strong when men of similar geographical origin serve 
together.
177
  In this case both are probably important factors. 
 
Language is an important factor in group identity.  Robin Barlow has stated that the men of 
predominantly Welsh-speaking counties were less likely to volunteer than those from 
predominantly English-speaking counties.
178
 If the proportion of Welsh speakers identified in 
the 1911 census of Wales (43.5%) is applied to the Welsh-born element of 119 Brigade an 
approximate figure of 18.8% Welsh-speakers within the brigade is obtained. There is a 
noticeable and not unexpected variation in the proportion of Welsh speakers between the 
battalions.
179
  With a fifth of its soldiers speaking Welsh (at least off the parade-ground) the 
image of the brigade as ‘Welsh’ would have been reinforced. At the front, during trials of a 
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field telephone prior to a trench raid by the 18
th
 Welsh in July 1916, it was proudly recorded 
that the conversations were conducted entirely in Welsh.
180
 
 
In referring to the 119 Brigade as “entirely Welsh” the divisional historian was almost 
certainly referring to the national content of the four battalion names.
181
 The figures presented 
above show the variable but none the less strong degree of ‘Welshness’ within the brigade.182 
Mark Connelly has stated that the four battalions of The Buffs (East Kent Regiment) that he 
studied still had by 1918 a “significant number” of men connected with Kent in their ranks 
(27%; 23%; 23% and 17%) enabling them to maintain “a geographical cohesion of a sort”.183  
The Welsh identity of 119 Brigade was very strong indeed by comparison. 
 
Having established the geographical origins of the men in the ranks what was their social 
background?  Clive Hughes has previously presented some data based on analysis of the 
occupations of a single company of the 16
th
 RWF showing that 89% of the men were 
‘working class’.  This figure was made up of 27% miners; 24% labourers and other heavy 
manual workers; 20% transport, manufacturing and other workers and 18% clerks, salesmen 
and servants. 
184
  Figures based on the available data for the battalions of 119 Brigade show a 
similar picture while varying in certain key details (Table 9).  Within the category of ‘heavy 
manual work’ the largest proportion of men were miners (41.2% across the brigade) closely 
followed by general labourers.  David Starrett’s perception of the brigade as “coal miners 
mostly” was a little wide of the mark but within the battalions they usually formed the single 
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largest group.
185
  The 17
th
 Welsh had 53.2% miners; the 18
th
 Welsh 31.3%; the 19
th
 RWF 
32% and the 12
th
 SWB 17.6%.
186
   
Table 9: Civilian Occupations 119 Brigade (sample sizes in brackets) 
Category 17
th
 
Welsh 
(126) 
18
th
 
Welsh 
(67) 
19
th
 
RWF 
(50) 
12
th
 
SWB 
(17) 
119 Brigade 
overall 
(260) 
Heavy Manual 
Work 81.7% 68.6% 64% 76.4% 74.6% 
Manufacturing, 
Transport and 
other 
7.9% 19.4% 22% 11.8% 13.8% 
Clerks, Salesmen 
and Servants 8.7% 6% 8% - 7.3% 
Shopkeepers 
- 6% 6% 11.8% 3.5% 
Professional 
Classes - - - - - 
Miscellaneous 
1.6% - - - 0.8% 
 
The figure for the 17
th
 Welsh receives some additional corroboration from the entries in the 
‘Platoon Roll Book’ for Number 16 Platoon, D Company. Of the sixty-five names in the 
book, forty-four (67.7%) give the civilian occupation of the soldier: twenty-three of these 
were colliers (52.3%); six (13.6%) were labourers; three were tin workers; two were moulders 
and the variety was extended with one each of a baker, barber, bricklayer, butcher, hotel 
servant, painter, papermaker, seaman, shunter, [blacksmith’s] striker and tailor.187 The 
apparent absence of the professional classes and the very low representation of middle-class 
traders may indicate that these bantam battalions were seen by potential recruits (and 
recruiters?) as the preserve of short, strong men from the labouring classes. 
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One further element of common identity is religion. At the beginning of the twentieth century 
Wales was dominated by Nonconformity. Barlow describes how figures gathered in 1905 
relating to communicants in Wales show that only 26% came from the Church of England 
while 71% belonged to Nonconformist denominations. He contrasts these figures with those 
from the roll book of a single company of the 16
th
 RWF which lists only 38.5% 
Nonconformists and 54.9% Church of England and suggests that this evidence indicates the 
unwillingness of North Wales Nonconformists to join up.  He is dismissive of the point made 
by Gervase Phillips that the army only seemed to recognise Anglicanism and Roman 
Catholicism but Phillips’ view receives some support here from the only piece of evidence 
relating to the religious affiliation of troops of 119 Brigade.
188
  The Platoon Roll Book of 16 
Platoon, 17
th
 Welsh gives denominations for fifty-four of sixty-five soldiers.  Of these, no less 
than forty (74.1%) are listed as Church of England, six as Roman Catholic (13.6%) and the 
remainder as one of three categories of Nonconformist.  If correct, this indicates a remarkably 
uniform religious affiliation among the platoon, the greater part of which was composed of 
miners from the Rhondda.  It seems more probable that the over-representation of Anglicans 
is due either to the unwillingness of the men to be singled out as Nonconformists or to an 
NCO’s misguided enthusiasm to enter something in the space in the Roll Book.189 
 
Discipline 
The volunteers of Kitchener’s New Armies were enthusiastic; they were also, quite 
understandably, unused to the strict rules and regulations that governed army life.  In June 
1915 Saunders Lewis (12
th
 SWB) wrote: 
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 The discipline of the battalion is very poor at present; the men, and most of them are 
boys, have little idea of military discipline, and as most of the officers are men of little 
experience, we are not allowed to take things into our own hands and assert 
ourselves… 
 
 and  
 
 … they are amusingly like bantams in one thing.  They have a strong tendency for 
fighting.  It is hard not to laugh when marching in front of them.  They spend the 
whole time they are marching at ease in threatening all dire things against each other, 
and the first stop they get into rings and we have to step in to stop any pugilistic 
exhibitions.
190
 
 
 
Whilst the majority of volunteers completed their army service with a clean disciplinary 
record, the surviving service records of the men of 119 Brigade give an indication of how 
many did not.  The largest sample is of men from the 17
th
 Welsh (127) twenty-two per cent of 
which (28) had one or more offences on their records.  Most offences took place during home 
service and consisted of absences or overstaying of leave although six men were punished for 
drunkenness (less than five per cent).  There are few single offences and men tended to repeat 
offending. Only five men in the sample are recorded as committing offences in a theatre of 
war.  In the 18
th
 Welsh (67 records) only twelve per cent of records contain offences while the 
records of men of the 19
th
 RWF (50 records) have no less than forty-four per cent showing 
offences.  The small surviving sample of men from the 12
th
 SWB (18 records) has twenty-two 
per cent with offences.
191
  In overview the predominance of absence as an offence seems to 
indicate a reluctance to give up the ties to home while ‘home’ was still within easy travelling 
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distance.  While occurrences of insolence to NCOs, lateness for parades, dirty buttons etc., 
indicate a lack of appreciation of the need for conformity and standards within the system. 
 
The relatively small number of surviving service records provides a glimpse of the 
disciplinary records of individual soldiers.  The state of discipline of organised units such as 
battalions is rarely recorded explicitly although several examples of collective indiscipline 
among the volunteers of the New Armies are known particularly from the autumn of 1914 
when shortages of rations and suitable accommodation were common in the rapidly 
expanding forces.
192
  These causes of complaint had been largely eliminated by 1915 but there 
is evidence for acts of collective indiscipline in at least two of the battalions of 119 Brigade. 
 
In January 1917 Mr A.L. Gardner, representing the Welsh National Council of the YMCA, 
was speaking on the war work of the institution and recalled that: 
 He was once told by the late Brigadier-General Dunn that a Bantam company had 
‘struck’ and he (Gardner) was asked to ascertain what was the matter.  He went down 
to the men, found what the difficulty was, it was remedied by the Brigadier and in a 
short time the Bantams were soldiering again.
193
 
 
In this case the cause of the ‘strike’ was not stated but other examples were clearly related to 
the reaction of volunteers to perceived ill-treatment.  William Edwards recalled that during 
the training of the 18
th
 Welsh at Porthcawl in May 1915 “at the hands of instructors drawn 
from the Metropolitan Police and the regiment of Guards [sic]”: 
 One of the young soldiers was struck on a very sore arm by one of these Sergeant-
Majors with a heavy stick which they always carried. The boy sank to the ground in 
great pain, his comrades went to his defence and loudly expressed their anger, actually 
threatening the offender.  After parade, meetings were held and it was decided to 
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refuse to ‘Fall In’ the next morning.  This was 100% successful, there was to be no 
further parades until the instructors were sent away.  The 3
rd
 Battalion Welsh Regt. 
were sent to Porthcawl from Cardiff to ‘persuade’ us to parade, they failed in their 
mission.  We remained in our billets for four days, we were fed as usual by our 
civilian landlords.  We were then informed that the instructors were transferred 
elsewhere and accordingly we resumed our training …194 
 
This event does not seem to correspond with an incident reported in the press early in the 
following month although there are some similarities. The prosecution of a civilian under the 
provisions of the Defence of the Realm Act for “having uttered words likely to be prejudicial 
to the discipline of His Majesty’s Forces and also with having obstructed a police officer” was 
reported in detail under headlines that told of a “Big Rumpus at Porthcawl” and “Bloodshed 
and a Frightful Riot Averted”.195 
 
In summary, following the witnessing of an “alleged act of severity by a non-commissioned 
officer to one of the recruits on the afternoon of 1 June 1915”, a noisy crowd of around two 
hundred soldiers and civilians assembled outside the orderly room of the 18
th
 Welsh in John 
Street, Porthcawl.  The CO, Lieutenant-Colonel Homfray, sent his adjutant (Captain Pugh) to 
investigate along with Sergeant-Major King - who it is implied was the NCO that had been 
involved.
196
  The accused was then allegedly heard to say that King “ought to be ------- well 
murdered” and Pugh arrested him.  The situation might have become worse when one officer, 
Second-Lieutenant J. Edward Walter Edwards, drew his revolver to discourage soldiers who 
were possibly moving to attempt the release of the prisoner.  Pugh ordered the guard turned 
out and the street to be cleared.  The disturbance died down but armed patrols policed the 
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streets until 12.30 a.m.    The prosecuting council emphasised that “in these days … discipline 
and training were the greatest assets of the state and that if interfered with then it would 
destroy the morale of the battalion”.  The defendant, William John Rees, aged 25, an 
insurance agent from Tondu near Bridgend was found guilty and fined five pounds or, if in 
default, one month’s imprisonment.  The newspaper report contains no reference to the refusal 
to parade as in the incident recalled by Edwards and so this may be additional event. 
 
Edwards related a further incident in August 1915 when “the battalion again refused orders to 
parade, until they had received an undertaking that Field Punishment No. 1 … would be less 
frequently imposed”.197  No other evidence of this particular incident or of the events leading 
up to it has been found.  The 18
th
 Welsh was likely to have been one of the two battalions 
“where the lack of discipline was notorious” and which received the attention of Brigadier-
General Style to “remove [their] rough edges” following the move to Aldershot in September 
1915.
198
 This receives some support from the data presented below (Table 10). 
 
Collective indiscipline among the volunteers of the New Armies was mainly confined to the 
autumn of 1914 when shortages of rations and suitable accommodation were particularly 
acute.
199
  The actions of the 18
th
 Welsh at Porthcawl more than six months later indicates that 
the army had not yet assimilated all of the lessons learned from earlier troubles with volunteer 
recruits; particularly when, as suggested by Dallas and Gill, those recruits came from a pool 
of organised labour such as the miners of the South Wales coalfield and proved to be “less 
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malleable” than most.200  In the instance of the disturbance at Porthcawl the relative 
inexperience of the officers on the spot may also have been a contributory factor. 
 
Routine matters of discipline were dealt with by the battalion CO but more serious offences 
were tried at a District Court Martial.  The examination of the District Courts Martial 
Registers produces no additional information on the cases noted above.  Indeed there are no 
courts martial involving men of the 18
th
 Welsh until September 1915. It does however show a 
marked difference between the number of cases per battalion and a distinct rise in the number 
of cases across the brigade after the concentration at Aldershot in September 1915 (Table 10).  
Table 10: Trials by District Courts Martial, 119 Brigade 
(Number of offences in brackets) 
 17
th
 Welsh 18
th
 Welsh 19
th
 RWF 12
th
 SWB Total 
Apr 1915 2 (3) - - - 2 (3) 
May - - - - 0 
June  1 (1) - - - 1 (1) 
July 1 (2) - - - 1 (2) 
Aug 2 (3) - - - 2 (3) 
Sept - 1 (2) - - 1 (2) 
Oct 1 (1) 3 (3) - - 4 (4) 
Nov - 1 (2) - 1 (1) 2 (3) 
Dec - - - - 0 
Total 7 (10) 5 (7) 0 1 (1) 13 (18) 
      
Jan 1916 1 (1) 1 (2) 1 (1) 2 (3) 5 (7) 
Feb 3 (5) - 1 (2) 3 (4) 7 (11) 
Mar  2 (3) 2 (3) 1 (1) 5 (7) 10 (14) 
Apr 4 (7) 2 (2) 1 (3) 1 (1) 8 (13) 
May 2 (2) 5 (7) 1 (2) 3 (7) 11 (18) 
Total 12 (18) 10 (14) 5 (9) 14 (22) 41 (63) 
      
Overall 19 (28) 15 (21) 5 (9) 15 (23) 54 (81) 
Source: TNA: WO 86/64-70 
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The brigade’s first courts martial took place in April 1915 when two privates of the 17th 
Welsh were tried on charges of insubordination (to a lieutenant) and desertion with theft.  The 
17
th
 Welsh had the worst record of the four battalions during 1915.  The 18
th
 Welsh start to 
close the gap following the move to Aldershot while the 19
th
 RWF and 12
th
 SWB have almost 
no trials.  The number of trials increased markedly in 1916 with 76% of the total of fifty-four 
occurring in the five months before the brigade left for France.  In comparison, in nine months 
of training at home the men of the three brigades of 10
th
 (Irish) Division (29, 30 and 31 
Brigades) were tried for 274, 249 and 118 offences respectively.
201
  In fourteen months just 
eighty-one offences were tried within 119 Brigade’s units. Battalion-level figures given in 
Bowman’s and Sandford’s works vary enormously.202 The figures for four sample battalions 
from the 36
th
 (Ulster) Division during their training at home are: 10
th
 Royal Inniskilling 
Fusiliers, 18; 9
th
 RIRifles, 47; 13
th
 RIRifles, 9; 14
th
 RIRifles, 5. While in the 10
th
 (Irish) 
Division figures range from 150 in the 6
th
 Royal Dublin Fusiliers to just 10 in the 6
th
 battalion 
of the same regiment (both 30 Brigade). There is an average of 69, 62 and 30 trials per 
battalion in 29, 30 and 31 Brigades respectively during their training period.  The battalions of 
119 Brigade seem to have remarkably well behaved in comparison. These soldiers were 
predominantly labouring men and, while it is tempting to think of them as well-behaved, 
chapel-going Welshmen, the presence of large numbers of men from England in two 
battalions (one of which has the fewest trials by courts martial) would indicate that discipline 
was not a function of nationality. The variations in the number of trials / offences between 
battalions in the same formation confirms Bowman’s conclusion that the application of 
military justice was not consistent and did indeed vary from unit to unit.
203
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What type of offence was tried by court martial in 119 Brigade? The most common offences 
were absence which featured either alone or with other offences in fourteen cases (17% of all 
offences); insubordination in thirteen cases (24%); desertion in ten cases (19%) and 
drunkenness in just eight cases (15%): a picture that is broadly similar to that for other New 
Army formations (Table 11) although once again each formation seems to have its own 
unique profile. The low percentage of cases of insubordination in 119 Brigade may reflect the 
long held acceptance of a hierarchy within the workplace, particularly in the coal mines of 
Wales. 
Table 11: Offences tried by District Courts Martial during training period 
Offence 
119 
Brigade 
(number of 
occurrences 
in brackets) 
10
th
 (Irish) 
Division
204
 
13
th
 
(Western) 
Division 
36
th 
(Ulster) 
Division 
(sample of 4 
battalions)
205
 
Absence  17% (14) 28% 16% 14% 
Drunkenness 10% (8) 9% 7% 4% 
Insubordination 16% (13) 8% 12% 5% 
Desertion 12% (10) 22% 10% 17% 
Loss of public property 11% (9) 15% 17% - 
Violence 6% (5) 12% 8% 3% 
Miscellaneous military 
offences 
14% (11) 9% 12% 50% 
Theft 4% (3) 4% 2% 4% 
 
The accused was found not guilty in only three of the fifty-four trials of 119 Brigade soldiers. 
The most common sentence was a period of detention (42 instances) while loss of property 
resulted in the imposition of stoppages (7 instances).  Drunkenness and other offences by 
NCOs invariably resulted in reduction in rank (9 instances).  There were only three instances 
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of sentencing to a period of hard labour and two of those were commuted to detention.  In all 
there were seven cases where sentences were commuted or remitted.  The figures presented 
by Sandford show that sentencing records of battalions was as varied as the number and type 
of charges but that detention was consistently the most common sentence.
206
  Data on Field 
General Courts Martial overseas will be presented in later chapters. 
 
Uniform, Equipment and Training 
The process of equipping and training the New Armies for war has been ably described by 
Peter Simkins, who has highlighted the effects of widespread shortages of uniform and 
equipment in 1914 – 1915.207  These shortages also affected the troops of the nascent WAC.  
Clive Hughes has described how the NEC tackled the shortage of khaki uniforms in the WAC 
by commissioning its own distinctive uniforms in ‘Brethyn Llwyd’ – a Welsh grey homespun 
cloth – which started to be issued in December 1914.  A total of 8,440 sets of Brethyn Llwyd 
jackets and trousers was purchased for the WAC and distributed unevenly across its units 
including to some troops of what became 119 Brigade.  WAC records show that Kitchener 
Blue trousers, caps, jackets and greatcoats were purchased along with the official khaki and 
Brethyn Llwyd items.
208
  Sometimes the same unit received different colours of clothing. 
Lieutenant-Colonel Homfray, OC 18
th
 Welsh, objected to the issue of Brethyn Llwyd to his 
battalion: 
 I beg to bring to notice that the following clothing has been received here for men of 
my battalion, viz: 160 suits of Khaki; 400 suits of Brethin Llwyd from Messrs Trippe 
& Sons and Messrs John Howell & Co respectively. 
 In view of the fact that the former suits have already been issued, I most strongly 
protest against issuing two different types of clothing to the men of my regiment. 
 Messrs Trippe & Sons of Cardiff have satisfied me they are in a position to supply the 
balance of the suits of Khaki as quickly as I require same which I entirely agree with. 
                                                 
206
 Sandford, Neither Unionist Nor Nationalist, p.246, Figure 7.4. 
207
 Simkins, Kitchener’s Army. 
208
 Cited in Hughes, Welsh Army Corps, p.92 et seq. 
78 
 
 I wish my men clothed in Khaki and quite consider that I am entitled to have them 
 clothed uniformly.
209
  
 
Homfray reinforced his argument in a letter to the Chairman of the WAC Clothing 
Committee: 
 I feel sure that if this be insisted on, the whole show will be spoilt, as we have already 
issued 256 suits, 576 greatcoats and 698 caps, all of Khaki, and to have some of the 
men in this material and some in something else would make us a laughing stock, and 
absolutely ruin our ‘Esprit de Corps’.  I hope you will do all you can to insist on our 
getting Khaki as soon as possible.
210
 
 
His outrage and his attempt to go his own way in sourcing clothing did not get far in the face 
of the NEC’s desire for centralised supply.  On 2 March 1915 he was told that “To complete 
the requirements of your Battalion 332 Brethyn Llwyd suits have been ordered from Messrs 
Masters & Co. Ltd, Cardiff”.211  A note dated 28 September 1915 to the OC 18th Welsh 
enquiring about how a discrepancy amounting to two suits between the number of Brethyn 
Llwyd uniforms reported by the battalion (1453) and those issued by the WAC (1455) came 
about seems to indicate that this battalion was still wearing the style at the time although the 
supply had already dried up.  As early as 12 July the WAC Secretary was telling the Corps 
Storekeeper, in response to a request for additional clothing from the 18
th
 Welsh, to use up 
stocks of Brethyn Llwyd to the nearest size possible because WAC contracts had expired and 
“there are no instructions to enter into new ones”.   The Storekeeper issued 142 suits of sizes 
5’3” to 5’6” to the battalion and the CO was informed that no more ‘Bantam’ sizes 
remained.
212
  A photograph of B Company, 18
th
 Welsh, at Aldershot in 1915 shows some men 
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wearing distinctly lighter shades of uniform. These may well be the remnants of the Brethyn 
Llwyd issue.
213
 
 
An account of three hundred men of the 19
th
 RWF marching from Llandudno to Deganwy in 
March 1915 describes how they were “all clad in their new khaki suits and appeared 
remarkably smart and soldierlike”.214  The battalion had achieved its soldierly appearance by 
breaking purchasing rules (along with the 15
th
 and 17
th
 RWF) prompting the WAC Secretary 
to complain: 
 We had already provided for all their requirements at full strength and now we are 
unexpectedly informed that they have entered into contracts with the manufacturers 
direct. As a civilian, I would suggest that the officers might be better employed in 
training their men than in taking upon themselves duties which have been delegated to 
the Clothing Committee. … I would suggest that, inasmuch as the Committee is 
directly responsible to the War Office for all goods entered into, the Committee should 
themselves make their own contracts without any regard to Officers Commanding.
215
 
 
There is no direct evidence to indicate that the 17
th
 Welsh were issued with Brethyn Llwyd 
clothing but a photograph of the battalion signal section shows six of twenty-five men 
wearing a distinctly paler shade of uniform.
216
 However, in May 1915 the battalion 
quartermaster requested three hundred and eighty-two khaki suits for “men who have not yet 
been supplied with Khaki Service Dress”.217 The 12th SWB seems always to have been clad in 
khaki and a photograph of A Company dated July 1915 shows a uniform appearance of the 
ranks.
218
  There is no evidence in the WAC records of any issue of Brethyn Llwyd to the 
battalion. 
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The presence of battalions of small men within the WAC added to the confusion of supply.  In 
March 1915 the 15
th
 Welsh at Rhyl received an order of bantam-sized greatcoats intended for 
the 18
th
 Welsh at Porthcawl and Lieutenant-Colonel Wilkie (OC 17
th
 Welsh) had to point out 
that hundreds of caps and pairs of boots “owing to their large size are unsuitable for the men 
in the unit under my command”.219   The following month an urgent request went out from the 
18
th
 Welsh for boots of sizes five, six and seven.  The 19
th
 RWF also urgently requested boots 
during the same month emphasising that “the prevailing sizes for men of this battalion [are] 5-
6-7”.220  The Platoon Roll Book of 16 Platoon, 17th Welsh records the shoe size of thirty-six 
of its sixty-five men.  Four were size five; nineteen were size six; twelve were size seven and 
just one was size eight.
221
 
 
Even without the special requirements of the bantams the system struggled with the same 
demands as those generated by most of the New Army units in the process of formation.  An 
early photograph of the 17
th
 Welsh at Porthcawl shows a sight typical of the early weeks of 
most New Army battalions with the men parading in their civilian overcoats and flat caps.
222
 
A press reporter commenting on the 18
th
 Welsh, then forming at Porthcawl, remarked on “a 
rather unusual sight being a number of men from Lancashire drilling with clogs on”.223  The 
WAC files record constant requests for clothing and kit of all types.  Cap badges and 
numerals, NCO’s chevrons and warrant officer’s crowns were urgently needed to help bolster 
the identity of the new units and their personnel.  The 18
th
 Welsh obtained badges from a local 
supplier near the Prees Heath camp as late as August 1915 and the photograph of A Company 
                                                 
219
 NLW WAC: C27/2 and C32/3. Memoranda 18 March 1915 and 20 April 1915. 
220
 NLW WAC: C34/4 . Telegram to WAC Secretary from OC 19
th
 Welsh, 30 April 1915. 
221
 Platoon Roll Book, 16 Platoon, 17
th
 Welsh, author’s collection. 
222
 Daily Mirror, 19
 
January 1915. 
223
 Western Mail, 6 February 1915. 
81 
 
12
th
 SWB mentioned above shows many men without cap badges.
224
  In April only half the 
men of the 19
th
 RWF had greatcoats and there were no shirts or drawers.  Even by June it was 
reported that “men remain unclothed” due to shortage of uniform.  Given the rapid growth of 
the New Armies such shortages were inevitable. 
 
In addition to problems with ‘official’ supplies some equipment was not forthcoming from 
official sources. The press reported that “a number of items which the War Office do not 
provide are still wanted, including field-glasses for non-commissioned officers, spades for 
trenching work, field cookers and a motor ambulance”.225 In an effort to provide 
entertainment and boost morale during marches, two battalions established bands. In March 
1915 Mr W.J. Tatem presented instruments to the 18
th
 Welsh at Porthcawl to form a band that 
gave its first concert in June.  While in North Wales, after Lieutenant-Colonel Wilkie had 
expressed his wish to form a battalion band and sought the £300 required, Madame Riviere 
stepped in and raised funds for a set of bugles and drums with accessories.
226
   
 
Despite the shortages of kit the four battalions of 119 Brigade had befitted from the 
experiences of the first three New Armies in other ways.  The first formations struggled to 
find acceptable accommodation and for many there was no alternative to the use of tents.  
When the weather broke in October 1914 the War Office hutting programme was seriously 
behind schedule and the tented camps became quagmires.  The War Office solution was to 
approve the greatly increased use of billets and to delegate arrangements for this to local Area 
Quartering Committees.  By the time that the 119 Brigade’s battalions were formed, systems 
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were well established at Porthcawl and in the seaside resorts of North Wales so that all of the 
battalions were able to use billets rather than tents or overcrowded public or industrial 
buildings.  Brigadier-General Owen Thomas, 113 Brigade, 43
rd
 (later 38
th
) (Welsh) Division, 
noted that “One thing I feel certain about is the fact that these men are billeted with 
respectable people has a splendid effect on their behaviour”.227  Meanwhile the creation of 
new camps included the hutted camp at Prees Heath, Shropshire where the brigade first came 
together in July 1915.
228
  While the use of billets had some advantages for the men, their 
dispersal even across a relatively small area created problems in gathering men together 
promptly for parades and training.   
 
While there was a clear syllabus for the training of new infantry recruits over a period of six 
months the lack of sources prevents a detailed picture of how this was applied to the four 
battalions of 119 Brigade.  Some of the men of the brigade (particularly those of the 17
th
 
Welsh) would complete eighteen months of service before proceeding abroad and the sheer 
boredom must have been disheartening – Lieutenant E.E.A. Whitworth, 12th SWB,  certainly 
found it “irksome and disappointing, and … some of us wondered whether we should ever see 
active service at all”.229 On the other hand the brigade had a head start in training matters over 
its sister brigades that were recruited later in 1915 and over the additional battalions brought 
in to bolster them in February 1916. Alexander Watson has stated that the average training 
period for a New Army battalion was 9.4 months which was “adequate to enable strong 
primary group bonds and feelings of esprit de corps to form”.230  These had the chance to 
develop further in 119 Brigade. 
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The basics of drill occupied the first part of the training syllabus and as this required neither 
arms nor equipment it could and did occupy the troops even while battalions were being 
recruited. The promenades and beaches of Porthcawl, Rhos-on-Sea and Llandudno provided 
parade grounds and in Newport the 12
th
 SWB used the municipal park.  Battalions were lucky 
if they had some experienced soldiers to call on. Second-Lieutenant Evan Beynon Davies, 
19
th
 RWF, noted that Sergeant J.E. Jones and Quartermaster Keating were the only 
experienced soldiers in the battalion.  At Newport, Second-Lieutenant J. Saunders Lewis, 12
th
 
SWB, noted that “the sergeants of another battalion are lent to us for training in early parts of 
work” while at Porthcawl the 18th Welsh were lent the services of lieutenants Bracher and 
Pugh and sergeants Davies and Prangley by the 16
th
 Welsh.
231
  Prior to Lieutenant-Colonel 
Homfray taking command of the battalion the two junior officers acted as OC and 2iC 
respectively and, although the loan was “a temporary measure only”, Pugh transferred to the 
battalion in the next month as captain and adjutant. In addition to these officers it was 
reported that “there are no fewer than ten competent instructors on duty, some of whom have 
seen considerable service in South Africa and elsewhere.  One of the instructors holds the 
DCM”.232 
 
Even though the 18
th
 Welsh was still recruiting it was reported in March that it was making: 
 Rapid strides towards efficiency, thanks to the keenness of officers, non-
commissioned officers and men.  This week A Company carried out their first night 
march and outpost work, and were visited at certain points by Colonel H.R Homfray 
[and] Adjutant Sidney W. Pugh, who took an entirely different route, in order to see 
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whether the work was properly carried out.  So well were the duties performed that 
they were unable to get through the lines unchallenged.
233
  
 
In Newport with the 12
th
 SWB, Saunders Lewis noted how “The Battalion is in a curious way 
now; there are some here who have had three months of training, and many a few days, and 
new men come in daily; so that our work as officers will range from the entirely elementary to 
the very advanced.”234  This must have been both confusing and frustrating for the officers 
concerned but there were other, unforeseen, problems: 
 I was put in charge of the scouts and signalling section of our battalion; in fact I was 
set to form and instruct them; and as there is a great deal of writing to do in these tasks 
I soon discovered that a big proportion of the men is quite illiterate, and that to read, 
write and spell fluently is quite exceptional – and it made my job next to impossible. 
 The only thing I could think of to remedy matters was to institute a night school in the 
battalion, and I suggested that to the men.  They seemed to take to the proposal very 
readily; so I said that if I could get a reasonable number of men keen on joining I 
should myself get a room in Newport and start classes two nights a week …235 
 
  ...only a few of them cannot write at all, it is dictation and spelling [that] they are 
 weak in.
236
 
 
His classes seem to have progressed but after a spell away at a signalling course he found that 
much depended on his own dedication to the task after “finding a man who had temporarily 
undertaken my work had succeeded in a few weeks in ruining all I’d tried to do at Newport, 
and had given the Colonel an idea that I had not taught the signallers a single thing.  I really 
felt like throwing up my old commission”.237 
 
Beynon Davies, 19
th
 RWF, contrasted the “warm and happy atmosphere in Wales” with the  
realization, following the move to Prees Heath, “that we were finally in reality going to war  
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and that we had a day of busy bending to the task ahead of us”.238 Quite what that task 
consisted of is not clear as no description on the training undertaken at Prees Heath has been 
traced.  Two photographs taken by a local photographer show men of the 17
th
 Welsh returning 
to Prees Heath in columns of threes behind their band.  The men have 1914 Pattern leather 
equipment and approximately one in three carries a long Lee-Enfield rifle – the type 
commonly issued (often in small quantities) to New Army units for initial training.  Clive 
Hughes has described how “the WAC received a few condemned rifles at the start of 1915, 
otherwise the men had to use walking sticks or other improvised arms” and how after 
attending the 128 Brigade St David’s Day parade at Llandudno, at which arms were 
conspicuous by their absence, Lloyd George interceded with Lord Kitchener.  “As a result 
each battalion [of the WAC] received a hundred Boer War firearms”.239  Captain E.E.A. 
Whitworth, 12
th
 SWB, noted that following the move to Aldershot “the men had not been 
issued with their service rifles and each company had a certain number of ‘D.P.s’ (Drill 
Purpose, that is rifles not fit to fire) on its strength”.240  It must be assumed that the training at 
Prees Heath focused on drill practice along with route marches and running while a start was 
made on rifle drill (but not firing) using the few weapons available. Beynon Davies records 
that the arms drill in summertime was no great problem and “reinforced our health and 
strength under the smiles of the sun”.241  Saunders Lewis noted that his writing classes might 
not take place because “in camp there is night work so often, there may not be time”.242 
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Training moved up a gear once the brigade moved to Aldershot and then, in December 1915, 
to nearby Blackdown: 
 We came to know a lot about the geography of England within about fifty miles of 
Aldershot, and we knew how hard it was to live in an open trench, what it was to fight 
with bayonets and mills bombs, how to read a map an how to withstand a gas attack. 
After being at it for hours training in the heat of the day it was grand to be able to 
return to barracks and to hear the boys singing ‘Tipperary’, ‘When I get my civvy 
clothes on’, and ‘Waltzing Matilda’.243 
 
By Christmas 1915 he thought that they “had become seasoned soldiers, and that we had 
hardened sufficiently to face anything on the battlefield”.244 Captain Whitworth, 12th SWB, 
noted that “at this stage in our training we were frequently practising by companies outpost 
and the attack” and “I was happy and fully occupied with the work of a company commander; 
the week’s training ended on each Saturday morning with a route march of 10 or 12 miles in 
full marching order and the Bantams, despite the weight of equipment and ammunition, 
responded well”.245 Saunders Lewis was also having a better time of it: “I am at work now I 
think would interest you, teaching map-reading and compass work; explaining contours and 
scales.  Tomorrow, if the snow abates, I am taking half a dozen NCOs out on bicycles with 
me cycling on compass bearings, and doing practical map-reading in the country.  It is work I 
really enjoy”.246  He was having problems though in finding NCOs to take on responsibility: 
 Sometimes work is very depressing.  I have had my class of nearly sixty men now for 
nearly eight months, and constantly training, lecturing, exhorting, yet now when I 
want to make more NCOs, out of fifty-odd men I can scarcely find one whom I can 
trust to take responsibly and be strong and be able to command men.  Even of the four 
NCOs I have, one who has been with me since the beginning is utterly weak and 
impotent to take command and care, the others are fairly successful.  Results like these 
make me very doubtful and rather hopeless.  You can preach, teach, command, 
persuade, bully, appeal, attempt to exemplify but unless they are in a man, nothing you 
(or I) do can give them the qualities I strive for.  I wish I had some training in teaching 
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or in psychology before I started this work.  Often I feel at a disadvantage in dealing 
with men.  For surely every man may be approached and won some way.
247
 
 
On 4 January 1916 Captain Gibbs, 18
th
 Welsh, noted that they had been firing on the ranges  
but a new hardness was entering his correspondence:  
 
 Unpleasant things happen and have to be done every day in the Army and life doesn’t 
go smoothly as in peace time.  In fact to carry on properly one has to be hard and think 
of nothing but the one job, work night and day, read, think and live for one end – 
killing Germans.  It’s horrid I know but the sooner it’s over the better and the more 
one gets right into it the sooner it will be over.
248
 
 
With the final musketry courses fired and the division made up to strength the frustrations of 
the long wait to go overseas were almost over.
249
  Gibbs reported how the difficult job of an 
officer was bearing fruit:  
 There are things that must be studied quite apart from drill and field work and these 
have to be gradually planted in every man’s heart unknown to himself even, so that 
when the time comes the men of the 18
th
 will not be found lacking in courage.  It 
means really that every man now serving must feel in himself that it matters little if he 
dies in June of this year or Dec of 1996.  He must also have the feeling that he’s going 
to come through the war quite alright and this in itself will help him through.  But it’s 
a bit of a job kid isn’t it -  to impart this unknown to them, but I believe it’s bearing 
fruit already as on the march today A Coy were singing to the top of their voices about 
what would happen if anyone would only show them a German.  It was a topping song 
and I didn’t know where they got it from ... though the language was perhaps not quite 
as it should have been.
250
 
 
The bantams distinguished themselves in other ways that helped to strengthen their identity 
and build morale: 
 There was a big cross country race here today – a team of 20 men from each battalion.  
There were over 700 running.  Our little Bantams ran and were 6
th
 team home.  Every 
one finished (of ours) and all were in the first 100. Can you imagine the sight? Little 
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wee fellows running against 6ft Australians, Canadians and goodness knows what – 
and beat them too. The King started the race.
251
 
 
 
The King would pay one more visit to the bantams.  On 25 May 1916 the whole of 40
th
 
Division was drawn up on Laffin’s Plain for a royal inspection and was told afterwards that  
“The Major General is much pleased at being able to inform all ranks that General Sir 
Archibald Hunter, Commanding the Aldershot Command, has notified that the parade of the 
40
th
 Division on the 25
th
 of May on the occasion of its inspection by His Majesty the King, 
was quite the best witnessed on Laffin’s Plain since the outbreak of the War.”252 
 
The proprietorial attitude of the WAC Executive Committee towards ‘its’ bantam brigade has 
been noted earlier in this chapter.  It was clearly demonstrated for a final time by the reaction 
of the NEC Secretary, Owen, to the arrangements for the otherwise successful royal 
inspection. Under the headlines ‘WHAT WAS LACKING / WHY WELSH 
MUNICIPALITIES WERE NOT REPRESENTED’ the correspondent of the Cardiff-based 
Western Mail reported: 
 So remarkable was [sic] the circumstances that none of the Welsh municipalities were 
 represented [at the inspection] that I afterwards made inquiries as to what had 
 happened. Mr. O.W. Owen, the secretary of the Welsh Army Corps, told me quite 
 frankly that he had not been consulted at all with regards to the arrangements for 
 today, and that he had only heard casually that certain private invitations were being 
 sent out [Lord Plymouth and Sir Ivor Philipps were present at the inspection].   
 “I was not asked,” he said, “to communicate any invitations to members of the 
 committee of the Welsh army Corps, who have been working so hard in connection 
 with the whole recruiting scheme, though, as you know, most of them, together with 
 several Welsh members of Parliament, journeyed to Winchester specially to send off 
 the [38
th] Welsh Division.” 
 The matter is certainly one which coals for inquiry, and when one recalls the 
 extraordinarily pleasant scenes at Winchester, when distinguished visitors from the 
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 various townships went among the troops distributing pipes and good wishes, one 
 could not fail to appreciate what was lacking in today’s proceedings.253 
 
On 28 May 1916 an advanced party of officers left for France and the division followed three 
days later. 
 
In summary, this chapter has established a previously absent history of 119 Brigade for the 
period before it became a part of 40
th
 Division and added detail for the period from September 
1915 up to its departure for France.  The brigade’s origins within the Welsh Army Corps at 
the commencement of recruiting bantams to the Fifth New Army and some of the issues 
surrounding recruiting and equipping bantams in 1915 have been demonstrated. The 
individual histories of the four infantry battalions have been presented along with quantitative 
data on geographic and social origins of  the men establishing that the brigade was indeed 
strongly ‘Welsh’ and composed almost entirely of men from the labouring classes.  Data on 
language and religion are also used to augment the picture of a formation with a distinct 
national identity. Quantitative data was again used, along with examples to establish the 
disciplinary records of the battalions while they remained in the United Kingdom and 
showing that, compared with other brigades for which data has been published, discipline in 
the 119 Brigade was good.  It is suggested that the extended period of training undergone by 
the brigade enhanced esprit de corps and how, even at the end of that training, the Welsh 
identity of the formation was still to the fore.  
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Chapter Two 
LEADERS, BATTALION OFFICERS AND THE 
FIRST SIX MONTHS IN FRANCE 
 
 
Chapter One of this thesis established a chronology for the formation of 119 Brigade, 
explored the geographical and social composition of its other ranks and examined how it was 
equipped and trained prior to despatch to a theatre of war.  This chapter will focus on the 
leaders that took the unit to France in June 1916 and examine its development and record in 
the field before the arrival of Frank Crozier as GOC in November 1916. Evidence will be 
presented to establish whether the Welsh identity of the ORs was shared by the battalion 
officers and data will be presented to illuminate the disciplinary record of the brigade on 
active service.  The record of the brigade’s participation in the controversial tactic of trench 
raiding will be examined and the perception of the value of bantam formations as fighting 
units explored.  Some of these perceptions will be challenged. 
 
Senior Officers 
Changes were made to the senior command before the brigade proceeded overseas.  At the 
battalion level two of the four battalions lost their existing commanding officers.  The first to 
go was the OC 19
th
 RWF, Lieutenant-Colonel Owen Lloyd Jones Evans, who as a prominent 
landowner and Welsh speaker had proved useful during the recruiting of the battalion but 
whose total lack of combat experience and age (he was 59) marked him for replacement.  
According to Beynon Davies, who had noticed his age, he was also “uncommunicative”.254  
His successor was very different.  Forty-one year old Lieutenant-Colonel Bryan John Jones 
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(1874-1918) had spent his army career in the Leinster Regiment rising from second-lieutenant 
to major and gaining combat experience in South Africa from 1899-1902 where he was 
mentioned in despatches.  He later acted as adjutant to the Royal Meath Militia (1905-1909) 
and to the 1
st
 Leinsters (1910-1912) and was a dedicated professional soldier. He was slightly 
wounded on 22 January 1915 at Dickebusch and probably wounded again later in the year.
255
  
The citation for the later bar to his DSO gives an impression of his capabilities: 
 For conspicuous gallantry and devotion to duty on the 14
th
 of October 1918, in the 
Moorseele Sector.  When it was impossible to get accurate information on the location 
of the troops during the attack, he went forward and organised his battalion while 
fighting in the streets of Moorseele, and personally placed his machine guns in action, 
causing the village to be soon cleared of the enemy. He personally shot a machine 
gunner who was holding up the advance.  His fine example and leadership were 
mainly responsible for the great success obtained by his battalion.
256
 
 
He took over command of the 19
th
 RWF on 12 November 1915. 
 
In the 18
th
 Welsh, the fifty-two year old Lieutenant-Colonel Homfray was cast in the same 
mould as Evans.  A well known figure in the county of Glamorgan, he had proved useful in 
recruiting the battalion, had not seen Regular Army service since 1889 and had no experience 
of combat. His replacement was the newly-promoted forty-eight year old Lieutenant-Colonel 
Richard Stirling Grant-Thorold (1868-1953) whose military career had been long but 
fragmented. The son of Alexander William Thorold Grant, one time High Sherriff of 
Lincolnshire, after leaving Eton in 1886 he attended the Royal Military College and was 
commissioned lieutenant in the RWF in February 1888.  He resigned his commission in 
January 1891 but joined the South African Light Horse as a lieutenant at the outbreak of the 
Boer War and was mentioned in dispatches.
257
  He left South Africa in March 1902 and in 
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May was commissioned as captain in the Lincolnshire Imperial Yeomanry.  He resigned in 
March 1905 and seems to have travelled.
258
  It was reported that in 1913 he was a breeder of 
polo ponies in British Columbia and was importing stallions from Australia.
259
  At the 
outbreak of the Great War he was in Australia where he applied for and was granted a 
commission as captain in C Company of the Australian Naval and Military Expeditionary 
Force that captured the German colony of Papua New Guinea; after which he was appointed 
district administrator for New Ireland.
260
  In March 1915 his commission was ‘terminated’ 
(the record gives no details) and he returned to Britain on 25 April 1915 to be appointed 
temporary major in the 8th Royal Fusiliers in May 1915 just before the battalion sailed for 
France.
261
  He may be the unnamed 2iC who was buried “by a crump” on 14 November 1915 
and dug out unhurt.
262
  He took command of the 18
th
 Welsh on 17 January 1916, saw the 
battalion to France and stayed with it until he was wounded on 3 January 1917.  He did not 
hold a field command again and relinquished his commission with the rank of colonel on 27 
March 1919.
263
 
 
Lieutenant-Colonels Wilkie (age 47) and Pope (age 40) took the 17
th
 Welsh and the 12
th
 SWB 
respectively to France.  The four battalion commanders were all in their forties with varying 
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degrees of experience of combat, three had served in South Africa where two were mentioned 
in despatches. 
 
At brigade level Rodney Style had commanded since the brigade was formally constituted but 
he would not lead it on active service.  In retrospect his appointment can be seen as a stop-
gap; with little combat experience, none of it in South Africa and none above the rank of 
captain, he could not have been expected to continue on into action.  His role was to bring the 
discipline of the regular army to a crowd of inexperienced volunteers.  Captain Whitworth 
(12
th
 SWB) noted that Style was: 
 The old type of regular soldier ... pre-eminently a ‘pukka-sahib’ himself he did not 
understand the material the New Army was accepting as officers … this led to much 
unnecessary friction and discontent … The GOC became intensely unpopular and 
young officers were disheartened instead of encouraged … [yet] the strictness and 
severity of the GOC was invaluable in removing the rough edges off two battalions 
where the lack of discipline was notorious … It is true that in war … the individual 
must always be sacrificed to efficiency and the attainment of any necessary object, and 
this was one of the stern lessons of warfare taught by the GOC before he left the 
Brigade. Later we learned that he was suffering from an internal complaint but he did 
not allow this to interfere with his work, and, although harsh and unsympathetic to 
individuals, his dignified presence always demanded respect as well as fear.
264
 
 
Despite a possible health issue it is clear that Style was not the man to take the brigade to war.  
His replacement took command on 8 May 1916 just three weeks before mobilization began. 
 
At fifty-four Charles Stewart Prichard (1861-1942) was a year older than Rodney Style 
(showing that age was not necessarily an impediment for command) but his background was a 
marked contrast. Educated at Marlborough he joined the Northamptonshire Regiment from 
Sandhurst as a subaltern in 1882 and became captain in 1889.  He served with distinction in 
South Africa, was mentioned in despatches twice and received the DSO. He was wounded in 
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November 1914 and again at Neuve Chapelle on 12 March 1915 while commanding the 2
nd
 
Northamptonshire Regiment, became a Companion of the Order of the Bath (Military) on 9 
December that year and was mentioned in despatches.
265
  Captain Whitworth’s view of the 
new GOC was considerably more positive than the last: 
 [He] was a man whose equal for charm of personality I have rarely if ever met in any 
sphere of life.  He was older than most Brigadiers appointed to the New Army but a 
man of great activity … To many he had two great characteristics as a General; his 
study of the men, their capabilities and necessities, was incessant, and like all great 
soldiers the idea of the impossible was abhorrent to him … in all things a very high 
standard was demanded by the GOC and this was certainly true of his inspections.
266
 
 
The first brigade major also impressed Captain Whitworth who described him as “brilliant” 
and giving “invaluable lectures on tactics and training”.267 This praise was directed at Robert 
Emile Shepherd Prentice (1872-1953) who took up his appointment on 22 July 1915 (the day 
after Style became the first GOC 119 Brigade) and stayed only until 24 October 1915 when 
he returned to the Western Front to command his battalion (2
nd
 HLI).  He was a veteran of the 
BEF’s 1914 campaign and had been wounded by shrapnel on 8 April 1915 a few days after 
taking up an appointment as Brigade Major, 2 Brigade, 1
st
 Division.  His appointment to 119 
Brigade was only going to be a temporary one but his injection of recent practical experience 
was clearly welcome.
268
 
 
The brigade major who succeeded Prentice and went to war with 119 Brigade was Captain 
Arthur Granville Soames (1886-1962), Coldstream Guards.  Soames was a member of an 
upwardly mobile family.  His father was a prosperous brewer and Arthur was educated at 
Eton, attended the Royal Military College, commissioned second-lieutenant, Coldstream 
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Guards, in 1905 and lieutenant in 1907.  He was appointed adjutant at the Guards Depot in 
September 1913 and was appointed Staff Captain, 4 Infantry Brigade, 2
nd
 Division, on 25 
August 1914. He was wounded, probably in the ferocious fighting on the Aisne in September, 
returned to England, promoted to captain in February 1915 and appointed Brigade Major, 119 
Brigade on 25 October 1915.  He was still in post when Frank Crozier took command of the 
brigade on 20 November 1916.
269
 
 
Battalion Officers 
So far this thesis has examined the other ranks of 119 Brigade, the brigade staff and the 
commanding officers of the four infantry battalions that made up the brigade.  This section 
will look at the less senior officers and their origins and form a view of their ‘Welshness’.  
 
Writing in 1917 Captain Eric Whitworth looked back at the system of officer recruitment in 
place in 1915: 
 Commissions were granted on the recommendation of Colonels after the applicants 
had been given a personal interview.  Some of these had served several months in the 
ranks, others came straight from a school OTC, while not a few were men who, 
however suitable they might be, had done no previous military training at all.  In all 
these cases there was no system of intensive training from the point of view of making 
them efficient officers before they joined their battalions; nor was there any 
opportunity of seeing whether those who had served in the ranks were really suitable 
to hold commissions … the training which these officers received consisted of a 
general course of instruction immediately after they were granted commissions.
270
 
 
Whitworth makes no observation on the geographical origins of these officers nor on their 
occupations in civil life.  In order to address this an analysis of surviving officer personal files 
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in TNA series WO 339 and WO 374 was carried out.
271
  A total of 209 personal files of 
officers who served in units of 119 Brigade 1914-1918 were identified and examined.  Of 
these 156 belong to officers from the four original battalions of the brigade.  How many of 
these were Welsh?  County of birth is only given in fifty per cent of cases and analysis shows 
a high number of Welsh-born officers (67.5%) but almost all the records give residency 
information (146) and this shows that sixty-one per cent of the officers found were Welsh 
residents (Table 12).   The figures vary across the battalions with only fifty per cent of 12
th
 
SWB officers Welsh resident - going a little way to confirming Second-Lieutenant J. 
Saunders Lewis’ observation that “there are more English (and one or two Irish) than Welsh 
officers in the [12
th
] SWB”.272  Surprisingly the 19th RWF, the least Welsh battalion in its 
other ranks, has the largest number of Welsh residents amongst its officers at more than 
seventy-three per cent (73.7%).  The battalion also has more Welsh counties represented and 
although the number of officers from Glamorgan in all battalions confirms the pre-eminent 
role of that county in recruiting, in the 19
th
 RWF the rural counties of North Wales 
predominate.  The 17
th
 Welsh have sixty-one per cent of officers Welsh residents (61.3%) and 
the 18
th
 Welsh sixty-five per cent (65.9%).  A surviving post-war address list for the Officers’ 
Association of the 18
th
 Welsh gives a lower (although still high) figure of fifty-four per cent 
of officers with Welsh addresses.
273
  As a comparison Timothy Bowman’s work on the 36th 
(Ulster) Division, a formation with strong political and geographical affiliations, shows that 
eighty-one per cent of its officers were resident in the nine counties of Ulster. 
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Table 12: Geographical origin of officers by residence (sample sizes in brackets) 
Welsh County 17
th
 Welsh  
(31) 
18
th
 Welsh  
(41) 
19
th
 RWF  
(38) 
12
th
 SWB  
(36) 
Anglesey - - 3 - 
Brecknock - - 1 - 
Caernarfon 1 - 9 - 
Carmarthen - 3 3 - 
Cardigan - 1 2 - 
Denbigh - - 2 2 
Glamorgan 17 19 8 6 
Monmouth - 4 - 10 
Pembroke 1 - - - 
Non-Welsh 
Resident 
12 14 10 18 
% Welsh 
Resident 
61.3% 65.9% 73.7% 50% 
Source: TNA: WO 339 and WO 374 Series. 
Both Gary Sheffield and Timothy Bowman have shown how the perception of the war time 
officer class as being dominated by the products of the public school system is incorrect.
274
 
Nevertheless, the Officer Training Corps, created in 1908 and consisting in 1914 of twenty-
four university-based units and 166 public school and grammar school-based units, was an 
important source of officers.  Between August 1915 and March 1915 20,577 men with OTC 
backgrounds were commissioned.
275
 The number of OTC men available seems, not 
unexpectedly, to have decreased markedly in 1915.  In the personal files identified at TNA of 
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108 commissions to units of 119 Brigade in 1915 just eighteen (17%) can be identified with 
men with experience at an OTC unit.
276
  These are not distributed evenly across the brigade: 
the 17
th
 Welsh and 19
th
 RWF having just two each while the 18
th
 Welsh and 12
th
 SWB each 
had seven.  The lack of military knowledge amongst the officers of the brigade must have 
been conspicuous.  This is in marked contrast with the situation in 1916/17 after the 
introduction of Officer Cadet Battalions in February 1916 to address the training of officers.  
In 1916/17 thirty of forty-seven commissions to the brigade’s units (64%) are known to have 
been given to OCB graduates while a further eight went to OTC members – a vast 
improvement in the number of trained officers. 
 
Gary Sheffield has pointed out that analysis of the civilian occupations of army officers 
carried out at demobilization showed that the largest numbers belonged to the ‘commercial 
and clerical’ (27%), ‘students and teachers’ (18%), ‘professional men’ (15%) and 
‘engineering’ (8%) classes. In 119 Brigade a similar picture emerges when the 127 records for 
the officers of the four original battalions that give an occupation are examined. 
Schoolteachers and students are thirty-one per cent of commissioned officers while clerks / 
bank clerks / bank cashiers make up thirty four per cent, engineers and shopkeepers each 
make up five per cent.  If the records examined are restricted to those commissioned up to 
1916 (91) the picture changes with schoolteacher/students making up thirty-three per cent and 
clerks/bank clerks making up twenty-four per cent (29% if civil servants are included).  The 
officers of 119 Brigade were overwhelmingly middle class throughout the war.  It is 
noteworthy that the single commissioned miner, labourer, painter and cotton-spinner all came 
through the OCB route. 
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Bowman’s study profiles the ages of the 36th (Ulster) Division officers and here a 
considerable difference with the ages of 119 Brigade officers emerges.  The Ulstermen had 
more older officers (Table 13) and this may be due in part to the deliberate selection “of older 
men who had held positions of responsibility in the business world”.277  The men of the 119 
Table 13: Comparative age profiles (sample sizes in brackets) 
Year class 36
th
 (Ulster) 
Division (228) 
38
th
 (Welsh) 
Division (37) 
119 Brigade (144) 
1855 - 1859 3% (7) 2.7% (1) - 
1860 -1864 3.9% (9) 2.7% (1) - 
1865 - 1869 7.5% (17) - - 
1870 - 1874 7 % (16) 2.7% (1) - 
1875 - 1879 13.6% (31) 2.7%  (1) 2.8% (4) 
1880 – 1884 19.7% (45) 21.6% (8) 11.1% (16) 
1885 - 1889 17.1% (39) 16.2% (6) 23.6% (34) 
1890 – 1894 22.8% (52) 37.8% (14) 45.8% (66) 
1895 - 1899 5.3% (12) 13.5% (5) 16.7% (24) 
Source: Bowman, ‘Officering Kitchener’s Armies’ for 36th and 38th Division data. 
Brigade in contrast were clearly younger even allowing for Bowman’s dataset containing 
more of the senior officers of the 36
th
 and 38
th
 Divisions.  Despite its small size the sample of 
data from 38
th
 Division suggests that its age profile is more akin to that of 119 Brigade.  
Despite the first impression of the brigade’s officer corps consisting of a large group of 
young, inexperienced officers a surprising number of them had gained some military 
knowledge before commissioning.  Of 109 commissions given before the brigade left Britain 
no less than seventy-seven (69%) went to men who had already enlisted.  Seventeen of these 
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came from the Territorial Force - mainly the Welsh Horse, Glamorgan Yeomanry and field 
artillery units while the largest single number (20) came from the 13
th
 RWF which had started 
recruiting in September 1914.  The surplus men from the 13
th
 RWF were the basis of the 16
th
 
RWF which contributed a further five men for commission in 119 Brigade.  Four men came 
from the 14
th
 Royal Warwickshire Regiment (raised September 1914) and three came from 
the 21
st
 Royal Fusiliers (Public Schools Battalion). 
 
Selection seems to have been in the hands of the OC battalion and most early applications 
seen were approved by the divisional general Sir Ivor Philipps.  John Saunders Lewis, a 
student at Liverpool University, had enlisted in the 19
th
 King’s (Liverpool Regiment) in the 
early days of the war.  In May 1915 he wrote that his application for a commission “kept me 
very busy, so many forms I had to sign, so many letters to write, so many officers to 
interview; the Vice-Chancellor has given me a recommendation but it will be many weeks or 
months perhaps before I hear anything of it”.278  A little later “The preliminary part of my 
application for a commission is now over, and if it were not I should myself annul everything, 
for I am tired of the endless interviewing and correspondence.  Yesterday, however, I was 
called to the Colonel and he seems willing to send my papers off.  Thank the Lord”.  At the 
end of the month he was called to an interview with Lieutenant-Colonel Pope, OC 12
th
 SWB. 
“[I] had my interview today, a horrid one, was sent from the room, thought it was all over and 
almost felt thankful, called back and found myself accepted, and sent by the next train back to 
London to buy my outfit … They gave me £50 to do it.”279 
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Eric Whitworth was a territorial officer, one of the men who did have a public school 
background and had an even more difficult time than Lewis.  When war broke out he was an 
assistant master at Rugby School, and found himself in December 1914 at Southend as a 
second-lieutenant with the 14
th
 (Reserve) Battalion The Rifle Brigade.  He was obviously not 
happy with his lot but used his connections: 
I met Lt Colonel Haig-Browne who had commanded the Lancing contingent of the 
OTC and I told him of the conditions at Southend.  His brother-in-law, Lt Colonel A. 
Pope, was raising a service battalion of the South Wales Borderers and was very short 
of officers with any experience at all to take command of the companies, and he 
offered me command of a company with the rank of Captain.  My colonel refused his 
consent to the transfer and I demanded an interview with the Brigadier.  I pointed out 
that I had two years service as a Territorial Officer, including attachments to the 
Northamptonshire and Warwickshire regiments and that the transfer offered me not 
only promotion but the chance to make use of my previous service.  The Brigadier no 
doubt realised the unsatisfactory state of affairs in the 14
th
 Rifle Brigade and 
authorised the transfer.
280
 
 
These were the type of men, overwhelmingly Welsh, educated, middle class, inexperienced 
and in their twenties and thirties, who would lead companies and platoons in France.  
 
Early Days in France 
After crossing the English Channel 119 Brigade completed its concentration in the French 
villages of Bourecq and St Hilaire (just west of Lillers in the Pas de Calais) on 5 June 1916 
and was attached to 1
st
 Division, I Corps, for instruction.  The system for inducting new 
divisions to the practicalities of trench warfare had been evolving through the previous year 
and usually involved attaching units from the newly-arrived division to units of one or more 
(often two) experienced divisions in a relatively quite sector of the front. When the first 
division of the New Armies, 9
th
 (Scottish) Division, arrived in France in May 1915 it received 
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its induction in the line from 6
th
 Division to which each of its brigades was attached for two 
days.  Following additional intensive training out of the line in the skills of bombing, the 
division relieved 7
th
 Division in the line near Festubert on the night of 1/2 July.
281
 By the time 
that Frank Crozier arrived in France in October 1915 as 2iC 9
th
 Royal Irish Rifles [RIRifles], 
107 Brigade, 36
th
 (Ulster) Division, GHQ had decided to augment the usual five day 
attachment to an experienced division (in this case the 4
th
 and 48
th
 Divisions) by removing 
one brigade for a longer attachment to another division and replacing it temporarily with a 
brigade of regulars from that division.  Thus Crozier found himself along with 107 Brigade in 
4
th
 Division for two months until the brigades were returned to their original divisions.
282
  
This highly disruptive system did not last long.  When 38
th
 (Welsh) Division arrived in 
December 1915 its battalions were attached in rotation over three weeks to the Guards and 
19
th
 Divisions, XI Corps, followed by attachment by complete brigades for a further two 
weeks before relieving 19
th
 Division and taking over its sector of the line on 24 January 
1916.
283
 
 
By the time that the bantams of 35
th
 Division arrived at the front in February 1916 the 
induction period seems to have shortened and the division’s units were attached to 19th and 
38
th
 Divisions, XI Corps, for just ten days before relieving 19
th
 Division in the line on 7 
March.
284
  The transfer of 40
th
 Division to France was delayed by the need to absorb and train 
the replacement battalions in 120 and 121 Brigades and so it was the 41
st
 Division that arrived 
first. On 14 May 1916 their first parties were despatched to the front for instruction in II 
Corps sector.  Two sections per company were given two days supervised induction in the 
                                                 
281
 John Ewing, The History of the 9
th
 (Scottish) Division 1914-1919 (London: John Murray, 1921), pp. 12-15. 
282
 Cyril Falls, The History of the 36
th
 (Ulster) Division (London: Constable, 1922), pp. 24-28. 
283
 TNA: WO 95/2539/1. War Diary 38
th
 (Welsh) Division General Staff. 
284
 H.M. Davson, The History of the 35
th
 Division in the Great War (London: Sifton, Praed &Co, 1926), pp.8-9. 
103 
 
trenches that their respective platoons would eventually occupy.  By 1 June 41
st
 Division had 
relieved the 9
th
 (Scottish) Division in the line.
285
 
 
Trench induction followed a similar although slightly extended pattern for 40
th
 Division.  
Starting on 8 June two battalions of 119 Brigade spent two days paired with men from the 
brigades of 1
st
 Division at a one to one ratio.  Ruggles-Brise reported to his wife “Tomorrow I 
am sending two of my little bantam Battns up to the trenches for instruction.  I think they will 
get on all right.  They go up by twos until they are all finished”.286 The initial two days was 
followed by a further two days with the battalions attached on a platoon to platoon basis.  
Once all battalions had completed this they were given a further two days in the front or 
support line retaining their company organisation.  By 5 July 1916 40
th
 Division had relieved 
1
st
 Division in the I Corps right sector.  119 Brigade manned the Calonne section, 121 Brigade 
was responsible for the Maroc section and 120 Brigade formed the reserve.
287
 With an 
adjustment to extend the length of front occupied, 119 Brigade would spend the next four 
months in this area. 
 
Things had not started well for the brigade. When the 17
th
 Welsh and 19
th
 RWF left for the 
trenches and it was noted that after ten miles their march discipline was “very bad”.  This did 
not escape the GOC Division who displayed some sympathy: “our little bantams did not do a 
very good march and they make them march much too far at the finish … This is rather 
annoying as I thought that I had taken every precaution”.288  The records show that there was 
another, more serious, issue relating to discipline and training. During its first tour in the 
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trenches the brigade suffered a total of nineteen killed and fifty-four wounded.  The brigade 
war diary notes that in seven of these cases (almost 10%) the causes were “accidental”.  The 
death of Lieutenant Alfred Newman, 12
th
 SWB, on the bombing range on 1 July 1916 
provides a useful case study of the hazards encountered.  The statement provided by Captain 
J.W. Foreman, 12
th
 SWB, details the incident: 
 On the afternoon of July 1
st
 I accompanied A Coy 12
th
 S W Borderers to a field in the 
neighbourhood of Marles Les Mines for the purpose of carrying out live bomb practise 
under the supervision of the Batt Bombing Officer Lt A Newman 12 SWB. About 
3pm it was Private E Wesson’s turn to throw.  He was given a bomb and fully 
instructed by Lt Newman what to do with it.  How to hold the bomb.  How to draw the 
pin and where to throw it.  The man drew the pin and threw the bomb which hit the 
parapet in front of him and rolled back into the trench at the man’s feet.  I am sure that 
his hand did not hit the back of the parapet.  The man in accordance with the 
instructions given stood still and upright.  Lt Newman who was standing to the right 
rear of the man stepped forward, stooped and picked up the bomb and threw it in a half 
right direction.  The bomb fell on the parapet and again rolled in to the trench between 
Lt Newman and myself.  Seeing this Lt Newman immediately doubled off to the left 
and I doubled to the right.  When I last saw Wesson he was still standing at attention 
as if rooted to the spot and in my opinion impeded Lt Newman from getting into the 
sap. Before I got to the bend in the trench the bomb exploded and I felt a burning 
sensation in my back.  As soon as the explosion was over Capt Whitworth and I 
rushed along the trench and found Lt Newman lying on his back with Wesson lying on 
his side on top of Lt Newman. 
 
Both men died.  A statement from Captain E.E.A.Whitworth commanding A Company 
confirmed the general sequence of events: 
 
 About 6 men had thrown a bomb when No 23446 Pte Wesson, E. 12
th
 SWB whose 
turn it was to throw after extracting the safety pin dropped the bomb when his hand 
was in the backward position for throwing.  I saw Lt Newman throw himself forward 
and pick it up and throw it.  I then lowered myself in the trench and waited for the 
explosion not knowing that an accident had occurred.  On stepping forward after the 
explosion, I saw Lt Newman lying in the trench wounded and apparently unconscious 
together with Pte Wesson in the same condition. 
 
Platoon Sergeant R.D. Howell was clear that the man’s hand had hit the back of the trench: 
 
 After about six men had thrown it was Pte Wesson’s turn to throw.  Capt Foreman 12th 
SWB warned him to come forward a little so that he would not catch the back of the 
trench. He went forward. He then started to throw the bomb but his hand caught the 
back of the trench and he dropped the bomb. I saw Lt Newman make a dive for the 
bomb.  He slipped on to his knees and I saw him throw the bomb as he was on his 
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knees. I saw the bomb hit the parapet and roll back into the trench. I then took cover 
and heard the explosion…   
 
The situation did not escape the attentions of the divisional commander who appended a note 
to the reports: “AAG, First Army. This is the 2nd accident of the sort that has occurred lately.  
I am taking up the whole question as to how to prevent a recurrence. Hitherto, the orders 
already issued have been found of little worth”.289 The bombing range was undoubtedly a 
dangerous place.  On 20 August Second-Lieutenant P.J. Farmer, 17
th
 Welsh and one man 
were accidentally wounded at the brigade bombing school despite the earlier attention of the 
GOC division.
290
 
 
There were other indicators of the inexperience of the brigade.  The brigade war diary implies 
a degree of annoyance in an entry for 20 July: “Frequent vacillation on the subject of reliefs as 
there was for the move from Bully Grenay and vicinity (June 22-25) to Marle-les-Mines and 
from the latter place to Les Brebis (July 3-4).  In this instance 4 separate and distinct rosters 
have been issued, the 4
th
 being definitely approved.  Since then neither of the Brigade reliefs 
due to take place (121
st
-120
th
 Brigade and 120
th
-119
th
 Brigade) have happened on the days 
scheduled.” And the next day: “Orders, counter-orders and disorders resultant once more.  
120
th
 Bde is now to take over all Calonne Section on 22
nd
 and half Maroc Section on 21
st
.  
Two battalions 119
th
 Bde are to be in Brigade Reserve to 120
th
 and 121
st
 Bdes 
respectively”.291 
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Inexperience showed in other ways.  In the early hours of 8 July following heavy German 
shelling to the left of the brigade’s sector Brigade HQ received an SOS message from the 17th 
Welsh that quickly resulted in a protective artillery barrage being fired but which proved to be 
a false alarm. Later that night the same battalion passed on a false gas alarm “despite it not 
being a gas wind” which caused the adjacent 12th SWB to don gas hoods.  On 10 July “there 
was another gas alarm owing to Brigade Operations sending out ‘Gas Alarm’ rather than ‘Gas 
Alert’.292 
 
Other matters were actioned successfully. A conference at divisional HQ attended by the 
GSO1, GSO2, three brigade majors, CRE and the OCs of 255 Tunnelling Company, RE and 
an un-named tunnelling company resolved that all requests for infantry working parties for 
RE purposes should be channelled via the divisional HQ for apportioning to the brigades and 
that the maximum demand on a brigade in reserve would be 500 men per day.
293
 
 
Administrative problems not withstanding, how did the brigade settle down to fight the war?  
As far as the British Official History is concerned, after recording the arrival of 40
th
 Division 
in France, it was invisible and it may have been this period that led its men naming it as the 
‘forgotten fortieth’.294  From its arrival to the end of October 1916 it was located in the old 
Loos battlefield in an area of mining villages dominated by spoil heaps or crassiers. The 
village houses provided billets for units out of the line and even those in support could use 
their cellars for comfort and protection.  During the summer of 1916 I Corps was responsible 
for the line from Loos to the La Bassée canal which it held initially with three divisions. The 
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southernmost (right) sector was allocated to 40
th
 Division. Once it was given responsibility for 
a sector the division followed standard practice and normally placed two of its brigades in the 
line and one in reserve.
295
  Each brigade then placed two battalions in the front line, one in 
support and one in reserve.  Each battalion spent four to six days in its allotted role before it 
was relieved and rotated through the cycle of line / support / reserve.
296
 A similar rotation was 
operated at brigade level.  These reliefs required a huge effort of organisation and it is not 
surprising that the resulting paperwork dominates the surviving records in the brigade war 
diary.  There was, however, an enemy to be reckoned with. 
 
Following their loss of ground to the BEF in the battle of Loos in September and October 
1915 the German army had consolidated and strengthened its new line to the south and east of 
the village of Loos.  It was here that 119 Brigade gained experience and suffered the first 
losses from its ranks while thirty miles to the south the BEF was engaged in the Somme 
offensive.  Despite its use as an area where new divisions could be introduced to trench 
warfare the area around Loos was far from ‘quiet’ and the British lines were frequently 
subjected to artillery bombardment.  However, the BEF had proved, if proof were needed, that 
this was not favourable ground for an offensive and neither side had any such plans but by the 
summer of 1916 the BEF had developed tactics, now well-established, for harassing the 
enemy, gaining intelligence and causing him casualties.   
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Tony Ashworth examined trench raids as one element of his survey of the ‘live and let live’ 
system that evolved at times on all fronts during the war.
297
 Anthony Saunders’ work looked 
in more detail at raiding and has described the development raiding of tactics and how raids 
on enemy trenches were initially promoted by GHQ in 1915 “since they relieve monotony and 
improve the moral[e] of our troops, while they have a corresponding detrimental effect on the 
moral[e] of the enemy’s troops and tend in a variety of ways to their exhaustion and general 
disquiet”.  Saunders notes that there seems to be no evidence for these positive aspects of 
raiding nor indeed that “enterprises of this nature constitute the most effective form of 
defence, since by throwing upon the enemy anxiety for his own security, they help to relieve 
our own troops from the wearying and demoralising effects produced by expected attacks on 
the part of the enemy”.298  The casualties among the raiding party and the likelihood of 
German retaliation do not seem to feature in the concept of trench raiding.  While Ashworth 
concluded that in non-elite units raiding had a ‘good effect’ on the non-raiding members of 
that unit, Mark Connelly acknowledged that the controversy over raiding has not yet reached 
a consensus among historians and that “the issue of raiding and its value is a complex one that 
makes it difficult to sustain a simple and clear conclusion as to its value and impact”.299 
 
Although raids had taken place in 1915 the pressures of trench construction and other duties 
on the limited number of troops available when not actively engaged in the year’s offensives 
meant that raiding was not as enthusiastically promoted as GHQ had hoped.  Nevertheless, 
some raids did take place and were given new impetus by a directive from Second Army HQ 
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to encourage aggressive action over the winter of 1915 – 1916.  Experience of best practice 
from these raids was accumulated, set down and circulated by the time that 119 Brigade 
arrived in France.  
 
SS107 Notes on Minor Enterprises was issued by the General Staff in March 1916 and offered 
practical guidance “compiled as a result of the experience gained in certain minor operations 
during the past few months.  No definite rules for the conduct of such operations can be laid 
down but the suggestions contained in these notes may be useful as a guide in future 
enterprises”. The notes emphasise the importance of thorough preparation, reconnaissance, 
secrecy, training and surprise in securing a successful outcome to a raid and displays its 
realistic approach by suggesting that “it is seldom advisable to persevere in a minor enterprise 
if the enemy are found ready and prepared”.   So did the minor enterprises planned by 119 
Brigade follow best practice? 
 
Originally conceived and executed at battalion level, the approval of raids had become the 
responsibility of brigade and divisional staffs by 1916.  In summer the strategic context of 
raiding was the Somme offensive.  First, Second and Third Armies carried out forty-three 
raids in the week preceding the start of the battle on 1 July in an attempt to distract German 
attention from the very obvious preparations in Fourth Army’s sector on the Somme. Between 
July and November 1916 as the battle progressed the three armies carried out three hundred 
and ten raids.  Analysis of the formations taking part has shown that in the period July-
October 1916 (when 40
th
 Division operated as part of I Corps and had completed its 
induction) I Corps carried out fifty-eight of these raids - the highest number within First Army 
and sixteen more than XI Corps - the second most active raiders.  The XI Corps Commander, 
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Lieutenant-General Sir Richard Haking (1862-1945) “was committed to, and always 
conformed with, the policies of his superiors”.300  He enthusiastically endorsed his 
Commander in Chief, Sir Douglas Haig’s policy “making raiding and aggression in no man’s 
land a key part of his general strategy of attrition”.301  The relevance of Haking’s attitude will 
become apparent below. 
 
Orders to reconnoitre the German wire “with a view to organising a raid” were received by 
the 17
th
 Welsh 16 July 1916 but no raid resulted as the original plan for two simultaneous 
raids by the 17
th
 and 18
th
 Welsh were reduced to a raid by a single battalion.
302
  The first raid 
from 40
th
 Division’s front was therefore carried out by the 18th Welsh on the night of 18/19 
July in response to 119 Brigade Operational Order No.8 issued on the previous day.  Captain 
Gibbs wrote to his sweetheart anticipating success: “they’ll be brave boys and by gum kid 
they’re a brave lot, fine hearts and MEN”.303 
 
The objects of the raid on the German front line trench just west of Puits 16 bis were defined 
as to obtain identification; to obtain prisoners and to damage the enemy’s defensive system.  
Following reconnaissance patrols during the night of 16 July, details were discussed at a 
meeting held at Brigade HQ on the 17 July attended by the GOC 40
th
 Division, his GSO1, 
GOC RA, BMRA, GOC 119 Brigade, BM 119 Brigade and OC Right Group RA (which 
covered the area to be raided). The stated impossibility of wire cutting by the artillery resulted 
in amended orders being issued but on the next day reports of unsuccessful wire cutting 
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prompted a reconvened meeting.
304
  The resulting amended orders were modified yet again 
following suggestions from the OC 18
th
 Welsh who, surprisingly, attended neither of the 
planning meetings.  The scope of the orders issued by the OC 18
th
 Welsh seems very 
complicated for inexperienced troops. Each party of one officer and sixteen other ranks had a 
range of tasks: 
 The artillery barrage will commence at 12.15am and by this time you must be up to 
the gap in the wire. Immediately the barrage begins you will rush to your positions, 2
nd
 
Lt Salisbury with 3 bayonet men and 4 bombers will enter the trench at point G and 
clear  trench up to point A.  
 Simultaneously 3 bayonet men enter at point G and work down to B also 1 NCO and 4 
bombers keep on parapet and work from G to B. 
 Remaining 3 enter at G and follow others to B. Three of the six then at B will work a 
 little way down towards C and three towards H. 
 
 2
nd
 Lt R.D. Grossart’s party: 
 3 bayonet men and 3 bombers will rush across trench at E and move on to D where the 
three bayonet men and look out, one up and one down the trench with the other 
between them. The 3 bombers will remain on the parapet above the bayonet men who 
will themselves carry bombs. 
 Two bayonet men will enter the trench at point E and two bombers, one each side of 
the trench, will remain on the parapet. Three bayonet men with bombs will enter the 
trench at E and work towards H meeting 2
nd
 Lt Salisbury’s party when they will both 
move down towards D. 
 
 Yellow ribbon (distinguishing badges) will be removed and pay books and any letters 
or papers handed in. 
 
 Wire ‘footballs’ will be taken for blocking trench. 
 
 Telephone wire will be run out to gap as soon as dark. 
 
 NCO and 5 scouts will move out at dark and carefully watch the gaps and report any 
movement there to the telephone operator. 
  
 C Coy will furnish a covering party on the right of 1 NCO and 8 men who will move 
out with the scouts.
305
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The raid was unsuccessful and recorded in the brigade war diary as “a costly failure. Total bag 
two rifles”.  There were seven casualties among the raiders including one officer wounded 
and one man killed.  The OC 18
th
 Welsh reported: 
 I regret the failure of the operation due, I consider, to the following causes: 
 
 (a) the moon was bright and it was impossible to actually go through the wire before 
the attack, so strands of wire left by artillery delayed some of the parties. 
 
 (b) we encountered a strong working party of Germans who were evidently there to 
mend their wire and although we had taken out 144 bombs these were exhausted and 
2
nd
 Lt Grossart’s party had to retire for want of ammunition when he had dead and 
wounded Germans in the pit in front of him. 
 
 (c) 2
nd
 Lt Salisbury being wounded left his party without a leader. This was a great 
misfortune. 
 
 (d) the finding of  German trench running out in front of gap left out by our artillery on 
left caused a certain confusion as it was not shown on our aeroplane photograph and 
the party that should have got to point G did not get there as quickly as they should.
306
 
 
 
The raid was obviously organised with the guidance of SS107 but the bright night and the lack 
of reconnaissance immediately prior to the raid to confirm that the wire was cut and the gap 
clear of Germans were the errors of inexperienced leaders.  The wounding of Second-
Lieutenant Salisbury removed command and control of the bombing fight and any direction to 
obtain identification from German casualties.  Two ‘shorts’ from British artillery plus enemy 
machine-gun fire caused casualties and speeded the withdrawal. Although there were at least 
two planning meetings for the raid, there is no mention of any training over similar terrain – 
an essential prerequisite according to SS107.  Given the situation on the Somme it is possible 
that there was a degree of pressure from above to organise raids quickly but if this was so it 
did not result in a flurry of raiding. The next raid from the brigade did not take place until 13 
August and was carried out by the 12
th
 SWB. 
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Originally planned for the night of 11/12 August, the raid was delayed for a day after a patrol 
discovered that the wire was insufficiently cut.  The detailed orders for the raid which was 
undertaken solely to secure identification of the German unit opposite had been issued by the 
battalion on 8 August (and were approved by the GOC 40
th
 Division) allowing time for 
preparation.  Two and a half typed foolscap pages detail the composition, equipment and 
deployment of three assaulting parties each of one officer, one NCO and twelve men plus a 
supporting party of one NCO and six men.  Each attacking party consisted of eight bombers 
and four riflemen and the importance of an adequate supply of Mills bombs is apparent as 
each bomber wore a waistcoat with ten bombs and carried a canvas bucket of bombs (these 
would normally hold twenty or twenty-four bombs); each rifleman also carried a bucket of 
bombs and each of the support party carried two buckets and were to return for more if 
needed.  The raiders therefore carried at least 1220 bombs in total – a considerable increase on 
the 144 carried by the 18th Welsh on their raid three weeks earlier even allowing for the 
increased number of raiders.  Each party had a light ladder to aid exit from the enemy trench, 
the men’s faces were darkened and each bomber carried a trench club.  Riflemen carried a 
loaded rifle with bayonet fixed and a bandolier of ammunition.  Fifteen “bombproof jackets” 
were available and were to be worn by all officers and NCOs with the remainder issued to 
men identified by the officer in charge of the raid, Captain Pritchard.
307
  White disks were to 
be placed by the support party to mark the route to the two gaps in the wire cut previously by 
the artillery and the return route.  The left and right parties would isolate a section of trench 
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between its junctions with communication trenches and prevent enemy attacks while the 
centre party would deal with two saps in its sector.  Seventy-five minutes were allowed for the 
parties to be in place before the start of a forty-five minute barrage to cover the raid.  Thirty 
minutes after the barrage started the retire signal would be given from the British front line by 
two buglers sounding the cookhouse call. Routes for the evacuation of prisoners and medical 
arrangements were also in place. 
 
The battalion war diary noted that the raid “was planned with great care, every detail was 
thoroughly considered and everyone engaged was completely familiar with the part he had to 
play”.   The raiders reached the enemy wire just in time for the barrage at midnight.  Rushing 
forward the parties met the enemy response of rifle, machine-gun and shell fire.  Captain 
Pritchard was wounded almost at once but refused aid, leapt into the trench and shot and 
captured a German.  The order to retire was given as soon as the prisoner was secured but 
Pritchard, already weak from loss of blood, was hit again.  Second-Lieutenant Wood brought 
in the prisoner while Second-Lieutenant Enright helped the stricken Pritchard back to the 
British line.  The whole of the party were back by 12.53 a.m. although one man was found to 
be missing later.  Two men were killed and twenty wounded (none seriously) but Captain 
Pritchard died later of his wounds.  “The battalion is congratulating itself today after 
accomplishing a quite successful raid … we cannot be but greatly pleased that our battalion 
was responsible for the first prisoner taken by the 40
th
 Division … [the raid] was carried out 
with great dash and all concerned behaved extremely well … the officers engaged behaved 
with great gallantry, admirable judgement and keen enthusiasm quite in keeping with the best 
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traditions of the Army and set a fine example to their men who eagerly and enthusiastically 
followed it.”308 
 
On 25 September both the 12
th
 SWB and the 17
th
 Welsh carried out raids to obtain 
identification from the enemy.  Both raids were unsuccessful.  For the 17
th
 Welsh it was their 
first minor enterprise and its methods illustrate another approach to raiding.  The one page 
order issued by Lieutenant Colonel Wilkie was much more succinct than that issued for the 
12
th
 SWB raid described above but there was obviously a lot of planning behind it.  In his 
post-raid report Wilkie described how the two parties involved (of one officer, two sergeants 
and fifteen men and one officer, two sergeants and twenty-one men) advanced to the gaps in 
the enemy wire under cover of the battalion’s Lewis guns “without a single hostile shot” and 
how when the artillery barrage opened “none [of the raiders] received any injury from our 
own gun fire.  This must inspire the greatest confidence in future operations”. Once through 
the wire the two parties worked along the trench each with a ‘driving party’ covered by a 
flanking support party.  Both parties found the trench empty and although dugouts were 
bombed no identity or prisoners were obtained.  Five men were wounded.  Nevertheless 
Wilkie could report “ the raid itself was carried out to programme without a hitch … Captain 
Lyne trained the raiding parties most successfully, Lt Rees and 2
nd
 Lt Walton (the leaders of 
the two parties) exhibited great coolness and handled their parties well. The rank and file 
performed their tasks like clockwork.”  The GOC 119 Brigade endorsed the report with “I 
consider the raid was well carried out according to the rehearsed programme … It was 
unfortunate that no prisoners were taken”.309 
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119 Brigade carried out eight raids from July to October 1916 while 120 Brigade carried out 
ten and 121 Brigade sixteen.  Was this comparatively low number a cause for concern?  It was 
certainly more than were occurring in some places.  Between the start of July and the end of 
September 1916 only two brigades of 12
th
 (Eastern) Division carried out raids and then only 
one each while in 24
th
 Division again just two brigades organised raids with one carrying out 
two raids and the other just one.
310
  On 15 August the newly-appointed (but temporary) 
commander of First Army, the energetic and aggressive Lieutenant-General Richard Haking, 
addressed his corps commanders at an Army conference: “ we must at all costs do our utmost 
to wear down the enemy, to reduce his moral[e] and at the same time improve the moral[e] of 
our own troops, and prove to them, by their own action, that they can get into the German 
trenches whenever they are called upon to do so.  This can only be done by raids”.311 That 
same day Haking visited Brigadier-General Prichard at 119 Brigade HQ.  Prichard left for 
England the next day.  There is no cited reason for Prichard’s departure but the brigade had 
carried out only two raids by this date and the low tally surely counted against him.
312
  The 
GOC 40
th
 Division, Harold Ruggles-Brise wrote to his wife on the 15 August “several of the 
older men in my Divn have already fallen out, they cannot stand the strain and the hard work, 
but so far no-one of any great importance”.313  Prichard wrote to Lieutenant-Colonel Pope, 
12
th
 SWB, (who had the one successful raid under his belt) “Time did allow me to say 
goodbye and to thank you for all the good work you have done while we served together.  
You can be justly proud of your battalion and if it continues to improve as it undoubtedly has 
under the strain of the trenches, I shall look forward to great things.”314 
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Prichard’s replacement arrived next day.  Charles Cunliffe-Owen (1863-1932) was a regular 
soldier and the second son of Major-General Charles Henry Owen, sometime Professor of 
Artillery at the Royal Military Academy, Woolwich.  Educated privately and at the RMA, he 
was gazetted lieutenant in the Royal Artillery in 1883, captain (1891), major (1900), 
lieutenant-colonel (1909) and substantive colonel (October 1914).  His surname was changed 
to Cunliffe-Owen by deed poll in January 1905.
315
 He saw service at home and in India and 
action in the South African War from 1899-1901 (including the relief of Ladysmith) for 
which he received the Queen’s South Africa Medal with six clasps and was mentioned in 
dispatches. At the outbreak of the Great War he took XXVI Brigade, RFA (1
st
 Division), to 
France and took temporary command of 2
nd
 Infantry Brigade between 10 and 23 November 
1914. On 19 January 1915 he was appointed to BGRA, Australian and New Zealand Army 
Corps and landed at Anzac Cove Gallipoli on 25 April.  He was BGRA, MEF from November 
1915 to February 1916 and arrived in France with the ANZACs on 2 April.   
 
While 119 Brigade was finding its feet to the north, on the Somme the fighting had moved to 
the village of Pozières where a complex situation was demanding ever more complex artillery 
plans.  On 25 July the C-in-C, Sir Douglas Haig wrote: 
 
 After lunch I visited … HQ Australian Corps … The situation seems all very new and 
strange to Australian HQ.  The fighting here and shell fire is much more severe than 
anything experienced at Gallipoli! The German too, is a different enemy to the Turk! 
… I spoke to Birdwood about his CRA, Brigadier General Cunliffe Owen.  The latter 
had served with me at the beginning of war but soon left France and so had no 
experience of our present artillery or the methods which had developed during the war.  
I therefore wished to give him an up to date CRA.  He thanked me and said he would 
take anyone I selected … I also saw Cunliffe Owen and explained how sorry I was to 
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have to move him, but in the present situation I would be failing in my duty to my 
country if I ran the risk of the Australians meeting with a check through faulty artillery 
arrangements.
316
 
 
Cunliffe-Owen was immediately replaced by Brigadier-General W.J. Napier and just over two 
weeks later assumed command of 119 Brigade.  His choice as GOC seems odd; he was first 
and foremost an artilleryman with one two-week period in 1914 in command of infantry.  
Captain Whitworth, 12
th
 SWB, was clear why Cunliffe-Owen was posted to the brigade: 
“Rumour said he only came to us to gain further experience of infantry work previous to a 
higher command, and for once a rumour was possibly true”.317 If this was indeed the case he 
only received thirteen weeks experience before he was relieved of the command, leaving for 
England on 18 November.  Perhaps this brief experience was enough because he went on to 
command 54
 
Brigade, 18
th
 Division, from 6 April to 22 October 1917.
318
  If he gained 
experience of infantry work what did the brigade learn from him?  Whitworth’s further 
comments indicate that perhaps it was not much: “Nothing escaped his eye as regards march 
discipline.  Officers could no longer carry a waterproof on the back of the saddle, nor an 
officer’s servant carry the acetylene lamp of the company mess outside his pack!  The 
transport officer had a more difficult task and was up before the Colonel [sic] at every 
halt”.319  During his time with 119 Brigade the number of raids increased markedly (only two 
before his arrival, six afterwards) but only two of six were successful.
320
 It may be that 
although Cunliffe-Owen acted on the wishes of GOC First Army it was the number of raids 
that counted in the eyes of the First Army commander rather than their success rate.  Cunliffe-
Owen’s departure came not long after Lieutenant-General Sir C. A. Anderson took over I 
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Corps and Major-General H.S. Horne became commander of First Army – both on 30 
September 1916 – and he might have fallen victim to two ‘new brooms’. 
 
In what condition did he leave the brigade?  There are no descriptions of its capabilities at this 
point in the war although Horne, writing to the CGS, Sir Launcelot Kiggell, on 5 October 
noted that 40th Division was “coming on” but had “many ‘bantams’ and has not been 
distinguished in trench warfare”.321  At the end of the month the division had a strength of 
17,439 all ranks and had not been massively depleted by five months in the trenches.
322
 An 
appendix to the October war diary of the 18
th
 Welsh indicates the level of attrition: 
 There have been about 279 casualties of which 110 either remained at duty or have 
since returned leaving a permanent loss of 169.  Casualties to officers have been few, 
no officer being wounded in the trenches by enemy fire. Of the 9 officer casualties 3 
were wounded on raids, 1 in ‘No Man’s Land’ (very slightly), 1 accidentally in our 
line and 4 were sick.
323
 
 
The sectors that 119 Brigade occupied suffered from regular bombardment, particularly by 
German trench mortars, and most fatalities were caused in this way.  In five months the 
brigade lost nine officers and 163 men.
324
  The most senior of these were Lieutenant-Colonel 
Wilkie (17
th
 Welsh) and his acting 2iC, Captain C.V. Lyne, both killed by a direct hit from a 
high explosive shell on 18 October while on a tour of the battalion’s line.  Replacements for 
casualties were few.  War diaries record that the 19
th
 RWF received a draft of eighty men on 
26 September, the 17
th
 Welsh received twenty-five men on 10 October and the 18
th
 Welsh 
received thirty-eight men on 4 November.  When Frank Crozier took command on 20 
                                                 
321
 TNA: WO 158/186 quoted in Simon Robbins, British Generalship during the Great War: the military career 
of Sir Henry Horne (1861-1929) (Farnham: Ashgate, 2010), p.275. 
322
 TNA: WO 394, Statistical abstracts of information regarding the armies at home and abroad. 
323
 TNA: WO 95/2607, War Diary 18
th
 Welsh. 
324
 SDGW. Fatalities in the battalions June-October 1916 were: 17
th
 Welsh - 3 officers and 31 men; 18
th
 Welsh - 
42 men; 19
th
 RWF - 3 officers and 39 men and the 12
th
 SWB 3 Officers and 51 men. 
120 
 
November 1916, the brigade had essentially the same make up as it had when it left England 
in June.  
 
At about the same time that Horne was telling Kiggell that the 40th Division was ‘coming on’ 
Harold Rugles-Brise was writing to his wife: “I do not know why the Divn was not taken 
down to the Somme.  I think possibly because they are bantams and the bantams that have 
already been there did not last very long – at least so I am told ... Lately we have done rather 
well, and my little lads have shown great gallantry, and some of their performances have been 
mentioned in communiqués”.325    Was he right? Was it the performance of the bantam 35th 
Division that kept the 40
th
 Division from being deployed to the Somme? 
 
While 119 Brigade was manning the line around Loos the Somme battle was consuming 
British infantry divisions at an alarming rate.  The original thirteen attacking divisions on 1 
July 1916 had been increased as the battle became one of attrition.  Fifty-three divisions of 
eleven corps, including Canadian, New Zealand, Australian and South African formations, 
fought on the Somme between July and November during which time the average death rate 
per day was 893.
326
  Why did 40
th
 Division not take part?  41
st
 Division was only a month 
longer in France and had done well at Flers-Courcelette on 15 September as part of XV 
Corps.  The bantams of 35
th
 Division which had arrived in February and received its initial 
instruction as part of Haking’s XI Corps had by contrast done rather poorly as part of XIII 
Corps.  Peter Simkins has described how the division’s “morale and resilience apparently 
became increasingly and unexpectedly fragile” in the second half of 1916 whilst 
acknowledging four “extenuating factors”:  during its time on the Somme the division never 
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fought as a coherent unit, being committed as single brigades or single battalions; the men 
were used extensively on trench digging and carrying duties, were exhausted and were losing 
men to German bombardments to which they could not retaliate; the sector in which they 
fought was an inherently difficult one and was flanked by the French Sixth Army and finally 
the period of July-August was one when Fourth Army repeatedly launched small-scale attacks 
against difficult targets with little chance of success.  Senior officers did not blame the 
original bantams but focused on the nature of new recruits to their battalions.  Brigadier-
General A.H. Marindin, 105 Brigade, wrote “The class of men we are now getting … are no 
longer the ‘Bantams’ proper but are either half-grown lads or degenerates”. While 
acknowledging that the recruits were “sorely needed” Simkins goes on to point out that the 
losses in the battalions before the Somme battle were not enough for the numbers of later sub-
standard recruits to have made a difference to the effectiveness of the division.
327
 Is there 
evidence for this? Casualties up to June 1916 were 819 - seven per cent of the division’s 
infantry but by the end of July the total was 3,728 or just less than thirty- two per cent of the 
division’s infantry.328  With this level of casualties it is more likely that the new men did 
make a (negative) difference to the division and a drop in morale might also be expected.  
This also adds weight to the argument that context and poor handling were the root causes of 
poor performance in 35th division rather than any inherent problem with the bantams 
themselves.   The fact that a number of the original 1915 recruits were amongst the twenty-six 
men of the Durham Light Infantry sentenced to death at the end of the year may not “reinforce 
that it was not just the later drafts that were substandard” as proposed by Simkins but rather 
reinforces the idea of a division that had had a generally bad time over a protracted period.  
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An influx of new, poor quality, recruits at just the wrong time focussed attention on the 
physical and mental state of the bantams and led to a major weeding out exercise in 35
th
 
Division later in the year.  Meanwhile, the bantams’ reputation as a fighting force was at rock-
bottom.  It is very likely then that Harold Ruggles-Brise was correct in attributing the lack of 
involvement of 40
th
 Division in the Somme fighting to the perceived defects of 35
th
 
Division.
329
   
 
On 6 December the officers of 35
th
 Division received a circular advising them that due to the 
shortage of recruits all battalions of the BEF were now accepting small men, that 
replacements would now be of average height and that the 35
th
 would no longer be referred to 
as a bantam division.
330
  This was forcefully restated by the new GOC, Major-General H.J.S. 
Landon, on 18 December making it clear that “in reorganising [the] Division … [the] Bantam 
standard must be disregarded for good and all”.331  The consequences impacted on 40th 
Division: 
Use of the term Bantam for designation of certain Inf[antry] units to be discontinued. 
No further bantam drafts [sic].
332
 
 
 The order came in to inform us that the [40
th
] Bantam Division would cease to exist as 
such and would be reinforced by men of any physique (I believe this was caused by 
the failure of the 35
th
 Division, the original Bantams, to carry out the work of bigger 
men on the Somme).  Our Division of Bantams had performed exceedingly well and 
took great pride in the fact that they were Bantams.  It was therefore a blow to us all 
when we ceased to be a Bantam Division.
333
 
 
A slightly different opinion was given by Captain Whitworth, 12
th
 SWB: 
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 I have had another draft of men - some fine type of men among them; it is a great 
thing to see some of the Bantam element going; they will never have the real spirit of 
soldiering, yet some of these recent [word missing] men - almost conscripts - are 
splendid.
334
 
 
Whitworth praises the bantams elsewhere in his memoir and it is interesting to note that he 
talks of “some of the bantam element” and does not mention physical shortcomings. Given 
certain events within his battalion at the time, his negativity is understandable.  These events 
will be described below.  Meanwhile the general weeding out of unfit men in 35
th
 Division 
did not extend to 40th Division.
335
 
 
Discipline in France 
In addition to dealing with the enemy the officers of 119 Brigade had to come to terms with 
dealing with problems amongst the ranks.  Mark Connelly has stated that “the final test of 
internal cohesion and morale is the disciplinary record of the battalions”.336  The battalion war 
diaries do not usually record minor disciplinary matters but a few surviving service files give 
an indications of the issues dealt with in the early months of active service.  On 24 June 1916 
the loss of part of his kit “by neglect” resulted in 25274 Private Robert Jones, 17th Welsh, 
being stopped three days  pay and a month later 28728 Private Richard Thomas, 19
th
 RWF, 
received two days Field Punishment Number Two for appearing “dirty on parade”. On 25th 
July 25613 Private Robert Jones, 17
th
 Welsh, was sentenced to twenty-eight days Field 
Punishment Number Two for “not complying with an order” while on 26 August 25262 
Private George Rogers, 17
th
 Welsh was convicted of “being absent from parade for [the] 
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trenches and being drunk”.  He received fourteen days Field Punishment Number One and 
was docked twenty-eight days pay.  Although varying in degrees of misconduct and 
punishment these instances highlight the adjustments that needed to be made by troops on 
active service and the necessary realization that they were now ‘in’ the war.  For some this 
was hard to do.   
 
On 29 June 1916 after less than four weeks in France Private N. Morris, 12
th
 SWB, was 
convicted of desertion by Field General Court Martial.  His death sentence was “commuted to 
ten years penal servitude, sentence suspended”.  On 8 July Private Morris shot himself in the 
foot while on sentry and was placed under arrest.
337
  Despite his previous offence and existing 
suspended sentence his FGCM on 21 July sentenced him to two years hard labour commuted 
to three months Field Punishment Number One.
338
  It seems that the military authorities were 
going out of their way to be lenient at this early stage of the battalion’s war.  There must have 
been extenuating circumstances to be considered when 23355 Private John Dalton, also of the 
12
th
 SWB, “rejoined from desertion” on 10 December 1916 and was simply forfeit twenty-six 
days pay.
339
 
 
These last two examples of misconduct occurred in the ranks of the 12
th
 SWB and something 
does seem to have been amiss in this battalion in the second half of 1916 despite Eric 
Whitworth’s description of Lieutenant-Colonel Pope having “immense drive and [being] 
determined to make his Battalion the best in the Brigade.  He was good with personal 
relationships with the men who liked and respected him and responded well to his exacting 
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demands.  He was too, a disciplinarian, intolerant of inefficiency whether it concerned an 
officer, NCO or men in the ranks”.340  The 12th South Wales Borderers were later regarded by 
Crozier as the best of his battalions “because they had been properly grounded, when young, 
by Colonel Pope”.341  Despite this reputation the battalion was the only one of the four 
original battalions in the brigade to record acts of collective indiscipline while on active 
service in France. 
 
Craig Gibson has written that alcohol was a ‘favourite target’ for theft by British troops.342 On 
7 November 1916, members of A Company appropriated fifty-two bottles of wine from a 
cellar in the village of Autheux while out of the line.  Having investigated, Lieutenant-
Colonel Pope “referred the matter to brigade”.  The battalion had arrived at its billets in 
Autheux on 5 November. Its training programme had been curtailed by rain on the 6 
November and had to be abandoned completely on the day of the offence.
343
  Presumably the 
men were bored and “apparently aggrieved with the owner of their billet and thought ‘to get 
their own back’ … 10 Francs paid by unit and charged against the [approximately twenty] 
men concerned”.344  The next day “by order of the Brigadier General [Cunliffe-Owen] the 
whole of A Coy vacated their billets and moved to Mon Plaisir Farm”.345  Presumably the 
removal from billets to the isolated farm was intended as a sanction on the whole of A 
Company.   
The second incident involving the battalion occurred later in the same month but was 
apparently unrelated. The battalion war diary records that on 1 December 1916 there was a 
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“FGCM on 20 men of D Coy for disobeying an order to fall in on defaulters parade”.  The 
entry for Sunday 3 December records the “promulgation of the FGCM for disobeying an 
order and the CO read out sections 4 to 44 of the Army Act” confirming that the accused had 
been charged with mutiny and disobedience.  Using the information from the papers of the 
Judge Advocate General as published by Julian Putkowski it is possible to name the nineteen 
accused (not twenty as stated in the battalion war diary).
346
  Although this source does not 
give the men’s service numbers it is possible to identify all but three of them with some 
confidence.  The service record of one of the accused, 24203 Private Walter Sutton, has 
survived and allows the sequence of events to be elaborated. 
 
Private Walter Sutton, a twenty-three year old platelayer from Swinton, Yorkshire, was placed 
under arrest awaiting trial on 21 November 1916 (presumably along with the other eighteen 
accused) and tried by FGCM on 1 December for “disobeying a lawful command given by his 
superior officer, A.A. Sect 9(2)”.347  He was found guilty and sentenced to eighteen months 
hard labour. Two of the accused were found not guilty and all the rest were given the same 
sentence as Sutton except for privates A.W. Leather and R. Milne who (presumably because 
they were identified as the ringleaders) were sentenced to seven years penal servitude and two 
years hard labour respectively.  The sentences were confirmed on 2 December by the GOC 
119 Brigade (who by this time was Frank Crozier), promulgated on 3 December and the 
guilty men passed to the APM of 40
th
 Division.  On 18 December the GOC 40
th
 Division, 
Harold Ruggles-Brise, commuted the sentences to two years hard labour for Leather and to 
three months Field Punishment Number One in respect of Sutton and the rest. 
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Table 14: Participants in the 12
th
 SWB ‘mutiny’ of 21 November 1916 
 
    
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
     
      
  
 
 
The table (Table 14) clearly shows that at the core of the group that refused to obey an order 
are a number whose service numbers are very close together, indicating that they enlisted at 
roughly the same date and probably in the same place.  There is no indication of the cause of 
this offence.  It may not be coincidence that Captain H.C. Lloyd, commanding D Company, 
left on leave on the day of the offence which was one of “fog and cold mists”.  “General 
leave” had started on 19th November and it is possible that tiredness and cold had lowered 
morale so that leave or the lack of it was the catalyst for the trouble.  After six months in 
France the men could not have been as “profoundly ignorant of the basic demands of military 
discipline” as they probably were when first recruited.348  The lack of esprit de corps 
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Price Charles R. Pte (L/Cpl) 24178 NG  
Milne Robert Pte 24180 G  
Kelly Sidney V. Pte 24196 G  
Rustage William Pte 24201 G Mexborough 
Sutton Walter Pte 24203 G Mexborough 
Wood William A. Pte 24204 NG  
Leather Albert W. Pte 24207 G  
Marsden Enoch Pte 24209 G  
Cooke Reginald Pte 24210 G  
Walton Robert Pte 24229 G  
French John Pte 24281 G Chesterfield 
Hale Thomas Pte 24351 G  
Gummer Evan Pte 24483 G  
Tough Thomas F. Pte 35193 G  
Samuel Vergil Pte 35362 G  
Claybank Arthur H. Pte 39897 G  
Thomas T. Pte (not traced)  
 
G  
Turner E. Pte (not traced) G  
Watkins F. Pte (not traced) 
 
G  
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highlighted by this episode reflected badly on the 12
th
 SWB and the GOC Division, Ruggles-
Brise, addressed the situation directly: 
 He rarely however spoke to the troops and the only occasion when he addressed our 
Battalion was a serious one.  There had been two cases of collective acts of 
insubordination and the General came and warned all ranks of the inevitable end of 
such conduct, namely death by being shot, with the unpleasant corollary of the men 
having themselves to shoot one of their own Battalion.  He spoke very shortly but to 
great effect.  Behind his words everyone felt determination to carry them out with 
strength and justice.  For he reminded all ranks of his duty also, to see justice was 
done to every officer and man in his Division.
349
 
 
This blunt warning seems to have worked.  No further similar incidents were recorded and  
for the remainder of its time with 119 Brigade the 12
th
 SWB had the fewest instances of trial 
by court martial in the brigade (Table 15).  The figures for 1916 show clearly the effect of the 
nineteen trials for mutiny in the 12
th
 SWB on the total.  However if the mutiny cases are 
excluded the battalion had a lower level of trial by court martial than the 19
th
 RWF which 
generated eighteen trials in 1916.  It is difficult, if not impossible, to attribute causes to the 
variations in the number of trials between battalions and from month to month.  When Freddy 
Plunkett took command of the 19
th
 RWF in August 1917 he regarded discipline as bad even 
though there had been only seven courts martial involving men of the battalion to date that 
year.  Changes in battalion COs may be a factor in the number of courts martial records for 
the 17
th
 and 18th Welsh but do not seem to affect the lower number of trials in the 19
th
 RWF 
and 12
th
 SWB. If the number of trials is a realistic indicator of the level of discipline in a 
battalion then discipline was notably better in 1917 after the arrival of Crozier as GOC 119 
Brigade.  As a comparison, over a period of ten months from December 1915 to September 
1916, the three brigades of the 16
th
 (Irish) Division put 112, 123 and 147 to trial by FGCM. 
Over twelve months from October 1915 to September 1916 the three brigades of the 36
th
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(Ulster Division) put 122, 41 and 84 men to trial. In twelve months of 1917, 119 Brigade put 
just 54 men to trial.
350
   
Table 15: Field General Courts Martial, 119 Brigade June 1916 to July 1918 
 17
th
 Welsh 18
th
 Welsh 19
th
 RWF 12
th
 SWB Total 
June 1916 1 - - 5 6 
July - - 4 6 10 
Aug 4 2 3 5 14 
Sept 3 1 2 2 8 
Oct 1 1 1 - 3 
Nov 1 1 3 - 5 
Dec 2 - 5 20 27 
Total 12 5 18 38 73 
      
Jan 1917 - 1 1 1 3 
Feb - 1 - - 1 
Mar  1 - - - 1 
Apr 1 2 - - 3 
May 1 6 - - 7 
June - - 2 - 2 
July 5 3 4 - 12 
Aug 4 2 - - 6 
Sept - 2 - 1 3 
Oct 5 1 2 5 13 
Nov - - - - 0 
Dec 1 1 2 - 4 
Total 18 19 11 7 54 
      
Jan 1918 - 1 4 - 5 
Feb - 2 - 2 4 
Mar  1  - - 1 
Apr -  - 3 3 
May 1  -  1 
June -  2  2 
July 1    1 
Total 3 3 6 5 17 
      
Overall 33 27 35 50 145 
Source: TNA: WO 213/9-23 
In the absence of further comparators it is not possible to prove the obvious assumption that 
discipline in 119 Brigade was good as it cannot be disproved that a more ‘relaxed’ 
                                                 
350
 Figures compiled from Timothy Bowman, Irish Regiments in the Great War: Discipline and Morale 
(Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2003), p. 113, Table 4.1 and  p.120, Table 4.2. 
130 
 
disciplinary regime that sent fewer men to trial was in operation.  Plunkett’s remarks about 
the discipline of the 19
th
 RWF might be taken to indicate that levels of discipline and numbers 
of FGCMs may not be closely related. 
 
The variation in the types of charge (Table 16) brought against members of different 
formations may be taken as an indicator of different standards being applied or, for example, 
may genuinely indicate that the men of 119 Brigade were more insubordinate and disobedient 
than the men of the 16
th
 (Irish) and 36
th
 (Ulster) Divisions but less prone to drunkenness. 
 
Table 16: Offences tried by Field General Courts Martial June 1916 – July 1918 
(Instances of offence in brackets)
351
 
Offence 119 Brigade* 16
th
 (Irish) 
Division** 
36
th
 (Ulster) 
Division** 
Absence 8% (15) - - 
Drunkenness 10% (18) 24% (53) 23% (38) 
Escaping confinement 1%  (2) 0.4% (1) - 
Miscellaneous Military Offences 30% (56) 57% (127) 54% (89) 
Cowardice 1% (2) 0.4% (1) 0.6% (1) 
Desertion 5% (9) 9% (20) 11% (18) 
Disobedience 17% (32) 7% (16) 4% (7) 
Insubordination 9% (16) 3% (7) 1% (2) 
Resisting 0.5% (1) - - 
Losing property 0.5% (1) - - 
Mutiny 10% (19) 0.4% (1) 0.6% (1) 
Quitting post / Sleeping 6% (10) 1% (3) 2% (4) 
Offence against inhabitant 1% (2) 0.4% (1) 0.6% (1) 
Theft 2% (3) 3% (6) 2% (3) 
Injuring/making away w. property - 0.4% (1) 0.6% (1) 
Violence - 0.9% (2) - 
Total Offences 186 224 165 
    *All 4 battalions June 1916 –July 1918, TNA: WO 213/9-23 
 ** Sample of 4 battalions October 1916 – February 1918 
 
Only six men of the brigade were sentenced to death during the war, one for sleeping and the 
rest for desertion, and all of the sentences were commuted to periods of penal servitude, 
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suspended in one case.
352
  In all, thirteen sentences were suspended and fifty-nine (30%) 
remitted or commuted to some degree.  There seems to have been a reluctance to apply the 
most severe punishments and although hard labour and field punishment predominate in the 
sentencing regime they were used just 140 times in two years (Table 17).  Field Punishment 
Number One seems to have been used fairly evenly across the battalions: in the 17
th
 Welsh 15 
times; 18
th
 Welsh 14 times; the 19
th
 RWF 18 times and the 12
th
 SWB 35 times including the 
19 sentences for mutiny described earlier.  
Table 17: Sentences of Field General Courts Martial June 1916 – July 1918 
Sentence Instances in 119 
Brigade 
Field Punishment No.1 42% (82)  
Field Punishment No.2 1% (2) 
Imprisonment 2% (3) 
Penal Servitude 4% (8) 
Hard Labour 30% (58) 
Death 3% (6) 
Reduction in Rank 10% (19) 
Stoppages/Fine 2% (4) 
Guilty but insane 0.5% (1) 
Not Guilty / Quashed 5% (13) 
Total Sentences 196 
Source: TNA: WO 213/9-23 
The disciplinary regime within 119 Brigade until its reorganisation seems to have been a 
moderate one but more comparators are needed before its status can be defined with 
confidence.  Other than the sources used as comparators in this study there is a notable lack of 
quantitative data available and the important works by Gary Sheffield, Alexander Watson and 
Peter Hodgkinson contain none.
353
  Further data on FGCMs during the final embodiment of 
the brigade will be presented later in this thesis. 
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The three studies cited above all touch on the subject of troop morale and the coping 
mechanisms that enabled the troops of the BEF to carry on in difficult circumstances and 
recognise the value of popular culture (sport, cinema, theatre, social drinking) in keeping up 
morale “convincingly demonstrated” by the work of J.G. Fuller.354 This thesis demonstrates 
the importance of organised recreational activity, particularly football, but one other facet 
appears to be absent in this formation. Fuller identified over 100 ‘trench magazines’ produced 
by a variety of mainly infantry units and used as the medium for sometimes black humour and 
veiled swipes at the military hierarchy.
355
 This particular medium does not seem to have been 
used by the troops of 119 Brigade or of 40
th
 Division.  The production of such magazines is 
reliant on a number of factors most notably the availability of materials and equipment plus 
the presence of motivated and literate individuals who had the time and organisational skills 
to commission or write copy and assemble and distribute the finished magazines.  The social 
make up of the brigade’s units was notably lacking in the commercial and professional classes 
and their absence may be one reason for the absence of a trench magazine.  
 
One form of entertainment that certainly was available to 119 Brigade was the divisional 
concert party. Only three New Army brigades had their own concert party but twenty-four of 
thirty New Army divisions had one.  Fuller notes that despite the popularity of Charlie 
Chaplin films, only nine New Army Divisions had cinemas and that concert parties were 
much more important as morale boosters.
356
 40
th
 Division’s concert party ‘The Gamecocks’ 
was certainly in existence by September 1916 and continued until the division was reduced to 
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a cadre after the German Spring Offensives.
357
 Before then the “troupe and band [had] lost 
most of their stage properties and instruments by enemy action” in April 1918.358  In 
November 1917 the troupe was performing four times weekly and in February 1918 ‘The 
Gamecocks’ gave performances in each of the three brigades’ areas weekly: “Brigade Hd.Qrs. 
are requested to assist Lieut. Davies as regards accommodation for the troupe and band”.359 
‘The Gamecocks’ cast included Sergeant J.F. ‘Jack’ Franklin, 17th Welsh, a well known music 
hall entertainer and comedian who had assisted recruiting at the beginning of the bantams. 
Away from the divisional troupe, in the 12
th
 SWB, but no doubt contributing, Lieutenant 
Harold Jones’ batman ‘Lester’ was also a music hall comedian.360 
 
In summary, this chapter has established the backgrounds of the senior officers of the brigade 
and the brigade staff and establish when and why some of them were replaced as the brigade 
moved to active service.  While the level of ‘Welshness’ of the battalions’ officers varied, 
there was still a strong national identity among them.  Data was presented to illuminate the 
discipline of the battalions while on active service and their level of participation in the tactic 
of trench raiding. The 40
th
 Division’s non-participation in the Battle of the Somme was shown 
to have been due to the poor opinion of the record of the bantams of 35
th
 Division held by 
senior staff and that poor performance in 35th Division was the result of other factors rather 
than any inherent problem with the bantams themselves.  
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Chapter Three 
 
CROZIER: REPUTATION WON AND LOST 
 
 
Chapters One and Two of this thesis have established the history and composition of 119 
Brigade, formed a view of its national identity and examined its first six months as an under-
performing formation of the BEF.  This chapter will examine the background of the brigade’s 
new GOC, Frank Percy Crozier, demonstrate how his reputation was established by briefly 
examining his military career before the Great War, looking in more detail at the record of his 
battalion in France and by examination of his post-war publications. In Broken Sword Charles 
Messenger described Crozier’s early career in South Africa, Nigeria and with the Ulster 
Volunteer Force in separate chapters. His time with the 9
th
 RIRifles is also covered in a single 
chapter as is the whole decade prior to Crozier’s death when his books were published.361 
Messenger’s chronological biography of Crozier sets out the story but does not venture into 
the level of detail that would assist academic study or analysis.  Statistics derived from 
records of courts martial compiled by Timothy Bowman are here abstracted and interpreted 
specifically in the context of the disciplinary records of the 9
th
 RIRifles and 107 Brigade.
362
 
While this thesis and Messenger’s book utilise some of the same sources, additional detail and 
analysis (for example of the disciplinary record of the battalion and the reception of Crozier’s 
books) is given in order to demonstrate the fall / rise / fall of Crozier’s reputation before, 
during and after the Great War.  The surviving correspondence of one of his subordinates, 
Captain William Montgomery, OC A Company, 9
th
 RIRifles, will be used here to illustrate his 
relationship with one his officers.  The oft-repeated observation by one subaltern that Crozier 
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was “particularly keen on sending out patrols to no purpose” will be challenged as will 
remarks made by Wilfred Spender which will be placed in context and quoted in full for the 
first time. The chapter will then move on to explore how Crozier’s hard-won reputation as a 
soldier was damaged by his own post-war writings and the reaction to them.  Two books in 
particular, A Brass Hat in No Man’s Land (1930) and The Men I Killed (1937), continue to be 
regularly used as sources for both academic and popular publications.  The examination of his 
output is presented here to define an important context for its previous and future use as a 
historical source.
363
  The popular perception of Crozier created by reading his publications, 
particularly the two mentioned above, out of context has inhibited not just the study of the 
man as a brigadier-general but the study of the brigade that he commanded. This chapter will 
provide that context. 
 
Crozier’s Military Background 
When the thirty-seven years old Frank Crozier arrived at 119 Brigade HQ at Le Souich (8km 
north of Doullens) on 20 November 1916 the brigade was taking a break from its long march 
south-west from the Loos sector to a training area east of Abbeville.  Crozier had arrived in 
France a year earlier in October 1915 as 2iC 9
th
 Royal Irish Rifles, 107 Brigade, 36
th
 (Ulster) 
Division, was placed in temporary command of the battalion on 10 December and was 
confirmed as CO on 1 January 1916.  As an officer with experience he had previously been 
given a key role in recruiting and training the battalion.  How had he arrived at this point?  
 
After two years at Wellington College, Crozier had been barred by his height and slight build 
from joining the Regular Army but obtained a subaltern’s commission in the 4th Middlesex 
                                                 
363
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Rifle Volunteer Corps in June 1897.   In October 1898 he ventured to Ceylon to learn the 
practicalities of tea planting only to leave as soon as news of the outbreak of the Second Boer 
War arrived.  He gained experience on active service in South Africa as a private then as a 
NCO in Thorneycroft’s Mounted Infantry and was present at the battle of Spion Kop (23 
January 1900).
364
  While in South Africa he was commissioned as a second-lieutenant in the 
2
nd
 Manchester Regiment and left Thorneycroft’s Mounted Infantry in June 1900.  He 
departed South Africa in January 1901 having volunteered for service in the West African 
Field Force and spent the next four years in Nigeria.  Thomas Astley Cubitt, Crozier’s CO for 
part of this time and a witness at his marriage, later recalled that Crozier was known as “The 
Bull Pup” and “always had physical ‘guts’”.365  His reputation as a soldier at this stage seems 
to be positive but alcoholism, ill-health, a bad marriage and a complete lack of financial 
awareness blighted his return to Britain and several episodes in various localities involving 
unpaid bills and dishonoured cheques led to bankruptcy and ended his military career.  On 22 
May 1909 he resigned his commission and left for Canada to farm.  The failure of this venture 
caused his return to Britain in 1911 as a committed teetotaller and in 1913 he found a niche as 
a captain in the Ulster Volunteer Force where his previous transgressions were apparently 
unknown.
366
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36
th
 (Ulster) Division, makes no mention of Crozier’s early transgressions in any of the 
sometimes very critical letters that he wrote.
367
 When war was declared Crozier, “late 
Captain, Canadian Forces”, was commissioned as a captain in the 5th Royal Irish Fusiliers.368  
Using his UVF contacts and the disorder and confusion of recruiting at that time, he avoided 
taking up this commission and instead was commissioned into the 9
th
 (Service) Battalion 
Royal Irish Rifles (West Belfast Volunteers).
369
  From 4 September 1914 he was major and 
2iC of the battalion. 
 
The 9
th
 RIRifles had at its core the West Belfast Regiment of the UVF.
370
  Crozier had 
commanded the unit’s Special Service Force and would have been familiar to many of the 
men and officers of the new battalion.
371
  After a period under canvas at Donard Lodge the 
autumn weather drove the 9
th
 RIRifles into billets before they moved to a new hutted camp at 
Ballykinler  - much to Crozier’s relief:  
 It is not possible to raise a … battalion in billets with any degree of satisfaction or 
hope of efficiency.  The barrack rooms and the officers’ and sergeants’ messes are … 
where discipline is forged and character. 
 
Crozier and his CO “concentrate on two things at the outset: knocking the beer and politics 
out of all ranks and building up esprit de corps in its place … while …we foster, inculcate, 
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teach and build up the blood lust for the discomfiture of the enemy”.372  Crozier writes that 
the CO, Lieutenant-Colonel G.S. Ormerod, asked him to “undertake the tactical training of the 
officers for war, from the theoretical point of view, by means of lectures after mess”. Each 
weekday evening, for (he claims) six months, Crozier lectured to the officers on subjects such 
as “Field Service Regulations, Parts 1 and 2, Infantry training, combined training, a little 
topography, organisation and equipment, military law and certain campaigns of history”.373  
His syllabus was informed by “a very extensive memorandum sent … early in 1915 regarding 
the training required for France”. The source was Crozier’s cousin, Colonel Brinsley John 
Hamilton Fitzgerald (1859-1931) who at that time was Sir John French’s Private Secretary 
having previously been his ADC in South Africa.
374
  While emphasising the principle of 
“never retire unless you’re ordered to”, he also stressed the need to conquer fear: “All soldiers 
… are frightened in action at times.  There comes that pain in the tummy.  That you have to 
master.  You must never let your neighbour know you are in a funk, either by word, deed or 
suggestion.  Funk in itself is nothing.  When unchained it becomes a military menace, and for 
that men die at the hands of their comrades”.375 Crozier’s lectures were additional to more 
practical exercises which he described in a letter in 1932: 
 When platoon drill had been mastered our routine was (1) Adjt’s pde before breakfast 
(with the CO and myself ‘observing’ (2) CO’s parade (steady drill 1½ hrs 10 to10.30 
am) after which we wander into the blue not knowing what was going to be done (I 
never knew myself till I invented the scheme, shouted out the general and special 
ideas, made the Adjt write the orders and the Coy cdrs give theirs and platoon cdrs 
explain to their men) and then got going – falling out half the officers as legitimate 
casualties in the first half hour to repeat the dose with the other half, putting the 
original half back instead and then – sounding the officers call – changing the whole 
scheme from A to Z – dinners in cookers and home at 4pm.  After mess, discussion of 
                                                 
372
 Crozier, Brass Hat, pp. 36-37. 
373
 Ibid, p.38. The campaigns covered included, of course, the abandonment of Spion Kop which Crozier 
contrasted with Smith-Dorrien’s stand at Le Cateau just a few months before.   
374
 Crozier Impressions, p.175. 
375
 Ibid, p.40.  Crozier is probably alluding here to the possibility of death by firing squad but just might be also 
hinting at summary killing. 
139 
 
the day’s work – followed by a dance until 11pm, bed, sleep, up again.  It made for 
astounding flexibility.
376
  
 
This first instance of Crozier’s promotion of practical training exercises has echoes in 1917 
that will be elaborated in Chapter Four.  All this training, however, was not enough.  When 
107 Brigade, including the 9
th
 RIRifles, reached France there were disciplinary problems with 
the men, some of whom were still over-fond of drink, and capability issues among the 
officers.
377
  
 
When Major-General Oliver Nugent took command of the Ulster Division in October 1915 he 
was not impressed.  He told his assembled officers what he thought of the division, that: “we 
had a good name … but he did not know how we got it.  Every rudimentary mistake that 
could be made had been made by officers that day [a field day].  They showed total ignorance 
of modern conditions and lamentable ignorance.  He did not know what sort of training we 
had had in Ireland but it was very poor”.378  He went on to stress the importance of discipline: 
 Discipline is the cement which binds every body of men into a homogeneous whole 
and without which any mob of solders has little to distinguish it from an ordinary mob 
… It is the spirit of discipline that enables you and the men you have to lead to face 
losses … [But] not all men are equally brave or equally [steady?] under fire … those 
are the men who in a big fight begin to look behind them … the bad example of one 
man is contagious … A rot must always be stopped before it spreads.  You would be 
justified in using every means even to the most decisive to prevent an individual 
whose nerve has one from being a cause of infection to others.  You would not only be 
justified in any step you took to deal with such cases but I would expect it of you.” 379 
 
The sentiments on discipline seem much in keeping with Crozier’s own although he (Crozier) 
was writing long after the fact.  The apparent incitement to summary execution is also 
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interesting given Crozier’s subsequent descriptions of his own actions – all written long after 
the fact – and it may be that Nugent was setting an example that Crozier sought to follow.   
 
Just ten days after this lecture Nugent’s attention focussed on 107 Brigade: “The Belfast 
Brigade is awful.  They have absolutely no discipline and their officers are awful.  I am very 
much disturbed about them.  I don’t think they are fit for service and I should be very sorry to 
have to trust them … It is all due to putting a weak man in charge of the brigade to start with 
and giving commissions to men of the wrong class”.380  The officers took the full force of 
Nugent’s tirade which though “not wholly deserved” was “very good for us [and] which I 
shall always treasure in my mind as the most complete example of what can be said by the 
powerful to the powerless in the shortest space of time … in the most offensive, sarcastic and 
uncompromising manner possible.”381  Nugent portrayed the transfer of the brigade to 4th 
Division for its trench induction (a standard BEF practice at the time) as ‘punishment’ but 
was more probably being pragmatic and losing (albeit temporarily) what he thought to be his 
most inefficient formation.  His changes worried his GSO2 who wrote to his wife: “We had 
officers like Crozier with plenty of experience but General N[ugent] has taken the line that 
they are all no good and brings over their heads men of 7 years service”.382 Crozier believed 
that it was the 9
th
 and 10
th
 RIRifles that “carried the weight of the brigade on their shoulders” 
at this time and that the problem lay with the 8
th
 and 15
th
 RIRifles “on account of the 
inferiority of their commanding officers”.  Consequently, the 9th and 10th RIRifles “sometimes 
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caught the reaction caused by the other two [battalions]”.383  Crozier may well have believed 
this but the evidence of the number men tried by courts martial during the division’s first five 
months in France indicates otherwise.   
 
From October 1915 to the end of February 1916 seventy-two men of 107 Brigade were tried 
while the total for 109 Brigade was thirty-eight and for 108 Brigade just nineteen.  The 9
th
 and 
10
th
 RIRifles were responsible for thirty-nine of these cases and the 8
th
 and 15
th
 accounted for 
thirty-three.
384
  The number of cases from the brigade fell markedly, particularly within the 9
th
 
and 15
th
 RIRifles, when one man from the former and two from the latter battalion were 
executed for desertion in February and March respectively.  In commenting on the cases 
Brigadier-General Withycombe  observed that “the discipline of the 9th R[oyal] I[rish] Rif[le]s 
is good for a service battalion” while that of the 15th RIRifles was only “fair”: giving a little 
support perhaps to Crozier’s claim that the problems lay elsewhere.385  Crozier’s role in the 
case and subsequent execution of 14218 Rifleman James Crozier, 9
th
 RIRifles, on 27 February 
1916 has been described in almost every work about Crozier and about the death penalty in 
the First World War.
386
  It is interesting that, despite Crozier reporting to the court martial 
that: 
  From a fighting point of view, this soldier is of no value.  His behaviour has been that 
 of a shirker for the past three months … I am firmly of the opinion that the crime was 
 deliberately committed with the intention of avoiding duty … more particularly as he 
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 absented himself shortly after the case of another soldier had been promulgated for a 
 similar crime.  The officer commanding the man’s company is of a similar opinion. 
 
He then inserted into his statement, apparently as an afterthought: “He has been with the 
Expeditionary Force since 3/10/15” - thus reminding the court that Rifleman Crozier was one 
of the original volunteers.
387
   David Starrett, though, recalled that “The Colonel [Crozier] was 
more upset than I had ever seen him. ‘To have to shoot one of your own men’ he kept saying 
… [that evening he] buried himself in maps and plans of the line.”388  Rifleman Crozier had 
been executed pour encourager les autres.  Writing in 1937 Frank Crozier stated: “I did not 
regret his death at the time … for intuitively I felt that it would be the first and last of its kind 
in my regiment [sic].  That prediction was proved true by fact.”389 As this was one of the 
episodes that coloured readers’ perceptions of Crozier’s character and hence his reputation 
there will be further consideration of the execution of Rifleman Crozier as described by his 
CO later in this chapter. 
 
Crozier was nothing if not even-handed. Just before the FGCM of Rifleman Crozier he had 
sent one of his junior officers for court martial.  Lieutenant Arthur Annandale had previously 
received his CO’s favour in the form of ten days leave granted (unofficially) while he 
received treatment for venereal disease but, when Annandale promptly bolted during a 
meeting with Crozier and his company commander when a German trench mortar 
bombardment started, he found himself in front of a FGCM.  He was found guilty of conduct 
to the prejudice of good order and military discipline but the sentence of dismissal from His 
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Majesty’s Service was not confirmed and he was sent to England where he later relinquished 
his commission on health grounds.
390
  Starrett observed that “The Colonel [Crozier] was off 
the deep end about both [cases], and few could get anywhere near him … if the officer did not 
know what he was doing, did the man?”391  Crozier had successfully refused to have 
Annandale returned to duty with his battalion and wrote that as a result “the Adjutant-
General’s Department at GHQ obviously tried to break me … for reasons best known to 
themselves” and that he owed his survival to the support of his divisional commander, 
Nugent, and the GOC 107 Brigade, Withycombe.
392
   Turning a blind eye to Annandale’s 
venereal disease indicates an element of tolerance in Crozier’s approach to discipline.  This is 
also evidenced by the case of Captain George Gaffikin, OC B Company, 9
th
 RIRifles, who 
Crozier discovered drunk while on front line duty during the winter of 1915/16.  Perhaps 
because of Crozier’s own battle with drink a blind eye was turned on the incident following 
receipt of a promise of abstinence while with the battalion
393
  Just two months after the courts 
martial the 9
th
 RIRifles received a mention (along with 9
th
 and 10
th
 Royal Inniskilling 
Fusiliers, 109 Brigade) in Douglas Haig’s first despatch as CinC, BEF, for “good work in 
carrying out or repelling local attacks and raids”.394  Back in Ireland the mention prompted the 
following assessment: “Such a distinction proves that the officers of this battalion [the 9th 
RIRifles], from top to bottom, have been most assiduous and successful in training their men 
for actual warfare”.395 Captain George Gaffikin and Second-Lieutenant K.W. Gould of B 
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Company, 9th RIRifles also received mentions.
396
  Back in December 1915, just after he had 
taken command of the battalion, Crozier wrote to Captain Montgomery, OC A Company, 9
th
 
RIRifles, asking him to remain when his company had finished its time in the trenches to 
supervise further working parties. Montgomery remarked “The General expects a lot, but that 
is the penalty we pay for a good reputation”.397  By June 1916, the evidence indicates that the 
reputation of the battalion and by inference that of Crozier, was improving.  How would they 
perform in their first major action? 
 
Experience of the Somme 
The ‘local attacks and raids’ mentioned above took place on a sector of the front line near the 
village of Auchonvillers but in March the Ulster Division gave up this northernmost part of its 
sector and concentrated in the area immediately north of the strategically important high 
ground at Thiepval.  During April, May and June 1916 duty in the trenches was interspersed 
with provision of working parties (mainly in Thiepval Wood) creating the assembly trenches 
and other essential infrastructure for the planned offensive on the Fourth Army front.  
Between 21 – 30 April and 1 – 6 May time was found for the battalion to practice attacks over 
dummy trenches.
398
 
 
The role of 107 Brigade during the battle was to support 109 Brigade, occupying 36
th
 
Division’s right sector which was to attack at zero hour and capture the first three lines of 
German trenches known as ‘A’, ‘B’ and ‘C’. 107 Brigade was to leave its position in the rear 
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at zero, move up and attack thirty minutes after the main assault with 10
th
 RIRifles on the 
right and 9
th
 RIRifles on the left. Halting at the already captured ‘C’ line, their objective was 
to capture the fourth or ‘D’ line of trenches which would be consolidated by the 8th RIRifles 
which was in support.
399
 
 
According to Crozier, and this is one of the many instances where there is no other source, he 
and his friend Lieutenant-Colonel Bernard, OC 10
th
 RIRifles, were (rightly as it turned out) 
concerned about the dominating Thiepval village and chateau on their right flank.
400
  In case 
the attack plan needed amendment they agreed to meet in no-man’s-land as their battalions 
deployed.  This ignored the orders of Major-General Nugent who had instructed that no CO 
should venture forward of their battalion battle HQ.
401
  At zero on 1 July the 9
th
 and 10
th
 
RIRifles advanced in parallel extended columns up the slope through Thiepval Wood to the 
British Front line.  The 10
th
 RIRifles to the right of the 9
th
 RIRifles were clearly visible to the 
German troops at Thiepval as they passed through the now defoliated wood and were heavily 
shelled.  Bernard was killed soon after the advance started. Crozier watched his four 
companies leave the British lines “bullets cutting up the ground at his feet” but realised 
something was wrong to the right.  He “could not see or hear of Colonel Bernard who was to 
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give the pre-arranged signal for the joint advance of both battalions”.402  A sunken lane ran in 
front of the captured German front line about half way across no-man’s-land. The men of the 
9
th
 RIRifles had formed up there where there was also a little shelter from the enfilade fire 
from Thiepval.  “Between the bursts Crozier doubled to the sunken road … rallied what was 
left of the Tenth … signalling the men on.  He walked into bursts, he fell into holes, his 
clothing was torn by bullets, but he himself was all right. Moving about as if on the parade 
ground he again and again rallied his men … without him not a man would have passed the 
Schwaben Redoubt let alone reach[ed] the final objective”.403 Second-Lieutenant H. Malcolm 
McKee, 9
th
 RIRifles, wrote many years later “that seeing Crozier standing in No-man’s-land 
gave me a feeling of glee that we were in the battle together.  He was a tiger – but his example 
inspired me lots of times not to run away!”404  Crozier acknowledged that he ‘saw red’ that 
day.
405
 
 
Crozier spent the rest of the day at battalion HQ on the British Front line although an 
adventure recounted in Brass Hat states that he went across to the old German front line that 
night.
406
  Mixed-up units of the Ulster Division were clinging on in the German lines 
subjected to counter-attacks, bombardments and critical shortages of ammunition, bombs and 
water.  They were also deficient in officers as the COs had been kept back and the 2iCs were 
part of the cadre retained for post-battle rebuilding.  The wounded Captain Montgomery, OC 
A Company, 9
th
 RIRifles, withdrew the few men remaining in his charge at about 10.30pm 
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but other isolated parties remained in the German front line.
407
  The night was spent collecting 
wounded and clearing trenches of dead and equipment.  On the second day Crozier was 
ordered to organise a party which eventually consisted of 360 men of the 8
th
, 9
th
, 10
th
, and 15
th
 
RIRifles to reinforce the troops still holding on.  Crozier “had arranged to lead the force in 
person” but was stopped by Brigadier-General Withycombe and command given to the 2iC, 
9
th
 RIRifles, Major Woods.  This enterprise was “well conceived and gallantly executed” and 
succeeded in its goal.
408
  Most of the exhausted men of the Ulster Division were relieved on 
the night of 2/3 July and, after some delay, Wood’s force was relieved on the morning of 3 
July having suffered 200 casualties.  Crozier had been at his battle HQ at the edge of Thiepval 
Wood for more than forty-eight hours.  Starrett, his servant, noted that even out of the line he 
“could not rest, sitting or standing”.409   
 
Out of the line he wrote to the families of some of the dead. One letter produced the wrong 
result when the parents of Lieutenant K.W. Gould who had been reported dead wrote back 
indignantly having received notice for the Red Cross that he was in German hands.
410
 Another 
letter appeared in the Belfast local press, forwarded by the widow of Company Sergeant-
Major Joseph Martin: “Your husband was killed just as the battalion was about to deploy 
from the wood for the attack … he has persevered to remain with the battalion all this winter, 
despite of being ill, and when he came back from hospital it only was because he knew it was 
his duty to be in the firing line come what may”.411  While not shedding any light on the 
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action the sympathy letters do illustrate another side to Crozier, even if the latter example is a 
little restrained. 
 
The 36
th
 (Ulster) Division had suffered 5104 casualties, including 189 officers, during three 
days of fighting.
412
 Crozier wrote that he marched out of the line with just seventy men of the 
9
th
 RIRifles.  SDGW lists 107 men and five officers killed in the battalion and the wounded 
must have numbered many more.
413
 Twenty officers were killed, wounded or missing - the 
joint highest total (the same as the 8
th
 RIRifles) for any of the division’s twelve battalions.414  
Captain Montgomery wrote that he had led 115 other ranks and four officers (including 
himself) into the battle and just he and thirty-four other ranks remained.
415
 
 
On 11 July the battalion entrained and left the vicinity of the Somme for Flanders where it 
rested and trained.  On 15 July battalion classes for Lewis gunnery, bombing and scouting 
commenced and 18 July was devoted to musketry training.  On 28 July the battalion took up a 
support position in Ploegsteert Wood and its two composite companies (losses not yet having 
been made up) moved into the front line on 31 July.  On 16 August two patrols went out to 
examine the enemy wire and this was repeated the next night. On 31 August 3 officers and 
twenty men left the trenches to raid the German trenches “under cover of gas” but had to 
return when the wind refused to cooperate.
416
  Further raids followed on 15 September and 12 
October, both successful.  Crozier wrote (fourteen years later) of three successful raids and 
that “during these hectic days I receive the prisoners personally, the number of the regiments 
                                                 
412
 J.E. Edmonds, Military Operations: France and Belgium 1916 Vol. 1 (London: Macmillan, 1932), p. 421. 
413
 Gregson, Belfast Boys, p.85. 
414
 Anon, The Great War 1914-1918: Ulster Greets Her Brave and Faithful Sons and Remembers Her Glorious 
Dead (Belfast: Books Ulster, 2015, first published 1919), p.13. 
415
 Letter quoted in Orr, The Road to the Somme, p.191. 
416
 TNA: WO 95/2305 War Diary 9
th
 RIRifles. 
149 
 
concerned being telephoned to GHQ via my report centre actually from the German lines”.417  
In fact the battalion war diary shows that he was away on leave during the second of the 
successful raids and it was Major Woods, the 2iC, who reported the efficacy of the telephone 
in this case.  It was probably true though, that when Crozier wrote “These three [sic] 
successful raids, on top of the Thiepval epic, stimulate the battalion to such an extent as to 
place it on the topmost rung of the war-ladder” – despite the losses, the morale and capability 
of the battalion were recovering under Crozier’s command.418 
 
Captain Montgomery, who had returned to the battalion, had to deal with a draft of 
‘undesirables’ from the 3rd RIRifles.  His irregular approach must surely have been known to 
Crozier:  
 Nice and quietly I said to the Sergt Major – please arrange to have these people well 
 beaten after parade, I don’t want to be bothered writing things on their conduct sheets 
 … If one beating isn’t enough you needn’t bother me about it. Just have ‘em beaten 
 every day at reveille for as long as it takes to lick ‘em into our shape … they don’t 
 love me much at present but are coming on quite nicely.
419
 
 
Montgomery chose this busy time to ask Crozier if he could go on a training course:   
 I asked the CO the other day … and he said ‘Go on a course indeed, Go to hell!’ – 
nice polite friendly person that he is, but soldier - he did end up by telling me that 
any time I really needed a course I could go on any one I liked just for the asking … 
this CO knows men because that ‘just for the asking’ is a perfect masterpiece.  The 
little ugly devil plays with the inside of us and that has made this battalion what it is.  
Those he cannot play on he doesn’t keep.420 
 
Crozier seems to have been generally well thought of among the officers of the 9
th
 RIRifles.  
As late as January 1918 his name heads the list of the ‘provisional committee’ on a leaflet 
promoting the formation of a 9
th
 RIRifles officers’ dinner club to be known as ‘The Webel’s 
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Own’ [sic].  The leaflet notes that it “was suggested by Brigadier-General Crozier DSO, when 
in command of the 9
th
 Battalion Royal Irish Rifles, that steps should be taken for the 
maintenance of a spirit of close comradeship between all the Officers who have served with 
the Battalion, for as long as two such survive”.421 
 
Another, less flattering, view of Crozier has been widely repeated.  In 1976 James L. Stewart-
Moore, who was subaltern in the 15
th
 RIRifles and later transferred to 107 Trench Mortar 
Battery in time for the Somme battle, gave his recollections of Crozier’s supposed penchant 
for sending officers on patrol: 
 Their object [officer patrols] was supposed to be the maintenance of offensive spirit 
but so far as I could see they never achieved anything on our part of the front.  Colonel 
Crozier who commanded the 9
th
 Rifles was particularly keen on sending out patrols all 
to no purpose except to show off.  He had the reputation of being a callous and 
overbearing martinet.
422
 
 
It is not clear to which period this comment refers and Stewart-Moore was invalided home in 
October 1916.  Post-Somme the 9
th
 RIRifles war diary records patrols going out on four dates.  
Pre-Somme patrols are only listed on three dates, all in December 1915.  While it is possible 
that the diarist did not record them, it is also possible that Stewart-Moore’s recollection had 
been influenced by Crozier’s own emphasis on patrol work in Brass Hat in which patrols lead 
to the death of one subaltern.
423
 Indeed, it is quite likely that Stewart-Moore’s whole image of 
Crozier as ‘callous and overbearing’ had been so influenced. If Crozier was indeed 
‘particularly keen’ on sending out patrols it is not reflected in the available evidence and his 
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“unenviable reputation … due to his advocacy of trench raiding” is founded on the single 
quotation given above.
424
 
 
Some in the 9
th
 Royal Irish Rifles must also have anticipated that after promotion was in the 
air.  Captain Montgomery, now Acting 2iC, 9
th
 RIRifles, who had obviously developed 
considerable respect for Crozier, wrote to his father in September 1916: “My CO [Crozier] is 
in command of the Brigade at present during the Brigadier’s absence on leave.  I think it is a 
case of ‘coming events’.  I hope so, if he will take me with him, otherwise not”.425  A month 
later Montgomery was writing that “I had a very straight heart to heart with the CO [Crozier] 
today. He has promised me that when he leaves this battalion he will fix it that I get a good 
job … the CO leaving the battalion depends on when he gets a Brigade. This I think must 
certainly occur before the Spring”.  Montgomery went on: “I couldn’t leave the little devil 
even if I were only in command of a platoon”.426  Montgomery was right about ‘coming 
events’.  On 19 November 1916 he wrote: 
 About 4.00pm the CO [Crozier] got a wire telling him to take over command of a 
 Brigade.  He didn’t know where it was, who they are, or anything, but he left here to 
take them over at 5.35pm … Some career in this war he has already had.  Captain to 
Temporary Brigadier-General in two years and a month.  He told me before he left that 
he would send for me just as soon as he finds a good job for me – preferably a staff job 
… From what Brigadier-General F.P. Crozier said to me before he left it 
[Montgomery’s reversion to captain following Haslett’s return] won’t be for long if he 
can help it … no more Coy cmdg for me if I can possibly avoid it.427 
 
Crozier did indeed attempt to obtain Montgomery’s services in 1917 but without success.  
This incident will be described in Chapter Four. 
                                                 
424
 See Bowman, Irish Regiments, p. 30. 
425
 Public Record Office of Northern Ireland, Belfast: D2794/1/1/14, Montgomery Family Papers, Letter from 
Major W.A. Montgomery to his father, 26 September 1916. 
426
 PRONI: D2794/1/1/17. Montgomery to his father, 30 October 1916.  Despite Crozier’s recommendations, 
Montgomery was replaced as 2iC, 9
th
 RIRifles, by the returning Major Horace Haslett, and passed over for the 
battalion command in favour of Major Philip Woods who returned from the Senior Officers Course at Aldershot.  
427
 PRONI: D2794/1/1/19. Montgomery to his father ,19 November 1916. 
152 
 
 
Crozier was lucky to have supportive superiors in the brigade and division - although he had 
tested his divisional general’s patience to the limit by his actions at Thiepval on 1 July. He 
later wrote that “Nugent, owing to Bernard’s death kindled up such a fuss about 
‘disobedience’ that I, for personal post battle safety, drew a very heavy veil over events.  You 
know better than I do the rules laid down in old F.S.R. governing the departure from an order 
in the presence of the enemy.  All the justifications for departure were present.  I saw the 
original recommendation for a DSO for me, made out by Withycombe, scrawled across in red 
ink by Nugent … ‘Rank disobedience of orders, should be court-martialled’”428 Nugent’s ire 
passed and Crozier was awarded a DSO in the next New Year’s Honours List and was 
mentioned in despatches. 
 
Nugent was obviously important to Crozier because no promotion could be forthcoming 
without his approval.  He (Nugent) certainly had earlier reservations when considering 
Crozier’s promotion to battalion command.  Wilfred Spender, then the GSO2 in the 36th 
(Ulster) Division, observed later that: “in fact General Nugent, who felt some hesitation in 
giving him [Crozier]  promotion owing to the roughness and ruthless way in which he 
handled his men, spoke to me on the subject, and I recommended him thinking that his 
courage and leadership would counterbalance his other disabilities.”429  Spender implies that 
they did not but, nevertheless, both Withycombe, GOC 107 Brigade, and Nugent, GOC, 36
th
 
(Ulster) Division, thought well enough of Crozier’s abilities to recommend him for promotion 
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after the Somme battle.  Crozier put it down to the fact that they “were fair-minded men, as 
my seniority was against me. I was the junior Colonel in the brigade”.430 
 
The quotation from Spender given in the last paragraph was first brought into the spotlight by 
Gary Sheffield who also highlighted Crozier’s “unbalanced views”.431  Spender wrote his 
letter just one month after the publication of Brass Hat and had not liked what he read.  It is 
important to read the full extract in context:  
 Brigadier-General Crozier has recently published a book which casts grave reflections 
 on the men of the [BEF] in fact General Nugent, who felt some hesitation in giving 
 him promotion owing to the roughness and ruthless way in which he handled his men, 
 spoke to me on the subject, and I recommended him thinking that his courage and 
 leadership would counterbalance his other disabilities. Perhaps the kindest view of 
 General Crozier’s mentality is to try and believe that his contact with men with very 
 high ideals in religion and patriotism has now produced a somewhat unbalanced 
 change of view corresponding to what sometimes takes place at a revival meeting on 
 the minds of men whose standards had previously not been high.  I refer to this matter 
 since, if it were possible to do so, the official history of the war should show in some 
 way the true picture which is so different to that being painted by General Crozier and 
 other writers of similar notoriety.  
 
The letter was obviously written in anger following Spender’s reading of Brass Hat. Thus 
Crozier’s ‘unbalanced views’ can be seen, in Spender’s eyes, to be a later manifestation and 
not a description of his wartime psyche as implied by Sheffield. 
 
Crozier particularly admired the working of the 107 Brigade staff which he called “first 
class”, singling out for praise the working relationship between Withycombe and his Brigade–
Major, Maurice Fitzmaurice Day MC.
432
  They had “served together for years” and Day had 
previously been adjutant to Withycombe when he commanded the 2
nd
 King’s Own Yorkshire 
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Light Infantry.
433
 Crozier was clearly aware of the value of good brigade HQ staff.  In 
Crozier’s opinion “General Withycombe should have got a Division at the end of 1916 but he 
never got one at all”.434 “Nugent was one of the worst treated men in the war and should have 
been a Corps commander, had the Gods been kind.”435 Crozier recalled that on the day he left 
36
th
 Division, Nugent gave him “sound advice; he always did.  ‘Treat your four battalions like 
four big companies,’ he said, and ‘do not forget your oddments,’ advice which I always acted 
upon to the best of my ability”.436 
 
Crozier’s promotion was the tangible result of his reputation as a capable commander. 
Subsequently that reputation has been eroded not only by the publication of the remarks made 
by Stewart-Moore and Wilfred Spender cited above but particularly by public reaction to the 
books that he published in the 1930s.  In order to understand the effect that Crozier’s books 
have had on his reputation, the next section will examine them in some detail. 
 
Crozier’s Post-War Writing 
The image of Brigadier-General Frank Percy Crozier was created largely by his books and the 
books that others have since written that draw on their content.  Understanding how and why 
they were written and how they were received is crucial to the understanding of the evolution 
of his public image and reputation.  This section will examine them in detail along with some 
of the reviews and press notices that they generated.  Although two books are very well 
known and often quoted he actually wrote seven: 
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Title     Publisher   Date Published 
A Brass Hat in No Man’s Land Jonathan Cape   April 1930 
Impressions and Recollections T. Werner Laurie  September 1930 
A Word to Gandhi   Williams & Norgate  October 1931 
Five Years Hard   Jonathan Cape   February 1932 
Angels on Horseback   Jonathan Cape   August 1932 
Ireland for Ever   Jonathan Cape   December 1932 
The Men I Killed   Michael Joseph  August 1937 
 
These do not form a logical sequence.  Brass Hat is a memoir of the Great War; Impressions 
is the nearest to an autobiography and covers the periods before and after the war as well as 
going over the same ground as Brass Hat; A Word to Gandhi is a account of British policy in 
Ireland and its lessons according to Crozier; Five Years Hard describes Crozier’s service in 
northern Nigeria between 1901 and 1905; Angels on Horseback is an account of his time with 
Thorneycroft’s Mounted Infantry in South Africa during the first half of 1900; Ireland for 
Ever returns to the subject of Ireland and British imperial policy, while The Men I Killed 
returns to the subject of the Great War.
437
   
 
Crozier’s public writing started with letters to newspapers and was initially concerned with 
his interest in the places where he had seen service. In 1920, for example, he wrote to The 
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Times about the situation in Lithuania.
438
 His resignation as commander of the Auxiliary 
Division of the Royal Irish Constabulary (ADRIC) in February 1921 was followed by a flurry 
of correspondence and articles.  Ireland seems also to have been the catalyst for his first 
attempt at extended prose at a time when he was said to be “burning with indignation”.439  In 
rejecting a political pamphlet ‘Imperial lessons from the Irish settlement’ in August 1923, the 
managing director of The Labour Publishing Company mentions that “I certainly remember 
you coming to us in regard to your book on Ireland”.440  It would be nine years before the 
book on Ireland appeared. 
 
By 1928 Crozier was a regular contributor of newspaper copy.  He published articles with 
headlines such as ‘Are we too Kind to the Modern Schoolboy?’, ‘Are You in Love with Your 
Job?’ and ‘Are the Professions Doomed?’441  He also contributed a series of ‘derring-do’ 
stories based on his experiences in the Baltic and South Africa to the boys periodical Chums 
and in the 1930s he was the military correspondent for Reynold’s News. 
 
Why did Crozier Write? 
In seeking the prime motive for Crozier’s writings it is impossible to disregard his financial 
situation.  He found no employment in the Regular army after the war, his Lithuanian 
adventure proved abortive, the reformed UVF did not want him and he had resigned his post 
with the ADRIC under a massive cloud and much public recrimination in February 1921. His 
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first wife died in April 1921 and he married for a second time later in the same month.  His 
actress first wife had brought no fortune, contributed to the frittering away of the income that 
he did have and suffered from physical and mental illness that required payment of medical 
bills.  His second wife had been employed as the nurse to his elder daughter and was also not 
endowed with funds.  His previous bankruptcy as a junior officer in 1909 was just the first of 
a series of events that illustrate how he had no capacity for effective management of his own 
finances. 
   
By March 1922 Crozier was Chairman and Director of the ‘Ex-Officers Automobile Service’, 
the Principal General Manager of which was Lieutenant-Colonel Richard Andrews, who 
served under Crozier in 119 Brigade.  Tragedy struck in January 1923 when Andrews was hit 
in the chest and killed by a disintegrating abrasive wheel in his garage with Crozier 
(supposedly) at his side, effectively putting paid to that venture.
442
  Crozier’s subsequent 
attempt at a parliamentary career came to nothing when he failed to be elected as the member 
for Portsmouth Central in the December 1923 General Election.
443
  The loss, by 3,502 votes, 
in what had been a marginal constituency, perhaps indicates that his reputation had suffered a 
knock in the aftermath of his very public resignation from the ADRIC.  By the end of 1925 he 
was bankrupt again.  At the first meeting of his creditors he declared liabilities of £600 and no 
assets – he also blamed his financial state on an establishment vendetta that set out to ruin 
him.
444
  Though writing was by now not his only option - by 1929 he was also earning by 
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speaking on behalf of the League of Nations Union - it seems that his published output was 
driven largely by financial necessity.
 445
 
 
Much has been written about the context of the explosion in war writing during the late 1920s 
and 1930s.  Crozier published his first book at the height of the period of disenchantment with 
the ideals that had carried Great Britain through the Great War and the years prior to the 
publication of Brass Hat saw the appearance of Max Plowman’s A Subaltern on the Somme 
(1927), Edmund Blunden’s Undertones of War (1928), Robert Graves’ Goodbye to all That 
(1929), Charles Douie’s The Weary Road (1929) and Erich Maria Remarque’s All Quiet on 
the Western Front (1929) amongst many.  These books abandoned the heroic and restrained 
tone of earlier works; they caught the public imagination and they sold well.  Cyril Falls 
wrote in April 1930 – the same month that Brass Hat was published – that “the characteristics 
of this book [All Quiet…] and its successors, whether fiction or reminiscence are very similar; 
indeed it is common gossip that several writers sat down to produce one in the same vein after 
watching Herr Remarque’s sales go soaring up into the hundred-thousands”.446   
 
Crozier was not likely to admit to a financial motive to his writing.  Defending his first book 
against the charges of sensationalism and untruth that appeared in the press, Crozier, said “I 
have written my book to focus attention on the futility of war. Another war will lead to the 
destruction of the moral fibre of the world”.447  His wife gave the reason for writing as “To 
tell the stark truth about war, not glossing it over or idealizing it but showing its stark 
realities”.448  At the time of writing Brass Hat Crozier was involved in the League of Nations 
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Union and a supporter of the League’s stance on peace.  Just as the book was published the 
London Naval Conference was ending and Crozier obviously expected much good to come 
out of it.  His ‘Epilogue’ at the end of Brass Hat describes an imagined scene in 2119 when a 
group of Boy Scouts visiting the museum which by then occupies the redundant War Office 
are told of the key role of the League of Nations in abolishing war and of the “constructive 
advance into the realm of disarmament and cooperation” that took place at the 1930 
conference.
449
  Crozier would have been disillusioned with its actual outcome.  In the 
reprinted edition of Brass Hat he acknowledged that he was wrong in his prediction: 
 Readers may feel that owing to the failure of the World to use the League of Nations 
as originally intended, owing to the collapse of collective security and the breakdown 
of the Disarmament Conference, some of the conclusions arrived at in this book no 
longer hold good.  They will I believe be right.
450
  
 
Crozier’s conversion to the cause of peace seems to be genuine and perhaps indicates an 
underlying remorse about his role as a soldier in causing the deaths of others but his 
enthusiastic support for the peace movement also gave him the chance to hit back at the 
establishment.
451
 
 
The different titles that he penned had other motives underlying their key role as income 
generators.  At the time of writing Brass Hat Crozier was developing his views on peace but 
aimed to push readers towards that cause by emphasising, even sensationalising, the 
beastliness of war by repeated reference to violence, alcohol and sex.  The success of his first 
venture prompted T. Werner Laurie to publicise Impressions as “By the author of A Brass Hat 
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in No Man’s Land …He lived a score of lives, each one a glamorous adventure”.452  In fact 
Impressions is Crozier’s most restrained work and the most readable.  It demonstrates the 
effect of tight editorial control over content and style. It is the nearest thing to an 
autobiography that he wrote, covering his life story up to the aftermath of his resignation from 
the Auxiliary Division Royal Irish Constabulary (ADRIC).  He does take the opportunity to 
air his views in departures from the narrative throughout the book and particularly in a final 
chapter on ‘The Lessons to be Learnt’, which focuses on the ills of alcohol, the need for world 
peace, the negative effects of bureaucracy and the need to ensure promotion within the 
military by merit and not favouritism.  There is no reference to sex.  Impressions also contains 
his first account of his resignation from the ADRIC.  He returned to the subject of Ireland in 
the strange A Word to Gandhi; The Lesson of Ireland (1931).  The description on the cover of 
that book states that the author: 
 Describes with fearless frankness the disastrous policy pursued by the British 
Government during the Irish Rebellion.  His case is that anything between martial law 
and concession of demands leads to reprisals, murder, and chaos. In India martial law 
is impossible.  The choice, therefore, is between a situation infinitely worse than the 
Irish, or practical concession of Gandhi’s terms. 
 
Crozier sent Gandhi a copy inscribed “Mr Gandhi will be surprised to find in a military man 
an admirer of his”.453  The publishers of A Word to Gandhi were Williams and Norgate. This 
company published Henry Brinton’s The Peace Army in the following year and their use by 
Crozier indicates his increasing engagement with the peace movement.
454
  Money and the 
cause of peace were two of Crozier’s motives for writing, the third (particularly in the case of 
the Irish-themed books) was revenge.  By 1931 it was obvious to Crozier that he had lost his 
continuing battle with the establishment over the loss of both his reputation and his income 
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following his resignation from the ADRIC back in 1921.  To a more perceptive man it would 
have been obvious that the establishment was not going to budge.
455
  
 
His next three books were published by Jonathan Cape in quick succession.  All three are in 
the mould of Brass Hat and written in Crozier’s trademark derring-do style.  Theatrical 
chapter titles lead into equally theatrical paragraphs of short sentences laced with florid 
language, extensive reported conversation and exclamation marks.  The first to be published 
was Five Years Hard.  Crozier uses this book to describe his experiences in northern Nigeria 
as a member of the West African Field Force (WAAF) and as such it forms one of the two 
‘prequels’ to Brass Hat.  The other is Angels on Horseback, which covers Crozier’s service in 
Thorneycroft’s Mounted Infantry (TMI) during the Second Boer War.  Despite both these 
subjects appearing previously in Impressions, Jonathan Cape must have thought that there 
would be enough interest in the subjects (and their author) to warrant the investment in 
publication. Like Brass Hat both works continue Crozier’s penchant for using pseudonyms 
for characters that were (mainly) still alive at the time of publication - although Crozier does 
not use the conceit consistently.  As many of the characters are easily tracked down by cross-
reference to the already published Impressions one wonders why he did this and whether it 
was a requirement of his publishers.  Most easily recognized in Five Years Hard is Thomas 
Astley Cubitt who appears in the guise of ‘Tom Spindle’.456  Anyone familiar with either 
Cubitt’s role in the WAAF or his tall, gangly frame would have quickly identified him.   
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Angels on Horseback describes a period in Crozier’s life before that of Five Years Hard and 
one again wonders why the books came out in the ‘wrong’ order.  Its subject is the six months 
that Crozier spent in the ranks of TMI in 1899-1900.  Though a short period it was an 
important one for the young man as he had his first taste of action and survived the battle of 
Spion Kop.  The battle and his future step-father’s role in abandoning the summit of the hill 
left a lasting impression on him and provided an example that he says he used time and again 
to his men during the Great War to illustrate the danger of retreat without orders.  The book 
again contains the use of pseudonyms but is notable for the prominent character of Rufus 
‘Ginger’ Ross.  Ross embodies the admirable characters of the British officer: concern for 
duty, care for his men, obedience to orders, steadiness under fire and moral courage, but who 
is also someone unafraid to speak his mind when it is necessary.  Ross is such an important 
character in the book that he deserves some study, particularly as Crozier claims to have met 
him again under fire in France eighteen years later.
457
 
 
A profile of Ross can be put together from snippets in the book. The son of a general, he 
attended Wellington College (like Crozier), he attended the same crammer in Earl’s Court as 
Crozier, was a ‘senior subaltern’ in a militia battalion before joining the Sierra Leone Frontier 
Police in 1896, served in Cuba against the Spanish in 1898 where he reached the rank of 
colonel, joined the Royal Niger Company before service with TMI and a commission in 
Brabant’s Horse.  By 1918 he was a “colonial cavalry general”.  Crozier gives the impression 
of hero-worship when writing of Ross so it is surprising that it has proved impossible to 
identify an officer with the same record.  It is most likely that Ross is a composite character 
based on Crozier’s contacts in South Africa and in Nigeria.  It is noteworthy that Ross does 
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not appear at all in Impressions but that Crozier describes W.C.N. Hastings (known as 
‘Marcus’) in similar terms as Ross: 
 He was at the same time not only quite a character, but perhaps the best practical 
soldier that the battalion possessed … A brave man, he had considerable respect for 
the enemy in the field but none whatever for his superiors, should they chance to be 
stupid, ignorant, or lacking that sense of humour which is an essential factor in a 
military machine.  On top of this able to superimpose his own personality, the result 
being that he generally got what he wanted.
458
 
  
Combine Hastings (and a little of Crozier himself)  with the like of Hugh Gilbert Gregorie, 
son of a Major-General, who joined TMI as a trooper on the same day as Crozier and rose to 
command 47 Infantry Brigade, 16
th
 Division,  in the Great War, and the character of Ross 
takes shape.
459
  One final element may be provided by the character of Jack Seely, an 
unconventional soldier, whom Crozier had seen in action in South Africa and who 
commanded the Canadian Cavalry Brigade from 1915 to 1918.
460
 
 
The next book, Ireland for Ever, was the vehicle for Crozier’s vindication of his conduct as 
Commandant of the ADRIC.  Its 301 pages outline the Irish situation in 1920 and 1921 
through Crozier’s eyes and he describes the organizational chaos and lack of clear policy 
which in his opinion led to the alienation of the population and the loss of Ireland by the 1921 
treaty.  Much has been made of Crozier’s role there (not least by Crozier himself) but it must 
be remembered that he was in command of the ADRIC between 4 August 1920 and 23 
November when he was involved in a serious road accident that left him hospitalised.  He did 
not return to duty until 10 January 1921 and resigned on 19 February.  His account is biased, 
is influenced strongly by subsequent events and therefore must be read with some scepticism.   
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Crozier’s last and most notorious book was The Men I Killed.  By the time this book was 
published Crozier had formed a close friendship with Reverend H.R.L. ‘Dick’ Sheppard and 
had been instrumental with Sheppard in founding the Peace Pledge Union in 1936.
461
  The 
book is not a good piece of writing.  As one reviewer put it: “This is a free country and 
General Crozier can have his convictions and have his say.  His say is noisy, excited, poorly 
arranged, ill-argued and ill-written”.462  The storm of criticism that greeted this particular 
publication is described further below. 
 
How were these books received? 
 
 May 15
th[1930].  Have I, asks our Vicar’s wife, read ‘A Brass Hat in No Man’s Land’?  
No I have not.  Then, she says, don’t, on any account. There are so many sad and 
shocking things in life as it is, that writers should confine themselves to the bright, the 
happy and the beautiful.  This the author of ‘A Brass Hat’ has entirely failed to do.  It 
subsequently turns out that our Vicar’s wife has not read the book herself, but that our 
Vicar has skimmed it, and declared it to be very painful and unnecessary.  (Mem: Put 
‘Brass Hat’ down for ‘Times’ Book Club list, if not already there).463 
 
The ‘Provincial Lady’ was one of many to seek out Brass Hat.  The book ran to five 
impressions within a month and was eventually also produced in a cheap edition in April 
1937.  After the author’s death extracts were also published in The Great War, I Was 
There.
464
  The reviews were mixed.  Robert Graves wrote in the house magazine of Jonathan 
Cape:  
 In spite of occasional clichés of phrase and sentiment, or even not in spite of them, for 
they are so obvious that they save the book from being judged too strictly on its 
literary merits, it is the only account of fighting on the Western Front that I have been 
able to read with sustained interest and respect … After a book of this sort has 
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appeared no one need bother to write more ‘startling war revelations’ of the Western 
Front.  Crozier has done the job once and for all; and nobody can challenge the 
authenticity of Crozier as witness.
465
 
 
The Times Literary Supplement reviewer (possibly Cyril Falls, who had served in the Ulster 
Division with Crozier) noted: 
 The author of this book had the reputation of being a man of remarkable physical 
bravery and a successful commander of the cut-and-thrust order; one cannot truly say 
that he reveals himself to be an engaging personality.  It must be admitted, however, 
that he has a philosophy and sticks to it consistently ... There are other features of the 
book in the highest degree reprehensible.  Allusions are made to despicable conduct on 
the part of brother officers, not always with names mentioned, indeed, but in a fashion 
such that the names could be identified by hundreds who served.
466
 
 
The Daily Mirror reviewer wrote: 
 
 When read carefully this egoistical book, which has aroused much discussion is not so 
unpleasant as some critics have supposed … If General Crozier is stern with the man 
who lets his fellow soldiers down, he can also be generous to the good fighter who is 
guilty of a temporary lapse … Much of the book is trivial or injudiciously phrased, but 
most of it remains an interesting eye-witness’s account of war conditions and a logical 
explanation of  the urgent military reasons underlying certain severities.
467
 
 
The New York Times noted that Brass Hat was “The literary sensation of the hour” and that 
much of “the torrent of abuse” with which the press greeted its publication was “simply the 
accusation, repeated over and over again in varying terms and at great length, that a British 
officer should be ashamed at himself for throwing mud at the British Army.  No reputable 
authority has attempted to challenge the statements of fact given on General Crozier’s first 
hand authority”.468 
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Sir Herbert Creedy at the War Office wrote to the King’s Private Secretary, Colonel Sir Clive 
Wigram:  
 When we saw that Brigadier-General Crozier had published his book … we went into 
the question of what, if anything, could be done and finally took counsel with the 
Home Office.  We have come to the conclusion, naturally with some regret, that there 
is nothing we could do which would not have the result of advertising the book and 
putting more money into the pockets of Crozier and his publisher. 
 
Wigram replied “Many thanks for your confidential note on General Crozier, which I showed 
to the King.  He is evidently an undesirable person and, as you say, the best thing to do is to 
let the book slide back into the mud from which it emerged”.469  The book sold 6,275 copies 
in two months and 10,000 copies of a cheap edition were printed in 1937.
470
 
 
The furore generated by the publication of Brass Hat is in marked contrast to the reception of 
another author’s work just three years before.  When Max Plowman (who would later work 
closely with Crozier in the Peace Pledge Union) sought a publisher for A Subaltern on the 
Somme, the book was rejected by Collins for lacking “the element of sensation” needed “for a 
book on war to have any reasonable chance of success”.  The book was published by Dent in 
September 1927, went to two impressions in two months and received at least twenty-five 
favourable reviews.
471
  It then faded from sight until reprinted by the Imperial War Museum 
in 1996.  This is surprising considering that it touches on alcohol abuse by officers, sex, 
venereal disease, threats to shoot anyone who retires without orders, courts martial and 
bullying officers in the course of its 269 pages.  Unlike Crozier’s book, however, it lacks the 
strained invective and the hectoring tone.  Being written by a subaltern and not a brigadier–
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general it certainly never attracted the attention of the establishment which suggests that the 
objections to Crozier’s work from the higher echelons of society were related to the rank of 
the author rather than the content.
472
 
 
When Impressions was published Cyril Falls wrote: 
 The tone of the narrative is altogether less provocative and more pleasing [than in 
Brass Hat].  Ruthless efficiency, rather than the creation of blood lust, is here his 
theme; and if he sometimes seems to suggest that he was about the only ruthless 
Brigadier on the Western Front his enthusiasm and single-mindedness afford some 
excuse ... the chief fault of his writing is its disjointedness. He is constantly breaking 
off his story to moralize, the result being that the sequence of events is often vague ...It 
need only be said that the disjointed methods of putting before his readers his narrative 
... are in this case very unfortunate in view of the grave charges which he brings 
against both his superiors and his subordinates, and of the persistent persecution of 
which he declares himself to be the victim.
473
 
 
 
“This comparison lacks force and meaning” was the dismissive verdict of the reviewer of A 
Word to Gandhi on Crozier’s comparison of British policy in Ireland and India.474 Ireland for 
Ever was also dismissed: “the writer prefaces his passages on the struggle in Ireland in 1920 
and 1921 with a historical summary of no great value.  The rest of the book is mainly taken up 
with accusations against the police in Ireland in those years”.475 At 31 December 1932, six 
weeks after publication, 821 of the 1,500 print run had been sold.
476
 
 
Cyril Falls was once again the Times Literary Supplement reviewer of Five Years Hard: 
 Brigadier-General Crozier can write in a vivid and arresting manner as he has already 
proved.  Apart from half a dozen phrases or paragraphs in which he insists upon saying 
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the things that ‘are not said’, this is a pleasant and amusing, as well as a bright and 
interesting book.
477
 
 
One of Crozier’s imperial heroes, Lord Lugard, who had been the ‘Chief’ in Nigeria during 
Crozier’s time there was rather less impressed.478  When asked to review the book by the 
Daily Mail, he declined: 
 I am surprised that any publisher should have accepted it and hope that you will ignore 
it, and not give it the valuable advertisement of a review … It represents officers of the 
West African Field Force … as perpetually under the influence of liquor, to say 
nothing of their relationship with native women, and the account of a white woman 
aboard ship which is not fit for publication … Some of the incidents Crozier relates … 
would not be credible were it not that he relates the facts as having being done by 
himself.
479
 
 
Lugard also brought the matter to the attention of Sir George Tomlinson at the Colonial 
Office: “A man who describes with apparent gusto how he told his native soldiers to mutilate 
the dead (his co-religionists) in the search for gold bangles, is a disgrace to the order of the 
DSO … This scandalous description of them [the officers of the WAFF] as a drunken 
immoral crowd is a libel on the traditions of the Corps”.480  Tomlinson replied pragmatically: 
“One can only hope that the book will be treated with the contempt it deserves and so sink 
into oblivion”.481  At 30 June 1932, five months after publication, 2,027 of a print run of 
5,000 had been sold.
482
 
 
When Angels on Horseback was published Cyril Falls was once again the reviewer: 
 In previous books Brigadier-General Crozier has had something to say of the South 
African war. Here he describes his part in more detail.  The book has the merits and 
demerits of its predecessors: a vivid narrative power and a gift for description on the 
one hand and on the other for indifferent taste and always too much reported 
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conversation in circumstances which make it impossible for the author really to 
remember what was said.
483
 
 
Crozier defended his powers of recollection – not very convincingly: 
 
 May I defend my memory on which your reviewer casts doubt?  Are we not 
accustomed to tell our stories in detail, at our regimental dinners, thirty, yes forty, 
years after – then why not write them? ... I can remember conversations, in action, as 
vividly today as thirty-five years ago – and the settings.484 
 
By the end of December 1932, five months after publication, 821 out of a print run of 2,000 
had been sold. 
 
But it was Crozier’s final book that produced the greatest outrage.  Publication of The Men I 
Killed triggered a blizzard of newspaper copy almost all of which was viciously 
condemnatory. The national and provincial press was awash with headlines such as ‘Church 
Leaders Denounced’; ‘Amazing Confession by General Crozier’; ‘My Men I Shot: Killed an 
Officer to Prevent Panic’; ‘Threats to General Who Told Truth about War’; ‘War with the Lid 
Off: Another Sensational Book By General Crozier’; ‘War Dead Slandered’; and ‘General, I 
Wouldn’t Be You’, most of which led into extracts taken from the more lurid passages in the 
book, usually those dealing with the shooting of an unidentified subaltern during the battle of 
the Lys in April 1918.
485
  There were a few, more considered, reviews: 
 He [Crozier] tells all that is important about the men he killed in one chapter and that 
chapter has ensured excellent reviews, not of the book, but of that one chapter.  For the 
rest ‘The Men I Killed’ is a pathetic plea for peace.  It is pathetic in its tone, its 
reasoning, and its disregard for the facts. At times irritating.  At times it is merely 
tiresome.
486
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 The publishers describe Gen. Crozier’s book as ‘sensational and important, and one of 
the most amazing revelations ever made by a distinguished soldier.’ In this description 
one need only take exception to the word ‘important’. Gen. Crozier’s account of a few 
cases in which it was necessary for him to exact the extreme penalty for cowardice on 
active service is certainly sensational. It is no less remarkable that any former officer 
should have felt it necessary to write such a book.  But it is not an important book … 
to describe in detail the execution of a private soldier is scarcely a constructive 
contribution to the pacifist movement Gen. Crozier has adopted.  It will seem to the 
average Englishman a piece of crude and peculiarly ill-timed sensationalism.
487
 
 
Those newspapers that gave Crozier the benefit of the doubt were those with some sympathy 
with the cause of pacifism: 
 It is annoyingly and repetitively written, disfigured by wild accusations, egotism and 
abuse.  It solves no problem and ignores the argument that a strong man well armed 
perhaps best guards the house of peace.  But it does ask questions, and they are 
questions which no citizen, no statesman and, above all, no Christian priest can afford 
not to answer in one way or another for himself.
488
 
 
George Orwell wrote ambivalently: 
 
 General Crozier is a professional soldier and by his own showing spent the years 
between 1899 and 1921 in almost ceaseless slaughter of his fellow creatures; hence as 
a pacifist he makes an impressive figure, like the reformed burglar at a Salvation 
Army meeting ... The only question is, can he advance any argument that will drive 
the general public an inch farther in the direction of active resistance to war? 
 Here, on the whole, the book fails.  It is a rambling, incoherent book, circling vaguely 
round two anti-war arguments, one of them good so far as it goes, the other doubtful ... 
if not a completely logical pacifist he is at least an engaging one.  As a living 
contradiction that every pacifist is a Creeping Jesus, he should be of great value to his 
cause.
489
 
 
Further criticism followed the publication of the book in America: 
 
 The Men I Killed is not a military book…[it] suffers not from lack of material but 
from lack of cohesion and a total absence of logic…[Crozier] repeats things that have 
a bearing on his arguments, and things that have no bearing on anything save his peace 
of mind … It is unfortunate that reading the book leaves one unhappy and thoroughly 
dissatisfied with General Crozier as a man and as a soldier, for occasionally flashes of 
characteristics come through the almost impenetrable verbiage which makes one think 
that General Crozier must have been a good man and an able soldier … [he] is very 
plainly honest.  He thinks he has something to say; he is trying to say it; and it is really 
pitiful that he does not say it.
490
 
                                                 
487
 Daily Telegraph, 10 August 1937. 
488
 The Spectator, 13 August 1937. Review by Lawrence Athill. 
489
 New Statesman and Nation, 28 Aug 1937. 
490
 Brooke Maury, ‘Review of The Men I Killed’, The Field Artillery Journal, May/June 1938, p.252. 
171 
 
 
As a result of the publicity the book went to a third reprint even before it was on the 
shelves.
491
  
 
A Trustworthy Source? 
Peter Buitenhuis’s study The Great War of Words has the subtitle Literature as Propaganda, 
1914-18 and After, and this is a particularly apt description of Crozier’s literary output.492  His 
work can be viewed as propaganda for the cause of peace, propaganda for the promotion of 
imperial policy and propaganda promoting his own position as an important historical player 
and honourable but ill-used patriot.  In a letter to Lord Ponsonby apropos of The Men I Killed, 
Crozier writes confirming the propagandist agenda of the book: “The test is will it do any 
good for the cause”.493  Ponsonby replied that “I am delighted to hear you were attacked ... it 
gives us something to bite on ... when a full-blown general comes and upsets them it makes 
them mad with rage ...  If I could go round addressing nothing but opponents who would 
attack me and even howl me down I should feel I were really doing something”.494 
 
Can Crozier’s books be used confidently as historical sources?  In a review of The Black and 
Tans by Richard Bennett, Hereward Senior accused the author of accepting “Crozier’s literary 
pose as the conventional professional soldier outraged at the irregular proceedings of the 
crown forces in Ireland” and of missing “the opportunity of entering into a long overdue 
discussion on the value of the much quoted Brigadier-General Crozier as a witness”.495  Many 
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authors have drawn and continue to draw on his texts uncritically without appreciating the 
context of their conception and the intent of the author.  This is especially true of the two most 
popular works that deal with the Great War, Brass Hat and The Men I Killed.
496
  The use of 
the latter book as a key source for the events surrounding the court martial and execution of 
Rifleman James Crozier by Cathryn Corns and John Hughes Wilson in their book Blindfold 
and Alone is typical.
497
  The authors acknowledge that the only evidence of this young 
soldier’s age is Frank Crozier’s book written some twenty years after the event and that “it 
may be unwise to place too much confidence” in it but then go on to use the testimony 
without further qualification.  In fact Crozier quite deliberately suggested that Rifleman 
Crozier was an under-age soldier to heighten the impact of the story when he wrote of the 
boy’s mother saying “But you’re not old enough Johnny.  You’re only seventeen.  I’ll tell on 
you to the officer”.498 James Crozier was born on 6 August 1894 and was 21 when he was 
executed.
499
 
 
Crozier’s descriptions of the execution in Brass Hat and The Men I Killed are the most 
frequently quoted extracts from his works.  Yet the exaggerated style of their narrative is 
clearly demonstrated when compared with a description published two years before Brass Hat 
and generally overlooked: 
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 I had had two previous experiences in other wars and I knew the difficulties. I 
decided to superintend personally the detailing of the firing party, the driving in of a 
stake into the ground to which the unfortunate man would be secured, and the 
allocation of warm, comfortable quarters within a few yards of the place of execution 
in which he could spend his last night on earth. 
 
I then gave our padre, a good fellow, half an hour in which to chat to our comrade in 
distress, after which I saw him myself for a few minutes before leaving him to his 
company commander. 
 
The fire having been stoked up, and an easy-chair, books and papers procured, and 
refreshments, in the shape of a cake, a bottle of whisky, and a pint of rum, placed on 
the table, he was left to himself. 
 
 Next morning at dawn the battalion fell in on the road under my command, the 
condemned man having been carried out of his last billet in secret and tied to the 
stake – speechless, blind and quite oblivious to anything that was happening around 
him. 
 
 I had specially selected the officer who was to command the firing party, and had 
warned him that as at dawn, while chilled and nervous, even the best men miss their 
mark, he was to be ready with revolver drawn and loaded in order that, if necessary, 
the victim might be ‘finished off’ instantly. 
 
 I had arranged that no words of command were to be given, save when I called the 
battalion to ‘attention’, when I saw (I was the only one who could) the officer 
commanding the firing party pick up a white handkerchief which was also the signal  
for the firing party to come to ‘the present’.  When he lowered his arm a volley rang 
out. 
 
 Alas! As I had expected, although only a few yards distant from the doomed man, 
several bullets missed their mark, whereupon the medical officer pronouncing life 
not to be extinct, the officer in charge of the firing party administered the ‘coup de 
grace’ with his revolver.   We buried the dead soldier in the little cemetery, with his 
name and the word ‘Died’, together with the date on his cross.500 
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Crozier refers in his books to letters, diaries and papers and the diaries do certainly seem to 
have existed for a photograph of two pages from a pocket diary appears in Impressions.
501
  
Yet we have already seen how Crozier admitted to relying on his memory during the creation 
of Angels on Horseback (and how his recall of the number of raids made by the 9
th
 RIRifles 
was faulty) and how key characters had their names changed (Tom Spindle) or were 
composite figures (Rufus Ross).  There are also deliberate omissions from the books, the most 
obvious being any details of the circumstances surrounding Crozier’s resigning of his 
commission in 1909 or any details of his two marriages.  Some dates are also (deliberately?) 
wrong.  Crozier claims to have left Canada in the autumn of 1912 having worked for the 
government telephone construction company in the summer and autumn and having dealt 
with a forest fire in the Rainy River district.  However, the Canadian census of 1911 places 
him with the telephone company in June 1911 while the Rainy River fire took place in 
October 1910.  Shipping records also indicate a return to Britain in September 1911 and not 
1912.
502
 
 
The style of Crozier’s writing gives the impression that the books were written hurriedly.  
Brass Hat was allegedly completed in ten days, although his wife was at pains to point out 
that “He did not burn the midnight oil in accomplishing this; he wrote quickly, filled with his 
subject, and still found time to meet his usual social engagements”.503  In a letter to Sir James 
Edmonds Crozier called the book “ a light effort at snap-shotting events in my mind, fourteen 
years on”.504  His style would seem to confirm that his other works were also penned quickly 
                                                 
501
 F.P. Crozier, Impressions, facing p.258 
502
 Information from:  http//data2.collectionscanada.gc.ca/1911/pdf/e001947592.pdf - accessed 17 March 2010 
and www.ancestry.co.uk – accessed 3.3.2007.  It is of course possible that Crozier returned to Canada but there 
is no evidence.  
503
 G. Crozier, Guns and God, p.144.  Copy in author’s possession.  
504
 TNA: CAB 45/132. Letter from Crozier to Edmonds, 23 March 1930. 
175 
 
and The Men I Killed reads like a series of harangues from a PPU platform.
505
  Crozier had 
completed a series of lectures for the PPU before publication and these may well have 
provided material for the book.
506
 
 
Despite misgivings, Charles Loch Mowat acknowledged that as a source (in the context of 
Irish history) “General Crozier was a man with a grievance, but he was in a position to know 
things from the inside, and his testimony must be given weight.”507  In respect of the Great 
War Crozier was also ‘in a position to know’ but his writings must be treated with caution.  
As shown above they cannot be taken at face value without investigating content and context 
and where possible cross referencing to confirm points.
508
  In particular, The Men I Killed 
should be used as a source warily, if at all, given its clearly propagandist intent.
509
   
 
Reputation and Character 
The inescapable conclusion of the above survey of Crozier’s books is that, far from enhancing 
his reputation as a capable, honourable but poorly-treated soldier driven by duty, they ensured 
that it foundered: 
 He scaled the heights of egotism with his ill-written and eccentric books of personal 
reminiscences and pontifications, and he gave English literary history one of its most 
tasteless book titles – The Men I Killed.510 
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 His account [of the execution of James Crozier in Brass Hat] is a graphic and wretched 
indictment of inhumanity … Crozier certainly lacked nothing in terms of self belief 
yet paid scant attention to the sufferings of the men under his command.
511
 
 
 An intensely disagreeable and mean spirited man ... A small pudgy figure with a thin 
wispy moustache, he was, in many respects, the epitome of the cartoon-British officer 
class.
512
 
 
 Crozier was an arrogant and cynical writer whose accusations (often obvious 
fabrications) amount to little more than indiscriminate mudslinging; and his wartime 
reputation as a martinet who cared little for the lives of his men was apparently well 
deserved.
513
 
 
 [Crozier was] not always a reliable witness, nor did his literary approach bring him 
many friends.
514
 
 
 [A man] whose memoirs … and style of command have made him a controversial 
figure.
515
 
 
 
It is easy to see how Crozier’s style, which often exaggerated the beastliness of war to drive 
readers toward the cause of peace, or promoted his own version of events in Ireland, 
overshadowed his historical narrative and to a large extent diluted its value.  It is too easy to 
extract from his writings the more extreme descriptions of events that he may have 
perpetrated, witnessed or simply heard about at second hand and then present them out of 
context.  Comments that confine themselves to Crozier’s military abilities are usually more 
restrained: 
 Throughout the Great War he showed an indomitable courage and all those other 
qualities which made him a fine leader of men.
516
 
 
 Definitely not a man to be trifled with.
517
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 The thrusting commander par excellence.
518
 
 
 Was promoted as a ‘thruster’ and did well in many battles…519 
 
  A man of rigid principle who believed in discipline, order and sobriety.
520
 
 
 A tough and uncompromising man.
521
 
 
The Men I Killed was published just three weeks before Crozier’s death and he was certainly 
aware of, and may have been pleased about, the furore that it caused.
522
  He may not have 
been aware though of the particular resentment about one aspect of the book that was growing 
in Wales:  
 Mr James Prince, General Secretary of the Cardiff Branch of the British Legion, which 
has the third largest representation in the Empire, said last night that it was their 
intention to circularise all Welsh MPs asking them to approach the Premier and to 
demand an inquiry.  Mr Prince said: ‘the book is a gross libel on ex-servicemen 
generally and on Welshmen in particular, by reason of the General’s reference to 
Welsh troops in the Battle of Bourlon Wood … They were not only going to demand 
an inquiry but also, pending that, that the book should be withdrawn from circulation.  
He also challenged General Crozier to come before ex-Servicemen in Wales and 
repeat his allegations.
523
 
 
The demand was taken up by the Opposition Whip, Sir Charles Edwards, MP for Bedwellty, 
who announced (ironically at Porthcawl) that he had the support of “many Welsh MPs” for a 
letter that he had sent to the Secretary of State for War demanding a full inquiry, a full 
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withdrawal and an apology to the Welsh soldiers.
524
  Six days later Crozier was dead and his 
reputation permanently damaged.    
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Chapter Four 
 
CROZIER’S BRIGADE: COMMANDERS, 
TRAINING AND OFFENSIVE ACTION 
 
 
Chapter Three examined Crozier’s military background and career up to his promotion to the 
command of 119 Brigade and demostrated his quick wartime rise from captain to brigadier-
general.  It moved on to show how his reputation as a capable soldier, earned on the Somme 
and, as will be demonstrated below, enhanced by his command of 119 Brigade, was damaged 
by his post-war publications.  In order to investigate the functioning of the brigade this 
chapter will move on to examine the brigade under Crozier’s command from his arrival up to 
and including the battle for Bourlon Wood in November 1917.  It will show how Crozier’s 
arrival coincided with renewed emphasis on training and how the command of the brigade’s 
units and HQ was moulded until, in Crozier’s words, the brigade was “at the top of its form”.  
 
Frank Crozier wrote that on 19 November 1916, while at St. Quentin Cabaret, he heard of his 
promotion to GOC 119 Brigade by a telephone call from the Staff Captain of 107 Brigade.
525
  
The news was not unexpected “because Sir William Peyton, the Military Secretary, had told 
my mother [that] ‘I had been very well reported upon’”.526  We have already seen how the 
news was also anticipated within the 9
th
 RIRifles. 
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When Crozier joined 40
th
 Division on 20 November 1916 it was approximately half way 
through its long march from the Loos sector to billets east of Abbeville where it would train.  
He was driven south-west along with his servant, Starrett; his groom, McKinstry, followed.
527
 
On that date Divisional HQ was at Bouquemaison, just north of Doullens, while 119 Brigade 
HQ was at Le Souich less than three kilometres away to the north-east.  Calling first at 
division, Crozier was “frankly astonished” to hear from the GSO1 “to the effect that I would 
be very disappointed in my brigade which was “very bad – quite the worst in the Division – 
the men were bantams from the coal mines of  Wales and could not even carry packs, while 
morale was low”.528 No other source suggests a problem with the men’s fitness but it is not 
surprising to find that morale was low (if indeed that was the case).  The brigade had its first 
five months of trench duty sitting beneath trench mortar and artillery bombardments of 
varying intensity, had been passed over for duty on the Somme, had no real chance to hit back 
at the enemy other than by small-scale raids, had lost some popular officers and was in the 
middle of a long march.   
 
Having reached the brigade, Crozier asked, Starrett, for his opinion of the men.  Starrett 
recalled: 
 Sturdy lads and a bit rough … coal miners mostly, speaking of places that all seemed 
to commence with the letter ‘Y’ and using up all the letters of the alphabet in their 
spelling.  They were fighters and stickers and had marvellous endurance … they were 
second to none.  The general thought so too, but not so much of the officers, who had 
to be put through it again and again before they were fit to lead their own men. ‘Well, 
Starrett, what do you think of them?’ and I told him what I’ve just said.  He smiled and 
suggested the officers would improve.  They were of good blood he said, not only of 
good families, as most were, but well schooled.  After they got over having their cup 
filled to the brim with good things, they’d be all right.529 
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According to Crozier they did ‘do all right’: “we gave him [the GOC 40th Division] a brigade 
which carried him to victory after victory, six months after the General Staff Officer had 
confessed to me that in the 40
th
 Division was probably the worst brigade in the British Armies 
in France!”.530  Did the brigade improve and, if so, how did it happen? 
 
 
Before Action  
When Crozier joined his brigade a change was already underway as the formation moved 
from the Third Army area around Loos to that of Fourth Army north of the Somme.  On 14 
November Fourth Army HQ learned of negotiations with the French that were likely to result 
in the BEF extending its southern flank to release three French corps and reinforcing the need 
for extra British divisions on the Somme.
531
 On 18 November the Somme battle had been 
officially ‘closed down’.  With many divisions exhausted and depleted by the summer’s 
fighting, it seems that, bantam or not, 40
th
 Division was now needed.
532
  The experience of 
40
th
 Division, though, was of static warfare unsuited to the offensive actions that had taken 
place in 1916 and which were expected to continue in 1917. 
 
After five days on the march a pause allowed the introduction of a new and, for the division, 
novel element – training.  Other than the initial induction training undertaken on arrival in 
France, specialised training on the bombing ranges or the focused training given to raiding 
parties, the brigade war diary does not mention training at all until 6 November 1916 when 
nine days were spent around Autheux in company and battalion training with emphasis on 
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artillery formation.
533
  No other details of 119 Brigade’s training are given but the two other 
brigades of the division were also training during this period.
534
  In addition to the catch-all 
entry ‘training’, their war diaries mention “practice relief in the open by night” by two 
battalions, an all units practice attack (both within 120 Brigade), “units carried out a brigade 
outpost scheme”, “the brigade practised the attack” and “cooperation with an aeroplane was 
carried out” (all by 121 Brigade).535  There is a conspicuous lack of detail in the unit war 
diaries of 119 Brigade’s battalions but that of the 12th SWB gives more details than the others.  
The programme from 2 - 21 November was as follows (missing dates indicate that the 
battalion was on the march): 
 
2  Arms drill and instruction in the use of the new Small Gas Box Respirator. 
 
3 Drill, bayonet fighting, lectures, use of Small Gas Box Respirator. 
 
6 Company training. 
 
7  Rain stopped training 
 
8  Company training. CO lectured all officers on ‘The Attack – Trench to Trench’. 
 
9  Company training. “Another useful lecture to officers.” 
 
10 Companies practise attack trench to trench. Lecture on consolidation of captured 
 trench. 
 
11  Company training. CO’s lectures on attack concluded. 
 
12 Battalion training p.m. 
 
13 Company drill. 
 
14 Company and battalion training. 
 
16 Battalion training and company work. 
 
19 Company training and battalion drill. 
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20 Company training all day. “Now practising trench to trench attack and artillery 
 formation.” 
 
21  Company training.
536
 
 
 
On 20 November 40
th
 Division had received orders to transfer to XV Corps, Fourth Army.  
This affected the training to be undertaken.  Having finally arrived in the new training area, 
on 27 November training re-commenced “in accordance with XV Corps Winter Training 
Course”.537 The units of 119 Brigade started intensive training in musketry, bombing, 
“machine-gunnery” [sic] and Stokes mortars.  Rifle ranges were constructed and “made full 
use of during the hours of daylight”.  Lewis gun and Vickers gun ranges were set up and a 
brigade training school begun to which one officer and six NCOs from each battalion were 
detailed to attend.
538
  On 4 December, for example, the 12
th
 SWB had “Company training all 
day and range practice. Lewis gunners also fired and Capt. T.O. Jones took a party in revolver 
shooting.  In the evening the CO gave a lecture and all Coys did rapid loading by night from 
7.30 to 8.30”.539  Training was interrupted on 9/10 December by the move east to XV Corps’ 
‘Middle Area’ in preparation for a move into the front line and was then postponed by the 
desperate need to improve conditions at the hutted camps 12 and 13 near Sailly Laurette 
which had recently been vacated by French units.  Nevertheless, training was clearly now a 
matter of some importance and recommenced on 13 December.  The brigade training school 
was reopened followed by the bombing and Lewis gun schools.  While one company per 
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battalion worked on camp improvements, the others trained.
540
.  All this activity stopped on 
27/28 December when the brigade relieved the left brigade of 33
rd
 Division in the Rancourt 
Section of the front line.
541
 
 
All this intensive training for the brigade was not initiated by Crozier but by higher 
formations.  What impact was his arrival having? 
 
Having been appointed to brigade command on the basis of his performance as a battalion 
CO, and specifically on his performance on the first two days of the Somme battle when he 
demonstrated personal bravery and a willingness to grasp a difficult situation, he may 
legitimately be regarded as a ‘thruster’ who displayed energy and drive.  Captain Eric 
Whitworth, 12
th
 SWB, who appreciated the ‘gentleman’ in his superiors had another epithet 
for Crozier who: 
 Was different in every respect from his three predecessors [Style, Prichard, Cunliffe-
Owen].  He lacked the presence, charm and greatness of the three respectively, and the 
dignity of them all.  He was essentially a hustler, who probably overestimated the 
results obtained by energy alone, and his authority was not strengthened by the issue 
of impossible orders, which could not be carried out owing to conditions he never saw.  
No doubt he had hustled his own battalion with great success, but his reputed boast on 
arrival that he had never obtained discipline in his own battalion until a man had been 
shot, was indicative of his own characteristics rather than of strength or greatness as a 
commander of men.
542
 
 
Whitworth was obviously not impressed but the ‘impossible orders’ that he refers to probably 
relate to the terrible first tour that the brigade carried out in the Rancourt sector when “very 
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definite instructions” for the construction of a thirty yard communication trench were issued. 
These could not be fulfilled because of appallingly cold, wet and muddy conditions.  Brigade 
“remained dissatisfied”.543 Yet Whitworth also says: 
 Not that the efficiency of the Brigade suffered much under his [Crozier’s] command; in 
many ways it was more efficient than it had ever been before, but this was from fear 
rather than as a response to any real leadership.  Instead of a steady level standard of 
work being maintained, it was felt that a kind of game was going on in which officers 
were justified in doing anything so as not to be ‘Caught’ by the Brigadier.  The word was 
always passed along of his approach and the men soon saw the position and, until he had 
passed, there could be no harder working Brigade in France; when he was gone there was 
the inevitable relapse, tolerated often by the officers, for although they feared their 
general, there was no feeling at all of respect or devotion; without doubt the Battalion 
began to feel less the influence of the Brigade than under any previous GOC.
544
 
 
This extract may tell us more about Captain Whitworth as it does about Crozier.  Whitworth 
saw Crozier in action for just four months before being invalided home after the brigade’s 
first offensive action. January and February 1917 saw the brigade hold the line in appalling 
conditions.  Not all of Whitworth’s writing is contemporary and his opinion of Crozier may, 
like those of others, be coloured by Crozier’s later books: “I met him on several occasions but 
never near the front line in the Rancourt Sector, though he chose as a title for his 
reminiscences ‘A Brass Hat in No Man’s Land’!  He was a tough and no doubt efficient staff 
officer but never showed any interest or sympathy with the officers of his Brigade when he 
met them; he was the type of ‘Brass Hat’ that provoked the ill feeling that was widespread 
against the staff”.545 Compare that with this description from Captain B. D. Gibbs, 18th Welsh: 
 At 5.46 I was asleep. Then up again at 12 noon and lucky thing too as about 12.30 the 
 Brigadier General came to the top of the dugout steps for me.  I hadn’t shaved or 
 washed for nearly a week.  I had my old tommy’s tunic on with the stars put up on the 
 shoulders and I just had time to slip my jackboots on and go up.  So I asked him to 
 please excuse me being improperly dressed which he did.  He wanted to know how I 
 had got on in the line and seemed very pleased especially when I told him that I didn’t 
 have a single case of ‘trench feet’ in the Coy again.546 
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Whitworth does not describe the ‘many ways’ in which the Brigade was more efficient under 
Crozier.  From the war diaries we know that Crozier inspected the 12
th
 SWB which was 
paraded in full marching order on 7 December and, despite the lack of references, it is a safe 
assumption that he inspected the other three battalions at about the same date.
547
  He inspected 
one of his ‘oddments’, 119 Machine Gun Company, on 9 December. He also visited both the 
incoming and outgoing classes at the brigade training school on 20 December.
548
  
Whitworth’s passing reference to Crozier’s ‘energy’ is important.  Crozier was sixteen years 
younger than the previous GOC, Cunliffe-Owen, and that contrast in itself would have been 
marked.  Crozier says that he used the power of ‘electricity’ (in a metaphorical sense):  
“‘Electricity’ had carried me from major to brigadier in nine months; it would carry this so-
called bad brigade to the very height of efficiency in half that time … We ‘electrified’ our 
men into activity”.549  For ‘electricity’ read ‘energy’. 
The first question tackled by the Brigadier was deficiencies of equipment.  The 
difficulty of the ordinary soldier to keep his clothing and equipment complete are 
almost insuperable. His pack and haversack are the only means at his disposal and it is 
impossible to keep his possessions separate in dark dug-outs, large barns or billets 
emptied of all conveniences. No doubt loss of equipment owing to slackness had 
reached serous dimensions and the GOC issued an order that any loss of kit was to be 
punished with 28 days F.P. No.1 subject to the right of trial by FGCM.  The first case 
was punished accordingly but the sentence crushed by higher authority and the whole 
incident deleted. A large amount of useless work had been involved which, in addition 
to the injustice to the individual, was due to [the] policy of hustle.  No alternative 
solution was offered and the serious question of loss of kit remained unsolved.
550
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Whitworth is obviously in sympathy with the other ranks and one suspects that he was the one 
put to ‘a large amount of useless work’. The ‘higher authority’ would have been divisional 
HQ. His memoir describes the conditions in January - March 1917:  
 Three months of trench warfare followed in the worst possible conditions and during a 
 very severe winter, with temperatures constantly below freezing … There was no 
 continuous front line or system of trenches; the line was held by the men living in 
 isolated posts, sometimes not much better than shell hole, and by day no movement of 
 any kind was possible.  As company commander I was isolated in a small dug-out 
 with my Company Sergeant Major and my runner from dawn to dusk; not until it was 
 dark could I go the rounds and visit the platoons holding the front line and often it was 
 not easy to locate them. No hot food was possible for the men beyond what they could 
 warm in a limited supply of ‘tommy-cookers’.  Water and rations, wire and trench 
 boards were brought up by pack mules to battalion HQ on the Bapaume-Peronne road, 
 and then brought up to the front line by carrying parties at night, over ground pitted 
 with shell holes, with 2 or 3 feet of water or slime and without any communication 
 trench to guide them or protect them from rifle fire.  On the other hand casualties were 
 few for the sea of mud made raids or an attack unlikely and there was little artillery 
 activity on either side.  There was the risk of casualties from trench feet and this could 
 decimate a battalion.  I had given instructions to platoon commanders as to the 
 necessity of maintaining circulation by every possible means; tight puttees were  
 discarded and replaced by sandbags tied round the legs, and even then boots had to be 
 removed so that the feet could be rubbed and a change of socks put on.  By a lucky 
 chance, on the evening before we left for the front line, I received from Queen Mary’s 
 needlework guild a bale of socks, hand-knitted and of much better quality than the 
 normal issue.  And I distributed a pair to every man in the company, and our casualties 
 from trench feet were very few.  Such were the conditions in the front line during the 
 severe winter of 1917.  Each night I visited the front line posts … I found the NCOs 
 and men, not only without complaint, but cheerful and alert with their Lewis guns kept 
 ready for action.  No company commander could have asked for greater reward. 
 
Captain Whitworth noted another illustration of the new GOC’s attention to detail: 
 
 26 December 1916 … With Brigade orders arrived a furious memorandum from the 
Brigadier (Crozier) that he had noticed, as the Battalion had marched past him, that 
many men were carrying their mess tins outside their packs instead of inside as had 
been ordered by the Brigade.  The civilian mind had difficulty in understanding the 
motive of such a complaint; usually it was enough if the men arrived as fit as possible 
and carrying their necessary equipment. It is a paltry mind which worries how men, 
who that night would be holding front line trenches, carried their mess tins. Yet it is 
insistence on this kind of detail which largely contributes to the discipline of our 
troops, and slackness in this respect would indicate indifferent officers.  In this actual 
case it was due to the mess tin being crowded out of packs by the remains of the 
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Christmas post, though this did not satisfy the anger of the CO, who, hunted by his 
Brigadier, had in turn to hunt his company commanders!
551
 
 
 
There was another manifestation of ‘energy’ – between 8 and 11 November 1916 the platoons 
of the 18
th
 Welsh had played a knock out football tournament (the first time that sporting 
activities within the brigade are recorded) and on the 13
 
November the battalion HQ took on 
the company officers: “the Colonel [Grant-Thorold] showed great form as goal keeper and the 
doctor seems to do all the running”.552  On 2 December 1916 the 12th SWB played a game of 
football with A Company of the Royal Engineers (who they beat 6–0).553   
 
In addition to ‘electrifying’ the men, Crozier “…‘executed’ our colonels and senior officers 
when necessary”.554  The first victim was the Brigade-Major, A.G. Soames, who made the 
mistake of stating that a kit inspection would be “most inconvenient”.555 Soames left on leave 
on 9 December 1916 prior to attending a Senior Officers Course at GHQ.  He did not return to 
the brigade.  Two other departures were not due to Crozier but to the enemy.  On 3 January 
Lieutenant-Colonel R.S. Grant-Thorold, OC 18
th
 Welsh, was wounded and evacuated and on 
the night of 22/23 January Lieutenant-Colonel B.J. Jones, OC 19
th
 RWF, met an enemy patrol 
while visiting isolated posts and was severely wounded.
556
  Meanwhile, another departure had 
been initiated by Crozier.  Lieutenant-Colonel C.B. Hore, OC 17
th
 Welsh, was relieved of his 
command on 8 January after 113 cases of trench feet occurred in the battalion in one six-day 
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tour of duty.
557
  Crozier placed Major B.F. Murphy, 12
th
 SWB, in temporary command.  Only 
Pope now remained from the four battalion commanders who had come out with their units 
and he would leave just before his battalion’s first offensive action.  On 17th April, he 
stumbled on some barbed wire during a visit to the line and cut his cheek open on the stake.  
Major Robert Benzie, who had arrived to take up the duties of 2iC just the day before, 
assumed the duties of CO.
558
   
 
Three of the ‘original’ battalion COs had been in command for more than the six months 
active service that Peter Hodgkinson suggests is the mark of a ‘viable’ battalion commander 
(as indeed Crozier had been before his promotion) and had exceeded (just exceeded in the 
cases of Grant-Thorold and Jones) the average of eight months active service that COs 
attained.
559
  Crozier had been deprived of, at the very least, a group of competent COs.  In 
January 1917 he had the chance to mould his own team. 
 
The first two replacements were internal to the battalions concerned.  Major Hugh Reginald 
Wood took command of the 18
th
 Welsh and Major James H.R. Downes-Powell took 
command of the 19
th
 RWF.  Both had previously been their battalion’s 2iC.  Downes-Powell 
had been seconded to the RWF from the Glamorgan Yeomanry as 2iC in October 1916 after a 
spell as a staff captain (formation unknown), while Wood had been one of the original officer 
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recruits to the 18
th
 Welsh in 1915.
560
 Both would remain in command until May 1917 and, in 
the absence of any evidence relating to ill-health or wounding, it is likely that they were 
ultimately found wanting.  It seems that Crozier, presumably with the agreement of his 
superiors, was willing to give 2iCs a chance to prove their capability as he did three months 
later with Robert Benzie.
561
 
 
Captain William Montgomery, 9
th
 RIRifles, was still anticipating a move. “[Crozier] wrote 
me and said that if I got on the course that Horace [Haslett] went on he would apply for me as 
one of his COs.  I didn’t get on the course, so I am still here”.562   The next month he asked 
his father “to turn over in your mind the possibility of you bringing influence to bear in the 
event of me applying for transfer to a Welsh regiment with a view to having that transfer 
facilitated”.563 Montgomery’s divisional commander [Nugent] had other ideas: “He told me 
that he would not let me go under any circumstances, although Gen. C[rozier] had written to 
him personally and asked for me.”564  
 I understand Gen. Crozier paid him [Nugent] the delicate compliment of asking for 
one of his Coy Cmdrs as he would be glad to have him command one of his 
battalions and was told politely ‘to go to hell’. Gen. Nugent told me anyway quite, 
quite distinctly that I would not go to Gen. Crozier, in fact he had other plans for 
me.
565
 
 
 
The first ‘outsider’ to find himself posted as a CO in the brigade was Lieutenant-Colonel Alan 
Bryant DSO who took command of the 17
th
 Welsh on 22 January 1917 after C.B. Hore was 
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relieved of the command.  Bryant was a regular soldier who had seen active service in South 
Africa and had been captured by the Boers.  Before the outbreak of the First World War he 
had served as a staff officer in several formations and in July 1914 was still GSO2 at the 
Canadian Military College, Ontario.
566
 Crozier tells us that Bryant (whom he does not name) 
was: 
 A delightful fellow … [who] had friends at court and longed for advancement to 
command a brigade … as a stepping stone … he was ordered to be placed in 
command of a battalion, while I was ordered to report on  him at the expiration of a 
month, as to his fitness to command a brigade.
567
 
 
This may be true but Crozier was wrong when he wrote that Bryant arrived in April 1917 and 
there is no evidence for the unchallenged German lodgement in the battalion’s front line 
trench that supposedly led Crozier to tell Bryant “that he had better send his kit to the 
transport lines at once and get off on another ten days leave, during which period I would try 
and get him back to the staff for which he was better suited”.568  It is unlikely that Crozier 
could take this initiative on his own authority and his description of the episode is written to 
reinforce his own reputation as an energetic and efficient commander.  By placing Bryant’s 
arrival just before his battalion’s first major offensive, and then having Bryant ask for leave to 
take his son to school for the first time, he diminishes Bryant’s authority and capability.569  
The facts are somewhat different.  Just after Bryant’s arrival in January it was Bryant who as 
the senior CO in the brigade stood in for Crozier when he was on leave and Bryant remained 
as CO 17
th
 Welsh until 15 September when he “proceeded to [Divisional?] HQ for duty”.570 
This is well beyond both the six month period defined by Hodgkinson and just about the 
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average length of active service for a CO.  Bryant did go on leave just before the battalion’s 
first attack in April 1917 (arriving back on 4 May) perhaps for the reason Crozier states.  He 
also had leave from 12-26 August 1917 and had taken temporary command of 120 Brigade 
from 26 June to 30 July during the absence on leave of its GOC.  It is likely that these regular 
absences would have disrupted the command chain and annoyed Crozier.  On 21 July a patrol 
from the 17
th
 Welsh was attacked and one officer and seven other ranks were wounded and 
four men reported missing. There was also a German raid on 18 June during which a Lewis 
gun post was bombed and five other ranks wounded plus failed raids by the 17
th
 Welsh on the 
German lines on 11 July, 30 August and 31 August when the officer in command of the raid 
and one other man were killed and another wounded.
571
  This lack of success was likely to 
have been a black mark for Bryant not only in Crozier’s eyes but in the eyes of the new GOC 
40
th
 Division, John Ponsonby (see below), who took over from Ruggles-Brise on 24 August.  
Bryant’s temporary command of 120 Brigade may also have alerted the high command to 
possible limitations to his effectiveness at that level but such speculation cannot be confirmed 
from the sources available.  Crozier’s verdict was that Bryant’s strengths were “neither the 
command of men nor the slaughtering of the enemy”.572 
 
The brigade staff also received an injection of new blood.  The staff captain of 119 Brigade 
was Percy Frederick Hone.  He was commissioned into the 17
th
 Welsh in January 1915 and 
became staff captain in the new 119 brigade in October.
573
  Crozier seems to have been 
satisfied with his performance although his early days with the Welsh Army Corps National 
Executive Committee Secretary did not bode well: “Capt. Hone I may say was Assistant 
Private Secretary to Mr D.A Thomas [later Viscount Rhondda], a member of the Welsh Army 
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Corps Committee, and his services therein were lent to me by Mr Thomas last October or 
November.  He is such a hopeless muddler in the office that I was seriously considering the 
advisability of dispensing with his services.  I made no secret of this either in conversation 
with Capt. Hone himself or with my assistant, Mr Brazel, and I was very glad when he was 
offered a junior lieutenancy in the 17
th
 Welsh.”574 He remained as Staff Captain, 119 Brigade 
until December 1918 when he moved a step up as Acting Brigade Major.
575
  His military 
career was a remarkable one for such a ‘hopeless muddler’. 
 
The other half of Crozier’s longest-lasting headquarters team, the replacement for the 
banished Soames, arrived on 18 February.  Guy Vernon Goodliffe surprisingly receives only 
one passing mention in Crozier’s writing and yet he was the BM throughout the remainder of 
1917 and during the brigade’s greatest test at Bourlon Wood.576  Crozier states that he left the 
brigade in December 1917 when he (Crozier) nominated him for “a six month staff course at 
Cambridge University”.577 
 
Disciplinary matters still needed attention.  On 17 April 27603 Private William Ramscar, 18
th
 
Welsh, was reported absent as his battalion marched into the line.  He was court-martialled on 
4 May and his death sentence subsequently commuted to five years penal servitude.
578
  Also 
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on 17 April, Second-Lieutenant Whaley, 18
th
 Welsh, was “released from close arrest after 
interview with Brig-Gen [Crozier] and to lose leave for 12 months”.579 
 
 
Offensive Action 
 
The push on training that had started in November was sustained through the winter.  Despite 
the weather conditions, training continued when the brigade was out of the line and not 
providing working parties.  On 29 January the brigade held a conference for COs at which 
“Administration matters and the organisation of ‘fighting platoons’ [were] thoro’ly [sic] 
discussed”.580 The next four days were spent in “cleaning up and close order drill” after which 
the brigade bombing, Lewis gun and trench mortar schools were reopened. From 5 - 9 
February training of fighting platoons took place in the morning and recreational training in 
the afternoon although it was noted that “the fighting platoons are still in a very elementary 
stage”.581  The end of February 1917 found the brigade almost completely given over to the 
supply of working parties under XV Corps instructions but a “composite training company” 
was formed for “training drafts and backward men of units of the Brigade”.582 
 
In March the brigade found itself forming the extreme right of the BEF when it took over the 
Clery sector abutting the right bank of the River Somme but it was out of the front line when 
the expected German withdrawal to the Hindenburg Line took place in the sector. Then 
almost a month was spent in slow forward moves or putting every available man to rebuilding 
the roads in the area. “Though the hours of work were long there was still time for a game of 
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football after the return to billets and a Brigade tournament was organised which our battalion 
[12
th
 SWB] won”.583 
 
One notable event during this period was the formation of a divisional mobile column for 
‘local protection’ to be ready on twelve hours notice. Consisting of Corps mounted troops, 
one section RFA, a proportion of the Divisional Ammunition Column, the 17
th
 Welsh, one 
platoon of divisional pioneers (the 12
th
 Yorkshire Regiment), one section of the 137
th
 Field 
Ambulance and the 119 Brigade HQ and signals, it is not clear whose idea it was.
584
  The fact 
that Crozier was given command may indicate that it was his suggestion, particularly as the 
two other brigade commanders were senior, or it might be that as a (comparatively) young 
‘thruster’ he was deemed suitable for the task.  In the event, the force was stood down and 
dispersed after only three days. 
 
The German army had moved back to the Hindenburg Line but had created an advanced 
outpost screen of occupied villages and high ground aligned approximately south-east / north-
west.  XV Corps now advanced its formations into positions from which this line could be 
attacked.  On the right 8
th
 Division would take the villages of Villers-Guislain and Gonnelieu.  
In the centre 40
th
 Division would take Villers-Plouich and Beaucamp while on the left 20
th
 
Division would take Trescault.  The central villages of Villers-Plouich and Beaucamp would 
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have to be taken once the villages on either flank were taken.  Operations on 21 April 1917 
would see the flank villages secured while 40
th
 Division undertook its first offensive by 
securing the German positions in front of Villers-Plouich and Beaucamp from which another 
forward move could take place. 
 
On 1 April 1917 there was a conference at corps to discuss “impending operations”.585  On the 
same day it was noted that despite a draft of ninety-three men for the 17
th
 Welsh “the [119] 
Brigade is much reduced in numbers averaging about 500 per battalion” and no other drafts 
were recorded before the action on 21 April.
586
  In planning his dispositions Crozier would 
have to allow for the reduced numbers.  Divisional orders for the attack “probably in a day or 
two” were issued on 18 April and followed up on 20 April.587 While 8th Division attacked 
Gonnelieu, 119 Brigade would capture a feature known as Fifteen Ravine and the adjacent 
spur while, to its left, 120 Brigade would take the ground from Fifteen Ravine to the 
Gouzeaucort – Trescault Road.  Crozier ordered the 19th RWF to take the spur on the right 
and the 12
th
 SWB to take Fifteen Ravine.  Each battalion was to assault with their two forward 
companies in the recently-learned fighting platoon formation.  The 18
th
 Welsh would provide 
support and the 17
th
 Welsh were in reserve.  The disposition of an assaulting battalion is 
illustrated by the 12
th
 SWB which had A Company in two platoons on the right with B 
Company similarly arranged to its left.  Two platoons of C Company provided the ‘moppers 
up’ while the remaining two platoons plus D Company provided the supporting wave.  Each 
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man carried fifty extra rounds, two Mills bombs and two (empty) sandbags, while the men of 
C and D Companies also carried a pick and shovel.
588
 
 
Just before zero the assaulting battalions moved out of the front line onto a taped line parallel 
to their objectives.  At 4.20 am the artillery barrage commenced and the battalions closed up 
to it and advanced behind it as it moved towards the objectives which were entered at 5.15 
a.m.  By 5.45 all opposition had been overcome and consolidation was underway.  To the left 
120 Brigade had occupied its objective meeting little resistance. To the right 8
th
 Division 
occupied Gonnelieu with some help from the right flank of the 19
th
 RWF which dealt with a 
troublesome strongpoint.  Brigade casualties were ten officers and 147 other ranks.  The 12
th
 
SWB met with the greatest resistance from snipers and MGs in Fifteen Ravine.  On the right 
the ravine was not well defined and this, plus a ‘pull’ to the right caused by trying to keep in 
touch with the 19
th
 RWF, meant that A Company, 12
th
 SWB (Captain E.E.A. Whitworth 
commanding) overshot its objective. 
 
Captain Whitworth recalled that up to the afternoon before the attack the men were expecting 
to be relieved but from 3pm to 2am had to work creating advanced dumps, a battalion HQ and 
a dressing station.  Despite their disappointment and tiredness “they worked like heroes with 
pick and shovel until the work was completed.  Such a response reflects well on the discipline 
of a battalion [my emphasis] where the men have learned that weariness or exhaustion are 
excuses no soldier will plead; and it is the best reward an officer can win”.589  Whitworth’s 
account gives interesting detail including the fact (not mentioned in the battalion war diary or 
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brigade report) that casualties were caused by the British artillery which was otherwise 
reported as “accurate and well timed”.590  Whitworth’s own account reads:  
 At 3 a.m. the companies fell in.  A short explanation was given for, in an attack, every 
 man must know sufficient to carry it out even if he has no further orders from officer 
 or NCO.  The objective was described.  The advance was by the right and it would be 
 fatal if touch was not kept. On reaching the objective the ravine was to be at once 
 crossed and firing positions established on the top of the further bank.  On no account 
 were bombs to be thrown wildly … in the event of a counter attack we would need 
 every bomb we had.  The objective would be taken and held at all costs … The 
 companies were at the low strength of 80 and consequently worked as two platoons, 
 each platoon forming one wave … Owing to the length of our objective the men were 
 extended to 15 paces …Our objective was 800 yards away and the company advanced 
 for 300 yards before suffering a casualty … [we expected] every minute that the 
 barrage would lift and in the dawning light we would strike the ravine..  In reality we 
 had already missed and passed our objective … we know found ourselves, a party of 
 two officers (one wounded), and about thirty men seeking for our objective and under 
 heavy fire from our own artillery and, as it grew light fired at from two or three sides 
 by German snipers. We saw an old German trench and in this took up our position … 
 and tried to collect a few isolated parties of our own battalion … we were in an 
 isolated position in front of the battalion on our right [the 19
th
 RWF].  Though 
 reluctant in any circumstances to give up ground which had cost lives to win, we 
 decided to withdraw … Consolidation of the new line was begun at once and it was 
 impossible to give the men any rest until early afternoon, when the defence of the line 
 was complete.  The battalion captured 40 prisoners, and suffered in casualties about a 
 third of the total number who went over.
591
 
 
Whitworth’s subsequent citation for the Military Cross noted that he was: 
 
 In charge of the assaulting line.  By his careful organisation of the men under his 
 command and his initiative and courage he was very largely responsible for the 
 successful carrying out of the operation.  Although wounded he refused to leave the 
 line until the position had been consolidated and then only at his battalion 
 commander’s instigation.592   
 
Lieutenant J. Saunders Lewis, 12
th
 SWB, was another casualty. He recalled in an undated 
 letter (probably in July 1917) that: 
 
 I was wounded in the left thigh and calf.  Two machine-gun bullets went through the 
 knee, and a lump of shell, I think it must have been shrapnel, blew the calf of my leg 
 away about an hour later.  The M.G. bullets have entirely healed, and the calf is 
 rapidly healing.  More than ¾ of it has already grown again.  The nerves were not cut 
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 only bruised and I shall have their use again.  The muscle will not be quite as pretty as 
 that of a flapper we once saw in Bidston.
593
 
 
The 19
th
 RWF on the right applied their newly-acquired tactical training in capturing a 
strongpoint: “at the same time our Lewis gunners and snipers engaged effectively hostile 
machine guns … [while] at the same time D Coy  was deployed to bring covering fire to 
bear”.594  The battalion reached its objectives without casualties but lost two officers and 
forty-nine men in holding them. 
 
The first offensive action by the brigade’s units had seen a pre-dawn attack pressed home 
successfully and an improved jumping off position secured for the next stage of the advance.  
Forty prisoners were taken.  “The operations were carried out with steadiness and precision, 
and were entirely successful.”595 
 
The division’s next attack, on 24 April, was focussed on the capture of Villers-Plouich and 
Beaucamp.  The task of 119 Brigade, which was once again on the right, was to take the high 
ground which dominated Villers-Plouich on the east. The village itself and the village of 
Beaucamp to the north-west were the objectives of 120 Brigade.  The tactics used were 
different to those of three days before and would involve the two battalions that had 
previously provided the supports and reserves for that attack.  On the right the 18
th
 Welsh 
advanced one company at 11.25 p.m. on 23 April and occupied without opposition the high 
ground to the east.  Four strong points were created each to house a garrison of one platoon 
with two Lewis guns to provide covering fire over the ground to the left.  On the left the 17
th
 
Welsh, drawn up once again in advance of the front line, waited for the barrage at 4.15am 
before moving forward with two companies in line of column of platoons and two companies 
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in support.  The retaliatory barrage fell on the empty front line trench.  The 119 Machine Gun 
Company deployed its guns to cover the high ground to the north of the village and to 
suppress the fire of the garrison of La Vacquerie to the east. Despite some difficulties with 
uncut wire all objectives were taken by 7.05a.m., surviving Germans were mopped up and the 
ground consolidated.  On the left Villers-Plouich was taken but evacuated due to heavy 
shelling.  The 17
th
 Welsh had to form a defensive left flank temporarily and plans were drawn 
up by the brigade to assist 120 Brigade with an attack through Villers-Plouich to take 
Beaucamp.  The 19
th
 RWF and 12
th
 SWB which together made up “the equivalent of one 
battalion of under-average strength”, were ordered forward to the east of Villers-Plouich but 
the attack was cancelled and movement halted as the GOC XV Corps “did not consider the 
situation required reinforcements at Villers-Plouich and that after the enemy intense 
bombardment died down [120 Brigade] would probably get their objective” – which they 
did.
596
 However, the capture of Beaucamp was not completed by 120 Brigade until the 
following day after 20
th
 Division had captured the flanking village of Trescault.  Casualties in 
119 Brigade were eight officers and seventy-nine other ranks.  Sixty-one prisoners were 
taken. 
 
The brigade had done what was asked of it and congratulations were forthcoming to 40
th
 
Division from XV Corps, Fourth Army and from the CinC himself: “Congratulate fifteenth 
Corps and 8
th
 and 40
th
 Divisions on the successful operations carried out this morning.”597  
Privately, though, Douglas Haig noted in his diary that “Villers-Plouich and Beaucamp were 
captured by 40
th
 Div
n
.  The latter is a poor Div. under Ruggles Brise.  Luckily they met a 
‘new’ German Divn which did not stand!”598  The CinC’s comments seem unfair in the light 
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of the successes. The opposing division (256
th
 Division) was indeed ‘new’ but was later 
reported as being a shock division in 1917 and had “suffered heavily” in the attack of 24 
April.
599
 The Official History was also more kind, referring to XV Corps’ “remarkable 
operations” and noting that the ‘new’ German divisions “contained unexpectedly good 
material”.600  Crozier’s message to his troops stressed the cooperation involved and their 
steadiness under the barrage.
601
 
. 
XV Corps intended to continue the steady advance of Fourth Army up to the Hindenburg Line 
by seizing the village of La Vacquerie which acted as an outpost just 500 metres from the 
German front line.
602
  Orders were issued by 40
th
 Division on 3 May for an attack to take 
place on the night of 5 May but this did not proceed as planned.  Fourth Army was scaling 
back its operations as plans were developed to support the French offensives on the Aisne by 
British attacks in Flanders.  The seizure of La Vacquerie in advance of an assault on the 
Hindenburg Line was now not required.  Instead, orders were issued by 40
th
 Division on 4 
May for an ‘extensive raid’ on the village based on the original attack plan. At 7.00 p.m. that 
day Crozier met with the COs of the infantry, MGC and TMB to explain the scheme of attack.  
While 119 Brigade attacked the south of the village, 121 Brigade would attack the north. The 
8
th
 Division would raid Sonnet Farm, on the right flank of the attack, at the time as the raid. 
The 12
th
 SWB and 17
th
 Welsh would be 119 Brigade’s assault battalions while the 19th RWF 
formed brigade support and the 18
th
 Welsh the reserve.  Each assaulting battalion had two 
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companies in front in line of columns of platoons and a company in close support in the same 
formation. One company would form the battalion reserve. The 19
th
 RWF would supply 
moppers-up armed with clubs, revolvers and ‘P’ bombs (phosphorus bombs) for the 
assaulting battalions.  The support companies would man a line just outside the German wire 
and cover the withdrawal.  All the wire cutters in the brigade were given to the men of the 
assaulting battalions.
603
  Major Richard John Andrews MC, 17
th
 Welsh, was placed in 
command of the forward operations and would supervise the withdrawal.
604
 
 
The brigade applied the tested tactics of April by forming up in no-mans-land parallel to the 
enemy line just before the barrage and following it to the objective. Zero was 11.00 p.m. and 
the withdrawal was planned for 1.00 a.m.  The raiders were slowed by uncut wire and found 
that much of the village was also thickly wired.  From 11.15 p.m. the German retaliatory 
barrage was intense.  Some Germans were killed or captured but progress was slow.  The 
attack of 121 Brigade on the left was halted outside the German wire and the 17
th
 Welsh on 
the left of the 119 Brigade attack had to form a defensive flank.  On the right the 12
th
 SWB 
were also subjected to enfilade fire as the 8
th
 Division raid was also held up.  Both the 12
th
 
SWB and the 17
th
 Welsh reached their objectives.  The delay, though, meant that there was 
little time for accompanying RE parties to demolish the enemy infrastructure although two 
dugouts were demolished and several houses badly damaged. The brigade’s casualties were 
four officers and 101 other ranks. Eight prisoners were taken.
605
 Second-Lieutenant W. 
Pollock, 12
th
 SWB, wrote: 
 We went on fairly well until we came to the wire in front of his [the German] 1
st
 line.  
This was only cut in places and of course it was too difficult to find the gaps so we 
started to climb over and through it.  Just then fire was opened on us from the trench 
and we quite a number of our men got hit. Eventually when I got over the wire there 
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were only about ten men with me and these got hit when about 25 yards from the 
trench … finding I was alone I dashed back to the 3rd and 4th waves (we went over in 4 
waves) to get more men … then one of our Lewis guns opened fire at the Bosch and 
just as suddenly the fire from the trench stopped. At this time everything was mixed 
up, that is to say there were a few of A Coy, some C Coy, some 2
nd
 Middlesex [8
th
 
Division], moppers up [from] 19
th
 RWF and even one man of the 17
th
 Welsh though 
goodness knows how he got there.  We got to the trench and then the men got excited 
and started bombing like hell with the result that some of us who had jumped into the 
trench got hit … the original garrison must have been between 25 and 30.  It had been 
arranged that the moppers up should take back our wounded and dead whilst we held 
on but they were in the hell of a hurry to get back and only made one journey … we 
had to leave the dead … The experience of this show impresses on me that men can 
never have too much training in advancing at night and keeping proper interval and 
line, for they will persistently bunch, no matter how much you shout at them … It has 
also showed me that 25 or 30 men with rapid fire can cause a large number of 
casualties to an attacking force.
606
 
 
119 Brigade had gained its objectives despite being under-strength and its troops had 
demonstrated skill in keeping close to the barrage and adaptability in dealing with 
strongpoints and unexpected developments such a lack of flank support.  They had also 
displayed commitment to the attack and personal valour.  However, as Pollock’s comments 
show, they needed more training and experience.  Given the proximity of the Hindenburg 
Line and the ferocity of the German bombardment they were undoubtedly lucky that the 
original plan to seize and hold La Vacquerie had been abandoned. 
 
 
 
Consolidation and Development 
 
The brigade would spend five months in the vicinity of Villers Plouich initially consolidating 
and developing the new British front line and its supporting infrastructure but also integrating 
new drafts and new COs. 
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On 8 May Major John Richardson Heelis MC took command of the 18
th
 Welsh.
607
  He was 
already known to Crozier:  
 [He] had been a subaltern with me [in the Manchester Regiment], and was just junior 
to me in days gone by at Aldershot … I was delighted to see him … he had been 
adjutant of the regiment, and in 1914 had been wounded.  Having stayed at home till 
1917 … and having been a brigade-major in a home service brigade … he was of 
course unfamiliar with modern war … but I was willing to make every allowance … I 
explained all sorts of details to him, after lunch, on the day of his arrival, but alas! My 
efforts were in vain … I tolerated a good deal in the hopes of improvement … but he 
had to go, as he could not assimilate modern conditions.  The SOS went up one night 
without a cause, the first and last time such a thing happened in the old brigade.
608
 
 
The brigade’s war diary records an SOS signal from the front line in response to a German 
raid on 4 June 1917, although the 18
th
 Welsh war diary mentions only a German rocket 
signalling a raid and the 12
th
 SWB (the other front line battalion) makes no mention of it.
609
  
There was a SOS signal fired from the front line on 30 June but the 18
th
 Welsh war diary says 
that the ‘right battalion’ (ie the 12th SWB) fired it in response to a German raid.  Acting 
Lieutenant-Colonel Heelis reported sick on 9 July and did not return to the battalion.
610
  
Crozier’s description once again diminishes the capability of a CO and is certainly inaccurate 
in the detail (or lack of it) of Heelis’ wartime record.  It is difficult not to agree with Charles 
Messenger’s conclusion that Heelis was removed because he would have known about 
elements of Crozier’s rather dubious pre-war career.611 How Crozier managed to justify his 
removal to his superiors so quickly is not known but a very poor report on Heelis’ command 
ability must have been involved unless his sickness simply provided a fortuitous opportunity 
to replace him.
612
  
 
                                                 
607
 John Richardson Heelis (1880-1962) see Appendix Six. 
608
 Crozier, Impressions, pp. 192-193. 
609
 TNA: WO 95/2604; WO 95/2606; WO 95/2607. 
610
 TNA: WO 95/2606 War Diary 18
th
 Welsh. 
611
 Messenger, Broken Sword, p.78. 
612
 Heelis seems not to have been given another field command during the war. 
205 
 
Heelis’ replacement was Major William Kennedy MC who had arrived as 2iC 12th SWB on 4 
June 1917.
613
  On 11 June Kennedy took command of the 18
th
 Welsh while Heelis was on 
leave and became its 2iC on Heelis’ return on 24 June.  Kennedy took command of the 
battalion on 11 July.
614
  He had transferred to 119 Brigade from the 18
th
 HLI, 106 Brigade, 
35
th
 Division.  That division and the 40
th
 Division had, from 2 June, come under the command 
of III Corps (GOC Sir William Pulteney) indicating a corps-level input to transfers and 
promotions.  
 
Downes-Powell, OC 19
th
 RWF, had been replaced by Major A.C. White DSO, 7
th
 KOYLI, 
20
th
 Division, on 14
th
 May (both the 40
th
 and 20
th
 Division were still in XV Corps at his time, 
again indicating a corps role in transfers) but White was quickly replaced on 2 June by the 
returning Lieutenant-Colonel B.J. Jones (wounded in January 1917).
615
  Jones was the last of 
the ‘pre-Crozier’ COs.  On 6 August 1917 he relinquished command and handed over to “the 
legendary Freddy Plunkett”.616 Plunkett’s career was remarkable.617  A pre-war regular soldier 
he had been part of the original BEF, been promoted from the ranks and was one of only four 
men (other than aviators) to receive five British gallantry awards during the war.
618
  He had 
joined 40
th
 Division before it left for France and, while 2iC 12
th
 Suffolk Regiment, had briefly 
deputised for the sick CO of the 21
st
 Middlesex in June 1917 and then, in July, for the CO of 
the 20
th
 Middlesex who was on leave. His diary records his impressions on arrival at the 19
th
 
RWF: “I found that the last CO had been sent home, this appearing to be quite a common 
occurrence in this brigade as a few more were sent home later …  I found the material of the 
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19
th
 RWF, both in officers and men, excellent, but discipline bad.  Discipline was soon much 
improved”.619 
 
After the raid on La Vacquerie training recommenced on 27 May “according to programme” 
and included close order drill and musketry while Lewis gunners and bombers “received 
special training under their respective specialist officers” at the reopened brigade schools.620  
The brigade moved back into the line on the night of 3 June.  During tours over the next four 
months the battalions raided or attempted to raid the enemy lines on fifteen occasions 
(successfully six times), carried out “vigorous patrolling” or “active patrolling” on most 
nights and met enemy patrols or drove off German raids on eight occasions.
621
   
 
A raid planned for the night of 28/29 July is interesting because it clearly demonstrates how 
the art of raiding had evolved in a year and demonstrates the increased ability of the troops to 
undertake a complex operation. The raiding party of two groups of 24 and 20 men of the 17
th
 
Welsh with one and two officers respectively was to approach and pass through gaps in the 
German wire under cover of a creeping barrage.  There would be a standing barrage on key 
trench junctions and approaches and a rolling barrage passing back and forth across key areas. 
40
th
 Division asked III Corps for an additional allocation of 4,000 rounds of 18-pounder shells 
and 700 rounds for the 4.5” howitzers, this request was duly passed from Corps to Third 
Army.  When the raid was cancelled because “the enemy has registered his front trenches” III 
Corps was not pleased: “Corps Commander [Pulteney] considers it undesirable that the raid in 
question should be cancelled unless another one can be is prepared and can take place with 
little delay.  It is most necessary that the enemy should receive a rebuff. If all raids are 
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cancelled on the grounds mentioned in your minute, one will seldom take place.” The raiders 
would wear ‘raiding order’ equipment and a senior officer of the 17th Welsh would command.  
The firepower involved in this moderate sized operation, the involvement of corps and army 
staff in the preparations, the evolution of ‘raiding order’ equipment, and the presence of a 
senior officer are in marked contrast to the raids of the previous summer.  The raid did not go 
ahead but the 12
th
 SWB and 18
th
 Welsh raided three days later.
622
 
 
During the summer of 1917 the battalions in reserve and support were digging and improving 
the trenches and roads in the sector.  They seem to have done a good job. In October 1917 
Captain Geoffrey Dugdale MC (Brigade Intelligence Officer, 60 Brigade, 20
th
 (Light 
Division) wrote that he was “lost in admiration … The trenches, beautifully planned to give 
an excellent field of fire, were built up with sandbags, supported with wire netting in the fire 
bays and round the trenches.  The whole of the system was duck-boarded; it was the most 
perfect system of trenches I saw during the time I was in France”.623 
 
On 13 June Crozier and Goodliffe met Ruggles-Brise and his GSO2 at the Brigade School at 
Nurlu where they watched a demonstration by the bombing and trench mortar classes.  
Brigade training again took place from 21 – 26 June and included musketry on the thirty yard 
range and a field day to demonstrate contact work with the RFC.  Brigade sports were held on 
26 June.  The brigade-major (Goodliffe) attended a demonstration “of the fighting platoon in 
action” at the III Corps School on 23 July.624 The brigade school at Nurlu was visited by 
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Crozier on 5 October to see a demonstration of a raid that was carried out that same night by 
men of the 18
th
 Welsh.  Training was now a regular feature of the brigade’s cycle of activities.  
Crozier wrote that “by September 1917 the brigade was at the top of its form … it had 
become well seasoned.”625 It had also escaped the large scale turnover of personnel that Mark 
Connelly has noted has “the potential to disrupt internal cohesion and efficiency”.626 
 
The longest and most intensive period of training undertaken by 119 Brigade was between 12 
October and 15 November.  Before this a new GOC was appointed to 40
th
 Division.  On 24 
August 1917 Major-General Sir Reginald Pinney (GOC 33
rd
 Division) noted in his diary that 
he had been told that “Gen[era]ls Snow, Cuthbert, Ruggles-Brise and Ross have been selected 
for work at home”.627  
 
The arrival of John Ponsonby from 2 Guards Brigade does not seem to have been the cause of 
any upheavals within the division, divisional and brigade staffs were unaffected.
628
 Like 
Ruggles-Brise, Ponsonby was a Guardsman (although Coldstream in this case) who, like his 
predecessor, gave Crozier an “entirely free hand”.629 Crozier wrote “I think there were times 
when … John Ponsonby may not have approved of me, or at least my methods” and he 
described him as amusing but prone to suffer fools too gladly in contrast to himself who was 
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“so engrossed in war that I could not tolerate anything or anybody I thought might clog the 
wheels of victory”.630 
 
The training that took place in October / November was guided by SS152 Instructions for the 
Training of the British Armies in France which was first printed in June 1917.  Jonathan Boff 
has examined the application of SS152 in the Third Army and found a lack of consistency 
across different units.
631
 In this case the syllabus as laid down seems to have been followed. 
The 119 Brigade war diary states that on 18
th
 October (one week into the training period) 
training commenced “in accordance with SS152 Appendix XIII”.632 On 23 October there was 
“a Brigade Instructional Scheme for [an] attack on enemy position” which was repeated next 
day “with slight modifications”.  The divisional commander visited to discuss training on 2 
November and again on 5 November to “discuss tactical schemes to be carried out”.  His 
interest in training impressed his new ADC, Harry Graham: “we went to watch another field-
day, and I was enormously struck by his competence.  He is charming to all the COs etc. but 
his criticisms struck the bull’s eye every time; he sees every weak spot, but can appreciate 
good work better than anyone – a perfect leader of men, I think”.633  A week later Graham 
wrote: “I am acquiring a perfect passion for J.P.  I can’t tell you what his usefulness and 
thoughtfulness are like.  He keeps the whole thing going here … anyone so much beloved by 
all ranks, and so deserving of that affection I never met”.634 
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Training ‘for the attack’ is recorded on no less than eight days.  On 5 November Crozier and 
Goodliffe watched the 17
th
 Welsh and 19
th
 RWF practising attacks and Crozier watched the 
17
th
 Welsh do it again next day when the battalion COs and brigade staff also met for a 
tactical ride.  Brigade officers provided umpires on 8 November when the 18
th
 Welsh were 
attached to 121 Brigade for an attack “under divisional arrangements”.635 On 9 November the 
19
th
 RWF and 12
th
 SWB led a practice attack on the Bois de Robermont and established posts 
on its northern edge while the 17
th
 Welsh passed through and ‘captured’ the village of 
Brevillers.  The 18
th
 Welsh threw out a right defensive flank in the Foret de Lucheux.  The 
divisional staff was present on 12 November when 119 Brigade practised another attack 
through wooded country: “the 19th RWF and 119 TMB formed rearguards in the Foret de 
Lucheux, 18
th
 Welsh attacking and 17
th
 Welsh passing through the 18
th
 Welsh as soon as the 
wood was captured”.636  The exercise was repeated three days later.  Freddy Plunkett recalled:  
 During our rest near Beaumetz from late in Oct to [the] 3
rd
 week in Novr we had quite 
a good time with training, shooting and sports.  We had some very good training in [a] 
wood about 4 miles from our billets called Lacheux [Lucheux] Wood.  It was large 
and fairly thick with undergrowth.  At the time little did we think how we would 
benefit by this training.  At first we took an enormous amount of time to carry out an 
attack on a wood but gradually that ‘stickiness’ was replaced by ‘dash’ and ‘getting 
there’ without paying too much attention that beautiful line of formation which one 
reads so much in attack formation, our principle of training being ‘those ahead assist 
those held up’.637 
 
The GOC division was present at a 119 brigade scheme on 24 October and on 14 November 
Douglas Haig was been present at a tactical exercise (involving 120 Brigade) noting that: “the 
men (though many ‘Bantams’ amongst them), seemed quick and alert, and cleaner than when 
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I last saw this division.  Ponsonby has only had the Division 3 months and will, I am sure, 
quickly remedy the defects I noticed”.638  
 
At about this time, commenting on the state of training of 51
st
 Division, Lieutenant-Colonel 
Edward Speirs noted: “The advance in tactical instruction in [this] and other divisions since 
the Somme was extraordinary”.639 Given what was to come at Cambrai, the extent of the 
training described above is an indication that 40
th
 Division was also a fortunate beneficiary of 
this advance.  
 
Bourlon Wood 
The Battle of Cambrai would be a Third Army operation.  The genesis of the battle has been 
described elsewhere and will not be detailed here.
640
 By the 16 September, Byng was ready to 
put detailed plans for the operation to Haig who promised him the Canadian Corps (which 
was then briefly assigned to Third Army before its transfer to Passchendaele) but a final 
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intention by using registering shots on enemy positions.  This found favour with Lieutenant-General Sir C.L. 
Woolcombe (GOC IV Corps), who forwarded it the Third Army on 23
 
August.  The suitability of the ground was 
confirmed by the Tank Corps who suggested an enlargement of the attack.  The essential elements of the attack 
were now identified: infantry supported by tanks; ground attack aircraft; and unregistered artillery bombardment. 
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decision on a date was postponed as Third Ypres was still not concluded.   Haig wrote on 15 
October 1917: 
 General Byng came to lunch and afterwards went into his proposals for an operation 
on his front.  I had already discussed the matter twice before with him.  It was now a 
question of getting him some troops…I was able to arrange for Byng to have 4 
divisions to start training at once. Viz. the 8
th
, the 12
th
, 29
th
 and 51
st
, the three latter are 
now in the Third Army. I promised before the operation is launched to concentrate a 
Reserve, if possible Cavan’s XIV Corps including the Guards.641 
 
Third Army’s reserve had, from 11 October, included 40th Division.  Byng briefed his own 
corps commanders and their staff on 26 October about the coming battle and issued a 
modified plan on 13 November. The object of operation ‘GY’, as the attack was called, was 
“...to break the enemy’s defensive system by a coup de main; with the assistance of tanks to 
pass the cavalry corps through the break thus made: to seize Cambrai, Bourlon Wood, and the 
passages over the Sensée River and to cut off the troops holding the German front line 
between Havrincourt and that river”.642  The bulk of the fighting would fall to III Corps to the 
south, which would press on to secure the crossings of the St. Quentin Canal, and to IV Corps 
in the north, which would secure the key high ground at Flesquières and then at Bourlon 
Wood. The plan stressed that “It is very important that Bourlon Wood be captured by us on Z-
day”.643  Staff had estimated that it would take the Germans forty-eight hours to bring in 
substantial reserves and the CinC, not wishing further casualties in a protracted campaign, as 
at Third Ypres, placed a forty-eight hour time limit on the operation. 
 
On 17 November Crozier, with his brigade staff, attended a conference at division and he met 
with his own COs, 2iCs and adjutants the next day “to discuss the attack to be launched at an 
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early date”.644  There is no evidence that details of the offensive were shared earlier than that 
date.   
 
The main attack was launched on 20 November and a conference at 40
th
 Division HQ that 
afternoon heard that the “attack was proceeding satisfactorily and that V Corps would be 
wanted shortly.  In the event of Bourlon being captured [by IV Corps] the V Corps were to 
follow the cavalry and capture the crossings of the Canal de la Sensée as 1
st
 objective.  40
th
 
Division to be on the right with 119
th
 and 121
st
 Infantry Brigades in front and 120 Brigade in 
Reserve”.645  Crozier later recalled a conference at Lucheux: 
 some days, or perhaps weeks before the battle [when] I was given the possibility of 
one of three tasks, namely (1) an attack on Bourlon (which actually fell to our lot), (2) 
the taking up of an outpost position some ten miles further east, or (3) an advance-
guard scheme still further east covered by a cavalry screen [his emphasis].  The 
carrying out of the latter tasks would have meant that a very considerable breach had 
been effected in the enemy lines.
646
 
 
If this conference did indeed take place at Lucheux it must have taken place before the 
division moved out on 16 November and it is more likely that Crozier was actually describing 
the divisional conference of 17 November.  The note of the next day’s brigade conference 
makes it clear that the planned objective was the high ground on the north side of the Canal de 
la Sensée some seventeen kilometres north of Bourlon Wood (see Appendix Two).
647
  This 
note does not suggest any alternative plans for the deployment of 40
th
 Division. 
 
The implication that 40
th
 Division would be advancing as part of V Corps came to nothing.  
Despite notable success on the first day, due to innovative artillery tactics and the first massed 
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use of tanks, progress in the northern sector was stalled by resistance at Flesquières.  The 
attacking divisions of IV Corps did not arrive at the foot of the Bourlon Ridge until evening 
on 21 November.  The operations of III Corps in the southern battle were then closed down 
but, with the dominating high ground of Bourlon so close, and the possibility of a cavalry 
breakthrough after its capture, Haig decided that operations would continue in the northern 
area.
648
  Verbal orders to that effect were passed by telephone from Third Amy to IV Corps at 
10.45 p.m.
649
 By that time 62
nd 
(West Riding) Division was in front of the southern edge of 
Bourlon Wood and 51
st
 (Highland) Division had captured the village of Fontaine (it would be 
lost again next day).
650
  
 
At 9.45 a.m. on 21 November 40
th
 Division had been ordered to start a move to Hermies to 
bring it closer to the battle. At 8.00 p.m. the division was placed at the disposal of IV 
Corps.
651
 At divisional HQ at 1.30 p.m. on 22 November it was announced that 40
th
 Division 
had been tasked with the attack and capture of Bourlon Wood and village on the next day.
652
 
 
 It is tempting to assume that the training of 119 Brigade in fighting through woodland was 
preparation for an attack on Bourlon but there is no evidence for this.  Bourlon was originally 
the objective of 62
nd
 Division which, after two days fighting and an advance of eight 
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kilometres was deemed to need relief. Of 40
th
 Division’s three brigades only 119 Brigade 
seems to have undergone training in woodland fighting.
653
  
 It was one of the most extraordinarily fortunate things that, quite by chance, we had 
 those field days in the woods, and the wood which we were attacking was very similar 
 to the one we had been practising on.
654
 
 
While the experience gained by 119 Brigade in the Foret du Lucheux was certainly fortuitous, 
it was not planned in anticipation of action at Bourlon.  The abandoned plan to attack across 
the Canal de la Sensée involved the occupation and defence of a wood called La Garenne and 
it is likely that the thoughts developed for this operation were applied to the very fast planning 
for Bourlon.
655
  When the brigade went into action, it attacked on the right of the divisional 
front - as it had been in the April actions.  It appears, then, as if a familiar tried and tested 
formula was being applied and the position of the brigade opposite Bourlon was the result. 
 
When 119 Brigade moved into position facing Bourlon Wood its men had marched 35 
kilometres over two nights and one day in poor weather, on roads that had been cut up 
previously by the men, guns and supplies needed for the Cambrai battle.  The relief of the 62
nd
 
Division was completed between 4.00 p.m. on 22 November and midnight.  At 4.00 a.m. the 
brigade issued its orders for the attack (Appendix Three).
656
  Zero was 10.30 a.m.  While 121 
brigade seized Bourlon Village, the objective of 119 Brigade: 
 will be the high ground to the N. of BOURLON WOOD (Coupez Mill which will be 
consolidated). 
 The 19
th
 Royal Welsh Fusiliers will attack on the right, and the 12
th
 South Wales 
 Borders on the left. 
 17
th
 Welsh will be in Brigade Support in proximity of CEMETERY at E.30.c.  
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 18
th
 Welsh Regt will be in Brigade Reserve under cover about K.6.b … 
 … Battalions will attack on a 2 company front in depth and will maintain artillery 
formation throughout so long as situation allows of same. 
 Infantry will keep from 100 to 200 yards in rear of tanks. 
 Support Battalion will be in readiness to either reinforce assaulting battalions or throw 
out a right defensive flank to the East of BOURLON WOOD. 
 Assaulting troops will be in position at minus 15 minutes.
657
 
 
The attack was to be supported by twelve tanks: 
 
 3 tanks will proceed along the road at the western edge of the wood. 
 3 tanks will proceed up the ride in F.20.a and splay out as the situation may demand. 
 6 tanks will crush the wire and cover the ground in between (a) and (b) and act as the 
 situation may demand. 
 These tanks will pass through the infantry advanced line at zero. 
 
The 12
th
 SWB war diary notes that “tanks went in advance of our left company but there were 
none in front of our right company”.658  The 12th SWB were the recipients of “some tanks” 
from D Battalion, Royal Tank Corps who were assisting 121 Brigade to their left.  The tanks 
of G Battalion, allocated to 119 Brigade were “not able to arrive until after zero”.659  The 
deployment of the tanks was disrupted because their petrol supply was delayed in the 
congested back area. Freddy Plunkett, CO 19
th
 RWF, noted: “I was now looking anxiously for 
my tanks but just then [10.15 a.m.] received a message to say that they would be late”.660 He 
does not mention tanks again despite the Official History reporting that “[after about midday] 
the tanks of G Battalion were now in evidence and did good work” and “of 16 tanks, 13 
reached the northern edge of the wood”.661  None of the four infantry battalions’ war dairies 
mention tanks again.
662
  While the tanks were an important but ultimately ineffective, 
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component of the assaults on Bourlon village (121 Brigade) and on Fontaine-Notre-Dame to 
the east, their importance to the attackers of Bourlon Wood seems inconsequential.  The tank 
crews had no time to make a reconnaissance and no time to establish contact with the infantry 
with whom they were to cooperate.  Neither had 119 Brigade (or the other two brigades of 
40
th
 Division) undertaken any training with tanks.  Crozier issued additional instructions to 
accompany the attack order that anticipated problems: “TANKS are a luxury.  This must be 
impressed upon all ranks.  If a tank breaks down, Infantry must push on at all costs unless 
particularly asked for help” (Appendix Three).663 
 
The same traffic congestion that delayed the petrol prevented the arrival of the smoke shells 
that were to cover tanks and infantry as they advanced over the open ground south of the 
wood.  Nevertheless, at 10.30 a.m. the artillery barrage hit the southern edge of the wood and 
the leading companies of the 19
th
 RWF and 12
th
 SWB moved off.  The next three days were 
one of intense, close-quarter fighting during which attacks and counter attacks pushed the 
battle line backwards and forwards between the central east – west ride and the northern edge 
of the wood.  
 
The details of the battle for Bourlon Wood have been extensively described in other works.
664
  
These will not be duplicated here.  Instead, accounts of the battle will be examined and key 
points highlighted.  In outline, the attack by the leading battalions was reinforced, initially by 
the 17
th
 Welsh and in mid-afternoon by the 18
th
 Welsh. As night fell the wood (and the high 
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ground within it) was secure but in need of further reinforcement in anticipation of further 
counter attacks.  The brigade works company and the salvage and burial sections were sent 
forward as were two companies of the 14
th
 A&SH (120 Brigade in reserve). Overnight the 
remaining two companies of the A&SH moved up as did the dismounted 15
th
 Hussars. During 
24 November several determined counter attacks by the Germans were driven off with heavy 
losses to both sides and yet more reinforcements were received overnight in the form of two 
companies of the 11
th
 King’s Own (120 Brigade) and 2nd Scots Guards.  Next morning a short 
advance collided with an incoming German attack.  This and further attacks were driven off 
“with difficulty”.665 On the night of 25/26 November the exhausted and much depleted 40th 
Division was relieved by the returning 62
nd
 Division and the defence of the hard-won ground 
in Bourlon Wood passed to 186 Brigade (Brigadier-General R.B. Bradford VC, killed 30 
November).  While 119 Brigade had captured the wood, neither Bourlon village (though 
partly gained by 121 Brigade and reinforced by 120 Brigade and dismounted cavalry) nor 
Fontaine-Notre-Dame (51
st
 Division, then the Guards Division) had been secured. 119 
Brigade had retained the wood despite having its flanks in the air for three days. Further 
attacks took place after the departure of 40
th
 Division but neither flank was secured and the 
wood was given up when the Germans counter attacked on 30 November. 
 
How did 119 Brigade achieve its success?  Firstly, there was a reconnaissance of sorts.  
Crozier and Plunkett have both left accounts of the mounted dash to see the ground in front of 
Bourlon Wood before night fell on 22 November.
666
 “The trees were very close, and the wire 
on the southern end appeared thick, but by means of glasses I could see that there were 
diagonal lanes through the wire which decided me to advance in lines of platoons in the attack 
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and not in an extended line.”667 Secondly, in the spirit of the 18 November brigade 
conference, “we went through the idea of attack with all officers and NCOs”.668 Thirdly, the 
attackers were determined and passed through the German counter-barrage despite the 
absence of covering smoke and the support of most of the tanks: “Although never doubting 
them I watched the platoons approaching the Boche barrage but, although suffering many 
casualties, they never faltered.  On reaching the wood (our artillery now having lifted 200 
yards) the wire was encountered but platoon Comdrs soon found the lanes I had told them 
about, passed through them, and were in the wood”.669  Fourthly, capable senior officers were 
in the wood with their men to organise defence and counter attack as appropriate but the 
attrition rate was high.  Plunkett (CO, 19
th
 RWF) moved down into the wood and took charge 
before the first counter attack. Robert Benzie (CO, 12
th
 SWB) was also on the spot and was 
placed in command of all the forces in the wood by Crozier on the evening of the first day.  
When the 17
th
 and then the 18
th
 Welsh moved up Richard Andrews (CO, 17
th
 Welsh) went 
with them (and was severely wounded on the second day), as did William Kennedy (CO, 18
th
 
Welsh) who led his men across to the wood on horseback and was killed shortly afterwards.  
The 2iC, 19
th
 RWF, Major Cole, was wounded before the advance started and two other 2iCs 
became casualties in the wood: Major C.C. Dowding, 18
th
 Welsh, was wounded on the first 
day and Major W.E. Brown, 12
th
 SWB, was wounded on the morning of the second day.
670
  
Losses in captains and junior officers were high.  Fifth, the tactics for attack and defence were 
appropriate and had been rehearsed.  In attack: “the enemy had a series of posts but these 
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were overcome by rounding [sic] and getting in with the bayonet”.671 “[I] ordered the whole 
line to attack.  It did and used the bayonet to such purpose that the position was taken with a 
large number of prisoners.  Our line reorganised and again moved forward, encountering 
machine guns in single prepared positions.  By using 2 of our Lewis guns, one from either 
flank of a located machine gun, the latter was invariably put out of action.”672 In defence: “I 
now consolidated our position … on high ground pushing forward couples to [the] edge of 
[the] wood”.673 At the end of the first day the 100 contour provided the site for “two lines of 
posts at intervals of 150 yards on this line”.674 “[On the second day] the enemy attacked very 
heavily, coming on in droves, without any particular formation.  We waited until they were 
about 150 yards away and then opened rapid fire with rifles and Lewis guns.  They melted 
away completely and not a single German reached our line.”675 The 19th RWF and the 12th 
SWB also had two Vickers heavy machine guns attached to each battalion which added 
massively to the firepower available to their defence of the wood.  The training received by 
the brigade had paid dividends.  Finally, three factors which contributed to success in the 
wood: firstly, despite wires being cut by German shells visual signals contact was maintained 
between the wood and brigade HQ via a signals hub in the cemetery beween Anneux and 
Graincourt; secondly, the signals facilitated protective fire from the artillery of 40
th
 Division 
and elements of 62
nd
 Division artillery that had been left in place; thirdly, there was a degree 
of confusion in the wood at the time of the opening attack which interrupted a relief, leaving 
the tired 3
rd
 Battalion IR50 (214
th
 Division) in the southern part of the wood to face the first 
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attack and the newly arrived 1
st
 and 3
rd
 Battalions Lehr IR (3
rd
 Guard Division) on unfamiliar 
ground in the north and west along with elements of other units.
676
 
 
How did Crozier perform during the action?  There is very little evidence other than the 
successful outcome. Harry Graham records “I shall never forget that visit to Graincourt - I 
dived underground about 30 feet to find a wild-eyed Brigadier and a pale Bde Major who 
urged me to return immediately and say that unless they were reinforced at once they would 
be absolutely done in. ‘Men, more men!’ was their cry …” which is not the sort of image that 
Crozier would have wished circulated.
677
 More to his taste would have been the description of 
“the brigadier, a dare-devil little warrior, setting an example to his men which none who 
followed him will forget”.678 Back in Cardiff, as if to emphasise the brigade’s continuing 
Welsh connections a laudatory article appeared in the Western Mail. A slightly abridged 
version reads: 
 Private narratives which have reached the Western  Mail ascribe the capture of 
Bourlon Wood to their dauntless courage and heroism.   While at present details of 
battle formations etc cannot be entered into, sufficient  material is gathered from 
letters to hand to throw light upon the admirable fighting  qualities of the Welsh 
troops…. As our men went deeper A[ndrews] had to be called  upon for 
assistance.  He had his men lined across the middle of the wood and down  either flank 
… by 12.30 we had reached the edge of the wood on the other side of the  hill and our 
objectives were gained.  In fact S[ymes] with some of his men had got  into the 
village beyond which was not our objective. … at 3.30 the situation became  very 
critical and K[ennedy] taking half his battalion, rode into the wood, dismounted 
 when he was half way through, deployed his men and met the Bosches just as they 
 were launching a counter attack.  He charged leading his men, and his fine spirit gave 
 his men such confidence that they not only drove back the counter attack but captured 
80 prisoners. K[ennedy] was killed but we still held the whole of the ridge and some 
of the slopes beyond … We dug in hard that night on the crest of the hill. C[rozier] 
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had his work cut out at our headquarters, and he did splendidly.  He has been 
magnificent all through. B[enzie] was wonderful, calm and collected all through. 
P[lunkett] was a perfect tiger and had a charmed life.  He was everywhere bullets were 
thickest, beating off counter attacks and driving home local attacks; he was almost 
superhuman, as he never ceased until he came out of the line… A[Andrews] got hit in 
the morning. He was carried down on a stretcher to an advanced dressing station 
where he was able to draw on a map our exact dispositions … our men all fought like 
heroes.  Of those you know, L[loyd?] had his hand almost off … he behaved most 
gallantly as also did D[unn?] who is missing. B[rown] was wounded but did awfully 
well.
679
 
 
“Our Div. is frightfully bucked with itself about the share we took in the fighting, and 
congratulations are pouring in from every side.  But it is a bloody business”.680 40th Division 
casualties were 172 officers and 3191 other ranks. 119 Brigade casualties in the infantry 
battalions were 60 officers and 1473 other ranks: 17
th
 Welsh - 13 officers and 240 other ranks; 
18
th
 Welsh – 13 officers and 400 other ranks; 19th RWF – 16 officers 443 other ranks; 12th 
SWB – 18 officers and 390 other ranks.681 
 
 We had not got the highest possible reputation before J[ohn Ponsonby] took over – 
 chiefly by bad  luck, for we never had a chance of showing our mettle – and it is 
 surprising that we should have been given the hardest nut of all to crack.  After it  was 
 over, the C-in-C ingenuously said to J.P: ‘I can’t understand how you got the 40th D to 
 do it!’ To which J.P. replied: For the simple reason that the 40th D was the best in the 
 British Army! (I believe the betting at GHQ was 12 to 1 against the nut being 
 cracked!).
682
 
 
Congratulations came from Douglas Haig: “who wished all ranks of the 40th Division to be 
congratulated on their recent success.  Great credit is due not only to Infantry Brigades who 
gave proof of fine fighting qualities and endurance”; from the GOC, Third Army: “The 
capture of Bourlon Wood to my mind stands out amongst all the other splendid actions of our 
                                                 
679 Western Mail, 28 December 1917. This account is likely to have come from Percy Hone, Staff Captain, 119 
Brigade.    
680
 IWM: Graham Papers, letter dated 29 November 1917. 
681
 TNA: WO 95/2594 War Diary 40
th
 Division HQ A&Q, Casualties to date, 1 December 1917.  The battalion 
war diaries give different figures: 119 Brigade total 73 officers, 1270 ORs; 17
th
 Welsh 18 officers, 301 ORs; 18
th
 
Welsh 15 officers, 262 ORs; 19
th
 RWF 18 officers, 343 ORs; 12
th
 SWB 22 officers, 364 ORs. If the battalions 
did, as suggested at the 18 November brigade conference, put 500 men into action, the figures are appalling - no 
matter which figures are regarded as the most accurate. 
682
 Ibid., letter dated 30 November 1917. 
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infantry … and in years to come I shall remember with unqualified satisfaction that it was 
performed by the splendid division with which I have now been associated for some time”; 
and from division: “The GOC wishes to especially congratulate you and your Brigade, also 
the A&SH and 15
th
 Hussars attached to you”.  Crozier’s own Special Order of the Day 
pointed out that “the valour and endurance displayed were beyond all praise.  A most 
important tactical position … was assaulted and taken … and held against countless counter 
attacks and ceaseless pressure until handed over, consolidated and intact …The flanks were 
kept secure against abnormal difficulties.”683 
 
Freddy Plunkett wrote: 
 
 I have fought with many regiments in this war but the achievement of the 19
th
 [RWF] 
 and [the] remainder of 119 Infy Bde in taking Bourlon Wood on 23
rd
 Novr 1917, with 
 no assistance from tanks, smoke barrages, etc, and only a few minutes preliminary 
 artillery bombardment, capturing at least 500 prisoners with many machine guns,  then 
 repelling counter-attacks for 3 days without sleep, subsisting on iron ration food 
 only, handing over the wood intact, marching 15 miles to the rear, after the Brigade 
 had suffered 75% casualties both in officers and men, and finishing the last mile of the 
 march in high  spirits, I place second to none of any other performance in the 
 war.
684
 
 
  
                                                 
683
 Congratulatory messages as compiled in TNA: WO 95/2605 War Diary 119 Brigade.  Douglas Haig 
congratulated the men in person as they marched away on 26 November.  “There is only one word which can 
describe Sir Douglas Haig as he appeared to me on that occasion –‘fine’ … A cavalry soldier he looked every 
inch of one with steel helmet and box respirator at the ‘alert’, ‘sitting’ his charger as only a British Light Cavalry 
Soldier can … he looked down upon and uttered words of encouragement, congratulation and thanks to my little 
Welshmen as they passed … ‘Well done, well done’, repeated the great Field-Marshal, over and over again for 
five minutes as the ‘remnants’ march by.”- Crozier, Impressions, p.206. Contrast this with Crozier’s words in 
1937 when his allegiance to the cause of peace was total: “... they [the high command] were all branded with the 
same mark – incompetence and self-satisfaction.  Haig, in latter days, thought that the mantle of the Almighty 
had fallen on him …” – F.P. Crozier, The Men I Killed (London, Michael Joseph, 1937), p. 88. 
684
 NAM: Plunkett – Diary of the War. 
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Chapter Five 
DEALING WITH CHANGE: DESTRUCTION 
AND RECONSTRUCTION 
 
 
Previous chapters have examined in detail the founding of the brigade and its development up 
to the fight for Bourlon Wood where it suffered the first substantial losses from its original 
establishment since arriving at the front eighteen months earlier. In contrast to this period of 
relative stability 1918 was a year of constant change for 119 Brigade with structural reform 
and repeated major rebuilding testing the capabilities of its GOC.  New units, new officers 
and new men gave the brigade a different character and structure on two occasions – resulting 
in a formation whose make up was in sharp contrast to that of the ‘Welsh Bantam Brigade’. 
This chapter will examine the brigade’s two episodes of restructuring, its actions during the 
German Spring Offensives of 1918 and its chequered history thereafter. It will show how in 
the hands of capable HQ staff the ‘building block’ of the brigade is capable of handling major 
change while delivering effective ‘on the job’ training - even when the raw materials are not 
of the best quality. 
 
The End of the Old Brigade 
Crozier wrote of Bourlon that “nine months toil [was] wiped out in three days”.685  The tired 
and depleted units of 119 Brigade might have legitimately expected some rest after their 
exertions at Bourlon Wood.  They would be disappointed.  After settling into billets in 
villages south-west of Arras, the brigade spent just one day cleaning up before learning that it 
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 F.P. Crozier, A Brass Hat in No Man’s Land (London: Jonathan Cape, 1930), p.184. 
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would relieve the 16
th
 (Irish) Division in the line near Bullecourt on 3 December, but the 
relief was brought forward.
686
  Crozier implies that this was because the 16
th
 Division was 
needed to help check the German counter attack at Cambrai.
687
  His opinion is supported by 
the war diary of the 2
nd
 Royal Irish Regiment (49 Brigade, 16
th 
(Irish) Division).
688
 So, on the 
night of 2 December, the 17
th
 Welsh and the 19
th
 RWF moved into the battered, captured 
German position at Tunnel Trench just north of Bullecourt.  Crozier says that he believed that 
the move into the line was “best for all, provided they send us men”.689 
 
Some men did arrive.  The 17
th
 Welsh war diary records forty-seven officers joining or being 
loaned to the battalion in December 1917 followed by four in January 1918 but does not 
mention any drafts to the ranks.  During December 1917 the 18
th
 Welsh received twenty-eight 
officers and 308 men, followed in January by a further six officers and ninety-nine men.  The 
19
th
 RWF war diary shows that the battalion received thirteen officers in December, followed 
by another two in January but records no drafts of men.
690
 Freddy Plunkett recalled though 
that the battalion “was made up to 500 strong including many Territorial officers who had not 
                                                 
686
 The 16
th
 Division had suffered very badly at Frezenberg Ridge and Langemark in the Ypres salient earlier in 
the year and had moved to the Bapaume-Miraumont sector (VI Corps, Third Army) at the end of August.  On 20 
November, as a diversion from the Cambrai attack, 16
th
 and 3
rd
 Divisions had successfully attacked and held 
Tunnel Trench, a part of the Hindenburg Line, south of Fontaine les Croisilles, killing 500 Germans and 
capturing 718.  When it left the trenches in December it was “desperately in need of rest and training”. See 
Terence Denman, Ireland’s Unknown Soldiers: The 16th (Irish) Division in the Great War (Dublin: Irish 
Academic Press, 2008). 
687
 Crozier, Brass Hat, p. 185.  The British success at Cambrai had created a salient fourteen kilometres wide and 
six deep. The German counter-attack started on the morning of 30 November.  After losing newly-won ground, 
particularly in the south of the battlefield, a general withdrawal of British forces took place between 4-7 
December. Bourlon Wood was given up and a new front line established for the winter on the Flesquières Ridge 
to the south-west.  Flesquières was itself in a salient (albeit a shallower one) and would prove a tempting 
objective for the Germans in the spring. 
688
 The National Archives, Kew: WO 95/1979/1 War Diary 2
nd
 Royal Irish Regiment. This records that the 
battalion was relieved on 1 December by the 12
th
 Suffolk (121 Brigade) and that “40th Division had been at 
Bourlon Wood and was rather ‘tired’.” On 2 December the rumour among the 2nd Royal Irish was “that we are 
going to Bourlon Wood to take an active part in the Battle of Cambrai”.  On 3 December the battalion moved 
closer to the fighting but on 4 December a move towards Havrincourt was cancelled.  Instead the battalion 
moved south to the VII Corps, Fifth Army, sector east of Péronne to rest and rebuild. 
689
 Crozier, Brass Hat, p.186. 
690
 TNA: WO/95 2607 War Diaries 17
th
 Welsh, 18
th
 Welsh and 19
th
 RWF. 167 of the men for the 18
th
 Welsh 
came from Number Six Infantry Base Depot (Rouen) and forty-six from the Divisional Depot Battalion. 
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seen service before”, so it is clear that drafts were often not recorded in war diaries.691 The 
12
th
 SWB received thirteen officers and thirty-six other ranks in December, followed by four 
officers and 213 other ranks in January.
692
  By the end of January 1918 all four battalions 
were probably, like the 19
th
 RWF, at least 500 strong. 
 
Through the months of December and January the brigade worked hard to bring some sort of 
order to the chaotic landscape of smashed trenches in this part of the Hindenburg system.  
Many of the trenches opposite were lightly held and there were numerous concrete 
strongpoints to be investigated and/or destroyed during the regular offensive patrols that took 
place.
693
  Despite the reduced establishment and the arrival of new officers, 19
th
 RWF carried 
out a major raid to improve its position, demonstrating just what the brigade’s units could do: 
 Between Valley Trench and our forward posts were nothing but shell holes half full of 
water, and in attempting to relieve my forward posts … no less than 20 men were 
stuck in the mud next morning, some waist high.  One man was stuck for 36 hours 
before being taken out and lost a toe from frostbite.  I decided that these forward posts 
were impossible for the winter and asked to be allowed to take the Boche line or fall 
back on Valley Trench, sending in a scheme for the former.  After a weeks delay I was 
told that I could attempt to take the Boche line.  Night patrolling told us that the Boche 
held the line strongly at night so I selected 3pm to attack.  As the Boche trench was a 
part of the renowned Tunnel Trench we knew that there would probably be a deep 
dugout about every 100 yards, so we took over 10 10lb mobile charges.  On the 15
th
 
Decr at 3 pm two parties of 30 each, who had been assembled at our extreme left and 
right post respectively, accompanied by RE with the mobile charges, rushed forward 
and reached the Boche line with hardly a dozen shots being fired at them, and working 
inwards, killing the Boche sentries, about 10, [and] posted 2 men at [the] door of each 
                                                 
691
 National Army Museum, Chelsea: 1994/05/398/1 ‘Diary of the War – by J.F. Plunkett’. 
692
 TNA: WO 95/2606 War Diary 12
th
 SWB. 100 of these men came from the 6
th
 SWB (Pioneers, 25th Division). 
One of the new officers was second-lieutenant Harold Jones. Jones had joined the Montgomery Yeomanry at the 
outbreak of war and had served in Egypt. After applying for a commission in January 1917, he joined the 12
th
 
SWB on 12 December: “Men who had come from the support line led us to Bttn HQ and there in a dugout we 
found our CO, Colonel Benzies [sic], and his staff enjoying a fairly decent looking meal.  We were greeted 
enthusiastically as the Bttn was very short of officers having lost heavily in the Bourlon Wood scrap and we 
were the first reinforcements.  The CO immediately posted us to our companies and I was posted to B Coy.  In 
less than half an hour I was following a guide up the support trench to my Coy HQ.  Here I reported to the 
Skipper who also appeared glad to see me” – RRW Museum, Brecon: 2001.98/Diary 68, Harold Jones Memoir.  
693
 For example, the 17
th
 Welsh investigated the ‘Vulcan’ pill box and, with associated RE parties, destroyed 
‘Argus’ pill box on 28th December, another (unnamed) on 30 December and a third, with a MG emplacement on 
top, on 8 January. 
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dugout.  As the Boche could be heard down the dugouts he was called upon to 
surrender but would not come up.  The RE officer blew up 8 dugouts. Our casualties 
were 31.  A Boche prisoner, wounded, stated, stated that they would not surrender as 
they had been told we killed all prisoners. … On this front the new Boche line was 
quite 300 yards away, so that, with the ground in such an awful state and winter 
weather, neither side could hope to do much in the line of operations, but the 
Bullecourt sector lived up to its name by every day shell fire.
694
  
 
Afterwards Crozier wrote a note to Plunkett:  
 My Dear Plunkett 
 Just a line to congratulate you and ‘yr’ battn on yr very fine effort of this afternoon. 
 Words cannot express in any reality [sic] what I and the rest of the Bde think of yr 
 performance. 
 Yours 
 FP Crozier 
 
But the raid marked the ‘last hurrah’ for the old brigade. 
 
 
While receiving reinforcements, patrolling and trying to keep the trenches free of mud during 
snow and subsequent thaw, the brigade’s battalions once again made time for training. 
Usually, where it is described, it consisted of close order drill, “platoon, section and arms 
drill” or simply “training according to programme”.695 The impression formed is of a brigade 
that is trying to get back into a routine, trying to promote ‘business as usual’.  Its efforts were 
to be thwarted by decisions made at the highest level.  On 19 January 1918, 40
th
 Division 
received notification that brigades were to be reorganised to have only three battalions.
696
  
The change would prove to be more drastic than the simple loss of one battalion. On 31 
January, the 12
th
 SWB received “a large batch of orders … regarding impending disbanding 
                                                 
694NAM: 1994/05/398/1 ‘Diary of the War – by J.F. Plunkett’. According to the battalion war diary, two 
attacking parties of two officers and 54 other ranks and two officers and 46 other ranks were used.  It was 
estimated that 20 of the enemy were killed while the attackers had four killed and 19 wounded.  Operations were 
often restricted by the weather but the units were experienced enough by now to know that patrols over snow in 
bright moonlight would be spotted and that muddy ground was too heavy for “good and silent work”. 
695
 TNA: WO 95/2607 War Diaries 17
th
 Welsh, 18
th
 Welsh, 19
th
 RWF; WO/95 2606 War Diary 12
th
 SWB.  The 
17
th
 Welsh did get one company onto the firing range. 
696
 TNA: WO 95/2594 War Diary 40
th
 Division HQ A&Q. The following week the war diary records the 
approval of a change to the divisional sign recognising the fight at Bourlon Wood – “the white diamond to be 
superimposed on a red gamecock with an acorn in the diamond”. 
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[of the] battalion”.697 It would not be alone.  Three of 119 Brigade’s four battalions were to be 
disbanded. 
 
The background to the major changes to the composition of divisions in the field is detailed in 
the Official History.
698
  At a time when a large increase in German divisions and materiel on 
the Western Front was anticipated following the cessation of hostilities on the Eastern Front, 
it became clear that the BEF would be facing a crisis in its own manpower during 1918.
699
   
The matter had been referred to the scrutiny of a Cabinet Committee in December 1917 and 
its draft report was passed to the Army Council early in January.  In trying to resolve a 
genuine paradox between the maintenance of the BEF and the sustainability of industries and 
services now crucial, not only to the British war effort, but also to that of the Allies, it felt 
unable to allocate more than 100,000 ‘A’ class men for the BEF (compared with the 615,000 
required by the CinC).  Faced with the certainty of a major German offensive in the west, the 
military members of the Army Council objected without effect.   The committee suggested 
that by reducing the number of battalions, the existing number of divisions could be 
maintained.
700
  A list of 145 battalions for possible disbandment was sent to Douglas Haig on 
10 January.
701
 His selection was compiled and reported to the War Office on 18 January.
702
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698
 James E. Edmonds, Military Operations France and Belgium 1918, Vol.1: The German March Offensive and 
its Preliminaries (London: Macmillan, 1935), pp. 47-56.  Also David Stevenson, With Our Backs to the Wall: 
Victory and Defeat in 1918 (London: Allen Lane, 2011), pp. 49-53 and Keith Grieves, The Politics of 
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699
 See J.M. Bourne, Britain and the Great War 1914-1918 (London: Edward Arnold, 1989), pp. 81-85 for a 
concise account of the situation on the eastern front and the threat to the western front. 
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 The likely necessity of this in the face of diminishing manpower levels had been pointed out to the War 
Office by Douglas Haig in November 1917. See Edmonds, Military Operations France and Belgium 1918, 
Vol.1, p. 28.  For an alternative view of the aim of the process of reduction see Bob Butcher, ‘The Nine Battalion 
Controversy’, Stand To! The Journal of the Western Front Association, 68 (September 2003), pp. 47-49. 
701
 No Regular, First-line Territorial or Yeomanry battalions were included at this point.  Dominion troops were 
also excluded from the exercise as they were the responsibility of their respective governments.  Martin Samuels, 
Command or Control?: Command, Training and Tactics in the British and German Armies, 1888-1918 (London: 
Frank Cass, 1995), p.249, describes the effect on 30
th
 and 36
th
 Divisions and regards the former as an ‘urge for 
administrative neatness’ in removing the highest numbered battalions of two regiments.  The fact that men were 
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“This reduction seriously interfered with the existing organisation of every division, and with 
the tactical handling of every brigade, while the breaking up of battalions was often bitterly 
resented by officers and men and tended to lower morale.”703 116 battalions were broken up, 
two were converted to pioneers in their own divisions and a further five converted to pioneers 
and transferred.  The resulting gaps were filled by moving twenty-two battalions between 
divisions and re-distributing a further thirty-two internally. In total, 114 battalions were lost to 
the British Army.
704
  Four battalions from 40
th
 Division were disbanded, three of them in 119 
Brigade which was one of just eight brigades to lose at least three battalions.
705
 This time the 
national affiliation of the brigade worked against it as regiments from Territorial District 
Number Four (which consisted mainly of Wales) were instructed to disband sixteen of their 
fifty-three battalions (30%) – the highest level of disbandment on the Western Front.706  The 
reasoning behind this was “The number of Battalions composing certain regiments is greater 
than can be adequately maintained by the output in men of the Territorial District concerned. 
It is necessary, therefore, to reduce the liabilities of these Territorial Districts by reducing the 
                                                                                                                                                        
generally sent to another battalion of their own regiment (even when it was in a different Corps or Army) 
indicates that the process was placed firmly within the regimental system.  The only other unit from 40
th
 
Division to be disbanded was the 11th KORL, another bantam battalion. 
702
 A similar organisational change in the French Army was largely complete by the end of 1917. See Elizabeth 
Greenhalgh, The French Army and the First World War (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014), pp. 
551-252. 
703
 C.M.R.F. Crutwell, A History of the Great War 1914-1918 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1934), p. 501. 
704
 The process is detailed in Simon Justice, ‘Vanishing Battalions: The Nature, Impact and Implications of 
British Infantry Reorganization prior to the German Spring Offensives of 1918’ in LoCicero, M. et al, A Military 
Transformed? Adaptation and Innovation in the British Military 1792-1945(Solihull: Helion & Company, 2014), 
pp. 157-173.  Justice has analyzed the process and created a ‘dislocation index’ in an attempt to quantify the 
impact of the reorganization. Both the 40
th
 Division and the 34
th
 Division are categorized as having a ‘severe’ 
level of dislocation.  It proved unfortunate to say the least that both were occupying adjacent sectors to the left of 
the Portuguese 2
nd
 Division during the Battle of the Lys in April 1918. 
705
 I am very grateful to Simon Justice for the information in this paragraph which is additional to that in his 
publication referenced above. 
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 Crozier, Starrett and the divisional historian all blame the shortage of Welshmen to maintain the 38
th
 (Welsh) 
Division as well as 119 Brigade units.  T.O. Marden, The History of the Welch Regiment 1914-1918 (Cardiff: 
Western Mail and Echo, 1932), p. 436, is more specific: “there were too few Welshmen to keep up the strengths 
of all the Welsh units, as the coal mines made heavy demands on the man power of the Principality”. 
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number of Battalions to be maintained”.707 In the case of New Army battalions the last formed 
were to be targeted making the high-numbered battalions of 119 Brigade particularly 
vulnerable. Within this broad direction many of the decisions on which battalions to disband 
were made at divisional level. 
 
Crozier wrote later: “they took away my Royal Welsh Fusiliers and South Wales Borderers 
(the best battalions in my command) and left me the choice of keeping the 17
th
 or 18
th
 Welsh. 
I decided on retaining the 18
th
 as it had been slightly less knocked about …”.708  While 
Crozier’s books suggest that he was rather sanguine about the change, Starrett recalls a rather 
different picture: “that was a blow that the General took hardly.  But all his letters, and he 
wrote a few, and all his arguments, and he saw nearly every brass-hat near and far, availed 
nothing.”709  Crozier went on leave to England on 25 January and returned on 17 February.710  
A very different brigade was waiting for him.  What happened to the Welsh units? 
 
The 18
th
 Welsh was the sole surviving battalion from the original brigade.  On 5 February the 
battalion received a draft of 179 men and seven officers from the 17
th
 Welsh followed by 
another four officers on 18
 
February.
711
  By 17 February it was strong enough to supply a 
working party of eighteen officers and 600 men.
712
  On 8 February the 17
th
 Welsh sent 
another two officers and fifty men to the 2
nd
 Welsh (1
st
 Division, II Corps) and two officers 
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 F.P. Crozier, Impressions and Recollections (London: T. Werner Laurie, 1930), p. 212. See also Crozier, 
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 TNA: WO 95/2594 War Diary 40
th
 Division HQ A&Q. 
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 TNA: WO/95/2606 War Diary 18
th
 Welsh. 
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and fifty men to the 9
th
 Welsh (19
th
 Division, V Corps).
713
  On 15 February the remaining 
officers and men were merged into the 9
th
 Entrenching Battalion.
714
 Next day the final war 
diary entry noted “This Bn (17th Welsh) ceased today to be an [sic] unit”.715 
 
The 19
th
 RWF sent eight officers and 150 men from its D Company to the 2
nd
 RWF (33
rd
 
Division, VIII Corps) on 6 February.  It then amalgamated with the 10
th
 RWF (76 Brigade, 3
rd
 
Division) to form the 8
th
 Entrenching Battalion on 15 February. The battalion’s last casualty 
was its CO.  Freddy Plunkett had a heart attack on 8
th
 February while marching his men out 
but he would return to the brigade later in the year.
716
   
 
The 12
th
 SWB was still raiding the German trenches as late as 4 February but on 8 February, 
two officers and fifty men left for the 5
th
 SWB (19
th
 Division, V Corps), followed on 10 
February by two drafts each of two officers and 100 men to the 1
st
 SWB (1
st
 Division, II 
Corps) and to the 2
nd
 SWB (29
th
 Division, VIII Corps).  Before they left they heard letters 
from Sir Douglas Haig and John Ponsonby read on parade.
717
  Ten officers went with the 
remains of the battalion to form the 9
th
 Entrenching Battalion along with the remnants of the 
17
th
 Welsh, 12
th
 SWB and 11
th
 KORL (the only battalion of 120 or 121 Brigades to be 
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 TNA: WO 95/2594 War Diary 40
th
 Division HQ A&Q. 
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 Entrenching battalions were created on several occasions during the Great War.  While those formed in 1918 
worked on creating defences in the rear areas, they were also ‘holding units’ for surplus manpower and were 
short-lived. 
715
 TNA WO 95/2607 War Diary 17
th
 Welsh. 
716
 TNA: WO 95/2606 War Diary 19
th
 RWF; WO 95/2594 War Diary 40
th
 Division HQ A&Q.  Freddy Plunkett 
had a long life for a man with poor health.  He died in 1953.  It is possible that his ‘heart attack’ was a different 
manifestation of months of stress. 
717
Ponsonby’s letter is in TNA: WO 95/2594. He wrote: “To all ranks … who are now leaving the 40th Division I 
wish to express my deep regret at the loss occasioned by myself personally and to the division as a whole by 
your departure.  Although the battalion in which you have served so long in this country is to be broken up, the 
memory of its splendid achievements will never fade.  The record of your past services, the fine fighting spirit 
that you have invariably displayed, and your constant determination to maintain the lofty traditions of your 
battalion, not only redound to your own credit and to that of the 40
th
 Division, but will add still further to the 
glorious reputation of your Regiment … As your Divisional Commander I wish to thank all ranks for the active 
and unfailing support you have so readily afforded me during the last six months of fighting under the most 
trying conditions…” 
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disbanded) and those remaining went “to the Base for posting”.718 “The curtain rings down on 
the Welsh Brigade, which fought its way to glory while it carried a whole division on its 
shoulders”.719 
 
The New Brigade 
On 1 February 1918 the first of the new battalions arrived.  The 10
th
/11
th
 HLI (46 Brigade, 
15
th
 Division) stayed with 119 Brigade for just two weeks before transferring to 120 Brigade - 
making it a wholly Scottish formation.
720
 According to Crozier it had been decided that “as 
the Welsh brigade had done so well at Bourlon Wood, it was thought by some that it would be 
a good thing to have another National brigade in the Division with the result that a Highland 
brigade was formed”. 721 He remained sceptical about the effect, believing “that an alteration 
is not made in the ingredients of any mixture by merely altering the labels”.722  
 
The replacement battalion for the 10
th
/11
th
 HLI arrived from 120 Brigade on 16 February.  
The 13
th
 East Surrey (Lieutenant-Colonel Herbert Lawton Warden) had taken twenty-one 
officers and 602 other ranks into the second day of the attack against Bourlon village.
723
  Its 
casualties were six officers and 223 other ranks.
724
 Since then it had received a draft of nine 
officers and 192 other ranks from the 7
th
 East Surrey (37 Brigade, 12
th
 Division) which was 
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st
 March – 
this may be an error or it might refer to the strength of 9
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 TNA: WO 95/2594 War Diary 40
th
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disbanded.
725
  The final battalion to make up the three-battalion brigade was the 21
st
 
Middlesex (Lieutenant-Colonel Herbert Charles Metcalfe) from 121 Brigade.
726
  Its casualties 
at Bourlon had been comparatively light: nine officers (two killed) and 126 other ranks 
(twenty killed).  Since the action it had received just ten new officers and apparently no drafts 
of men.
727
  On 5 January 1918 its effective strength was forty-three officers and 723 other 
ranks.  One month later the battalion transferred to 119 Brigade and on 12 February received a 
draft of fifteen officers and 300 other ranks from the disbanded 17
th
 Middlesex (6 Brigade, 2
nd
 
Division). Its effective strength on 16 February is recorded as fifty-six officers and 1016 other 
ranks.
728
   
 
119 Brigade was now fully reformed and approximately up to strength. Crozier could have 
some confidence in the Welsh which he knew but the other battalions had let him down at 
Bourlon (or so he believed) and needed to be brought up to a higher standard:  
 We received two battalions that were far below the requirements of modern war … 
 when being put through their paces for two days we found them to be greatly wanting.  
 They did nothing quick enough.  Officers hesitated while, of course, other ranks 
 followed suit. They lost their equipment and were deficient of vital items, and failed to 
 realize that the role of the infantry is to get to grips with the enemy with cold steel 
 supported by fire of their own making aided by the fire of others … the Welsh, my 
 stalwarts, were of quite a different stamp, which caused me to resort to the unpleasant 
 necessity of making the two battalions stand by and watch everything the Welsh did in 
 the field for several days, while I in addition lectured them myself.
729
 
 
From the middle of February all three battalions were training and all received regular visits 
from Crozier at camp, in training, on the ranges and at larger scale training schemes.
730
  
Notable among these events were the lectures given by Crozier to all officers and NCOs of 
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the brigade on 25 February;
731
 the battalion counter attack demonstrated by the 18
th
 Welsh on 
26 February, advancing 1000 yards and deploying into artillery formation and then extended 
order , which was repeated next day under the gaze of the CinC;
732
 the brigade practice attack 
of 6 March at which the 13
th
 East Surrey and the 21
st
 Middlesex provided the assaulting 
waves and the 18
th
 Welsh provided two companies as moppers-up and another two as the 
reserve. Again, this was repeated next day with a contact aeroplane, a barrage marked by 
flags, gas represented by smoke and the final assault by men wearing their box-respirators.
733
 
There were lectures on pigeon training for signallers, cooperation with aircraft and with tanks 
and anti-aircraft Lewis gunnery.  The 18
th
 Welsh marched companies for differing times 
wearing their box respirators and discovered that it was possible to march for eighty 
minutes.
734
 The 13
th
 East Surrey practised attacks on strongpoints on 18
th
 March and 
progressed to attacking a succession of strongpoints next day.
735
  The 21
st
 Middlesex practised 
the attack in cooperation with tanks.
736
  The battalions trained constantly through February 
and March with a few days given to moves and for church parades.  They also supplied 
working parties for trench improvements and for burying signalling cables.  The divisional 
armourer sergeant inspected all rifles, Lewis guns and bicycles. There were practice alarms 
and the men might have noticed their officers’ regular excursions to reconnoitre the ground 
and select suitable places of assembly.
737
 A divisional conference was held to discuss the use 
of tanks, barrages, machine-guns and communication with artillery (see Appendix Four).
738
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The hectic training, the GOC’s constant presence, the digging, the reconnaissance, the 
weapons inspections - the German attack was clearly imminent and certainly not unexpected.  
 
119 Brigade and ‘Michael’ 
Both GHQ and the French GQG were expecting a German offensive that would take place as 
the weather improved in spring 1918.  Douglas Haig told his Army commanders in December 
1917 that: “We must be prepared to meet a strong and sustained hostile offensive.  It is 
therefore of first importance that [you] should give [your] immediate and personal attention to 
the organization of zones for defensive purposes and to the rest and training of [your] 
troops.”739  This was the context of the training and digging carried out by 119 Brigade. 
 
The German decision to attack was made in November 1917 and several plans were 
developed but the first operation orders were not issued until 24 January.
740
  The French and 
British armies both believed that their own front would be the target of the attack.  The BEF 
was particularly vulnerable in the south, where Fifth Army extended its front to take over 
more line from the French in January, but GHQ believed that Third Army would bear the 
brunt of the attack as the Germans attempted to pinch out the salient to the west of 
Cambrai.
741
  In the event, the length of the attack front was longer than anticipated and while 
Third Army was heavily engaged, it was Fifth Army’s collapse in the south that has become 
the abiding image of the offensive. 
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The Third Army sector was formed by V Corps in the south, then IV, VI and finally VII 
Corps in the north.  59
th
, 34
th
 and 3
rd
 Divisions formed VI Corps’ front line centred on and to 
the east of the village of Croisilles.  40
th
 Division was in GHQ reserve.  The letters of Harry 
Graham (ADC to John Ponsonby, GOC 40
th
 Division) show just how common speculation 
about the offensive had become: “the good Daily Mail tells us that the terrific Hun attack it 
has been so long prophesying should have started two days ago, and is evidently disappointed 
by its unpunctuality.  We can stand any number of such disappointments out here with perfect 
equanimity.”742 “Really, the English press is becoming intolerable.  Not only do they insist 
upon the Hun making his onslaught at once, they even (The Times at any rate) urge him to 
choose that portion of the line where they must know I am.  Tactless is hardly the word for 
it”.743  On 12 March 119 Brigade’s units were notified that the attack on VI Corps’ front was 
expected next day but the day passed without incident.
744
 Harry Graham noted: 
 I suppose, unless the whole thing is a gigantic bluff that the hun is bound to make his 
 big attack this week …Things are very interesting out here now.  I have been very 
 busy making plans for all possible eventualities – and there are many – and have still 
 more to make.  Probably something will happen quite different to anything we’ve 
 imagined.  Anyhow, we’re ready for them!745 
 
And on 15 March: 
 Here we live in a continuous state of rumours.  Hun prisoners and deserters tell us 
 such cunning tales, giving dates of attack and all particulars, but nothing ever 
 happens!  I am beginning to believe that they are sent over to keep us nervous, and to 
 make us waste millions of pounds worth of ammunition and that meanwhile Fritz is 
 making off to Italy or Salonica or India or somewhere, and that the surprise will come 
 when we least expect it.  We have reached that condition of mind in which we singly 
 pray for an attack, so that we may deal with it and get it over.
746
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The attack, codenamed ‘Michael’, came on 21 March on an eighty kilometre front.  In the 
south, where men and defences were sparse, the German advances gained momentum. In the 
north, where the defensive zones were more complete, things moved more slowly.  The 
British defences were breached near Bullecourt by 11.30 a.m. but there was time to bring in 
reserves, including 40
th
 Division.  The events of the next few days demonstrate clearly the 
increased capability of the men of the “poor division” of a year before.   
 
During the first day 119 Brigade was on half an hour’s notice to move but, despite 120 and 
121 Brigades moving forward in the middle of the day (when 40
th
 Division passed from GHQ 
reserve to VI Corps reserve), the order did not arrive until the evening.  The enemy was now 
advancing on Croisilles on the front line of the ‘battle zone’.747  After a false start the brigade 
moved off at 6.45 p.m. eastward towards Henin Hill which was to be held “at all costs”.748 
Despite chaos on the roads the brigade was in position by 10.30 p.m. with the 21
st
 Middlesex 
in the “front line of the second system” with 13th East Surrey in support and the 18th Welsh in 
reserve.  The brigade then had to cope (12.15 a.m.) with another night march to the south, 
acting as reserve to 34
th
 Division which had been engaged since morning.   
 
On 22 March, 119 Brigade started the day with 18
th
 Welsh in the front line (the Sensée 
Switch) west of St Leger, the 13
th
 East Surrey in support and the 21
st
 Middlesex in reserve.
749
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After conferring with the divisional commander, Crozier spent the morning visiting his 
battalion COs.
750
  By 2.15 p.m. there were no British troops in front of the 18
th
 Welsh. At 
about 6.00 p.m., in response to news that the Germans had taken St Leger, the 13
th
 East 
Surrey was ordered to attack the village with the help of two tanks but, seizing an opportunity, 
the 18
th
 Welsh commandeered the tanks “and by a brilliant counterstroke put a stop to the 
German advance and captured five enemy machine guns”.751  By nightfall 13th East Surrey 
was forming the brigade’s left (north) front just east of Judas Farm and facing east towards St 
Leger; the 18
th
 Welsh formed the centre and the 21
st
 Middlesex the right, facing north-east.  
The brigade frontage was approximately three and a half kilometres (4000 yards) and its right 
flank was about a kilometre north of the village of Mory.  This was a very different form of 
warfare than that experienced in the confined spaces of Bourlon Wood.
752
  Attackers had no 
option but to cross open spaces where they were subject to artillery, machine gun and 
concentrated rifle fire. 
 
Early on 23 March the brigade was told of a crisis developing to the south where the enemy 
had broken through at Mory.  The extension of the line of 4 Guards Brigade, 31
st
 Division, 
(on 119 Brigade’s left flank) to the south allowed 119 Brigade to shift southwards.  The 13th 
East Surrey was now on both sides of the Mory – Ervillers road facing Mory and effectively 
blocking the shallow valley.  On its left the 21
st
 Middlesex held the high ground while 18
th
 
Welsh formed the reserve.   At 6.00 a.m. the 21
st
 Middlesex received verbal orders from 
Crozier via the brigade major to attack Mory alongside the 13
th
 East Surrey which it did at 
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9.00 a.m.  British artillery fell short causing casualties but the attack continued “in short 
rushes, one section or Lewis gun team covering the advance of another” until it was halted by 
fire from a strongpoint in Mory Copse on the left and from machine-guns in Mory to the 
right.
753
 “The troops carried out the attack in the best possible order and with magnificent 
dash, more as though they were on a field day than a battle”.754 However, “it was then realised 
that the amount of cooperation which the [13
th
] East Surrey were apparently able to afford 
would make it impracticable to press home the attack on Mory and at the same time comply 
with the instructions to keep touch with the Guards on our left”.755  The 21st Middlesex 
stopped and dug in on the high ground.  “The Lewis gunners had an unlimited number of 
targets but he necessity of keeping a reserve of ammunition for any attack prevented the 
gunners from taking full advantage of them.”756 
 
The 13
th
 East Surrey were held up by machine gun fire and it was probably at this point when 
Crozier supposedly made a call to press home the attack to “an officer” [unnamed but 
certainly Lieutenant-Colonel Warden] who told him that it could not be done: 
 “What’s that I hear”, I say. “Can’t!” “Don’t understand the meaning of the word, I 
 say. “Lead your men to the objective”, I order, “or, if you ‘can’t’, come back here … 
 and you can be tried by court martial”. He thinks twice and attacks, gaining much 
 kudos thereby.
757
 
 
In another version of events: 
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 I had to tell one senior officer over the telephone that if he could not see his way to 
 carry out an attack instantly he not only would rue the day but might not live to see 
 another.
758
 
 
Warden “proceeded to the village himself to push on the main attack, reorganised three of his 
companies in the lower portion of the village, sent for the OC, Reserve Company and gave 
orders for his entire command to mop up the village and establish itself in the Army Line 
beyond.  This attack commenced about 5.00 p.m. and proved entirely successful, the village 
being captured and great loss inflicted on the enemy”.759  Because of growing German 
numbers the village was quietly evacuated.  When the enemy attacked in strength during the 
night, heavy Lewis gun and rifle fire was maintained on the village causing numerous German 
casualties.  Advanced British troops were withdrawn at dawn on 24 March when it was clear 
that German troops were massing near Mory for an attack on Ervillers.   
 
119 Brigade was now drawn up east of Ervillers and, when the German attack moved up the 
valley below, enfilade fire from the brigade and the adjacent 4 Guards Brigade aided by 40
th
 
Division’s artillery ensured that the attack was “completely wiped out.”760  However, by 6.00 
p.m. the German forces had broken through from the direction of St Leger and were 
advancing up the Sensée Valley towards the rear of the two brigades.  Crozier now had to 
practise what he preached about Spion Kop.  Although the Guards Brigade was retiring, he 
“had received no orders to move.  It is now dark.  We wait … I send my own groom with a 
personal letter asking for instructions and point out the danger … ‘if morning comes … and 
we are seen … we shall be wiped out’ … My duty is clear.  The lesson of Spion Kop is at my 
own feet!  The words I burnt into the souls of my subalterns apply equally to me.  ‘Never give 
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any excuse for retiring, don’t retire unless you’re ordered to’ … At last the moment arrives.  
We may go!”761 The 21st Middlesex were withdrawn, then the 18th Welsh and finally the 13th 
East Surrey, to a line on the north of Ervillers.  On 25 March, the right of 40
th
 Division was 
fending off repeated attacks from the south-east but was pushed north-westwards.  119 
Brigade HQ moved from Gomiecourt to Courcelles.  That evening the twice-postponed relief 
of the division by 42
nd
 Division took place.
762
  At 11.00 p.m. 119 Brigade marched from 
Courcelles to Bucquoy, only to move further back to Bienvillers the next day as the Germans 
kept up the pressure on the front line.  In response to rumours about a break-in by German 
armoured cars, the 21
st
 Middlesex, the only unit to have arrived at Bienvillers, took up a line 
on the ridge to the south, while, to the east, the 18
th
 Welsh and 13
th
 East Surrey formed the 
left flank of 40
th
 Division “in battle formation” at Monchy-au-Bois.  Crozier temporarily 
passed command of his brigade to the GOC 120 Brigade while he took command of, and 
inspected, the line and machine gun positions in front of Mochy-au-Bois.  No attack came.  In 
the evening, 40
th
 Division was ordered out of the line.  It had been a hard and confusing five 
days during which the new formation had done well in a fluid situation and despite a type of 
combat with which it was unfamiliar.
763
  This recommendation by Crozier for a DSO for 
Lieutenant-Colonel W.E. Brown from gives a flavour of the nature of the fighting: 
 For gallantry and good leadership and a fine example set in the retention of ground in 
 front of Ervillers, etc, Lieut-Colonel Brown was in command of the battalion which on 
 the 22
nd
 March was holding Sensée Switch.  On the evening of the 22
nd
March the 
 enemy attempted to outflank this position in the vicinity of Judas Farm from St Leger. 
 Lt Col Brown extended his left and held the railway bank and during this counter 
 attack killed many Germans.  He kept the situation well in hand and by bold counter 
 strokes warded off the pressure.  On being relieved in the Sensée Switch by the 
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 Guards, the Battalion returned to Brigade Reserve, and in this position for the 
 remainder of the time the Brigade was in action up to March 26
th
, this officer was 
 constantly reinforcing the other two battalions and heading off local and general 
 attacks.  Frequently his whole battalion HQ were in action at close range. This 
battalion was responsible for the observation of the enemy on the whole Brigade front 
and the information sent back was of the utmost use.  Lieut-Colonel Brown’s personal 
efforts and example under heavy fire for a long period cannot be over-estimated, and it 
is largely due to him that the Germans were held up for a time at Ervillers.
764
 
 
Crozier wrote later:  
 Thanks to the lack of uniformity of training throughout the British Armies in France, 
 we were a bad brigade just prior to the Somme battle in 1918, as the introduction of 
 two new battalions to take the place of my best two … spoilt the general level or 
 standard.  Fortune had, however, favoured us, as we came through the second Somme 
 better than might have been expected. Though our casualties were heavy.
765
 
 
The brigade casualty figures were less than those of the other two brigades of the division 
which had been heavily engaged to the right of 119 Brigade.  The 13
th
 East Surrey had 206 
casualties of all ranks; the 18
th
 Welsh 228 and the 21
st
 Middlesex 268.  The brigade total was 
702 (52 killed) while that of 120 Brigade was 911 (76 killed) and that of 121 Brigade was 825 
(77 killed).
766
  On 30 March the 13
th
 East Surrey still had a strength of 800. 
 
Crozier’s opinions on the two new COs that he inherited are interesting.  The 13th East Surrey 
“deceived me, as I thought they were better than they were.  Undoubtedly they could have 
been had they been better led”.767  Their CO, Lieutenant-Colonel Warden, embodied the 
failure to take Bourlon village as far as Crozier was concerned.  He (Warden) had gone into 
the village with his battalion on 25 November and had assumed command of troops there after 
the death of Lieutenant-Colonel Battye (14
th
 HLI, 120 Brigade).  His unit was the last to leave 
the village on 27 November, well after the rest of 40
th
 Division had been relieved. But he had 
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not completed the capture of the village and, according to Crozier, even though the 13
th
 East 
Surreys retook Mory on 23 March 1918, it was “only after great ‘pressure’ on the telephone 
from Brigade Headquarters”.768 It is also possible that Crozier disliked the fact that Warden 
was an ex-TF officer. He seems to have regarded the regular army, or rather regular 
‘gentlemen’, as his preferred source of COs, despite his positive experiences of men such as 
Benzie, Andrews and Kennedy and his own early association with volunteer and irregular 
units.
769
  His comments about Metcalfe are in sharp contrast to those about Warden.  Metcalfe 
had arrived as CO of the 21
st
 Middlesex (which had also failed at Bourlon) on 18 December 
1917 – and was not tainted by the earlier failure.  Despite concern about Metcalfe’s age (he 
was fifty-three - Crozier calls him “nearly sixty”), “despite the previous poor training of his 
men, despite their low morale and narrow outlook, despite all their other defects, [he] turned 
them into real ‘Diehards’ on the battlefield itself, by his own efforts, courage, leadership and 
example.”.770 “He held the line … because of what was in him – blood and breeding.”771 
 
Warden did not last long after the March fighting.  Crozier says that a Medical Officer 
reported that:  
 ‘Colonel Morden [Warden] should go down or go to a suitable rest house’, he says; 
 ‘he’s nearly off his head.  I’ve doped him quite a lot but he wants an entire change.’ 
 ‘Do what you like with him, Doctor,’ I say. ‘Last night he was found fighting under 
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 his bed with a pillow, swearing it was a Boche.’ ‘Poor devil,’ I say, ‘he’s played 
 out!’772 
 
Lieutenant-Colonel Warden was admitted to hospital on 6 April 1918 and returned to his unit 
on 14 April.
773
 During the next major action the battalion would be commanded by the 2iC, 
Major W.G. West. 
 
The thanks of senior commanders were forwarded to 40
th
 Division. The VI Corps 
Commander, J.A.L. Haldane, said that he could not speak too highly of the division: “They 
have made a magnificent defence and, tired as they must be with so prolonged a struggle, 
have stood like a stone wall between my right and the Germans”.774 Sir Julian Byng, GOC 
Third Army wrote: “they have broken up overwhelming attacks and prevented the enemy 
from gaining his object, viz: a decisive victory.”775 
 
Meanwhile, John Ponsonby thanked his division.  He said presciently: “We shall no doubt be 
called upon again to fight for all we are worth”.776  He was right. 
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 Division, 28/3/18” – quoted in 
McCue, Wandsworth and Battersea Battalions, p. 143.  King George V visited the division on 30 March and 
“was fully conversant with the work accomplished by the Division and while offering his sincere congratulations 
thereon he deplored the losses that have been incurred” - TNA: WO 95/2593 War Diary 40th Division GS. 
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119 Brigade and ‘Georgette’ 
40
th
 Division moved north to join XV Corps, First Army, and entered the line on 2 April 
1918.
777
 It relieved 57
th
 (2
nd
 West Lancashire) Division in seven kilometres of the front line in 
a quiet sector south of the River Lys between Neuve Chapelle and Armentières.
778
 On the 
evening of 6 April 119 Brigade moved from reserve into the line.
779
  The brigade was in its 
usual position on the right with 121 Brigade on the left.  On 119 Brigade’s right was the 
Portuguese 2
nd
 Division spread very thinly indeed over ten kilometres of front.
780
   
 
As early as November 1917 the German army planners had identified the Portuguese sector as 
the weakest on the Western Front. One of several offensives developed for 1918 was aimed to 
smash through the line here and press on toward the important railway junction at 
Hazebrouck.  Originally planned as a larger operation, ‘Georg’, involving attacks towards 
Hazebrouck and against the Ypres salient, the operation was recast as ‘Georgette’ - a follow-
up to ‘Michael’ - at very short notice.781  The all-important artillery plan was put into place in 
just nine days.  At GHQ it was thought that any attack in the sector was likely to be a feint, 
                                                 
777
 Harry Graham wrote: “[we are] only praying to be left in peace for a bit.  But the worst of acquiring a 
reputation as a fighting Division is that directly there’s trouble they shove you in again.  They are busy 
reinforcing and reequipping us now at a great pace!” – IWM: Graham Papers, letter dated 3 April 1918. 
778
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inflicted 39 killed and 238 wounded on 57
th
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then corps reserve behind the fronts of VI and IV Corps. “All ranks were pleased to get out of the dull and damp 
country in Flanders and see the hills and pretty country of the Somme for the first time.” The division’s artillery 
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 Crozier, Brass Hat, p. 200 says that the brigade arrived on 7/8 April, thus heightening the drama of what 
followed. 
780
 Germany declared war on Portugal on 9 March 1916.  Portuguese troops arrived on the western front in April 
1917 and thereafter proved both a military and political problem for the CinC.  By April 1918 they were under 
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masking another strong attack in the vicinity of Arras.  This belief persisted for several days 
after the start of the attack.
782
 
 
The British were aware of the vulnerability of the Portuguese sector.  In December 1917 
Douglas Haig had been told by Henry Horne (GOC, First Army) that “he did not think that 
the Portuguese Corps would stand against a German attack”.783 That view was also conveyed 
by General Smuts following a visit to the front in January 1918.
784
 Haig believed that any 
break-in by the Germans could be contained by the adjacent British units throwing back 
defensive flanks to the line of the rivers Lawe and Lys which would also be defended by 
British troops.
785
 Part of the Portuguese front was taken over by XV Corps in December but 
the lack of available divisions prevented further reduction in its length.
786
  When the 1
st
 
Portuguese Division was finally withdrawn from the line on 5 April, the weak 2
nd
 Portuguese 
Division simply extended its frontage to compensate.
787
  Its relief by 51
st
 (Highland) Division 
was overtaken by events. 
 
Crozier too recognised the danger posed by the Portuguese on his right.  On 3 April he had 
been visited by Lieutenant-General John Du Cane, GOC XV Corps, who no doubt pointed it 
out, but he later described “Our certainty that the Germans were going to attack owing to that 
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‘trench sense’ which we had acquired”.788    On 3 April the 21st Middlesex received orders to 
man a system of trenches on the right flank “in the event of the Brigade on the right 
(Portuguese) giving way”.789 On 4 April Crozier “reconnoitred the defensive flank to be 
manned in case of an enemy attack on the right flank which is held by Portuguese troops”.790 
On 5 April he “reconnoitred the Bridgeheads of Estaires and La Gorgue with a view to 
defence in case of an attack on the Portuguese”.791 On 7 April while the Brigade Major visited 
the brigade’s left battalion, the 13th East Surrey, Crozier visited the right, the 18th Welsh.  
Next day Crozier visited the left battalion while the Brigade Major took the right. The 
“various defensive positions” of the 21st Middlesex (in support) were also visited by 
Crozier.
792
 He also records in Brass Hat, Impressions and The Men I Killed how he visited the 
Portuguese front line only to find few sentries, men asleep without wearing boots or 
equipment, rusty rifles, jammed Lewis guns and insufficient wire.
793
  He unsuccessfully 
requested that the division’s reserve brigade (120 Brigade) be put into the line immediately.794  
119 Brigade patrols on the nights of 6, 7 and 8 April reported all quiet and made no contact 
with the enemy. 
 
At 4.15 a.m. on 9 April the German bombardment opened in thick fog.
795
 While trench 
mortars targeted forward positions, the heavier artillery deluged strongpoints, HQs, villages, 
and crossroads with high explosive and poison gas.  Four German divisions faced the 
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Portuguese with another three ready to reinforce.
796
 German troops were in the Portuguese 
front line of the forward zone by 7.00 a.m.  The main infantry attack swept in at 8.45 a.m. and 
the second line of the forward zone was occupied by 9.00 a.m. By 1.40 p.m. the Portuguese 
2
nd
 Division was in captivity or scattered beyond the fighting line. Chris Baker notes how “the 
sheer scale and speed of the Portuguese capitulation makes a coherent view of the battle 
difficult to compile”.797  The same could be said of the difficulties of following 119 Brigade’s 
battle, driven as it was by the Portuguese collapse.
798
 
 
When the bombardment started, the 21
st
 Middlesex ‘stood to’.  On receiving an ‘SOS’ signal 
from the 18
th
 Welsh, they moved into their pre-arranged battle positions behind the right flank 
of the brigade, taking heavy casualties from shelling.
799
  At 5.55 a.m. the 18
th
 Welsh reported 
large numbers of Germans advancing on the Portuguese front as the barrage lifted onto the 
support line.  Just a few minutes later they reported a German breakthrough between their left 
post and the first post manned by the 13
th
 East Surrey.
800
  Large numbers of the enemy 
advanced behind the battalion towards the support line. No men of the 18
th
 Welsh appeared 
from the forward posts which were presumed lost.  At 8.20 a.m. the right company of the 18
th
 
Welsh reported that it was surrounded but fighting on. No one from the company made it to 
the rear.
801
 At 9.00 a.m. the left front of the battalion was pushed back and by 10.00 a.m. the 
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Germans were within 100 metres of the battalion HQ.  Lieutenant-Colonel Brown now led a 
fighting withdrawal, inflicting many casualties at point-blank range but also losing men.
802
  
Behind him, the 21
st
 Middlesex had heard that the front line had been penetrated at 9.20 a.m. 
and by 10.00 a.m. had learned of the Portuguese collapse.  By 11.00 a.m. they had lost their 
2iC (killed) and their adjutant (wounded) and their battalion HQ had been forced to move to a 
nearby trench.
803
 
 
Nearby, Brown had led his remnants to Winters Night Post which was held by a detachment 
of the 21
st
 Middlesex.  Returning from seeking ammunition he found the post surrounded by 
Germans who were advancing towards the 21
st
 Middlesex HQ.  The post was all but wiped 
out by machine gun and shell fire.  Brown, his signalling officer and just twenty men escaped. 
“As I now had no troops to command I made my way to Bac St Maur [Brigade HQ] hoping to 
find some of my men on the road to organise but I found none except a Lewis gun and two 
men ...”.804 
 
The actions of the 13
th
 East Surrey on the left of the brigade front would be the cause of 
persistent annoyance and resentment for Crozier who believed that they had surrendered 
because of “the cowardice of a battalion commander on the left, who surrendered his regiment 
[sic] without firing a shot because he was attacked in the rear instead of the anticipated front 
and his person was thereby endangered”.805 The CO, 13th East Surrey, Major West, wrote: 
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  My battalion was holding front line trenches on the left flank of Portuguese Corps.  
 About 7.30am the enemy shelled our lines heavily with gas and high explosive 
 causing heavy casualties to my battalion, after eight o’clock the enemy completely 
 broke through the Portuguese front.  No infantry attack occurred on my batt[alion] 
 front at this time and no information as to what was happening reached me from any 
 source. While endeavouring to get in touch with my Coy commanders, I was rushed 
 and taken prisoner by a German ‘mopping up’ party which had worked along a road to 
 my rear, coming from the right flank of my brigade.
806
 
 
There does appear to have been some inertia on the part of the battalion HQ staff: 
 It was stated in my hearing that the Germans had broken through the Welsh.  
 Messages were also brought in to Major West which were also read by Capt. Ainger 
 and Capt. Price but the other officers were not informed of their nature … I waited to 
 receive orders from Major West as to his plan of action but received none … I heard 
 no orders given by Major West and received none.  Suddenly I heard a voice cry 
 ‘Heraus’ [Come out] and Major West walked out of the dugout holding up his hands 
 … Before going out Battalion Sergeant-Major Lee turned to me and said ‘Well Sir, we 
 have held out to the last’.  I was thoroughly disgusted at not having had a fight for it 
 and replied ‘Yes and never fired a shot’.807 
 
However, Crozier was too quick to place the blame.  There had been resistance: 
 I was on the extreme left flank.  The enemy did not attack our direct front but there 
 was a lot of movement going on in front of us in which we stopped a lot by sniping 
 and Lewis gun fire. I tried but could not get any information as to what really had 
 happened until about 9 o’clock when my Company Commander came up to my post 
 and told me that we were being surrounded and we were to move back on to the 
 Middlesex [20
th
 Middlesex, 121 Brigade, was on the left flank of the 13
th
 East Surrey], 
 when at the same time we were attacked from our right. I at once got my Lewis gun 
 going which unfortunately broke down in the first magazine and I only had 8 rifles 
 with me. We stood out until the enemy was within 50 yards of us and which 
 outnumbered us by a 100, when I received a bad wound in my arm … we got back to 
 the next trench where we got more support and I handed my men over … I went down 
 to the dressing station and in the next minute the enemy was on us and we were 
 forced to surrender.
808
 
 
The 13
th
 East Surrey was overwhelmed by the speed of the attack just as the 18
th
 Welsh and 
the 21
st
 Middlesex had been.  The line consisted of posts linked by a (usually unmanned) 
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breastwork. These posts were several hundred metres apart, easily within range of supporting 
fire from rifles and machine-guns in adjacent posts, but with visibility down to twenty to 
thirty metres at the start of the battle it is unsurprising that the line was quickly infiltrated.
809
 
This fight was in total contrast to that at Mory two weeks earlier where the open spaces 
allowed repeated opportunities to destroy attacks with bullets and shells. The 13
th
 East Surrey 
was surrounded by about 9.30 a.m.  Elsewhere, as we have seen, isolated groups held out or 
tried to fight their way back but the posts were surrounded and, as the fog lifted, retreating 
troops were easily killed or captured.  By the middle of the day there was very little left of 
119 Brigade. 
 
Crozier had been woken by his batman Starrett as the artillery bombardment crashed down on 
his billet and brigade HQ: 
 By the time I got to the signallers the General was away … Back came Crozier, 
 swearing dreadfully, to lead us or drive us in hurried retreat to Bac St Maur … Our 
 reserve battalion [21
st
 Middlesex] did its best to put some guts into the Portuguese 
 defence, and how the General managed to be with them and with us at the same time 
 passes my understanding to this day.  But there he was whipping us into some sort of 
 order, and there he was steadying the reserve, with every bit of ground he trod torn to 
 pieces by heavy stuff. My, his charmed life was being proved just then.
810
 
 
Crozier was later critical of the “slowness of a brigade on the right”.811 120 Brigade had 
started to move to support the Portuguese left at the start of the attack only to find that the left 
had gone and its own left flank was under attack.  Steadily losing men it pulled back towards 
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the River Lys.
812
 Realising the need for support, early in the morning Crozier had ordered the 
OC the brigade school to bring forward the entire school to Bac St Maur.
813
  He now fell 
back, forming a defensive line with such remnants as he could find, joined by the 12th 
Yorkshire (the divisional pioneers) and what remained of the brigade’s units, on the south 
bank of the river.  Major Amery-Parkes (40
th
 Battalion MGC) and 229 Field Company, RE 
held the bridges at Bac St Maur.
814
  The troops on the south side of the river, including 
Crozier, withdrew over the bridges, probably between 1.00 p.m. and 2.00 p.m. Slightly further 
upstream, at Sailly, Metcalfe and his remnants (these now numbered about 400) crossed later 
at about 4.00 p.m.
815
 The permanent bridge at Bac St Maur was then destroyed.  There 
Crozier met the troops from the brigade school which he used as “a mobile reserve”.816  The 
Germans took possession of the houses on the south side of the river and opened heavy 
machine gun fire on the defenders of the north bank, preventing the destruction of the last 
pontoon bridge and forcing the defenders away from the bank. Crozier and the brigade HQ 
troops resisted until the German machine guns were 100 metres away, giving time for a 
position to be formed in their rear in front of Croix du Bac.  The line was held there until 
about 5.00 p.m. when the division ordered a withdrawal to Le Petit Mortier, a farm two 
kilometres to the north-west, behind an existing trench called the Steenwerk Switch. About 
this time 74 Brigade (25
th
 Division) passed through and attacked Croix du Bac but failed to 
push the Germans back over the river.
817
 The remains of 119 and 120 Brigades were then 
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reorganised into composite battalions.  The 120 Brigade-battalion mustered 300 rifles.  The 
119 Brigade-battalion was made up of ‘details’ and the brigade school troops.818 If the story is 
not a fabrication, it was probably during this afternoon that Crozier shot a fleeing British 
subaltern on the Strazeele road.
819
 This story appeared in 1937 at the height of Crozier’s 
pacifism. It is designed to shock.  It may be true.  When challenged, Crozier named David 
Starrett as a witness.
820
  Starrett does not mention the incident in his writing.  Crozier claims 
to have shot the subaltern and the German behind him thus placing himself on the front line. 
He also mentions losing “two of the best and most valuable members” of his staff shortly 
before.
821
 Both the machine gun officer and the signals officer were severely wounded (one 
later died) on 9 April. There are two other, less quoted, examples of Crozier administering 
summary justice in the pages of The Men I Killed. He claims to have shot a soldier who was 
harming a French woman during the April retreat and hints that he also killed the man who 
stole both his horses at Ervillers who “never stole another”. 822  Neither of these incidents is 
mentioned elsewhere or corroborated. Crozier promoted the impression that he believed that 
men running away would be shot.  The case for him actually carrying out the threat is not 
proven. 
 
The composite battalions occupied the Steenwerk Switch during the night and were told to 
hold it at all costs.  The trench was enfiladed and pressure from the Germans pushed back the 
flanks. The centre withdrew but then counter attacked, driving the advancing Germans back 
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and reoccupying the Switch.
823
  At about 5.30 p.m. 180 men of the RE were incorporated in 
the line and at about midnight Major Gough (18
th
 Welsh) brought up 200 men. 
 
At 10.30 a.m. on 11 April, John Ponsonby (GOC, 40
th
 Division) visited the HQs of 119 and 
120 Brigades and told them “that to hang on was what was expected of us”.824 Ponsonby 
wrote that “I found Crozier and Hobkirk [GOC, 120 Brigade], they both seemed tired out.  All 
I could tell them was that divisions were coming up behind us and that we must all hang on as 
long as possible and stop the Bosch”.825  But, under pressure, the line withdrew for two 
kilometres by stages through the day, to a position in front of Le Verrier.
826
  Late that night 
the brigade was relieved and marched back to Strazeele where it arrived between 9.00 a.m. 
and 10 a.m. the next morning.
827
 
 
40
th
 Division had suffered badly, worse than at Bourlon. Total casualties were 4,491 of which 
3,020 were missing. 119 Brigade had 1,442 casualties, the highest in the division (Table 
18).
828
 120 Brigade had a total of 1069 casualties and 121 Brigade 1227. 
 
Overnight on 12/13 April, 40
th
 Division’s troops, acting as XV Corps reserve, dug in to 
protect Strazeele (and therefore Hazebrouck) from any further advance by German forces. 
Their active involvement in the Battle of the Lys was over.  John Ponsonby noted: “… it was 
a soldiers battle and impossible to direct matters from Head Quarters as the situation kept 
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changing every minute”.829  By 15 April they were behind the lines “resting and 
reorganising”.830 On 17 April the formation was transferred to VIII Corps and training 
 
Table 18: 119 Brigade casualties Battle of the Lys (compiled to 23 April 1918)
831
 
 
Unit Killed Wounded Missing Total 
 Officers OR Officers OR Officers OR  
13
th
 East 
Surrey 
1 7 - 56 18 428 510 
18
th
 Welsh 1 18 12 187 15 306 539 
21
st
 
Middlesex 
6 25 12 107 10 233 393 
 
recommenced, aided by the arrival of specialist instructors in musketry, physical training, 
bayonet fighting and Lewis gunnery “rendering valuable assistance to battalion commanders 
in the training of the reinforcements recently arrived”.832 Harry Graham noted “They are 
reinforcing and re-equipping us as fast as possible – you can imagine what our losses have 
been in he last 3 weeks - and I suppose we will go in again as soon as we are ready, but the 
new material is untrained and necessarily inferior – I do think we deserve a bit of a rest”.833   
 
Perhaps it was tiredness, overwork, stress or just bad judgement that caused Crozier to 
overstep the mark in correspondence with his old superior Major-General Oliver Nugent at 
this time.  The incident was recounted to Wilfred Spender by his wife after a visit to Netley 
Hospital where Sergeant Russell, ex-9
th
 RIRifles, was recuperating.  According to Russell, 
Nugent had kept the Ulster Division in the line at Ham during the German March offensive 
“long after it was hopeless” and “according to him [Russell] Col. Crozier (now Brig.Gen.) 
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wrote such a strong letter to O.N. on the subject that the latter was furious and  made him 
apologise. That sounds highly probable!”834 
 
The continuing need for reinforcements elsewhere now caused the division to be regarded as a 
source of men.
835
  On 23 April, 119 and 120 Brigades were ordered to form one composite 
battalion each for work on the line.
836
  The same day: “Information has been received that that 
the whole personnel of the Division, less Div., Brigade and Battalion Headquarters and a 
small staff of instructors are to be sent to the base”.837 Harry Graham wrote home: 
 We are fighting for our existence.  The lack of imagination in high places is absolutely 
 incredible.  There are endless divisions (or several at any rate) who have had no share 
 in any fighting for months and months – but when one like ours survives 2 battles in 3 
 weeks, and by means of reinforcements etc is almost up to its old strength, they 
 propose to beak it up all together – thereby killing the esprit de corps that has taken 
 months to build up, and thoroughly depressing hundreds of gallant men who are 
 drafted away to fresh units for which they have no affection at all.
838
 
 
And the next day: 
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exertions, and more must still be asked for, but I am confident that, at this critical period, when the existence of 
the British Empire is at stake, all ranks of the First Army will do their very best. [signed] H.S. Horne, 
Commanding First Army, 13 April 1918”; “On you leaving the Corps, the Corps Commander directs me to 
convey to you his appreciation of the services rendered by you Division during the operations of 9
th 
April - April 
13
th
. [signed] H. Knox, BGGS, XV Corps, 16/4/18”; “The Division has again been engaged in heavy fighting 
and all battalions have fought the enemy with great courage and determination in spite of having to face 
overwhelming odds. The same fighting spirit continues and I know will continue in the Division. I wish GOC 
Brigades to convey to the troops under their command my sincere congratulations and thanks for their gallant 
behaviour under trying circumstances. [signed] John Ponsonby, Major-General, Commanding 40
th
 Division, 
19/4/18.” – all copied in TNA: WO 95/2593 War Diary 40th Division GS. 
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 We are all sunk in the depths of depression.  The fate of the 40
th
 Div is sealed.  We are 
 to be broken up, so that nothing remains but a staff and a very small nucleus, and all 
 our men sent to reinforce other Divisions.  It is vain to fight against our doom.  John 
 [Ponsonby] went to GHQ, where they were very nice to him, told him how much they 
 appreciated and recognised the way the Div had fought in the last two battles, but said 
 that owing to the lamentable shortage of men all divisions that had sustained heavy 
 losses must be broken up instead of being remade.  They promised that if ever any 
 men turned up, we should be the first to be reinforced.  So the poor old Div. is reduced 
 to about 500 men and if ever we can make it up again it will be a totally new Div 
 (whatever one calls it), composed of men who have never heard of Bourlon, of 
 Armentieres or Bapaume, and the esprit de corps will have to built up again ab initio.  
 All this is very depressing.  Meanwhile we have nothing to do though I believe we 
 may be employed training Yanks or Irish conscripts or even (save the word!) 
 Portuguese.
839
 
 
On 25 April: 
  
 I have come to the conclusion that it’s no use being depressed at the breaking up of 
 the division.  The 40
th
 can never die.  They may take away all the officers and men, 
 but they can’t take away all the traditions and the reputation; and these we shall have 
 to instil into whatever type of conscript we eventually get to fill us up.  After all, why 
 is one Division ever different to another?  Why for instance, have we seen the – Div. 
 actually stampeded, while we (made of the same material) held on?  Simply, I think, 
 John – and the 3 Brigadiers – one of them a perfect little tiger to fight, absolutely 
 fearless, not much liked, but a splendid man in a tight place [Crozier]; the second a 
 ‘strong decent man’, quiet and reliable [Hobkirk]; the third … fairly capable and 
 resolute and cheerful and brave [Campbell] – we shall be all right, and we can rebuild 
 the new division on the old lines and be ourselves again ere long.  Several divisions, in 
 our plight as far as casualties are concerned, have been done away with altogether.
840
 
 
On 27 April: 
 All orders for our breaking-up are cancelled, and it is assumed that with the remnants 
 of men who have not yet left us (and of course we have had no reinforcements – they 
 having been directed elsewhere!) we are to form composite units of some kind to go 
 and dig or hold or do something to a line somewhere in front!  All this is very 
 disturbing and depressing, for it seems that we don’t know where we are.  After the 
 farewells are said, bands playing at stations and John waving goodbye to his troops, 
 we find ourselves still a division (of a sort), all mixed up under new leaders and 
 without an interval of a few days to coordinate and train the units together.  I know 
 what John fears is that those in authority will say to themselves ‘Oh, it’s all right – 
 such and such a bit of the line is held by the 40
th!’ whereas it isn’t the 40th at all that 
 will hold – it’s a mixed remnant of the 40th, jumbled together hurriedly and having 
 been so badgered about with contradictory orders during the last fortnight that that it 
 is doubtful whether the esprit de corps that once sustained them is left.
841
 
                                                 
839
 Ibid., Letter dated 24 April 1918. 
840
 Ibid., Letter dated 25 April 1918. 
841
 Ibid., Letter dated 27 April 1918. 
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The situation was obviously very confused for the men on the receiving end of GHQ’s 
decisions and it continued to be so.  On 1 May “Instructions were received from GHQ that 
‘circumstances demand the immediate withdrawal for drafting purposes of all available 
Infantry and Machine Gun Corps personnel’”.842 Next day the division transferred from VIII 
to VII Corps: “I think the fate of the Division is settled at last, and that we are to train B1 men 
who can fight but can’t march far, owing to veins or feet or whatnot - old soldiers I believe, 
and well disciplined … Thank God we have left the Corps we were in a day or so ago, and 
can hope to be treated with some common sense”.843  ‘Common sense’ was apparently in 
short supply: 
  
Orders for the disbandment of battalions were received by 119 Brigade on 3 May. On 4 and 5 
May, the MGC troops and the men of 119 Brigade and the 12
th
 Yorks (the division’s 
pioneers) left for the base or for Calais after Crozier had visited each battalion.  On 6 May, 
120 Brigade sent four officers and 578 other ranks to the base while 121 Brigade sent 36 
officers and 1666 other ranks.  By now Harry Graham was despairing, especially when news 
was received about the Portuguese version of events on the Lys: 
 You will hardly believe it possible, but all our orders to move are cancelled again last 
 night, and now we are to stay here (with no men) and superintend the digging of 
 another line. By the way, our oldest allies have sent in an official report of their 
 wonderful stand on the Lys … they say that they would have hung on even longer 
 (time enough to boil an egg perhaps) if the Division on their left hadn’t broken!!! 
 Pretty good isn’t it when you recall my experiences with them that morning and how 
 we waited on till afternoon until almost surrounded?  The Corps we were in at that 
 time is  much upset by this, and it undoubtedly accounts for the fact that, although sent 
 in for mention, GHQ took no notice thereof – to describe how we held out would have 
 been to give the lie to the Blue Monkeys, an impossible thought truly!  It is not worth 
 bothering about now, especially as we don’t really exist now except on paper.844 
 
                                                 
842
 TNA: WO 95/2593 War Diary 40
th
 Division GS. 
843
 IWM: Graham Papers. Letter dated 3 May 1918. 
844
 Ibid., Letter dated 5 May 1918. 
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 So now a Major-General, three Brigadiers and the united staff of the whole Division 
 are concentrating their minds on the digging (by Chinamen) of a new line.  Such a 
 waste of time to many of us who have nothing on earth to do for the moment, and 
 might better be at home.
845
 
 
 
119 Brigade Reformed 
Crozier spent most of May 1918 looking over the ground and laying out the line of defences 
to be created by RE, Chinese Labour Corps and Labour Corps units.  The brigade war diary 
records that he was out, usually with his Brigade Major, on almost every day from 10 May 
until the end of the month.  There had been some changes in the brigade staff.  After Bourlon, 
Percy Hone had taken over as Acting Brigade Major when Goodliffe left to go on a course.  
His upward move left a vacancy for Staff Captain and Lieutenant R.W. May, 18
th
 Welsh, the 
brigade’s intelligence officer, stepped up, also on an acting basis.846  A vacancy for a 
permanent post was created when Goodliffe was promoted to GSO2, XVIII Corps, on 4 April.  
The new BM was Captain Anthony John Muirhead MC, Oxfordshire Yeomanry, who arrived 
on 25 April.
847
 Both Hone and May had done good work during the fighting in March and 
April.
848
  Hone was awarded a second bar to his DSO and given command of a battalion. May 
was confirmed as Staff Captain. 
 
                                                 
845
 Ibid., Letter dated 6 May 1918.  
846
 Reginald Walter May (1896-1969)see Appendix Six. 
847
 Anthony John Muirhead (1890–1939) see Appendix Six. 
848
 Hone was appointed DAAG, 62
nd
 Division on 12 January 1918 but declined the appointment out of loyalty to 
Crozier (Crozier, Impressions, pp. 209-211).  Crozier claims that the appointment was made without the 
knowledge of 40
th
 Division HQ.  This seems likely because after the announcement on 17 January that Hone 
would remain as Staff Captain (his BM role was in an acting capacity), 40
th
 Division A&Q noted: “Instructions 
regarding recommendations for advancement of staff and other officers [were] revised” – TNA: WO 95/2594 
War Diary 40
th
 Division HQ A&Q. Hone was awarded a second bar to his MC, was promoted Lieutenant-
Colonel, 21
st
 Middlesex, May-October 1918 and took the battalion back to the UK. He was posted to command 
the 13
th
 DLI (74 Brigade, 25
th
 Division) in the final weeks of the War and was badly wounded on 24 October.  
Reggie May had “entirely lost the use of his legs for two days at the end of the March battle, owing to fatigue” – 
Crozier, Brass Hat, p.198. 
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Crozier wrote that during the construction of the new defence lines he took four days “local 
recreation at the base” and spent time at Paris Plage.849  Charles Messenger has pointed out 
that neither the divisional nor brigade war diaries mention this.
850
 The episode may be a plot 
device, providing a break from descriptions of fighting and life at the front, but there are no 
references to his presence in the brigade war diary from 7 – 10 June, so he may have gone 
away as he said.  Away or not, he received notice that he was “to form a new brigade which 
has to be in action within a month … Into the line again, three new battalions once more, 
thank goodness I have a good staff”.851 
 
“A growing feature of the supply of military manpower was the use of Category ‘B1’ men for 
front line service”.852  On 8 June notification was given to brigades “of the raising of infantry 
Garrison Guard Battalions composed of men of category lower than ‘A’.  These units to be 
posted in the first instance to the cadres of 40
th
 and 59
th
 Divisions as a temporary measure”.853  
The need for men for defence was such that in April Labour Corps guard companies were 
brigaded to take over part of the line south-west of Arras and by the end of May the Labour 
Corps units were being scoured for category B1 men who had previously served in the 
infantry.
854
  Twenty-four ‘Garrison Guard’ Companies were quickly assembled to form 
                                                 
849
 Crozier, Brass Hat, pp. 207 and 209-212. 
850
 Messenger, Broken Sword, p. 104. 
851
Crozier, Brass Hat, p. 210. Crozier’s staff teams - the pairings of Goodliffe/Hone, Hone/May and 
Muirhead/May – provided continuity and seem to have operated efficiently and effectively.  There is no evidence 
of the decline in standard of brigade majors or definite improvement of staff captains as the war progressed 
suggested by W. N. Nicholson (GSO1, 51
st
 (Highland) Division and later AA&QMG, 17
th
 (Northern) Division)  
as quoted in Aimée E. Fox, ‘Military administration and the role of brigade staff, 1916-1918’, University of 
Birmingham, MA Thesis, 2010, p.51. The fact that Goodliffe and his predecessors Soames and Prentice were 
professional soldiers supports Fox’s conclusion that “the ‘civilianisation’ of brigade staff represented a 
meritocratic approach to promotion”. 
852
 Grieves, The Politics of Manpower, p.196.  Grieves does not specifically mention the use of Labour Corps 
men of this category but focuses on men from Home Service divisions in Britain. 
853
 TNA: WO 95/2605 War Diary 120 Brigade.   
854
 See Charles Messenger, Call to Arms: The British Army 1914-18 (London: Cassell, 2005), pp. 521-522 for 
definitions of medical categories.  B1 men were classified fit for service abroad in Garrison or Provisional units, 
but not for general service. 
261 
 
number 6 to 11 Garrison Guard Battalions.  Three of these units would form the ‘new’ 119 
Brigade and the ‘temporary measure would become permanent.855 
 
The Category B Men 
On 10 June 1918 the HQ of the six Garrison Guard battalions arrived at 120 Brigade. On 10 
June the battalion designations were amended to reflect the move from Labour Corps to 
infantry.  Numbers 7, 8 and 11 Garrison Battalions became the 13
th
 Garrison Battalion Royal 
Inniskilling Fusiliers, 13
th
 Garrison Battalion East Lancashire Regiment and the 12
th
 Garrison 
Battalion North Staffordshire Regiment respectively.
856
 These battalion HQ transferred to 119 
Brigade on 15 June and the four companies of the 12
th
 North Staffords arrived the same day. 
The men of the 13
th
 RIF and 13
th
 East Lancs followed the next day.
857
  Freddy Plunkett 
returned to command the 13
th
 RIF “by pure chance” according to Crozier in one book but in 
another, having arrived in France and seen the commandant of the base camp, “insisted on 
being sent” rather than taking a soft job.858 Plunkett simply says that he was “given 
command”.859 His comment on his new unit was: “When they marched in my heart sank to 
the lowest as they straggled badly, looked old and weary, with not the slightest sign of 
discipline in them.  These remarks apply to both officers and men.”860  
 
                                                 
855
 John Starling and Ivor Lee, No Labour, No Battle: Military Labour During the First World War (Stroud: 
Spellmount, 2009), pp. 146-147.  Harry Graham’s comments (quoted earlier) about training B1 men were then 
ultimately correct but the whole division had indeed been close to being permanently disbanded.  Douglas Haig 
came under pressure from Ferdinand Foch (appointed during the March crisis as Allied CinC) who had 
“protested very strongly against the reduction of any divisions”. By the end of June six of eight threatened 
divisions had been reconstituted, five with ‘B’ men (including 40th Division). See Edmonds, Military Operations 
France and Belgium 1918, Vol.3, pp.5-6. 
856
 Approval for the elimination of the ‘Garrison’ designation was received on 13 July. 
857
 TNA: WO 95/2605 War Diary 119 Brigade. 
858
 Crozier, Impressions, p. 226; Brasshat, p. 215. 
859
 NAM: ‘Diary of the War – by J.F. Plunkett’. 
860
 Ibid. 
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Table 19: Background of 119 Brigade troops 1918
861
 
 
12
th
 North 
Staffords 
(72) 
13
th
 Royal 
Inniskilling 
Fusiliers 
(76) 
13
th
 East Lancs 
(81) 
Place of 
Residence/Birth 
given 
97% (70) 95% (72) 85% (69) 
 
Place of 
Residence/Birth* 
 
Lancs 
20% (14) 
 
Lancs 
17% (12) 
Yorks 
18% (15) 
  
London 
14% (10) 
 
London 
15% (11) 
Lancs 
17% (12) 
 Yorks 
10% (7) 
Lanarkshire 
11% (8) 
 
 
 
Yorks 
10% (7) 
 
Total ‘counties’ 
represented** 
22 22 26 
Previous service 
given 
94% (68) 95% (72) 81% (66) 
Number of 
Regiments/Corps 
represented by 
previous service 
36 40 39 
  
Ages present in 
sample 
64% (46) 57% (43) 54% (44) 
Youngest/Oldest 
 
19 / 43 19 / 45 19 / 42 
Average / Median 
 
28 / 25 30 / 31 27 / 25 
 *Only locations making up 10% or more of the battalion total are specified 
 **includes ‘Ireland’ and the Channel Isles 
Data compiled from Soldiers Died in the Great War and the online database of the 
Commonwealth War Graves Commission has been used as a sample of the men of the three 
                                                 
861
 Data extracted primarily from Soldiers Died in the Great War 1914-1919, CD-ROM, Naval and Military 
Press, 1998 supplemented by information from the CWGC extracted with ‘Geoff’s 1914-1921 DB Search 
Engine’ at the ‘Hut Six’ web site: http://www.hut-six.co.uk/cgi-bin/search1421.php last accessed, 5 February 
2016. 
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battalions (see Table 19).  In summary, compared with the recruits that made up the original 
‘Welsh’ brigade in 1915/17, these men were older, with previous service in other regiments or 
corps and from a wider range of localities in the UK and beyond.  The majority had no 
geographical affiliation to the regiments in which they now found themselves.
862
 Most came 
from the industrial areas of the north, particularly Lancashire and Yorkshire with (for reasons 
unknown) men from Lanarkshire providing a significant part of the 13
th
 RIF.  London is 
prominent in the figures for two battalions but not (again for reasons unknown) the 13
th
 East 
Lancs.  If the Labour Corps ‘pool’ was homogenous, one would expect all three battalions to 
have had approximately the same composition. 
 
The Officers 
David Starrett noted: “we sorted out officers and men, especially the officers, who always 
made the General’s greatest problem.  Some were old men – as were some of the men – from 
Dunkirk and La [sic] Havre where they had cushy jobs, sheltered by their own, or their 
superior’s red tape”.863  Freddy Plunkett said of his officers: “The only officer of my battn 
staff who had previous experience in his appointment was Lt Petrie my Signalling Officer.  
Capt Fleming, my Adjutant, had never worked in an orderly room, and my QtMaster had 
never worked in a QtMaster’s stores (later I had to get rid of him)”.864 Data on the officers is 
sparse but a small sample has been compiled.
865
 Twenty-three of the files are of officers of the 
13
th
 RIF, eight of the 13
th
 East Lancs and just two from the 12
th
 North Staffords.  Ten of these 
had come from the Labour Corps or a Garrison Battalion, nine had been posted from their 
                                                 
862
 For example, just one man from North Staffordshire has been found in the sample of the 12
th
 North Staffords. 
863
 IWM: Starrett –‘Batman’, p.117. 
864
 NAM: ‘Diary of the War – by J.F. Plunkett’. 
865
 Just thirty-three officer files have been traced and examined (compared with 156 of the four Welsh 
battalions). The low number may be due to a higher proportion of officers from this last year of the war staying 
with the army into the 1920s and their files not yet being in the public domain.  Files of officers with TF 
commissions seem largely absent from the files at TNA.  Note that some of the sample arrived at the brigade 
after June 1918. 
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regiment’s reserve battalion and three had come from TF units.866  Twenty-three (70%) had 
been promoted from the ranks and twenty-one of these had been commissioned from an OCB 
(18) or OTC unit (3).  Six had received their first commission in 1914, four in 1915, one in 
1916, fifteen (50%) in 1917 and just four in 1918. The majority (22) had been born between 
1890 and 1900.  Of the twenty-nine records noting civilian occupation ten (34%) were clerks 
or civil servants and six (21%) were schoolmasters or students – a similar picture to that 
outlined in Chapter Two for an earlier stage of the war. It is doubtful, however, whether the 
boilermaker’s apprentice and the machine cutler represented in this sample would have 
received commissions in 1915. 
 
Training 
Major Sidney Tabor, 13
th
 East Lancs, noted: “[as] a number of officers and men had not been 
in the line for some time, and a great many never had, it was necessary that they be put into 
strict training”.867  “The Division will be required to hold a quiet sector of the line and all 
efforts are to be concentrated on training with this object” was how the division phrased it.868  
Plunkett was practical: “the Brigadier informed me that I could settle down to three months 
steady training so I treated all as recruits, except that after a week I fired ball cartridge and 
threw live bombs to try and improve the nerves of the men, and most of them required 
improving badly”.869  The battalion war diaries give little detail of the training programme but 
the 13
th
 East Lancs war diary is used as a source here to describe it in outline (Table 20); it 
was certainly ‘back to basics’. 
                                                 
866
 A list of nineteen officers posted to the 13
th
 East Lancs in June and July 1918 shows a similar make up. Eight 
came from Garrison Battalions or the Labour Corps, six were attached from other East Lancs battalions or the 
Lancashire Fusiliers (2), two came from Special Reserve battalions and three from TF units – London Gazette, 2 
October 1918. 
867
 TNA: WO 95/2606 War Diary 13
th
 East Lancs, ‘History of 13th Bn The East Lancashire Regiment’. 
868
 TNA: WO 95/2594 War Diary 40
th
 Division GS, 14 June 1918. 
869
 NAM: ‘Diary of the War – by J.F. Plunkett’. 
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Table 20: Training carried out by the 13
th
 East Lancs June-August 1918
870
 
Date Training Activity 
18 June Squad drill, musketry, specialist training 
19 Squad drill, platoon drill, musketry. A Company on range, grouping practice; B 
Company firing stopped when Chinese Labour refused to work in vicinity 
21 GOC lecture to all officers in evening 
22 Brigade route march, five miles 
24 Gas drill, platoon drill, musketry 
26 Musketry, rapid loading, outposts, small schemes, specialist training 
27 Musketry, platoon drill, outposts, small schemes, specialist training 
28 Musketry, platoon drill, outposts, PT 
29 Musketry, platoon drill, outposts, route march (D Company) 
30 Football, Brigade HQ v E. Lancs (result 3-2) 
1 July Musketry, platoon drill, PT, lecture on Gas (to all senior officers and company 
COs in brigade) 
2 Saluting and box respirator drill. Lecture on outposts to all officers by CO 
3 Gas drill, marching in masks, musketry, platoon drill and handling of arms, PT 
4 PT, musketry, identification of targets, rapid loading, platoon drill, handling of 
arms 
5 Gas drill, musketry, PT, platoon drill, specialist training, short route march in 
fighting order 
6 Company training (B, C and D Companies – A Company working creating new 
range) 
7 - 11 Manning East Hazebrouck Line for instruction in trench duties 
13 Battalion saluting, gas drill 
14 Range (two companies), gas test 
15 Practice concentration West Hazebrouck Line 
16 Range (two companies), gas drill, PT and bayonet training, musketry, company 
drill, specialist training, Lewis guns on range 
1 August Range 
2 Range, PT and bayonet fighting (two companies), bombing (two companies) 
3 Bombing (two companies) 
5 Range, Battalion through lachrymatory chamber, Brigade Intelligence Officer 
lecture on SOS (Sniping, Observation, Scouting)  
6 Company training, training under specialist officers 
7 Battalion training, recreational training p.m. 
8 Battalion training 
9  Battalion training – the battalion in the attack. CO attends lecture on ‘Infantry 
Training’ by Sir Ivor Maxse and watches platoon demonstration by XVIII Corps 
School students
871
 
10 Battalion sports 
                                                 
870
 Extracted from TNA: WO 95/2606 War Diary 13
th
 East Lancs and WO 95/2605 War Diary 119 Brigade. 
871
 Maxse had been in command of XVIII Corps until his appointment as Inspector General of Training in July 
1918. 
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12 Battalion moves to Second Army School of Musketry 
13 Companies practising attack. Ranges p.m. 
14 Companies practising attack. Ranges p.m. 
15 Ranges – rapid fire and snap shooting. (“Companies as a whole showed great 
improvement”. CO and company COs attend demonstration in fire discipline and 
control by School students.  
16 Battle practice all companies – “on the whole fairly good for the first time” 
17 Brigade sports 
19 Company training. Platoons and companies practising attack, PT and bayonet 
fighting, gas and close order drill 
20 Brigade field day – East Lancs defend attack by 12th N Staffords and 13th RIF.  
GOC Division present. 
 
Some weeding out of unfit men took place.  A visit from the Inspector of Medical Services 
from GHQ on 24 June resulted in forty-four other ranks from the 12
th
 North Staffords “of 
category less than B1 [being] sent to Labour Group Base”.872 Neither the brigade nor battalion 
war diaries record the numbers of men combed out but Crozier’s later claim of fifty per cent 
seems exaggerated.
873
  
 
The GOC 40
th
 Division, John Ponsonby, inspected the brigade on 16 June just after its arrival 
and this was followed by an inspection by the DAG on 19 June.
874
  On 24 June the CinC 
inspected one battalion of each brigade. The 13
th
 RIF represented 119 Brigade: 
 I saw some at drill, others musketry, one whole battalion was on parade in open 
 order.  The latter presented arms and handled their rifles well.  I was greatly 
 surprised and pleased with the class of men in the ranks. They can shoot and will hold 
 a position but cannot march very far, say, 5 miles slowly is the normal … I think that 
 these divisions of old veterans will be a very great strength to us as they can hold 
                                                 
872
 TNA: WO 95/2605 War Diary 12
th
 North Staffords. 
873
 Crozier, Brass Hat, p. 215.  On 17 June 119 Brigade strength was noted as 2500 rifles - WO 95/2594 40
th
 
Division GS, Division Order 170. When B Company, 12
th
 North Staffords, went to the range on 29 June it had 
four officers and 120 OR - WO 95/2605 War Diary. In mid-July Freddy Plunkett noted that he “had 2 Battns of 
the brigade at my disposal of about 450 bayonets each” - ‘Diary of the War – by J.F. Plunkett’. It seems likely 
that the 2500 figure was notional or wildly optimistic and battalion strengths were actually about 500 bayonets. 
Battalion firepower seems to have been supplemented by additional Lewis guns (over and above the standard 36 
per battalion). In June 119 Brigade had 48 120 Brigade 45 and 121 Brigade 42 – WO 95/2594 War Diary 40th 
Division GS, Divisional Order 175, 24 June 1918. 
874
 There are nine DAGs in the Army List for August 1918. 
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 ‘Support lines’, and if the front becomes quiet can relieve a division (for training) in 
 the line.
875
 
 
Plunkett recalled that Haig “said he was astonished to see them [the men of 13th RIF] looking 
so wonderfully well.  In a conversation he told me that it was not intended to make first line 
troops of the B1 Battns but they would simply be used in the event of the Boche breaking 
through.  He asked COs to make it known to the men”.876  Crozier said that he ignored an 
order to do just that but Ilana Bet-El is wrong when she writes that he “specifically 
disregarded an order that B grade men should not be employed in offensive action”.877  
 
On 2 July, the day before Ponsonby’s departure to command 5th Division, 40th Division’s 
brigades were inspected by Field-Marshal HRH The Duke of Connaught, ADC to King 
George V, with Sir Herbert Plumer, commanding Second Army, and Sir H. de Beauvoir De 
Lisle, commanding XV Corps, in attendance.
878
 Crozier wrote of  later: “We were not slow to 
seize upon the useful Royal lesson of disinterested service brought before us by the presence 
of the Royal Field-Marshal in our midst, which we passed on to ‘the old and the bold’, as they 
liked to call themselves”.879 He summed up the training process: “We ‘electrified’ our ‘B’ 
                                                 
875
 Gary Sheffield and John Bourne (eds), Douglas Haig: War Diaries and Letters, 1914 – 1918 (London: 
Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 2005), p.423. 
876
 NAM: ‘Diary of the War – by J.F. Plunkett’. In the event, the brigade was used for more than ‘line holding’ in 
a quiet sector although this was the original intention. One of the items on the agenda for a 40
th
 Division 
conference on 21 June was “Is it advisable for Commanding Officers to explain to the men the probable role of 
the Division in future as regards their duty in active operations” – WO 95/2608 War Diary 120 Brigade.  The 
conference agreed that “Battalion commanders should explain to the men under their command the role which 
the Division has been called upon to fill and that the enrolment of Class B men in fighting units is necessitated 
by the shortage of manpower” – WO 95/2611 War Diary 11th Cameron Highlanders, 120 Brigade.  Crozier 
writes that he ignored an order from the CinC to explain to the men that they would only be used in a quiet sector 
and not put into offensive action – Crozier, Impressions, p. 226. 
877
 Ilana R. Bet-El, Conscripts: Forgotten Men of the Great War (Stroud, Sutton, 1999), p.35. Crozier actually 
wrote that he ignored an order from the CinC to explain to the men that they would only be used in a quiet sector 
and not put into offensive action – which is not the same thing - Crozier, Impressions, p. 226. Grieves, Politics of 
Manpower, p. 198, recounts Crozier’s account at face value. 
878
 This appears to have been an exercise in public relations designed to confirm the place of the new battalions 
within the BEF and the men’s identification with their new regiments. 
879
 Crozier, Impressions, p. 228. 
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men into activity by a simple process … We got them all to play games, take part in sports, 
take a pride in their new regiments, march, shoot and forget about their ills – real or 
imaginary”.880 Was this positive development reflected in the number of trials of men from 
119 Brigade by FGCM? 
Table 21: Field General Courts Martial, 119 Brigade, July 1918 – June 1919 
 12
th
 N. 
Staffords 
13
th
 E. Lancs 
13
th
 Royal 
Inn. Fus 
Total 
July 1918 1 1 - 2 
Aug 3 3 4 10 
Sept 3 2 4 9 
Oct 8 2 10 20 
Nov 5 4 10 19 
Dec 2 1 1 4 
Total 22 13 29 64 
     
Jan 1919 2 3 2 7 
Feb 2 1 - 3 
Mar  5 1 - 6 
Apr 1 1 1 3 
May - - - 0 
June - 1 - 1 
Total 10 7 3 20 
     
Overall 32 20 32 84 
Source: TNA: WO213/23-29 
The figures (Table 21) clearly show that there was an issue.  In 1917 fifty-four men of the 
brigade were sent for trial while in just six months of 1918 sixty-four men were tried. The 
highest number of offenders came from the 13
th
 RIF perhaps indicating that the ex-RSM, now 
CO, Plunkett enforced a stricter regime. The 12
th
 North Staffords suffered from an initial high 
turnover of COs this may have contributed to the battalion having the second highest total of 
FGCMs.  The arrival of an ex-Grenadier Guardsman, Major E.R. O’Connor (see below) as 
CO in October may account for the rise in numbers of trials at that time although it is notable 
that the higher monthly figures correspond to periods when the brigade was in action. This is 
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 Ibid., pp. 227-228. 
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in contrast to the record of the Welsh bantams which showed an increase when the brigade 
came out of the line.  The command of the 13
th
 East Lancs was stable through the summer of 
1918 and this may be a factor in the lower number of FCCM cases from this battalion. 
 
Table 22: Offences tried by Field General Courts Martial, 119 Brigade, July 1918 – June 
1919 
(Instances of offence in brackets) 
Offence 119 Brigade 
Absence 39% (36) 
Desertion 21% (19) 
Insubordination 5% (5) 
Disobedience 7% (6) 
Drunkenness 2% (2) 
Desertion Quitting post / Sleeping 1% (1) 
Striking 2% (2) 
Miscellaneous Military Offences 20% (18) 
Self-inflicted Wound 3% (3) 
Total Offences 92 
Source: TNA: WO213/23-29 
The ex-Labour Corps men of the new brigade brought a different culture with them.  Having 
believed that they would not find themselves in the front line it is not surprising to see that 
50% of offences were absence or desertion (Table 22).  The low figure for drunkenness might 
indicate that the offence was dealt with by the CO rather than being indicative of a high level 
of sobriety.  Although three cases involving self-inflicted wounds are specifically recorded it 
is known that this offence was also categorised under ‘miscellaneous’ and it is almost 
certainly under-represented in the figures.  Despite the problems with absence and desertion 
the sentencing regime remained broadly the same as earlier in the war with a very similar 
percentage of offences punished by hard labour, penal servitude or field punishment number 
one (Table 23).  Twenty-one of thirty-five sentences of hard labour or penal servitude were 
remitted or commuted and eleven were suspended - as was the only death sentence (for 
desertion, August 1918) which was commuted to five years penal servitude and suspended.  
The drop in the most severe sentences after the armistice is marked. 
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Table 23: Sentences of Field General Courts Martial, 119 Brigade, July 1918 – June 
1919 
Sentence Instances in 119 Brigade 
 July-December 
1918 
January- June 
1919 
Field Punishment No1 37% (31) - 
Field Punishment No2 6% (5) 50% (10) 
Imprisonment 1% (1) - 
Penal Servitude 13% (11) - 
Hard Labour 29% (24) 35% (7) 
Death 1% (1) - 
Reduction in Rank 6% (5) - 
Stoppages/Fine 1% (1) 5% (1) 
Discharge with Ignominy 5% (4) - 
Not Guilty / Quashed 1% (1) 10% (2) 
Total Sentences 84 20 
Source: TNA: WO213/23-29 
 
Commanding Officers 
What of the battalion COs?  Crozier had confidence in “the old warrior” Freddy Plunkett in 
the 13
th
 RIF but the others were unknown to him, sent from what Crozier called the ‘CO’s 
pool’.881  The 13th East Lancs were commanded from 17 June by Australian-born Lieutenant-
Colonel R.I.B. Johnson DSO, RWF.
882
 He seems to have performed satisfactorily until 7 
October when Crozier (apparently unofficially) gave his command to the newly-returned 
Richard Andrews who had turned up (also unofficially) while Johnson was away.
883
 “Of 
course ‘the Base’ made a dreadful fuss when they found out what had happened, but … ‘what 
we have we hold’” was Crozier’s comment.884  So, the command of two battalions was 
relatively stable but Plunkett noted that not all was well with the 12
th
 North Staffords which 
“had no less than three Battn Comdrs in a month … I had the doubtful honour of being the 
                                                 
881
 Ibid., p.227.  Actually the Commanding Officers’ Pool at Étaples – Hodgkinson, Battalion Commanders, p. 
188. 
882
 Robert Ingelow Bradshaw Johnson (1874 – 1955) see Appendix Six. 
883
 It may not be coincidence that on 20 September, division had asked for submission of names of battalion COs 
and 2iCs for three months leave. Johnson went on leave on 28 September and officially remained CO until 26 
November.  Andrews took command of the 13
th
 East Lancs on 7 October. 
884
 Crozier, Impressions, p.227. 
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only CO who lasted three months.  Brig Genl Crozier our commander, who was a thorough 
fighter, had no sentiment”.885  Plunkett implies that the turnover in COs was driven by 
Crozier.  While Crozier had no say as to who was posted from the ‘CO’s pool’, he clearly had 
some say in who stayed and who was posted elsewhere.  The first CO of the 12
th
 North 
Staffords was Lieutenant-Colonel G.M. Grogan DSO, Royal Irish Regiment who stayed from 
10 -19 June.
886
  He was replaced by Major T. K. Pardoe DSO, Worcestershire Regiment who 
stayed for four days.
887
  He was followed by Lieutenant-Colonel H.S. Tew CMG, East Surrey 
Regiment, who remained until 26 July.
888
 Next to arrive was Lieutenant-Colonel C.H. 
Kitching DSO, KRRC, who stayed until October 1918.
889
   The final CO of the battalion was 
Major E.R. O’Connor who arrived at the 13th RIF as 2iC on 5 August.890 He had a totally 
different background from the others having risen through the ranks of the Grenadier Guards 
and was commissioned in 1915.  Crozier was impressed and he was put in charge of the 13
th
 
East Lancs when Johnston left, only to be removed when Andrews arrived.  Crozier says that, 
in seeking a replacement for “a colonel”, he “was afraid to apply to the base for one lest I 
should get a ‘dud’ from ‘the pool’ … I spotted O’Connor … and to his great surprise told him 
to take command of the North Staffords.  He ‘electrified’ that battalion and really transformed 
it within ten days”.891  In another version Crozier “told” the staff captain to post O’Connor to 
command the battalion.
892
 In this case Crozier seems to have had the authority to deal with a 
vacancy without upsetting the base.  Peter Hodgkinson notes how, despite the attrition of COs 
in the German March Offensive, battalion disbandments ensured there was no shortage of 
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 NAM: ‘Diary of the War – by J.F. Plunkett’ 
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 George Meredyth Grogan (1867-1942) see Appendix Six. 
887
 Thomas Kenyon Pardoe (1873-1946) see Appendix Six. 
888
 Harold Stuart Tew (1869-1945) see Appendix Six. 
889
 Charles Henry Kitching (1881-1952) see Appendix Six. 
890
 Ernest Robert O’Connor: (1886 - ?) see Appendix Six. 
891
 Crozier, Impressions, p. 232. The London Gazette entry gives the date of O’Connor’s promotion as 24 
October 1918. 
892
 Crozier, Brass Hat, p. 225. 
272 
 
replacements.
893
  Yet none of the officers noted in the preceding paragraphs came from that 
source.  All, except O’Connor, were above (in some cases well above) the average age of a 
battalion CO in the Hundred Days of thirty-four years and eleven months.
894
 At this point in 
the war forty per cent of battalion COs were professional soldiers.  In 119 Brigade at the end 
of August 1918 all three were regulars (Plunkett, Kitchen, Johnson) but by November the 
appearance of Richard Andrews had reduced that number to two (Plunkett and  O’Connor).  
This reconstituted brigade was an unusual formation in more ways than one.
895
 
 
What of Crozier’s own promotion prospects? Brigadier-General John Campbell who had 
commanded 121 Brigade since October 1915 had been promoted to command 31
st
 Division in 
May 1918.
896
  Given Crozier’s successful record he might also have expected promotion.  He 
acted as divisional commander during Sir William Peyton’s (see below) brief absence in 
August 1918 and met a figure from his past service in the UVF and the 36
th
 (Ulster) Division 
while attending a memorial service and a corps conference.  William Spender reported to his 
wife: 
 I saw Crozier – looking rather too fat a Brigadier – who seemed pleased to see me at 
 first but shied violently when I talked of our rebellious days etc and he sheered off.  
 Considering I got him his first step at a deal of fuss with O[liver] N[ugent] I think 
 perhaps_______but that is probably why.
897
 
 
 Little Crozier was at the powwow as Acting Divisional Comm[ande]r! I cannot get 
 over the amusement at this nor at his evident desire to leave behind the associations of 
 which I am most proud.
898
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 Hodgkinson, Battalion Commanders, p. 188. 
894
 Ibid., p. 63. 
895
 The make-up of formations rebuilt from cadres in mid-1918 and the performance of category B men in 
general would repay further study. 
896
 John Campbell (1871-1941) see Appendix Six. 
897
 PRONI: D1633/1/1/1172, William Spender to his wife, 5 August 1918, quoted in Baguley (ed.), World War 
One and the Question of Ulster, p. 429. 
898
 PRONI: D1633/1/1/1155, William Spender to his wife, 6 August 1918, quoted in Baguley (ed.), World War 
One and the Question of Ulster, p. 431. 
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If Spender was correct, it seems that Crozier was being very careful to guard his reputation by 
avoiding mentions of one element of his irregular career path at this time. 
 
Just as John Ponsonby was leaving the 40
th
 Division he supposedly told Crozier that he had 
recommended him for “command of a Division, which, however, came too late to be of use to 
me, as the war was over just as I was about to be appointed”.899  Was this wishful thinking on 
Crozier’s part?  There is no evidence of a recommendation from Ponsonby.  Ponsonby’s 
replacement was Major-General Sir William Peyton KCB KCVO DSO who, Crozier 
acknowledged, “knew something about me”.900 Peyton had served in Thorneycroft’s Mounted 
Infantry from May to October 1900, knew Alexander Thorneycroft (Crozier’s step-father) and 
may well have known something of Crozier’s dishonourable early career.  If he did not, his 
long spell as Military Secretary at GHQ should have ensured that he (or his staff) accessed 
Crozier’s personal file.  Yet, on 29 November, Peyton confirmed that Crozier’s name had 
indeed “been submitted for advancement to the command of a Division”.901 It was unfortunate 
for Crozier that the GOC Second Army, Sir Herbert Plumer, also knew something about him, 
having “owing to friendship with my mother” helped “to get oil poured on troubled waters” 
around the time of Crozier’s resignation and bankruptcy in 1909.902 Peyton’s replacement as 
Military Secretary at GCQ was none other than Harold Ruggles-Brise who would also have 
had access to Crozier’s personal file although, as he seems to have remained a friend of 
Crozier, he may not have read it.
903
  Either these senior officers did not know at this time 
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 Crozier, Impressions, p. 228. 
900
 William Elliot Peyton (1866 – 1931) see Appendix Six. 
901
 TNA: WO 374/16997 Personal File F.P. Crozier. Memorandum from Sir William Peyton to HQ XV Corps, 
29 November 1918. 
902
 Crozier, Impressions, p. 136. 
903
 Ruggles-Brise became Military Secretary on 22 March 1918. In December he endorsed the recommendation 
for a divisional command and forwarded to the War Office “for such consideration as it may be possible to give” 
- WO 374/16997 Personal File F.P. Crozier. Memorandum from Military Secretary to War Office, 8 December 
1918.  
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about Crozier’s past misdemeanours or they chose to overlook them in the light of his recent 
record.  Crozier did not get his division. With formations being reduced or disbanded after the 
end of hostilities it was too late.
904
  His aggressive style was not suited to peacetime 
soldiering and had won him few friends.  In late 1917 he had been warned by Sir Oliver 
Nugent that he “was in the wrong shop; [he had] cut off too many heads to be popular”.905  
There is no evidence that Crozier was ‘just about to be appointed’ as the war ended. 
 
Defence to Offence: July – November 1918 
The evidence presented above clearly shows that the perceived role of the reconstituted 40
th
 
Division was defensive.  Indeed, through June and July it was regarded by the CinC as being 
incapable of anything else.  In mid-June orders were issued “In case of an enemy attack on the 
Second Army Front 40
th
 Division … will be required to man the West Hazebrouck Line … 
units must be prepared to act … at short notice”.906  The division front was 13,000 yards (11.8 
kilometres) and it needed support from additional Labour Corps and Royal Engineer units 
that, for example, increased the strength of 119 Brigade from (a probably notional) 2500 rifles 
to 4500 rifles.
907
  The line was to be held “in accordance with the principles set down in 
SS210 The Division in Defence.
908
  It was to be “clearly impressed on the troops that they are 
to hold the line in which they are posted ... to the last man and the last round of ammunition. 
No withdrawal of troops will take place, even from the line of Observation until orders are 
issued from Divisional Headquarters to do so”.909  Clearly someone was very worried.  From 
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 Crozier, Impressions, p. 207. 
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 TNA: WO 95/2594 War Diary 40
th
 Division GS, 15 June 1918. 
907
 TNA: WO 95/2594 War Diary 40
th
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 SS 210 was issued in May 1918 and was regarded as ‘too little, too late’.  See Jim Beach, ‘Issued by the 
General Staff: Doctrine Writing at British GHQ, 1917-1918’, War in History, 19:4 (2012), pp. 464-491, 
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 TNA: WO 95/2594 War Diary 40
th
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outpost zone in April 1918 probably accounts for the reference to “no withdrawal”. 
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April to July GHQ expected the German army to attack the BEF in Flanders again, despite the 
obvious build up of their forces against the French further south.  There was indeed a German 
plan for a new attack in Flanders (codename ‘Hagen’) that would press north-west and west to 
the north of the Lys to take Hazebrouck and Ypres.  Plans were completed in June but the 
offensive was first delayed and then abandoned on 20 July as German divisions and artillery 
were moved south in response to the allied counter-offensive on the Marne.
910
  By the 
beginning of August GHQ had confirmed the cancellation, although Second Army remained 
cautious.
 911
 A change of outlook can be seen expressed in the training programme (Table 15, 
above) where ‘the battalion/company/platoon in the attack’ appears several times after 9 
August.  By then, of course, the bigger picture had changed for the better and the BEF had 
started on its advance in Picardy with Fourth Army’s success at Amiens on 8 August.  Second 
Amy’s advance in Flanders started on 18 August. 
 
The B men of 40
th
 Division were having to learn fast.  In addition to the practice manning of 
the West Hazebrouck Line, in July every battalion of each brigade had a four day tour in the 
East Hazebrouck Line.  This enabled the induction of the men into trench routine well away 
from the front line.
912
  More realistic conditions were provided for 119 Brigade on 18 July 
when it relieved 87 Brigade (29
th
 Division) in the front line where it was attached to 1
st
 
Australian Division.
913
 Next day the new formation suffered its first casualty from shell fire.  
The 13
th
 RIF were in the front line which consisted of posts “of about platoon strength with 
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 Zabecki, The German 1918 Offensives, pp. 280-307. 
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 11
th
 Cameron Highlanders (120 Brigade) were supported by three officers and six NCOs from 31
st
 Division’s 
troops during this exercise and it is probable that all battalions were so treated – WO 95/2611 War Diary 11th 
Cameron Highlanders. 
913
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th
, 29
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, 31
st
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st
 Australian Divisions. 40
th
 Division was Corps 
Reserve. 
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intervals of from 70 to 200 yards between”.914  The 13th East Lancs were in support and the 
12
th
 North Staffords provided the reserve.
915
  The East Lancs relieved the RIF on 22 July and 
were relieved in turn by the North Staffords on 26 July. Despite their lack of recent 
experience and what must have been a strange new context for warfare, the battalions all 
patrolled actively and all brought in prisoners of the 98
th
 RIR during the tour.
916
 Freddy 
Plunkett recalled that on the night his men took their first prisoners: “From this night the men 
became a fighting force”.917  On the night of 21/22 July a patrol of the 13th RIF found no 
enemy and no obstacles on their front and managed to advance their line (by an unspecified 
distance) and establish new posts.
918
  But there were setbacks.  On the previous night, when a 
13
th
 RIF patrol was engaged by machine guns, a flanking party of one sergeant and eight other 
ranks were sent to “get round the guns”.  They failed to return.919  Second-Lieutenant J.N. 
Robinson, 13
th
 East Lancs was killed during a patrol on 23 July and on the night of 25/6 July a 
patrol of one officer and twelve men was forced to withdraw by flanking fire from German 
machine guns.  It withdrew without loss but an Australian officer and corporal were killed 
while they watched the patrol. During the tour the adjacent Australian 1
st
 Division placed one 
officer and four NCOs with each front line company: “they were invaluable in instructing 
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 TNA: WO 95/6505 War Diary 12
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 North Staffords.  The 13
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 East Lancs war diary mentions seven posts in 
the front line. 
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 TNA: WO 95/2605 War Diary 119 Brigade. 
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 The 13
th
 RIF captured two prisoners on the same night that they took over the position; the 13
th
 East Lancs 
captured two on 25 July; the 12
th
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both officers and men in their duties”.920  The CO of the 13th East Lancs was “on the whole 
satisfied” with the battalion’s tour “but pointed out certain faults which steps are to be taken 
to remedy”, including not paying enough attention to improving the posts and to wiring.921  
The brigade was relieved on 31 July and continued its training programme until 21 August 
when the B men of 40
th
 Division were ordered to relieve 31
st
 Division in the front line.
922
  The 
principle of using category B men for defence had lasted just eight weeks. 
 
XV Corps’ contribution to Second Army’s advance in Flanders had a successful opening on 
18 August when the 9
th
, supported by 29
th
, Division had captured the Outtersteene Ridge.
923
  
On the night of 22/23 August 120 Brigade (already in the front line) sidestepped to the left 
and 119 Brigade entered the line taking over part of the 120 Brigade front and relieving 94 
Brigade (31
st
 Division).  The 13
th
 RIF and the 13
th
 East Lancs manned the forward positions 
with 12
th
 North Staffords in support.  At this time of likely offensive action Crozier went on 
leave to the UK from 23 August to 8 September.  This turn of events seems very strange but 
on 28 August his wife Ethel appeared in court and was certified insane and ordered to be 
detained in a private asylum.
924
 He is not mentioned in the account of her trial but it is likely 
that he was called back deal with this family crisis.  Command of 119 Brigade passed to 
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 Division GS. Division Order 186, 21 August 1918. XV Corps lost the 1
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Australian Division early in August in the build up to the Fourth Army offensive at Amiens. The corps now 
consisted of 9
th
, 29
th
, 31
st
 and 40
th
 Divisions. On 11 September 9
th
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th
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Lieutenant-Colonel Johnson.  While Crozier was away the brigade carried out its first serious 
offensive scheme.  Freddy Plunkett had come up with a plan:  
 On the 24
th
 Aug the brigade on my right attempted to take Rue Pruvost [sic] and the 
 ground immediately north of it.  They failed and suffered fairly heavily.  I watched the 
 fight and came to the conclusion that my Battn, by swinging my left flank round 
 southwards during the night, I could attack at dawn … thereby compelling the Boche 
 to give up Rue Pruvost.  I gave my scheme to my Divnl Comdr Sir W E Peyton and he 
 approved.
925
 
 
Remarkably, at this late stage in the war, Sir William Peyton sent the plan to the Corps 
commander, Beauvoir de Lisle, who returned it on the same day with four changes.
926
  Orders 
were issued by division on 25 August for the attack to take place on 27 August.  The left flank 
would be sealed by a standing barrage from heavy artillery - which also targeted roads, cross 
roads and buildings – while the right flank was protected by a 4.5 inch howitzer barrage.  
Troops would advance behind a creeping barrage from fifty-four 18-pounder guns.  Freddy 
Plunkett gives the wrong zero hour (it was 10.00a.m. in division orders and the after action 
report) but his account gives a good picture of this type of engagement and of the importance 
of German machine guns and artillery in countering incursions like this: 
 Zero hour was 5am on 27
th
 Aug.  I was in position about 4am, my Hdqts being in a 
hole 3’ deep on [the] assembly line.  About 4.30am a Boche plane came over us flying 
very low but I dare not fire at him as I would give the situation away.  He went back to 
his lines and shortly afterwards a Boche observation balloon went up.  Needless to say 
as 5am approached I was a bit anxious but somehow I felt that both officers and men 
would play the game.  Exactly at 5am we went forward under a creeping artillery 
barrage 3 minutes to 100 yards. The Boche machine guns opened a heavy fire and in 
the first 300 yards my four Coy Comdrs were casualties, Captain Summerhayes killed 
leading his men, Captains White, Moss and Roxburgh being wounded.  I at once 
placed the senior officers of each Coy in command and the advance continued.  House 
to house fighting took place on the left and Lieut Smiles who had taken command of 
his coy handled his men wonderfully, so that in less than an hour he was at Bishops 
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 TNA: WO 95/2594 War Diary 40
th
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Corner consolidating posts.  The two Coys on the right were not so well led, so I went 
forward with them and by 7am we had taken the whole of the objective. We 
consolidated the line by means of small posts on a 2000 yards front under heavy MG 
fire.  I noted Rue Pruvost [sic] was strongly held by the Boche and sent word for our 
artillery to concentrate on it, but before our artillery opened the Boche counter-
attacked my right from Rue Pruvost.  He paid dearly and had to retire as he was 
practically enfiladed from 3 of my Lewis guns at Bishops Corner.  Shortly afterwards 
our artillery opened on Rue Pruvost with I am afraid disastrous results to the Boche.  
By 9am I was enabled to send by messenger (all wires had been cut by Boche shell 
fire) to Brigade that we had completed consolidation. I then went to my hole of a 
Headqtrs and got a devil of a time.  The Boche balloon must have spotted it by 
messengers going to and fro.  For 3 hours without a break he concentrated on us 
rooting up the ground all round, one gun in particular landed his shots within 20 yards 
of us.  We got quite accustomed to this gun and from the sound knew exactly when to 
expect one from him.  I wanted to send a message to our artillery to retaliate but had 
no orderlies near as they had very sensibly moved some distance away, but I had a 
messenger dog with me.  I placed a message on him but every time I pushed him out 
he came back with the first fall of a shell.  I cannot speak too highly of the conduct of 
all ranks in this engagement.  When I think of what they were like on 10
th
 June, and 
then this performance after a little over 2 months training it only proves what the 
Britisher will do when put to it.  One weak lad took 6 prisoners in a house.
927
  
 
This colourful account contains several important points: Plunkett was close enough to the 
action to intervene personally (he received a second bar to his DSO for this action); casualties 
amongst junior officers were high; responses from German machine guns were heavy, 
accurate and immediate; the German response was quickly followed by counter attack; 
German artillery fire could still be heavy and accurate; consolidation was by means of posts 
not trench lines; the category B men had impressed an ‘old stager’ like Plunkett.  What he did 
not mention was that the response from machine-guns and artillery had stopped a flanking 
attack by 121 Brigade troops and that the final objective was not reached.  The ‘official’ after 
action report noted that the barrage had been good and that the men had kept up with it; that 
German machine gunners put up stout resistance until their positions were turned by troops on 
their flanks; that the enemy held out at one position until rushed from three sides; that 
enfilading machine guns were the cause of failure.  The men taking part carried just two Mills 
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bombs each, clearly demonstrating the effectiveness of rifle grenades, Stokes mortars and 
Lewis guns in destroying or suppressing the opposition. German casualties were fifty killed 
(counted on the ground) and thirty-two prisoners; two heavy and three light machine guns and 
three Lewis guns were captured. 119 brigade casualties were two officers killed and nine 
wounded, and fifteen ORs killed and sixty wounded.
928
 The northern half of the salient had 
been captured but the southern half was taken by 120 Brigade on the afternoon of 29 August 
after night patrols had failed to do so.   
 
On 30 August, morning patrols were “500 yards in front of the old line moving east”.929   40th 
Division reported “all indications point to the enemy being in retreat in front of us”.930  This 
was followed at 11.15 p.m. that day by “the 40th Division will continue its advance 
tomorrow”.931 An advanced guard was formed consisting of 121 Brigade, two batteries of 18-
pounders, one section of 4.5 inch howitzers, one company of a machine gun battalion and one 
company of XV Corps cyclists. Brigadier-General W. B. Garnett DSO who had followed 
John Campbell as GOC 121 Brigade was in command.
932
 119 Brigade was left to man the old 
divisional front temporarily while “the advance guard troops will attack the enemy where and 
when located”.933  Over the next week the advanced guard pressed the German forces as they 
slowly pulled back eastwards across the old Lys battlefield.  The 121 Brigade war diary 
records the German use of machine guns to guard the flanks of the retreating forces, 
“considerable opposition” and “considerable machine gun opposition”.  The potential for 
serious error was obviously very great and the relatively inexperienced officers needed careful 
                                                 
928
 TNA: WO 95/2594 War Diary 40
th
 Division GS, ‘Account of the attack on Bishops Corner by 119th Infantry 
Brigade … on the 27th August, 1918’. 
929
 TNA: WO 95/2594 War Diary 40
th
 Division GS. 
930
 Ibid., Division Order 195. 
931
 Ibid., Division Order 196. 
932
 William Brooksbank Garnett (1875-1946) see Appendix Six. 
933
 TNA: WO 95/2594 War Diary 40
th
 Division GS. Division Order 196. 
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supervision.  Things went badly wrong for 121 Brigade on 5 September when B Company, 8
th
 
Royal Irish Regiment, advanced through Pont de Nieppe, suffered many casualties to heavy 
artillery fire and lost communication with battalion and brigade HQ. Those not killed were 
captured.
934
  The brigade was relieved next day and the GOC Division ‘conferred’ with 
Brigadier-General Garnett twice on 7 September.  Reports on the events of the day were 
submitted to Division on 9 September and it is unlikely to be a coincidence that Garnett was 
replaced on 17 September.  Immediately after the incident 40
th
 Division told its brigades: 
“The situation regarding reinforcements for the Division, particularly Infantry 
Reinforcements, is not, at the moment entirely satisfactory.  Hence it becomes more than ever 
necessary to conserve as far as possible officers and men.  The Divisional Commander looks 
to unit commanders for their wholehearted cooperation in this.”935 Suggested methods to 
minimise wastage included the avoidance of unnecessary movement, the use of cover and 
appropriate use of steel helmets and box respirators.  On 6 September 119 Brigade relieved 
121 Brigade as advanced guard and the 13
th
 East Lancs occupied the whole brigade front of 
5,000 yards (4.5 kilometres) with its fighting strength of 369 men.  The next day the battalion 
was ordered to capture Pont de Nieppe and establish posts beyond.  Zero was at 10.00 a.m. 
and all went well at first but a strong counter-attack by sixty to seventy of the enemy forced 
the attacking company out of the village and back to its start line.
936
  This reverse would have 
done nothing to enhance Lieutenant-Colonel Johnston’s reputation as advanced guard 
commander.  Next day, 8 September, Crozier returned from leave and took command.  On the 
night of 10/11 September patrols found the village of Pont de Nieppe empty and the 12
th
 
                                                 
934
 TNA: WO 95/2613 War Diary 121 Brigade. According to Plunkett, ‘Diary of the War’, the lost company 
consisted of 3 Officers and 80 men. The village of Pont de Nieppe is on the west bank of the Lys, opposite and to 
the west of, Armentières. 
935
 40
th
 Division Instruction 23(a), 6 September 1918. Quoted in Williams, ‘British Second Army’, p. 131. 
936
 TNA: WO 95/2605 War Diary 119 Brigade; WO 95/2606 War Diary 13
th
 East Lancs. Total strength of the 
two companies involved was 105 - ‘History of 13th Bn The East Lancashire Regiment’. 
282 
 
North Staffords moved forward to occupy the village with 13
th
 RIF in support.  Plunkett 
recalled that he:  
 Found that the Staffords had gained an entry into Pont de Nieppe but had made no 
 move to reach the river which was the natural obstacle to prevent a Boche 
 counterattack from Armentieres.  As I could not find their CO I took command of 
 those in Pont de Nieppe and with a few casualties pushed forward until the whole 
 town and left bank of the river to [the] S of the town was in our hands and then placed 
 out a line of posts and consolidated.
937
 
 
The enemy tried to regain the village and was successfully beaten off by the North Staffords 
but attempts by the battalion get patrols across the River Lys that night were thwarted by the 
destroyed bridges and a river in flood.
938
 119 Brigade was relieved next day.  The 12
th
 North 
Staffords had two officers wounded, fifteen ORs killed, thirty-five wounded and thirty-five 
missing in the week as advanced guard.
939
  The 13
th
 East Lancs had one officer wounded, 
three ORs killed, twenty-nine wounded and ten missing.
940
  These are tiny figures compared 
with those of the major battles of 1917 and spring 1918 but, as 40
th
 Division had pointed out, 
the depleted battalions could not afford to lose more men. 
 
During the next ten days ‘rest’, although some working parties were provided for road 
improvements, the brigade’s units set once again to training. The 13th East Lancs recorded 
‘saluting drill without arms’ before breakfast as well as the ‘standards’ of arms drill, gas drill, 
musketry and platoon drill. On two days ‘tactical schemes for companies’ were carried out 
and A Company managed to use a miniature range.
941
 The 12
th
 North Staffords carried out 
bombing and Lewis gun training and, even after the unit had moved up into reserve, carried 
                                                 
937
 IWM: Plunkett, ‘Diary of the War’.  The war diaries of the 13th East Lancs and the 12th North Staffords do not 
mention this detail. 
938
 TNA: WO 95/2606 War Diary 12
th
 North Staffords. 
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 Ibid. 
940
 TNA: WO 95/2606 War Diary 13
th
 East Lancs.  There are no figures in the 13
th
 RIF War Diary which is has 
the least information of the three battalion diaries. 
941
 Ibid.  
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on with Lewis gun training in which “the whole battalion was engaged”.942 Clearly, great 
importance was now attached to the Lewis gun as an essential tactical weapon and a boost to 
depleted firepower. The 12
th
 North Staffords received a draft of one officer and seventy-seven 
ORs on 29 September just before it moved back into the line but there are no other references 
by battalions to drafts around this time.
943
 
 
On 28 September three bridges had been thrown across the Warnave River which, although 
little more than a large drainage channel, effectively blocked the northern approach towards 
Armentières.  The 13
th
 East Lancs pushed patrols across the bridges but these were driven 
back across the river by strong opposition.  On the next night, posts were established on the 
German side and held despite strong counter-attacks. Robert O’Connor, acting CO 13th East 
Lancs, was awarded the MC for this action which he led from the front.
944
  The next obstacle, 
the village of Le Bizet, was taken by the 13
th
 RIF. “The open ground to the NW of Le Bizet 
rendered a direct assault … inadvisable.  It was therefore decided to capture it by an 
encircling movement during the night.”945 Freddy Plunkett described the attack and the 
subsequent action: 
 I tried to find out if Le Bizet was occupied and had 3 officers and a few men wounded 
 in the effort.  I now received orders for what appeared to be a most daring movement.  
 I had to ‘take Le Bizet, find or make a crossing over the River Lys, mop up Houplines 
 and occupy the old British front line from the river to 2000 yards frontage.’  
 Simultaneously another brigade would move through Armentieres and occupy 2000 
 yards of [the] old British front line on my right as far south as the railway.  The whole 
                                                 
942
 TNA: WO 95/2606 War Diary 12
th
 North Staffords. 
943
 Ibid. The manpower shortage was an ongoing problem. On 28 September 40
th
 Division had decided that “as 
there are surplus pioneer officers, they may be cross posted to ordinary battalions who are short of officers”. On 
5 October the division responded to a request for a list of agricultural labourers in the division by stating that if 
agricultural labourers were withdrawn “the division will be reduced to a non-fighting capacity” – TNA: WO 
95/2594 War Diary 40
th
 Division A&Q. 
944
 London Gazette,1 February 1919. “While acting in command of a battalion … he led his men forward under 
heavy fire and established a line of posts east of Warnave. Throughout the night, which was very dark, he moved 
from post to post, visiting them all, and improving their tactical positions, under continuous fire of all 
descriptions.” 
945
 TNA: WO 95/2605 War Diary 119 Brigade.  
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 time both my flanks would be in the air unless 31
st
 divn on my left moved forward, 
and  once I had taken Le Bizet nobody would be within a mile of my right.  At 
dawn on 30
th
  Sept I took Le Bizet with little opposition and beating down machine 
gun fire.  I reached the Lys eventually finding a place where it was possible to bridge.  
On [the] night of 1
st
 Oct the Engineers constructed a one man bridge and the battn 
crossed. Just after dawn on the 2
nd
 we took Houplines but no sign of the brigade which 
was to  connect up with my right appeared.  Reorganising at Houplines I made up my 
mind to take and hold the 4000 yards of old British front line from the right bank of 
the river to the railway.  I sent 12 platoons forward, operating 300 yards apart, holding 
one coy in reserve.  Only MG fire was encountered on the N 2000 yard front and my 
batt objective in [the] old British front line was taken by 3 p.m.  On the southern 2000 
yard front more opposition was encountered but the platoons pushed on until they had 
 taken the old British front line and consolidated.  During the night the Boche attacked 
 the left of my line but Lieut Foulds with his platoon gave them a hot time, the upshot 
 being that they left 8 prisoners in his hands.  Next day we were relieved.
946
   
 
A brigade consisting of category B men, having had intense training in a short period was 
now, with aggressive leadership, conducting large encircling operations and river crossings at 
night.  
 
With Houplines taken, the north and north-east of Armentières were secure and the Germans 
evacuated the town.
947
 The 12
th
 North Staffords took nine prisoners during mopping up of the 
captured ground on 4 October.  The brigade continued its forward moves through October but 
saw little action.  What it did see plenty of was training and more training. The war diaries of 
the 13
th
 East Surrey and the 13
th
 RWF both record fourteen days devoted to training in 
October while the 12
th
 North Staffords record ten days training.  In addition to the usual 
entries for musketry, platoon and company drill, close and open order drill, bayonet fighting 
and physical training appear: “all ranks who had not fired [rifle] grenades were practised and 
all ranks instructed how to fire and load the Lewis gun”; “practise with smoke and rifle 
                                                 
946
 NAM: Plunkett, ‘Diary of the War’. 
947
 It was during this period that the BM, Anthony Muirhead, won a bar to his MC: “ near Armentieres, between 
29
th
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th
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exposed to danger, in order that the situation might be kept in hand.  The enemy rearguard of machine gunners 
and snipers were all over the country.  This officer did the work entirely on his own initiative, and the results 
were very valuable” – London Gazette, 1 February 1919.  
285 
 
grenades on a strong point”; “all companies practised the attack, each company demonstrating 
with a platoon under the CO [Andrews]”; a platoon demonstrated before the GOC [Crozier] 
the use of grenades 27 [phosphorus] and 36 [Mills]”; “demonstration by CO of new formation 
of the platoon in the attack”; “CO lectures all officers on FSR Part 1” and lecture to all 
officers on FSR Part 1” by Crozier.948 The 12th North Staffords’ C Company also 
demonstrated the use of rifle grenades for the GOC.  Even on the march training was carried 
out.  When the 13
th
 East Surrey were acting as the brigade’s advance guard on the march to 
Bondues “an attack was carried out against the town.  This was done as an exercise”.949 The 
12
th
 North Staffords used the same occasion to “carry out an advanced guard scheme”.950  The 
brigade advanced eastward: 
 After a couple of days rest we advanced through Mouveaux to Roubaix on to 
Wattrelos.  The inhabitants of Roubaix gave us a great reception, masses of flags being 
in evidence. Their faces told us what they had been through during the last 4 years 
under the heel of the Hun.  There now being a brigade in front of us, we rested for 
some days at Wattrelos.  Here my battn had a knock.  I had taken my battn … N of 
Wattrelos for live rifle grenade and bombing practice.  The morning went off without 
anything of note happening.  We were out again at 2pm for bombing practice.  After 
about ¼ hour practice the Brigadier sent for me so that Capt Fleming who was there, 
my 2
nd
 in Comd, carried on.  While talking with the Brigadier at Brigade Hdqrs about 
½ mile from the bombing ground we heard a terrific explosion which smashed all the 
glass in Brigade Headqrs.  We were under the impression that a plane was bombing 
us.  I returned to the bombing ground about 4pm and found that a Boche delayed mine 
had blown up where we were bombing. 3 of my officers were killed including Lieut 
Foulds who had just been awarded the MC.  Capt Fleming had been thrown some 
yards and stunned but not seriously hurt.  6 men were killed and a dozen injured.
951
 
 
Despite the setback, training continued as did the eastward advance towards the next major 
obstacle, the River Scheldt (also called the Escault). 
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 TNA: WO 95/2606 War Diary 13
th
 East Surrey. It is interesting to note the continuing relevance/importance 
of FSR. 
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 TNA: WO 95/2606 War Diary 12
th
 North Staffords. 
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 NAM: Plunkett, ‘Diary of the War’. Wattrelos is north-east of Lille and the adjacent town of Roubaix. 
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On the night of 4/5 November 119 Brigade took over the division’s front line at around Pecq 
on the west bank of the Scheldt with 12
th
 North Staffords on the right and 13
th
 East Surrey on 
the left.
952
  The weather was wet and the permanent bridges had been demolished.  There was 
a single plank footbridge on the ruins of the old bridge but this was submerged knee deep 
during the height of the flood. On the east bank was a low lying flood plain overlooked by 
higher ground and crossed from Pecq bridge by a narrow causeway.  Both battalions pushed 
out daylight patrols across the river on 5 and 6 November but these were driven back by 
heavy machine gun fire and trench mortars.
953
  On 8 November patrols again came under 
heavy machine gun fire but two RA officers had crossed behind them and quickly brought 
down artillery fire on to the German defences.
954
 These patrols reported signs of impending 
evacuation and at 8.30 p.m. the battalions started to cross the river.  “The Brigadier, 
determined to be first of the Army across the river, used artillery, and after slight resistance 
the Boche retired, with our brigade after him.”955  By 2.00 a.m. on 9 November they were 
across and Herrines, to the north of Pecq on the opposite bank, was occupied.
956
 Through the 
9 November the battalions pushed east onto the high ground.  A mounted German patrol was 
driven off with three killed by the 13
th
 East Lancs and by evening the battalions were as far as 
La Bacotterie and Clipet.  By 2.00 p.m. on the 10
th
, patrols had pushed forward to the high 
ground around Haut Rejet, eleven kilometres from Pecq (as the crow flies) and corps cyclists 
attached to the brigade pushed on for another six kilometres.
957
  From here, once contact had 
been made with 29
th
 Division to the north and 69
th
 Division to the south, the brigade’s units, 
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 There is no evidence to support Crozier’s assertion that the brigade “was specially put back into the line out 
of their turn” – Crozier, Brass Hat, p. 227. 121 Brigade had formed the advance guard from 14 October and 120 
Brigade from 6 October – WO 95/2594 War Diary 40th Division GS. 
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along with the rest of 40
th
 Division, were withdrawn from the narrowing battlefront.  When 
the armistice came into effect the brigade’s units were in billets east of the Scheldt.958 
 
After the Armistice 
On 16 November 1918 119 Brigade retired to the town of Croix “and killed time there until 
coming home as a cadre in June 1919”.959 There would be no glorious march to Germany and 
the formation withered as men were demobilized.
960
  Time was passed in training and sports 
and even in January 1919 bayonet fighting and physical training were being conducted by the 
12
th
 North Staffords.
961
  On 18 November 12
th
 North Staffords’ officers, warrant officers and 
NCOs instituted a series of educational classes in French, elementary mathematics, motor 
engineering, agricultural science, poultry keeping, shorthand, business methods, accountancy, 
building construction, music and singing, magnetism and electricity, farming, carpentry and 
freehand drawing in the afternoon on four days per week.
962
  Men not attending had arms 
drill.  The last military gathering of the brigade was on 21 January when King’s colours were 
presented to the three battalions in the square of Roubaix by the XV Corps Commander (De 
Lisle). 40
th
 Division noted “rapid demobilization” in February.963  On 7 March sixty-six men 
and one officer of the 13
th
 East Surrey left for the 1
st
 East Surrey and fifty-six men and two 
officers left the 13
th
 RIF for the 7
th
/8
th
 RIF on 16 March.  On 28 March 1919 all men of the 
12
th
 North Staffords, except the cadre (cadre strength in May was just thirty-six), left to join 
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th
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POW Companies at Calais and Dunkirk and on 4 June the cadre moved to Bordon, Hampshire 
for dispersal.
964
  
 
There were still war-related casualties.  Richard Andrews seems to have had a breakdown, 
telling his men in robust terms what he thought about the value of educational training and the 
GOC Division who encouraged it.  When his behaviour was reported to Crozier, Andrews 
confronted his officers, seeking the informant, and had to be disarmed and arrested.  Crozier 
says that he managed to get “matters fixed up satisfactorily” by speaking to the CO of the 
hospital where Andrews was detained.
965
 Another victim of the mental trauma caused by war 
was Second-Lieutenant Eric Wetherall, 12
th
 North Staffords.  While Andrews had been more 
at home in the fighting than in a classroom, Wetherall certainly was not. A twenty-three year 
old civil servant at the Admiralty, he had been conscripted in January 1917 and was 
commissioned into the Labour Corps from the Artists Rifles in June.  On 27 December 1918, 
having seen that his latest confidential report contained the phase “is not a good officer under 
fire”, he protested to the adjutant and the CO (O’Connor) and then went to his room and shot 
himself.
966
 He was the brigade’s last casualty. 
 
With the prospect of having no brigade to command, what was Crozier going to do?  His 
prospects for divisional command have been discussed above.  He evidently wrote to his old 
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 Crozier, Impressions, p. 234.  According to his personal file Andrews left his unit on 24 December and 
embarked for the UK on 31 December, “sick, post influenza” – WO 339/59109 Personal file, Richard John 
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commander Harold Ruggles-Brise (Military Secretary, GHQ, since March 1918) to enquire 
about employment with the Army of Occupation.  Ruggles-Brise replied: 
 Many thanks for your letter. I hope you are all flourishing.  If anything comes along in 
Germany, I will think of you. But what will the 119
th
 Infantry Brigade do without you? 
… I hear you and your men did wonders.967 
 
On 26 November Crozier requested to be retained in the army at demobilization and the 
associated paperwork sheds some light on his reputation at the time. His request for retention 
was strongly supported by Peyton:  
 General Crozier’s services during the present campaign have been such as to bring 
him continuously to notice as a leader of marked ability with great capacity for the 
administration and training of troops, and his name has, with every confidence, been 
submitted for advancement to command of a Division.
968
 
 
This note was endorsed by Lieutenant-General Beauvoir de Lisle, GOC XV Corps, on 1 
December: “Brig-General Crozier is an excellent Brigade Commander in the field”.969 The 
request must have been passed on by Fifth Army as it was also endorsed by Harold Ruggles-
Brise, now Military Secretary at GHQ, with a hint of realism: “Forwarded for such 
consideration as it may be possible to give.  Brig-General Crozier is an excellent Brigade 
Commander and has proved himself a most efficient soldier”.970  It was too late.  Whether 
these officers knew about Crozier’s early record is not certain but a note in Crozier’s personal 
file dated 11 December indicates that someone in the Military Secretary’s section at the War 
Office had seen the paperwork relating to dishonoured cheques, Crozier’s resignation from 
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 Quoted in Grace Crozier, Guns and God, undated typescript biography of her husband, Frank Crozier 
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the Special Reserve in 1909 and his barring from the Reserve of Officers.
971
 A diplomatic 
rejection of the application followed on 14 December.  It acknowledged Crozier’s good 
service but pointed out that there were many regular majors with equally good service records 
already seeking employment.
972
 It did not mention past misdemeanours. 
 
Crozier did not give up his search for employment. In February 1919 he wrote that “while in 
London recently” (he was on leave from 1-18 December) he had applied for employment with 
the Colonial Office, the Foreign Office and the Office of the First Lord of the Treasury.  As 
he had heard nothing so far he attempted to speed things up with another letter enclosing 
“various reports that have been made upon me”.973 One of these was a copy of Peyton’s latest 
confidential report on Crozier: 
 Pre-eminently a fighting leader with sound knowledge, energy and determination.  
 The efficiency of his Brigade in all details testifies to his high power of command and 
organisation.  It will be a great loss to the Army if he is not retained with rank and 
position consistent with his age and attainments.
974
 
 
The latest application was also endorsed by the CinC (signed on his behalf by one of the 
assistant military secretaries, Lieutenant-Colonel the Honourable Eustace Vesey DSO): “in 
view of the circumstances set forth in the attached application and of the valuable services 
rendered by this officer during the war, I trust that every consideration will be afforded to his 
request for employment in the capacity stated.”975 
                                                 
971
 Ibid. ms annotation to file, initialled (but illegibly), 11 December 1918.  For the background to Crozier’s 
resignation see Charles Messenger, Broken Sword: The Tumultuous Life of General Frank Crozier 1879-1937 
(Barnsley: Pen and Sword, 2013), pp. 35-44. 
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Once again he was unsuccessful.  In March 1919 he assumed command of the 40
th
 Division 
cadre and in April passed the command to Freddy Plunkett. He returned to assume temporary 
command of the 3
rd
 Welsh (the previous CO was Alexander Pope, late 12
th
 SWB, who had 
died on 9 April). Crozier’s file notes that he had “refused a battalion on the Rhine which was 
offered to him.  His reason for refusing it was that he hopes to obtain an appointment in 
Palestine”.976  He was indeed “anxious to get to Palestine as it is a country possessing 
opportunities suitable to my temperament”.977  Crozier stayed with the 3rd Welsh until July.  
He was thwarted in his attempts to find a niche until appointed ‘Inspector General’ in the 
Lithuanian army in September.
978
 
 
The comments on Crozier’s ability quoted above also shed a little light on the reputation of 
119 Brigade which was not often remarked on.  John Ponsonby, writing to Crozier on 5 May 
1918, wrote “I can’t help feeling that whatever credit has been due to the Division has been 
mainly brought about by the very fine fighting spirit that has invariably existed in your 
Brigade”.979  As we have seen, Crozier also claimed pre-eminence for his brigade and his 
view receives some support from the list of ‘Honours and Rewards [sic]’ kept for 40th 
Division.  This bound ledger was started in 1916 and records all awards, including mentions 
in dispatches, mentions in divisional routine orders, brevet promotions, British and foreign 
honours and medals for all ranks and all divisional troops including HQ, RA, ASC and RE 
units.
980
 There are 1,658 entries and 1,024 of these are to men of the three infantry brigades. 
Of these, 528 (52%) are to men of 119 Brigade, 159 (16%) are to 120 Brigade and 337 (33%) 
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with the title and ‘From Capt. A.H. Bathurst, France 1916’. Bathurst was the division’s DAA&QMG. 
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are to 121 Brigade.  While some awards may have been regarded as ‘coming up with the 
rations’, and other factors such as some commanders’ tendency to be generous (or not) with 
their recommendations for awards must be recognised, the army had instructions which 
should have provided for equal and fair consideration of awards.
981
 The marked disparity in 
the scale of recognition of achievement between the three brigades is significant.  This adds 
support to Crozier’s claims about his brigade.  In the matter of awards the brigade did indeed 
“carry a whole division on its shoulders”.982 
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 See for example Military Secretary’s Branch, GHQ, Instructions Regarding Recommendations for Honours 
and Awards 1918 (Reprint, Naval and Military Press, no date). 
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Conclusion 
This thesis set out to investigate aspects of one of the least known formations of the British 
army in the Great War and to answer particular questions about 119 Brigade and the 
brigadier-general who commanded it from November 1916 until its disbanding in 1919.  In 
pursuing these questions it has been necessary to establish exactly how and when the brigade 
and its constituent battalions came into being and what part they played in events on the 
Western Front from embarkation in June 1916 until the armistice in November 1918.  By 
looking at the social background of officers and ORs it has been possible to develop a picture 
of the type(s) of men making up the brigade and, particularly for those units that Brigadier-
General Frank Percy Crozier inherited, make an informed judgement regarding their national 
identity and potential esprit de corps.  In examining the brigade in action it is possible to see 
key elements of how it carried out its role at the tactical level and, in particular, how these 
tactics were moulded by the training it carried out.   
 
The origins of the brigade were established in Chapter One as part of the failed attempt to 
create a Welsh Army Corps of at least two divisions envisaged by David Lloyd George in 
September 1914.  The National Executive Committee enthusiastically and very quickly took 
up the idea of forming bantam battalions as pioneered in Birkenhead by Alfred Bigland.  The 
creation of more units to make a bantam brigade commenced after approval in Wales in 
January 1915 but was not officially sanctioned by the War Office until May.  The four Welsh 
battalions created were the product of the pragmatic expansion of recruiting to include men of 
modest stature who were hitherto excluded and of the ambition to create a distinct national 
force that embodied the Welsh (or, more correctly, Lloyd George’s) view of Wales as a nation 
of freedom-fighters with a proven record of martial achievement in the face of larger, 
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aggressive nations.  The evidence presented in Chapter One demonstrates that, although the 
proportion of non-Welsh recruits and Welsh-speakers varied from unit to unit, the brigade can 
certainly be confidently regarded as ‘Welsh’. This contrasts with the other brigades of 40th 
Division where there was no national identity and consequently less potential esprit.
983
 These 
Welsh units were composed of volunteers from the labouring classes (predominantly colliers) 
commanded by junior officers who were students and teachers, clerks and civil servants in 
civilian life.  Senior officers were initially selected because of their connections locally or 
with Wales more generally but as the war progressed COs were brought in without such 
connections.  When the creation of a second Welsh division failed, the brigade was eventually 
incorporated into 40
th
 Division where it retained its distinct identity.  This was expressed by 
the continuing use of the term ‘Welsh Bantam Brigade’ and by the repeated use of 
‘Welshmen’ or ‘little Welshmen’ by senior officers when referring to the brigade long after 
the formation left the control of the NEC. The reported reaction of the NEC Secretary to the 
lack of Welsh representation at the royal inspection in May 1916 attests to the clear national 
identity of the brigade and, as if to confirm its continuing ‘Welshness’, Crozier wrote to 
David Lloyd George in December 1917 describing the fight at Bourlon Wood.
984
 
 
The history of the brigade shows that it did evolve through time: both tactically, as it became 
more experienced and received more training, and organisationally as brigadier-generals and 
COs were replaced.  This evolution was interrupted by two periods of sudden ‘mutation’ in 
February and June 1918 when new units were introduced.  Crozier’s leadership and the 
training carried out following his arrival produced a formation that, having spent the summer 
of 1916 carrying out no action larger than a trench raid, successfully captured Fifteen Ravine 
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and the ground east of Villers Plouich in April 1917 and raided the Hindenburg Line outpost 
village of La Vacquerie with some (albeit limited) success in May.  The brigade that captured 
Bourlon Wood and held it for three days in November was substantially the original Welsh 
bantam brigade that Crozier had inherited one year previously. Its depleted battalions had 
only just been made up to strength when the February 1918 reform of divisional structures 
removed all but one of the original battalions from the brigade and introduced one from each 
of 120 and 121 Brigades.  The training of these units was curtailed by the German Spring 
Offensives but, as described in Chapter Five, they played a positive role in slowing the enemy 
advance in the north of the Third Army sector in March 1918.  The much reduced battalions 
had no time for the induction of any new drafts they had received before they faced the full 
force of the German attack on the Lys just three weeks later.  Faced with the sudden collapse 
of the front, some units fought on while others were quickly captured.  Reserves were caught 
in the wrong place by the speed of the German break-in but the remnants of the brigade 
fought to stem the tide over three days with scratch formations.  The losses on the Lys were 
such that 40
th
 Division (along with others) was not deemed to be viable by GHQ and its units 
were disbanded or relocated.  After it was reconstituted with category B men in June 1918 the 
brigade provides a case study of the importance of training in creating troops that can achieve 
the tasks demanded of them.  These new units lacked local, regional or national identity and 
had been pulled together for a particular purpose.  Originally formed for a strictly defensive 
role, the units of ‘ex-non-combatant’ men from the Labour Corps carried out attacks in 
conditions of open warfare from late August until the armistice and dealt with a succession of 
enemy rearguards using sophisticated tactics.  They embody the positive evolution that the 
brigade had undergone. 
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The assessment of the quality of the brigade is a difficult task.  There is certainly no doubt 
that 40
th
 Division was not amongst the elite formations of the BEF.
985
  Having arrived as the 
last New Army division to reach France it did little for six months and was undoubtedly 
looked upon as poor.  Chapter Two examined the issues surrounding the performance of the 
35
th
 Division’s bantams during the Somme battle and developed the view that their 
performance did impact on the deployment of 40
th
 Division.  It also suggested that there were 
many elements contributing to the poor performance of 35
th
 Division and that the perceived 
poor performance of that division was not directly attributable to bantam men per se but 
rather to poor quality recruits and poor use of the division on the battlefield.  The men of 119 
Brigade were not given the chance to demonstrate their potential during the summer of 1916.  
They had been under the command of an artilleryman who was learning the basics of 
commanding an infantry formation and the appointment of Crozier as GOC is seen here as the 
deliberate introduction of energy and drive to the command of the ‘bad brigade’ described to 
Crozier on his arrival by the GSO1, 40
th
 Division.   
 
The perception of the performance of the brigade by the CinC in the following spring 
described in Chapter Four was almost certainly still influenced by the negative views of the 
previous year.  The successful actions of April were unfairly attributed to the presence of 
‘new’ German divisions that would not stand and it was not until the appointment of John 
Ponsonby as GOC 40
th
 Division that Haig acknowledged that the division was ‘coming on’.  
After Bourlon he acknowledged their ‘fine fighting qualities and endurance’, their ‘gallant 
service’ was mentioned in his Cambrai despatch and he was there to thank them as they 
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marched back from the front line.
986
  The evidence presented does not support Paddy 
Griffith’s dismissive description of “the whole pathetic Bantam phenomenon” which was 
apparently based on his reading of Allinson’s The Bantams.987  Griffith also noted that 40th 
Division “seems to have been so little trusted that it was committed [to action] only 9 
times”.988  This statement is the result of an assessment of the capability of BEF divisions by 
counting the number of times that each was engaged in an official operation as listed by 
Becke in the Order of Battle of Divisions.
989
 Whilst this may give a broad picture of activity it 
is questionable whether in itself it supports the “unavoidable conclusion that the high 
command observed an informal ‘pecking order’ of divisions” as proposed by Griffith.990 It 
does not include a qualitative assessment of performance in these actions, ignores actions not 
included by Becke and makes no allowance for heavy losses curtailing active involvement in 
further actions.  Neither does it allow for the time actually spent in France.
991
  It simply shows 
that the more a division was used, the more it was used again.  Griffith’s other conclusion, 
that the pecking order was based on “little more than prejudice, hearsay and the cut of the 
division commander’s jaw”, receives some support from the contrast between the negative 
comments made by Douglas Haig referred to above and the performance of 119 Brigade in 
action in 1917 and 1918.
992
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In an attempt to introduce a qualitative element into the assessment of 119 Brigade’s 
performance 40
th
 Division’s honours and awards were analysed (Chapter Five).  The possible 
drawbacks of this are identified but within the Division the level of recognition of 
achievement is considered to be an indicator of the relative success of the division’s brigades.  
While acknowledging that all awards may not have been subjected to the same standard of 
rigour by battalion, brigade or divisional HQ, the difference in numbers between 119 
Brigade’s awards (56%) and those of the other two brigades (33% and 16%) is clearly 
significant. It has not been possible to extend the exercise beyond the 40
th
 Division as a 
comparable and compatible dataset has not been located. 
 
How crucial was Crozier’s leadership to the development of the brigade?  There is no doubt 
that there were other competent brigadier-generals in the British army who could have taken 
on the role successfully - but Crozier was there for a reason.  His conduct as CO of the 9
th
 
RIRifles and his action on the first day of the Somme merited recognition and this was 
supported by his immediate superiors.  His promotion to brigadier-general and the award of 
the DSO were the result.  His posting to command the brigade, part of a formation that had 
accomplished little in its first six months in France, was certainly related to the skills that he 
had demonstrated as a battalion commander, particularly leadership under fire, and a thirst for 
discipline and efficiency.  His role was, in his words, ‘to electrify’ the brigade.  The relatively 
poor archive of contemporary documents and memoirs left by his subordinates sheds a little 
light on how he achieved his goals but many of them were written after (in some cases well 
after) the publication of Crozier’s books in the 1930s and the consequent self-destruction of 
his public image.  All these sources must be read with this in mind and used carefully.  
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Chapter Three described how and why Crozier’s books were produced and examined their 
impact on his reputation and their use as (un)reliable sources.   
 
As we have seen, Crozier projected an image of himself as a hard man with extreme views on 
discipline.  He certainly believed in the efficacy of the death penalty as a deterrent to others 
and argued later against its removal.
993
  Yet, despite the regular association of his name by 
authors with one execution, it was the only execution that occurred during his command of 
the 9
th
 RIRifles and there were none at all during his command of 119 Brigade.  His attitude 
seems to have been more flexible in matters of discipline than has been recognised.  He turned 
a blind eye in the case of Captain George Gaffikin, 9
th
 RIRifles, on receipt of a promise of 
sobriety and he “tore up” the request by a CO for the trial by court martial on a capital charge 
of an un-named “little Welshman”, recognising that the man’s evacuation of a front line post 
(that he later reoccupied) during a sudden bombardment was common sense, not 
cowardice.
994
 His apparent addiction to summary justice as a way of keeping men to the task 
in hand no doubt has a core of truth.  Crozier seems to have made it clear to his men that in 
fleeing they risked death from his and other officer’s pistols but such a standpoint was not 
uncommon among BEF officers – we have seen in Chapter Three how Major-General Nugent 
implied as much in his address to the officers of the Ulster Division.
995
  Crozier’s mantra of 
‘if you run, I will shoot’ repeated within the pages of his books might be interpreted as just 
another device to emphasise the horror of war.  Yet the incident on the road to Strazeele as 
described by Crozier leaves the impression that it did take place in a moment of extreme 
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stress and ‘in hot blood’.  This event and the other examples cited in Chapter Five, may 
actually have occurred but remain ‘not proven’.  Crozier’s view on the matter of summary 
justice may have been more nuanced than it appears.  In one book he states clearly (and 
apparently without realising that it contradicted his stated position) that “I did not and do not 
think positions can be held by using threats”.996 As an efficient soldier with a need to get the 
job done, he surely recognised that summary execution “destroyed the element of trust which 
lay at the heart of the officer-man relationship”.997 It is going too far to use Crozier as 
representative of “a tiny handful of officers [who] did make a practice of summary execution” 
without qualifying the statement.
998
 
 
Crozier’s style could certainly be brusque.  He called a spade a spade.  In Chapter Four we 
read how Wilfred Spender commented on the roughness and ruthless way that he handled the 
men of the 9
th
 RIRifles while acknowledging his courage and leadership.  One of his staff 
officers told him long after the war that “he disliked the way I handled and treated the 
divisional staff above me”.999 Harry Graham also noted from his own position as ADC to 
John Ponsonby, GOC 40
th
 Division, that Crozier ‘was not well liked’. Yet he also inspired 
loyalty.  We saw how Captain Montgomery, 9th RIRifles, respected him, how Crozier tried to 
help Montgomery by requesting his services, how two of his COs, Plunkett and Andrews, 
came back after illness and wounds to serve under him and how Lieutenant Lamb thought him 
‘awfully nice’. Starrett stayed with him throughout the war and helped Crozier afterwards.  
An ex-soldier from 121 Brigade noted how “he was always looked upon as someone a little 
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different from the old school of Brass Hats”.1000 Crozier was a strong-willed individual. The 
origins of his willpower and drive to succeed may lie in his small stature and the adoration of 
his flawed soldier father but such speculation needs to be informed by psychological 
expertise.  One manifestation of his willpower was his abstinence from alcohol from 1910 
until his death – a remarkable achievement through times of great stress.  If anyone doubted 
the truth of this, in 1925 Sir William Peyton confirmed (for reasons unknown) that “I know as 
an absolute fact that from the commencement of the war until the present time he [Crozier] 
has been a strict teetotaller”.1001 Captain Eric Whitworth’s observation that Crozier was a 
‘hustler’ (Chapter Four) unintentionally confirms his energy and drive but the use of a term 
with such  negative connotations was influenced by Whitworth’s own background as a well 
educated young man (Radley; Trinity College, Cambridge) and a volunteer.
1002
  After the 
previous more ‘gentlemanly’ brigadier-generals that Whitworth had encountered, Crozier 
would have appeared blunt and driven but he did, as Whitworth grudgingly acknowledged, 
get things done. 
 
There is no doubt that he set an example by his own physical courage.  We have read in 
earlier chapters how both David Starrett and Malcolm McKee comment on it in their accounts 
of the first day of the Somme.  To McKee Crozier was a ‘tiger’ while later to Freddy Plunkett 
he was a ‘thorough fighter’ with ‘no sentiment’. To Harry Graham he was also a tiger and 
‘absolutely fearless’, a ‘splendid man in a tight place’.  Robert Graves quotes an ex-19th RWF 
sergeant who called Crozier reverently “a mad gentlemen”, going on to explain that this was a 
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compliment.
1003
 An annotation in his personal file says “a fighting brigadier” and a 
transcription of a memorandum from Sir R.D. Whigham includes “his record as a fighting 
soldier is excellent”.1004  The fact that he remained in command of his brigade for over two 
years indicates that courage was just one facet of his character.  Gary Sheffield notes that 
there are two functions in leadership: the creation and sustaining of unit cohesion (a broadly 
managerial function) and the moulding of the cohesive group as part of the greater 
organisation.
1005
  Crozier has been seen to have carried out both functions.  While he was 
assisted in the organisational aspects of brigade command by a succession of staff officers 
that he could rely on, it is revealing to note the comments (Chapter Five) by Sir William 
Peyton. Acknowledging Crozier’s leadership skills, Peyton highlights his “great capacity for 
the administration and training of troops” and “his high power of command and organisation”.  
These are crucial aspects which have been overshadowed by the image of Crozier as Stewart-
Moore’s ‘callous and overbearing martinet’.  This study has shown clearly that he was not 
simply lucky to remain in post; he was an effective and efficient commander. 
 
Does Crozier’s claim to have removed a brigade-major, a brigade signalling officer, nearly a 
dozen commanding officers, a few seconds in command, three adjutants, several doctors, 
quartermasters and transport officers and one or two sergeant majors stand up to scrutiny?  
There was a certainly a significant turnover of battalion COs in 119 Brigade.  Plunkett’s 
comment that he “had the doubtful honour of being the only CO who lasted three months” in 
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summer 1918 indicates that the turnover was a recognised phenomenon.  Oliver Nugent told 
Crozier that he “had cut off too many heads”.  Yet it remains unclear exactly how he did this.  
The selection and posting of new COs was not within his remit (Crozier acknowledges the 
role of the COs ‘Pool’) and was the responsibility of the Military Secretary at GHQ.1006 While 
it was apparently possible for a divisional commander to exercise some influence over 
postings - as seen in the case of John Ponsonby and H.C. Metcalfe (Chapter Five) - it is not 
likely that a brigadier-general could operate in a similar fashion.  Crozier had to work with the 
material he was given.  He believed that “Four good colonels, well backed up [his emphasis], 
make a good brigade”.1007 If the CO was not efficient and effective in Crozier’s eyes he 
implies that he removed them.  Even if, as he asserts, two of the divisional commanders under 
whom he served gave him a ‘free hand’ it is not likely that his authority extended to the 
removal of battalion COs.  It is probable that a bad report from Crozier to higher authority 
would result in the replacement of a CO and that this might be accomplished quickly as, for 
example, in the case of Lieutenant-Colonel C.B. Hore, OC 17
th
 Welsh, in January 1917 
following the surge in cases of trench foot in the battalion.  Sometimes, however, Crozier has 
not been accurate in reporting the timescale or circumstances of a CO’s departure as seen in 
the case of Lieutenant-Colonel Alan Bryant, Hore’s replacement.  Here Crozier’s description 
of events is shown to be at odds with the facts and constructed to boost his own image as an 
efficient and effective commander and diminish that of a subordinate.  In the case of Arthur 
Soames, the Brigade Major, posting to a training course (presumably on Crozier’s 
recommendation) was the method used to remove him from his appointment.  Unfortunately, 
there is no evidence to confirm the removal of the other officers and WOs as claimed by 
Crozier.  In the case of the COs matters are clearer. With the exception of the appointment of 
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Lieutenant-Colonel Andrews as OC 12
th
 North Staffords at the end of the war, when Crozier 
deliberately ignored the role of ‘the Base’, there was a turnover which was initiated by 
Crozier although he exaggerated his part in the decision making process. 
 
The results of evolution by Crozier’s selection were three successive ‘generations’ of the 
brigade, starting with the modified Welsh Bantam Brigade in 1917 and then the ‘new’ three-
battalion brigade of February 1918 that did not have the chance to develop its full potential 
and finally, the brigade of June 1918 composed of category B men.  This study has 
concentrated on aspects of the first of these because of its unique origin as a part of the WAC 
and its bantam composition and yet it is the creation of the last that clearly demonstrates 
Crozier’s ability beyond simply that of a man who was good in a fight. 
 
To modern historians Crozier remains “not an easy man to like”.1008 Some at least of the men 
who served with him had another view: “I had the privilege of serving under General Crozier 
and I think that all who did so … agree with me in that we knew him as a very fine General, a 
wonderful soldier and a very brave man.  If any suggests otherwise – they are wrong.”1009  
Basil Liddell Hart noted that “some who had wide experience considered that he was the best 
brigade commander they saw in action, and quote his share in the capture of Bourlon Wood as 
an epic feat of arms.”1010  
 
Was 119 Infantry Brigade a ‘bad brigade’? The evidence demonstrates that it was not. 
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Appendix One 
Bourlon and Mametz: a brief comparison 
 [Bourlon] was the second occasion in the war when a splendid piece of 
 woodland fighting was carried through by the men of the Principality, and 
 even Mametz was not a finer performance than Bourlon.”1011  
 
 
The attacks of the 38
th
 (Welsh) Division at Mametz Wood in July 1916 have, as shown by the 
scale of the centenary commemorations, become part of the national identity of Wales.  The 
evocative writing of Llewelyn Wyn Griffith in Up to Mametz, the epic poem In Parenthesis 
by David Jones and mentions in the novels of Graves and Sassoon have given a few days of 
ferocious woodland fighting an importance well beyond their military significance.
1012
 
 
Fourth Army regarded the capture of Mametz Wood, along with the village of Contalmaison 
to its west, as an essential first step in securing a line from which to assault the German 
second position in that part of the Somme battlefield. Mametz Wood is smaller than Bourlon 
Wood (approximately 1.64 square kilometres compared with 2.93 square kilometres) and is 
elongated along its north/south axis.  Like Bourlon, it was divided by a central north/south 
ride and there were two significant cross rides dividing the wood into six unequal parts.  The 
western flank was protected by a fortified re-entrant valley which was itself flanked by 
Contalmaison.  On the south east corner an irregular projection of the wood known as the 
‘Hammerhead’ flanked its southern edge and was in turn flanked by Flatiron and Sabot 
Copses which were in German hands.  The land sloped gently from the open ground on the 
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south and continued rising through the wood to its northern edge.  The trees were dense and 
two years of growth had produced a thick mass of shrubs and brambles beneath them.   
 
The task of taking the wood was given to XV Corps whose 17
th
 and 38
th
 Divisions would 
attack the left and right flanks of the wood respectively. It would be 38
th
 Division’s first 
offensive action.  A preliminary assault on the left was driven off and a second attack went in 
on the morning of 7 July 1916 while the 38
th
 Division attacked westwards across open ground 
towards the ‘Hammerhead’. Originally planned by Brigadier-General H.J. Evans (115 
Brigade) as an attack by two battalions on a one battalion front, it was (for reasons that remain 
unclear) extended to a two battalion front. This pushed the right flank much closer to 
enfilading German machine guns in the copses.  Zero was at 8.30 a.m. A planned smoke 
barrage was not delivered and the totally exposed attacking battalions never reached the 
wood. “It would be difficult to imagine a more suicidal direction of attack than that chosen by 
XV Corps for the 115
th
 Brigade.”1013 Further artillery support was at first refused by XV 
Corps which remained convinced that two battalions were sufficient for the task.  When a 
renewed barrage materialised it fell short.  In the afternoon the failure was reinforced as a 
third battalion was fed in.  Further attack plans were abandoned in the evening.  There were 
over 400 casualties among the three attacking battalions for no gain.
1014
   
 
On 8/9 July another attack on the western edge of the wood was preceded by confusion over 
the scale of the action which led to it being called off.  Next day Major-General Sir Ivor 
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Philipps was removed from command of 38
th
 Division (Major-General T.D. Pilcher, GOC 
17
th
 Division followed on 11 July) and was replaced temporarily by Major-General H.E. 
Watts, GOC 7
th
 Division.  Watts immediately put in place plans for a much larger attack by 
the two brigades of 38th Division that had not been involved on 7 July, supported by the 
depleted 115 Brigade.  East of the central ride 114 Brigade attacked on a two-battalion front 
while to the west the 113 Brigade attacked into a narrower space on a one-battalion front.  
Zero was 4.15 a.m. and this time the barrage contained covering smoke.  Despite setbacks, the 
wood was entered and by 5.00 a.m. the first objective (the first cross-ride) was reached.  
Fighting within the wood was confused and at close quarters.  Problems were caused by the 
British barrage falling short at times and communications with the rear were dependent on 
runners and were consequently very slow.  The barrage did not stop German reinforcements 
arriving but by evening the wood was cleared to within forty metres of its northern edge 
despite some shaky moments when panic spread amongst groups within the wood.  By now 
Contalmaison and the western re-entrant had also fallen to 23
rd
 and 17
th
 Divisions 
respectively.  Overnight a line 200 metres from the northern edge of the wood was 
consolidated.  No major counter attacks had taken place.  Next day the wood was all but 
cleared but as troops approached the northern edge they became visible from the German 
second position and withdrew to the 200 metre position once more.  The exhausted troops 
were relieved on the morning of 12 July 1916 by 62 Brigade (21
st
 Division) who completed 
the capture of the wood. The Welsh had taken more than 400 German prisoners and thirteen 
heavy guns. Casualties were almost 4,000 all ranks including seven battalion commanders.
1015
 
Douglas Haig wrote “What effect on the division has a good commander!”1016 
 
                                                 
1015
 Miles, Military Operations, 1916, Vol. II, p.54. 
1016
 Haig Ms Diary quoted in Hughes, Mametz, p. 116. 
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As described in Chapter One of this thesis, 119 Brigade had a common ancestry with 38
th
 
Division and both formations had a strong national identity. The attacks at Mametz and 
Bourlon by Welsh units have some common features but some significant differences. Both 
woods were dense and difficult to traverse; both were on rising ground (though Bourlon was a 
steeper climb); both were subdivided by rides and both were flanked by strongpoints – the 
copses and Contalmaison in the case of Mametz and the villages of Fontaine and Bourlon in 
the case of Bourlon Wood.  It took five days for 38
th
 Division to capture Mametz and just one 
day for 119 Brigade to capture Bourlon.  Both actions were planned at short notice but at 
Mametz a number of factors combined to produce a failure at the first attempt: poor planning; 
no smoke screen; inexperience; inadequate and inaccurate artillery fire and confusion caused 
by interference from XV Corps which dictated inappropriate tactics.  At Bourlon, artillery fire 
was (mainly) accurate and visual signalling facilitated reasonable response times.  Despite the 
lack of smoke the more experienced troops of 119 Brigade pressed home their attack.  The 
ultimate success of the action at Mametz was due largely to the weight of numbers used 
which surprised the Germans and prevented serious counter attack.  At Bourlon, the wood 
was taken by one brigade rather than a whole division but the problem then was how to hold it 
with limited reinforcements against repeated, aggressive counter attacks.  Blunt force captured 
Mametz Wood. Tactics captured and held Bourlon Wood. 
 
The most significant difference between these two attacks, separated by just fifteen months, 
was in the level of training and experience of the troops at all levels.
1017
  Mametz was at the 
start of the BEF’s learning process while Bourlon was some way into it.  Brigade staffs were 
                                                 
1017
 Henry Horne, GOC XV Corps, wrote about 38
th
 Division on 13 July 1916 after the capture of Mametz 
Wood: “this division is not yet sufficiently trained to take part in an attack” – Horne to Fourth Army quoted in 
Simon Robbins, British Generalship in the Great War: The Military Career of Sir Henry Horne (1861-1929) 
(London: Ashgate, 2010), p. 118. 
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inexperienced and internal communication was poor in July 1916.
1018
 In the opinion of G.P.L. 
Drake-Brockman, one of Major-General Watts’ staff, Ivor Philipps’ wish that attacks should 
not be continued in the face of machine gun fire also undermined discipline and morale and 
led to half-hearted attacks.
1019
  In the aftermath of Mametz there was said to be a widespread 
belief that the 38
th
 Division had ‘bolted’.1020 113 Brigade COs were told later “that the word 
‘retire’ is not to be used and that any man using it is likely to be shot on the spot.  Officers 
must deal with all cases of indiscipline of this nature which can only be stamped out by the 
most drastic action.”1021  The reputation of 38th Division took some time to recover from 
Mametz while 119 Brigade’s was enhanced by success at Bourlon Wood.  
 
  
                                                 
1018
 Hughes, Mametz, p.134. 
1019
 Ibid. p.138. 
1020
 Ibid. p.139. 
1021
 Ibid. p.136. Quoting WO/95 2552 War Diary 113 Brigade, message dated 16 July 1916. 
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Appendix Two 
[40
th
 Division Cambrai – Original Plan for Advance to the Sensée River] 
Secret    119
th
 Inf. Bde. No.39/249/G.L. 
NOTES ON CONFERENCE AT BRIGADE H.Q. SUNDAY NOV. 18
TH
. 1917 
(1) Shell Fire 
 There will no doubt be a lot of shell fire. The Boche has got a lot of guns. Men must 
 be impressed with the fact that shell fire cannot be accepted as an excuse for not going 
 on. 
 Rifle fire at close range may stop people but shell fire must not. 
 Men must go on irrespective of what fire there is. 
 
(2) The Best flank is his most vulnerable flank. 
 
(3) Discipline 
 The whole of our success for this show depends upon the fitness of the men when they 
 reach a certain point.  Men must be as fresh as possible.  Marching, fighting and 
 digging all the same day.  Men must be told later on and the whole thing explained to 
 them.  COs to lecture the Battalion on this subject so that he knows every man has 
 been told. 
 Units must not parade before necessary. 
(4)  Packs and equipment to be taken off at halts. 
 
(5) At least 10 officers must be left behind, but at least 21 officers must be taken. 
 
(6) Battalions are to be not less than 500 strong.  Officers, NCOs on leave, courses and 
 men at the Depot Bn. may be included in those left behind, so that if the GOC wants 
 ‘A’ or ‘B’ Battalion, he knows there are 500 men there. 
 
(7) 2nds in Command and Coy Commanders must proceed with the Battalion.  COs 
 should make the greatest use of his [sic] 2
nd
 i/c.  He is to be at Bn HQ when the CO is 
 not there.  He is useful for finding out information. 
 
(8) Mounted officers to be told that they must make the utmost use of their horses.  They 
 do not do so at present. 
 A Coy Commander following up an attack will keep his horse moderately close under 
 cover.  He can use his horse if necessary. 
 
(9) Blankets, greatcoats and haversacks will be dumped at Brigade dump.  Men will carry 
 cardigan, jerkin, 2 iron rations and unexpired portion of the day’s ration, also at least 
 one spare pair of socks. 
 GOC Division wants an inspection of this equipment to be carried out most rigidly by 
 Battalion Commanders. 
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(10) 120 rounds SAA to be carried.  No unauthorised stuff, presents or souvenirs to be 
 carried. 
 The whole success of the operation depends on the condition of the men when they 
 arrive at their place.  If they arrive done, they will be done. 
 Waterproof sheet to be carried under the flap so that it can be got at. 
 Bombs, SAA, etc., will be equally divided among 4 limber wagons. 2 of these will 
 form Echelon ‘A’. 
 The Staff Captain will go into this matter with COs and see what adjustments will be 
 necessary. 
 
(11)  Flares are going to be WHITE. This is the Corps colour.  They will not be issued at 
 the rate of 2 per man.  1500 are being issued per Brigade.  There must be a careful re-
 adjustment of flares. 
 A certain proportion are to be kept in reserve at Bn. HQ., as it is possible that men 
 with flares will be knocked out. 
 The method of carrying these will be as already laid [out]. 
 
(12) Stokes 
 1 limber wagon will be detached from the DAC to each Brigade to carry 2 Stokes guns 
 and 108 shells. 
 Remainder of guns to be left at the dump in the Brigade Area. 2 Mortars will be in 
 Brigade Reserve. 
 
(13) 110 long handled wire cutters will be issued to each Brigade.  They are to be carried in 
 the Battalion tool cart. 
 
(14) Baggage Officers baggage is to be cut down to 35lbs.  All baggage wagons will be 
 parked in the BAPAUME Area under Divisional arrangements.  Officers are to be 
 warned that they may not see their kits for about 3 days. 
 
(15) Water Water is scarce.  Water tins will be issued to Units and carried empty on the 
 carts. 
 
(16) The policy is to let civilians remain where they are.  Arrangements can be made to 
 send them away later. 
 If they want to get away, warn the Brigade. 
 
(17)  Battalion Commander, 2
nd
 i/c, Adjutant, Intelligence Officer and Signalling Officer, 
 remainder to make up to 21. 
 
(18) As regards Lewis Gunners and people at Schools these are to be counted out. 
 
(19) Part II Infantry Training is to be thoroughly gone into.  Instructions impressed upon all 
 officers. 
 
(20) We go tomorrow night to ROCQUIGNY which is close to YTRES. 
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NOTES ON OPERATIONS 
 
(1) The chief elements of this operation is one of absolute surprise.  No gossiping.  Ample 
 time if Coy Commanders are told tomorrow. 
 
(2) The attack itself is going to begin from GONNELIEU South to CROISELLE in the 
 north.  The north performance will be bluff but no gas will be discharged.  The main 
 idea is to break through from GONNELIEU to north of HAVRINCOURT WOOD on 
 a 2 Corps front.  This sector is quieter than ever. 
 
(3)  On that front 350 tanks are going to be employed to cut wire.  The 2 Corps that are in 
 the line will follow up. 
 
(4) Zero will be within the next 2 or 3 days. 
 
(5)  Cavalry are to push on and isolate CAMBRAI and seize bridgeheads over the Canal 
 running East and West North of CAMBRAI. 
 The 36 Division do not go forward but the way is going to be cleared for them from 
 SE to NE and when this cleared that Division will be used. 
 The 29
th
 Division are following up the people who go over first. 
 
 We go up from ROCQUIGNY on 2 roads, BAPAUME – CAMBRAI Rd and the other 
 running through DOIGNES – GRAINCOURT – LES HAVRINCOURT – ANNEUX 
 – ST OLLE – SANCOURT. 
 
 The objective of the Division is the high ground north of the canal already alluded to, 
 the bridgeheads of which will be seized by the Cavalry. 
 
(6)  It is not yet known which brigade goes on which road.  The 120
th
 Brigade will 
 probably go on the BAPAUME – CAMBRAI RD. 
 
(7) Provided the Cavalry have already collared their Bridgeheads, the first task will be the 
 occupation of the high ground the left of which is to the north of the village of 
 BUGNIECOURT on the left, the high ground of the village of ERCHIN being held as 
 an advanced post.  It is very commandeering [sic] ground.  There is a wood there 
 which will have to be held called LA GARENNE.  
 The Divisional Commander has not yet decided as to whether the rest of the high 
 ground from FRESSAIN to WAVRECHAIN will be held, or whether we will hold in 
 a more N.E. direction the high ground just north of MONCHECOURT running out 
 into a spur north of EMERICOURT south of ANICHE. 
 We have got the advantage of holding the north of the high ground farther away from 
 the marshes. 
 
(8) You will see that this amounts approximately to a 2 brigade front, 1 in Divisional 
 reserve somewhere on the left.  
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 Divisional mounted troops will be 2 squadrons of Cavalry and 2 companies of 
 Cyclists.  They will be withdrawn when they have done their work on the right of the 
 South of the Canal. 
 The Boche has on that front where the main attack will be pushed through, 2 Divisions 
 whose morale is not very good, consequently it is hoped to get through.  If he can 
 bring reserves into CAMBRAI it will present another feature. 
 DOUAI is a place where concentrations can take place, and it is from that direction 
 that a counter attack may be expected, this is the reason that the Brigade in Divisional 
 reserve is somewhat on the left. 
 Orders will be issued to secure the high ground and to hold it at all costs. 
 
(9) Subalterns must therefore be told to be more particular than ever in the siting of their 
 trenches and the matter is one which is one for them, as we have not enough 
 supervision to go all round.  They will dig for their lives. 
 If this Brigade is there, Battalions in reserve will be sent up to dig should the 
 opportunity occur and the Works Coy will work under the RE. 
 
(10) The Brigade Transport Officer will have to be prepared if necessary to take up wire 
 and short stakes. 
 When we started in April last the whole of the trenches were spoilt by undercutting. 
 
(11) Visual signalling must be established at all costs. 
 
(12) In the event of the bridges being destroyed, COs must let the GOC know the exact 
 state of what they want and must look about for every expedient to crossing.  In any 
 case a thorough reconnaissance of the river is wanted. 
 Division are to let us have later on information regarding fords.  It is not certain if 
 there are any. 
 
(13) I all probability your right will be in the air and a strong flank guard probably need to 
 be thrown out. Your left should be fairly secure. 
 It is possible that after the Bridgeheads and high grounds have been seized by the 
 Cavalry, villages etc may hold out as strong points.  On the other hand it is possible 
 that you might have quite easy marching on the BAPAUME – CAMBRAI RD under 
 peace conditions. 
 The idea is that CAMBRAI should not be entered for some time, except by selected 
 people and that steps must be taken to see that it is not destroyed by fire. 
 There are 2 Div HQrs in CAMBRAI which is hoped to seize and 1 at EPINOY which 
 may come into our operations. 
 
(14) The idea is to go up by steps and possibly we may have a few hours at DOIGNES.  
 Major GOUGH is now there with some men putting in Soyer Stoves, where food will 
 be dished out. 
You will see the object is to get the men up fresh. 
There will possibly be a few hours halt a DOIGNES, and then go through.  Men are to 
 be rested as much as possible and hours of silence are to be in all camps.  Everybody 
 is to be sure of getting sleep. 
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The question of whether tents will be struck; it may be by day if it is fine.  COs will 
 find out from Town Majors re striking tents. 
 
(15)  Orders will be of the briefest when we get to ROCQUIGNY, and as clear as possible.  
 They must be acknowledged. 
 SDRs will be sent whenever necessary.  There will be a lot of work to do afterwards 
 and the men are to be saved as much as possible. 
 Brigade Signals to be made up by runners from Battalions. 
Caps are to be stored in haversacks. 
Platoon Commanders are to be impressed with the fact that the censoring of letters is 
of more importance than ever. 
 
November 18
th
 1917       [signed] G.V. Godliffe 
         Captain. 
         Brigade Major 
         119
th
 Infantry Brigade. 
 
 
[Pencil Annotation] To be destroyed before leaving Gommiecourt 
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Appendix Three 
 
[Attack Orders – Bourlon Wood] 
 
SECRET  119 INFANTRY BRIGADE ORDER NO.128 
 
 
Reference Map MOEUVRES 1/20,000 
 
1. (a) The 40th Div. assisted by tanks will attack BOURLON WOOD and Village 
today, 23
rd
 November. 
 
(b) The 51
st
 Division will attack FONTAINE-NOTRE-DAME on our right and the 
36
th
 Division QUARRY WOOD and INCHY on our left. 
 
(c) The 119
th
 Infantry Brigade will attack on the right of the Divisional front, and 
the 121
st
 Infantry Brigade on the left. 
 
2. (a) The objective of the 119th Infantry Brigade will be the high ground to the N. of 
BOURLON WOOD (Coupez Mill which will be consolidated). 
 
(b) The 19
th
 Royal Welsh Fusiliers will attack on the right, and the 12
th
 South 
Wales Borders on the left. 
17
th
 Welsh will be in Brigade Support in proximity of CEMETERY at E.30.c.  
18
th
 Welsh Regt will be in Brigade Reserve under cover about K.6.b. 
 
3. BOUNDARIES 
Right Divisional Boundary from F.20.c.6.0. through F.8.central and in 
prolongation. 
Inter-brigade boundary will be Crossroads E.24.a to about E.18.central inclusive, 
thence along west edge of BOURLON WOOD skirting the village in E.12.d.and b. 
to road junction E.12.b.9.9. thence along road to its junction with the railway at 
F.1.c.2.8. inclusive. 
Inter-battalion boundary will be the ride F.19.c.3.9. thence through the centre of 
wood through the B of BOURLON thence to F.1.b.9.1. 
 
4. TANKS 
12 tanks 1
st
 Tank Brigade will assist 119
th
 Infantry Brigade as under:- 
(a) 3 tanks will proceed along the road at the western edge of the wood. 
(b) 3 tanks will proceed up the ride in F.20.a and splay out as the situation may 
demand. 
(c) 6 tanks will crush the wire and cover the ground in between (a) and (b) and act 
as the situation may demand. 
These tanks will pass through the infantry advanced line at zero. 
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5. INFANTRY PLAN 
Battalions will attack on a 2 company front in depth and will maintain artillery 
formation throughout so long as situation allows of same. 
Infantry will keep from 100 to 200 yards in rear of tanks. 
Support Battalion will be in readiness to either reinforce assaulting battalions or 
throw out a right defensive flank to the East of BOURLON WOOD. 
Assaulting troops will be in position at minus 15 minutes. 
 
6. A shovel waved from the top of a tank signifies that the tank is out of action. 
Infantry desiring assistance from a tank will wave their helmets on their bayonets. 
 
7. MACHINE GUNS 
 
 O.C. 119
th
 Machine Gun Company will detail 3 Sections to be placed in echelon 
in the trenches in F.20.c. to protect the right flank.  These sections will move 
forward in bounds conforming to the pace of the tanks. 
 Should the attack by the 51
st
 Division be successful, these sections will eventually 
take up positions in F.2. and F.8. 
 1 subsection will be placed at the disposal of 19
th
 RWF and 12
th
 SWB to be used 
as the situation may demand. 
 O.C. 18
th
 Welsh will detail a carrying party of 64 o.r. with a suitable proportion of 
NCOs as carrying party for M.G. Company. 
 O.C. 119
th
 M.G. Company will remain at Brigade Headquarters. 
 
8. TRENCH MORTAR BATTERY 
 O.C. 119
th
 T.M.B. will hold 2 Stokes in readiness at Brigade Headquarters to 
move at short notice. 
 O.C. 119
TH
 T.M.B. will remain at Brigade Headquarters. 
 
9. WORKS COMPANY 
 O.C. 119
TH
 Works Company will hold his men in readiness under cover in the 
neighbourhood of Brigade Headquarters to proceed at short notice. 
 O.C. will remain at Brigade Headquarters. 
 
10. 2
nd
 Lieut T.G. DANIEL, 19
th
 RWF will proceed with 4 selected ORs immediately 
in rear of assaulting Battalions and will from time to time report by runner direct 
to Brigade Headquarters regarding the situation. 
 
11. ARTILLERY 
 (a) The preliminary advance of the tanks will be covered by a smoke screen from 
Zero minus 40 to Zero plus 20. 
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 (b) The subsequent advance will be covered by H.E. and shrapnel barrage in lifts 
of 200 yards every 10 minutes finally forming a protective barrage on the line F.3.  
X.26. X.25. 
 
 (c) The initial intense barrage will be put down from F.20.a.7.7. along the S. edge 
of the wood. 
 
12. Tanks will not withdraw till the infantry has consolidated.  Tank Commanders 
will consult with Infantry Commanders before withdrawing. 
 
13. Assaulting Battalion Commanders will keep close touch with the formations 
operating on their flanks by means of patrols. 
 
14. Zero hour will be 10.30. a.m. 
 
15. When contact aeroplanes sound Claxon Horns or fire Very Lights, each section of 
Infantry will light a White Flare and endeavour to attract attention by movement. 
 
16. Prisoners of War will be marched to Brigade Headquarters under escort as per 
instructions already issued. 
 
17. Advanced Dressing Station will be established at the pond in Graincourt. 
 On Bn. Headquarters moving forward R.A.Ps. will also move forward when 
original R.A.Ps. will be taken over by Medical Officer in charge of Advanced 
Dressing Station. 
 
18. Assaulting Battalions will exchange liaison officers with the Battalions on their 
flanks. 
 
19. O.C. Signal Section will arrange for synchronisation of watches prior to Zero 
minus 60. 
 
20. Brigade Headquarters will be at the CHURCH, GRAINCOURT, to which all 
reports will be sent. 
 
21. Acknowledge. 
 
 Issued at 4-0. a.m. 
Nov. 23
rd
. 1917.      [signed]        G.V. Goodliffe 
          Captain. 
          Brigade Major. 
         119
th
 Infantry Brigade. 
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INSTRUCTIONS TO ACCOMPANY 
119
TH
 INFANTRY BRIGADE ORDER NO. 128. 
 
1. TANKS are a luxury.  This must be impressed upon all ranks.  If a tank breaks 
down, Infantry must push on at all costs unless particularly asked for help. 
 
2. The rendering of information, negative or otherwise, is the essence of the attack. 
 This must be impressed on all ranks prior to moving off and every possible effort 
must be made by every means to get information back to Brigade H.Q. 
 
3. All commanders must at all times have in their minds the possibility of counter 
attack, flanks must therefore be closely watched, and when the objective is 
gained, men must instantly dig in and all ranks must realise that rifle fire is the 
first line of defence of an Infantry soldier for this purpose. 
 
4. It is most important that in debouching from a wood all ranks do so at the rush. 
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Appendix Four 
 
[Preparations for Defence March 1918] 
 
NOTES ON THE CONFERENCE HELD AT 40
TH
 DIVISION HQ 
6
TH
 MARCH  1918 
 
 
PART 1 
 
 
Tanks 
 Pace Over good dry surface down hill, tanks go faster than infantry. 
  Over ground like that between the 2
nd
 and 3
rd
 Systems on the VI Corps  
  front, allow 20 minutes per 1,000 yards. 
 
 Formation 
  (a) Tanks work in groups of three. 
  (b) Infantry move preferably in small columns, extending into line when  
  nearing enemy. 
  (c) Infantry should not follow tanks closely but should work more or less  
  independently. 
 
 Gaps in Wire 
  When going through wire the two rear tanks close in and cross wire  
  entanglements where the leading tank did so.  Tanks do not cut gaps in  
  wire, they only crush it down.  Infantry should pass through these places in 
  file, being cautioned to be particularly careful not to kick up the wire, for if 
  they do, it will spring up and form an obstacle again. 
 
 Tactics 
  When all three tanks cross the first enemy trench, the leading tank goes on 
  as close to our barrage as possible; the other two work sideways and help  
  leading wave of Infantry to kill the enemy. 
 
  When the next wave of infantry comes up, the tanks go on again to the next 
  objective, followed by the Infantry detailed for the purpose. 
 
  NOTE/- Owing to various reasons, it cannot be guaranteed that tanks will  
  be available for counter-attacks and also that, if available, they will not  
  break down.  Infantry must therefore always be prepared to attack without  
  tanks, even if arranged for. 
 Liaison 
  A Liaison Officer from the Tank Corps to be at Divisional and each  
 attacking Brigade Headquarters during operations in conjunction with  
 tanks. 
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Barrages 
  Our Artillery Barrage to be put down and worked on a pre-arranged  
  timetable, not to be controlled by aeroplanes. 
  If our assaulting troops have to move far in order to get up to our initial  
  barrage, this barrage could with advantage, at first be largely a smoke one, 
  turning to shrapnel before the first lift. 
  When working over good ground the barrage to lift at 200 yards in eight  
  minutes. 
  Barrages to be put down on the whole front of attack. 
 
Practice Attacks 
  GOCs Infantry Brigades to arrange for dummy tanks for practising Infantry 
  to work with tanks, and communicate direct with OC No. 6 Battalion Tank 
  Corps at WAILLY, for officers of the Tank Corps to be present at practices. 
 
Aeroplanes 
  The question was raised of aeroplanes signalling to the artillery, when to  
  commence and when to begin lifting the barrage. 
  It was decided that this was impracticable - owing to the dust and smoke it 
  would be impossible for the aeroplane to see our Infantry, and also there  
  would always be the chance of the aeroplane being brought down   
  prematurely. 
 
 
 
PART 2 
 
1. Notes from the Corps Conference were read out regarding probability of an early 
 German attack. 
 
2. The difficulty of communicating with Artillery of Divisions already in the line and 
 of their cooperating was discussed. 
 This difficulty would also probably be found with Machine Guns of other  Divisions. 
 A counter-attack would therefore probably have to rely chiefly on its own Artillery 
 only for support. 
 
3. Machine Guns 
 Two sections of Machine Guns would probably be attached to each   
 attacking Brigade for close cooperation and the remainder being employed  
 on barrage work if practicable. 
 
4. It has been found in another Division, that many box-respirators of men employed 
 on working and carrying parties have become damaged. 
 
 The box-respirators of RA, RE, Infantry and Pioneers are all to be examined 
 accordingly, and all damaged ones replaced at once. 
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5. Brigadiers to consider the various counter-attacks which they may have to carry out 
 and to work out one or more with battalion commanders, and then select a piece of 
 ground and practice with troops. 
 
6.  If the Division is moved to another area by rail, all surplus kits to be taken; but if  the 
 Division is marched up for counter-attack in this neighbourhood, all surplus kits to be 
 left behind. 
 
 All formations and units to arrange for storing their kits locally, and to inform ‘Q’ 
 of arrangements they make. 
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Appendix Five 
 
[40
th
 Division Lessons of the Recent Fighting, April 1918] 
 
NOTES ON THE CONFERENCE HELD AT DIVL. HQ 19/4/18 
 
 
1.  Lessons of the recent fighting which had been brought to notice in GHQ memoranda were 
discussed and Brigadiers were directed to go into them categorically with their subordinate 
commanders. 
 
2. The following points were agreed upon: 
  
 (a) Every opportunity should be taken for giving instructions to Lewis Gunners on lines 
laid down in No. 3 ‘Notes on Recent Fighting’.  In the attack Lewis Guns should be pushed 
up boldly in order to give supporting fire to the advancing infantry in the same manner that 
German Light Machine Guns do, and in the Defence they should be employed to 
counteract the tactics of the German Light Machine Gunner by occupying advanced posts 
in front of the main line of resistance in any particular zone. 
 
 (b) When making a defensive line, a series of defended localities arranged chequerwise to 
afford one another mutual support is preferable to successive long trench lines which 
cannot be garrisoned throughout. 
 
 (c) Obstacles should first be erected between those Defended Localities rather than 
covering the localities themselves with a view to the continuity of the hostile advancing 
line being broken up and the enemy troops held under enfilade fire from the defended 
localities. 
 
 (d) If a withdrawal becomes necessary it should be carried out on the principle laid down 
in FSR for rearguard actions, ie a proportion of troops should be left out in the original 
positions as a covering force while the remainder are withdrawn quietly and systematically 
to a selected position in rear.  When the new position is established then only should 
covering troops be drawn back on to it as rapidly as is found possible or desirable. 
 
 (e) The best means of preventing the turning of flanks is the organisation of the Defence in 
depth and the maintenance of adequate local reserves to deal with unforeseen situations as 
they arise. 
 
 (f) The dispositions of MGs should not be made separately from those of the Infantry but 
in strictest coordination with them.  To enable this to be done the MG Commanders act in 
consultation and mutual agreement with Infantry Commanders. 
 
 (g) The organisation and delivery of local counter attacks must be carried out by the 
subordinate infantry commanders on the spot.  All subordinate commanders, therefore, 
should be trained and encouraged to act on their own initiative and responsibility.  Such 
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action on their part should never be allowed to pass without commendation or 
acknowledgement. 
 
 (h)  During a fight, all Brigadiers should have at their HQrs selected liaison officers from 
each Battalion who should be freely used for personal reconnaissances whenever 
necessary. 
  HQrs should be organised into two echelons so that during movement, forward or 
backward, control is never lost or communication cut. 
 
 (i) Arrangements for the collection and disposal of battle stragglers must be made at all 
times by whatever formation may be in general or local reserve. 
 
20/4/18       [signed] Black Lieut. Col. 
         General Staff, 40
th
 Division 
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Appendix Six 
Persons Principally Mentioned in the Text 
Note: The key sources for all of the entries below are the Army List and the London Gazette. 
Any additional sources are given at the end of each entry as appropriate. 
 
 
John Amery-Parkes (1897-1918): educated Wellington School; joined 2
nd
 Battalion 
Middlesex Regiment from RMC Sandhurst, June 1915; posted to 23 Coy Machine Gun Corps 
[MGC], January 1916; lieutenant, November 1916; 2iC 121 Coy MGC, February 1917; CO 
119 Coy MGC, July 1917; captain, August 1917; major, February 1918; wounded, 9 April 
1918; died 30 April; MC, April 1918. 
 
Richard John Andrews (1887-1923): born Hackney (not “a Scot” as stated by Crozier, Brass 
Hat, p. 142); educated City of London School; poulterer; lance-sergeant 128
th
 Company 
(Westminster Dragoons), Imperial Yeomanry, South Africa; Queen’s South Africa Medal; 
engineering staff, Antofagasta and Bolivian Railway (no evidence of service in Chilean Amy 
- see obit. The Times, 19 January 1923 probably by Crozier); arrived Liverpool from Chile 13 
January 1915, listed as ‘civil engineer’; enlisted 14th Battalion Royal Fusiliers (London 
Scottish), 18 January 1915; second-lieutenant, 2
nd
 Battalion Devonshire Regiment, 1 May 
1916; part of battalion’s battle reserve 1 July 1916; acting captain 2 July 1916; MC August 
1916; acting Major and 2iC, 17
th
 Battalion Welsh Regiment, 18 April 1917; DSO June 1917 
for work at La Vacquerie; acting lieutenant-colonel, July 1917; lieutenant-colonel, October 
1917; wounded at Bourlon Wood, November 1917; CO 13
th
 Battalion East Lancashire 
Regiment, October-November 1918; Chief Liaison Officer, Onega River Column, North 
Russian Expeditionary Force, April-July 1919; prisoner July 1919-April 1920; relinquished 
commission October 1920; CO G Company, Auxiliary Division, Royal Irish Constabulary, 
October 1920-January 1921.  Starrett’s description of Andrews in Batman was “a machine 
that never ran down”.  
Personal file TNA WO 339/59109. 
 
Herbert Clifford Bernard (1865-1916): was educated at Llandovery School and Derby 
Grammar School; graduated from the Royal Military College and was gazetted into the 
Hampshire Regiment in 1884.  Next year he transferred to the Indian Army and saw active 
service in the Burmese Expedition 1885-89, the Burmese War 1889-92 and the Chinuk 
Expedition 1901. CO Rattray’s Sikhs from 1909-1914 when he retired from the Indian Army. 
Short obituaries in the Belfast News-Letter, 7 July 1916 and 13 July 1916. 
 
Robert Benzie DSO** (1874-1930): of Methlick, Aberdeenshire; served an apprenticeship 
with Alan S. Weir, Chemist, Kemnay, Aberdeenshire; occupation ‘Merchant’; sailed for 
Ceylon February 1899; by 1914 Second-Lieutenant, F Company, Ceylon Planters Rifle 
Corps; captain CPRC by 1916; served at Gallipoli; captain Scottish Rifles, June 1916; major 
12
th
 Battalion South Wales Borderers, April 1917; lieutenant-colonel 12
th
 South Wales 
Borderers, May 1917; DSO January 1918; bar to DSO February 1918; second bar to DSO 
July 1918; relinquished commission March 1919; sailed for Ceylon August 1926. W.R. 
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Birdwood, Khaki and Gown (London: Ward Locke, 1941), p. 244, describes how the CPRC 
was made up of keen and well educated men and how he obtained commissions for all of 
them except one. 
 
Alan Bryant (1869-1917): was gazetted second-lieutenant, Gloucestershire Regiment March 
1890 from the Royal Military College; lieutenant, 1891; captain, February 1890; major, 
October 1911; South African War, Queen’s Medal (3 clasps).  In 1902 he was “seconded 
whilst a student at the Staff College”. Between 1904 and 1907 he acted as Brigade-Major 
[BM], 12 Brigade, 6
th
 Division and BM, 8 Brigade, 4
th
 Division, Southern Command; from 
July 1908-July1912 he was GSO2 Coastal Defences, Eastern Command; from November 
1912 he was GSO2, Military College of Canada. In December 1914 he was appointed GSO2 
and, in December 1915, GSO1, 18
th
 Division until September 1916 although his last signature 
in the war diary is in June.  From October-December 1916 he was GSO1, 56
th
 (1
st
 London) 
Division. He was MiD January 1916; DSO, January 1917.  His medal card states that he first 
landed in France in October 1916 but this is clearly incorrect. After commanding the 17
th
 
Battalion Welsh Regiment he took command of 9
th
 Battalion Northumberland Fusiliers in the 
Ypres Salient on 2 October 1917.  On 17 October 1917 his HQ dugout was hit by a shell 
killing him, his adjutant, medical officer and intelligence officer.   
Gloucester Echo, 1 November 1899 and 23 October 1917. 
 
Philip Thomas Buston CB CMG DSO (1853-1938): of Tilstock Lodge, Whitchurch, 
Shropshire, had retired from the Royal Engineers with the honorary rank of Brigadier-General 
in 1910. He had seen active service in Afghanistan, the Hazara expeditions and in the Second 
Boer War. He was a member of the Shropshire T.F. Association Committee and was 
appointed to the staff of Western Command in November 1914.  
Western Mail, 15 July 1915; England and Wales National Probate Calendar online at 
www.ancestry.co.uk. 
 
John Campbell (1871-1941): was educated Haileybury College, RMC; second-lieutenant 1
st
 
Cameron Highlanders, 1892; lieutenant 1893; captain 1898; served Sudan, 1898 (MiD, 
brevet-major); South Africa, 1900-1; DSO, 1901; Staff College, 1902-3; staff captain, 1904-5; 
BM Aldershot, 1905-8; School of Musketry, Hythe, 1909-13; CO 2
nd
 Battalion Cameron 
Highlanders, January-May 1915 (wounded Hooge); GOC 121 Brigade, October 1915-May 
1918; CMG, 1915; GOC 31
st
 Division, May 1918-1919; CB, 1918; GOC 11 Brigade, 1919-
1921; retired, 1921.  
Professor John Bourne personal communication. 
 
Thomas Astley Cubitt (1871-1939): was commissioned into the Royal Artillery in 1891 and 
served in West Africa and Northern Nigeria where he was Crozier’s CO for a period. He was 
one of the witnesses at Crozier’s second (public) wedding.  The start of the Great War found 
him in Somaliland where he served until transferring to the Western Front in 1916, rising to 
command 38
th
 (Welsh) Division from May 1918.  His final appointment was as Governor of 
Bermuda.  
Who Was Who. 
 
Ernest William Parry Davies (1891-?): educated at Wycliffe College. Applied for a 
temporary commission on 6 May 1915; lieutenant; transferred from the ASC (40
th
 Divisional 
Train) to the 18
th
 Welsh (attached 40
th
 Divisional HQ) on 6 Dec 1917 (which is the likely date 
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of his involvement the ‘The Gamecocks’) and was posted to the 24th Welsh on 25 May 1918 
on the reduction of the Division. He contributed a photograph of ‘The Gamecocks’ and one of 
himself in female costume to Sir Ernest Swinton, Twenty Years After: The Battlefields of 
1914-18, Then and Now, (London: George Newnes, no date), Volume One, p.436. 
Personal File TNA WO 339/1403. 
 
Maurice Fitzmaurice Day (1878-1952): educated at Oakham School and Pembroke College, 
Cambridge; private Suffolk Regiment (Cambridge Volunteers) South Africa 1900-1; second-
lieutenant KOYLI, July 1901; lieutenant, December 1905; adjutant, 2
nd
 Battalion King’s Own 
Yorkshire Light Infantry, April 1911; captain, January 1912; seconded to staff appointment, 
August 1914; major, May 1915; MC, June 1915; BM 107 Brigade, 36
th
 (Ulster) Division). In 
1917 he went on to the American Military Mission for the duration of the war and remained 
as Military Attaché at the British Embassy in Washington. GSO2 and lieutenant-colonel 
October 1927. He was also an Irish tennis international.  
Cambridge Independent Press, 10 May 1901. 
 
James Henry Richard Downes-Powell (c.1874-1958): a solicitor and Welsh-speaker.  He 
was admitted to the Middle Temple in 1911 and in July 1914 was selected as the unionist 
candidate to contest East Denbighshire at the next General Election.  In September 1914 as 
“late Lt. Imperial Yeomanry” he was commissioned lieutenant, Glamorgan Yeomanry; 
captain, Glamorgan Yeomanry, November 1914; seconded as a staff captain (formation 
unknown) July 1915; major and 2iC 19
th
 Battalion Royal Welsh Fusiliers, October 1916. 
After being replaced as CO 19
th
 Battalion RWF he was seconded and in November 1918 was 
Director for Wales and Monmouthshire of the Appointments Department, Ministry of Labour. 
He relinquished his commission in July 1919, was granted the rank of lieutenant-colonel and 
went on to be Chairman of Bevan & Co., Cardiff; a successful dog breeder, JP and Chair of 
Penarth Urban District Council.   
Western Mail, 3 November 1945. 
 
Cyril Bentham Falls CBE (1888-1971): joined the 11
th
 Battalion Royal Inniskilling Fusiliers 
and served on 36
th
 Division’s General Staff.  He became a military historian and journalist, 
military correspondent for The Times, 1939-53, and Chichele Professor of Military History at 
All Souls College, Oxford, 1946-53.  
Oxford Dictionary of National Biography. 
 
William Brooksbank Garnett (1875-1946): educated at Charterhouse; joined Inland 
Revenue; second-lieutenant 24
th
 Battalion Middlesex Regiment (Post Office Rifles), 1895; 
lieutenant, 1897; second-lieutenant 1
st
 Battalion Royal Welsh Fusiliers, 1900; to half pay (ill 
health), 1908; captain and adjutant, April 1913; CO 20
th
 Battalion Royal Fusiliers, August 
1916 – February 1917; CO 2nd Battalion Royal Welsh Fusiliers, October – December 1917 
and January – April 1918; GOC 121 Brigade, May - September 1918; retired 1927; High 
Sheriff County Tyrone, 1941.  According to Siegfried Sassoon he was “indulgent and 
conciliatory” and “greater aggressiveness would have been preferred” – quoted in 
Hodgkinson, Battalion Commanders, p. 136. 
 
Guy Vernon Goodliffe (1883-1963): educated at Charterhouse and Magdalen College, 
Oxford; played first-class cricket for Oxford University and minor counties cricket for 
Berkshire; played soccer for Oxford University 1902-3; lieutenant, 1
st
 Battalion Royal 
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Fusiliers, November 1909; captain, 1
st
 Battalion RF, December 1914; acting major, August 
1916; MC, January 1917; BM,119 Brigade, February 1917 to April 1918; GSO2, VIII Corps, 
April 1918; brevet major, Reserve of Officers,  June 1918; “Instructor of English at a French 
Military School”, November 1920. Goodliffe’s account of the 2nd Battalion Royal Fusiliers’ 
attack at Beaumont Hamel on 1
st
 July 1916 is in TNA: CAB 45/189 and is quoted in Paul 
Kendall, Somme 1916: Success and Failure on the First Day of the Battle of the Somme 
(Barnsley: Frontline, 2015), p. 171. 
 
Jocelyn Henry Clive ‘Harry’ Graham (1874-1936): actor, author, lyricist, screenwriter and 
wit. Educated at Eton and the Royal Military College; second-lieutenant Coldstream Guards, 
1895; seconded as ADC to Lord Minto, Governor General of Canada 1899 and again in 1903. 
Retired and was Private Secretary to Lord Rosebery; rejoined regiment in 1914; ADC to John 
Ponsonby, October 1917; relinquished appointment, February 1919. Best known today as the 
author (under the pseudonym Col. D. Streamer) of Ruthless Rhymes for Heartless Homes 
(London: Edward Arnold, 1899) and Perverted Proverbs: A Manual of Immorals for the 
Many (New York: R.H. Russell, 1903).   
Personal file, TNA WO 374/28451; Obituary The Times, 31 October 1936; Who Was Who; 
Oxford Dictionary of National Biography. 
 
Hugh Gilbert Gregorie (1878-1928): son of Charles Frederick Gregorie (1834-1918; major-
general 1890, Colonel in Chief, Royal Irish Regiment 1897). Gregorie served briefly with 
TMI in South Africa, transferred to the Imperial Light Infantry and was gazetted second-
lieutenant Royal Irish Regiment on 26 October 1900. He was Mentioned in Despatches 9 
November 1900, gazetted lieutenant 1903, captain 1908, major 1915, lieutenant-colonel 1916 
and brigadier-general November 1917.  
 
George Meredyth Grogan (1867-1942): second lieutenant 1
st
 Battalion Royal Irish 
Regiment (from 5
th
 Battalion Royal Dublin Fusiliers, Militia), July 1890,; lieutenant, August 
1891; captain, May 1899; adjutant 5
th
 Royal Irish Regiment (militia), July 1906; major, 1907; 
retired, August 1909; Railway Transport Officer, August 1914; CO 5
th
 Battalion Royal Irish 
Regiment (Pioneers), January 1916-May 1918, service in Gallipoli and Salonika; DSO, 
January 1917. 
 
John Richardson Heelis (1880-1962): was educated at Dover College and Clare College, 
Cambridge; second-lieutenant, 5
th
 Battalion Manchester Regiment, May 1900; transferred to 
1
st
 Manchester, May 1901; lieutenant, December 1901; West African Frontier Force, 1907-9; 
in India 1911; captain, 1912; to France 28 August 1914 as captain and adjutant, 1
st
 Battalion 
Manchester Regiment; wounded; MC June 1915; brigade major, 182 Infantry Brigade, 61
st
 
Division, October 1915 to April 1917; CO 18
th
 Battalion Welsh Regiment, May-July 1917; 
MiD three times; served post-war in Iraq and India; lieutenant-colonel, 2
nd
 Battalion 
Manchester Regiment, November 1925; retired May 1930.  
Personal File TNA WO 76/207/42; 1901 Census at www.ancestry.uk. 
 
Percy Frederick Hone (1878-1940): educated at Blackheath School and Downing College 
Cambridge; Private, Cambridge University Rifles Volunteers 1898-1900; Trooper Southern 
Rhodesia Volunteers 1900-1902; Mines Dept, British South Africa Company’s Civil Service, 
S. Rhodesia 1900-1905; author Southern Rhodesia (London: George Bell, 1909); “Secretary 
for Viscount Rhondda’s American Interests”, pre-1914; private, Cardiff Exchange Volunteers, 
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August 1914; lieutenant, 17
th
 Battalion Welsh Regiment, 12 January 1915; captain’ 17th 
Welsh, 16 January 1915; staff captain 119 Brigade, 5 October 1915; brigade-major, 119 
Brigade, 13 December 1917; Lieutenant-Colonel 21
st
 Battalion Middlesex Regiment, May 
1918; Lieutenant-Colonel, 13
th
 Battalion Durham Light Infantry, 16-26 October 1918, when 
seriously wounded; MiD, May 1917 and June 1920; MC January 1918; bar to MC, February 
1918; second bar to MC, September 1918; DSO, January 1919; bar to DSO, February 1919; 
relinquished commission due to ill-health caused by wounds, December 1919;  Commissioner 
National Savings Committee, 1919-38. Head ARP Warden, West Horsley 1939-40. Died 19 
April 1940 by an accidental fall into a chalk-pit.  
Personal File TNA WO 339/22723. Report of inquest, Surrey Advertiser, 27 April 1940. 
 
Charles Beauman Hore (1879-1965): was given command of the 17
th
 Battalion Welsh 
Regiment after Lieutenant-Colonel Wilkie was killed by a shell in October 1916; educated 
Shrewsbury School; second-lieutenant Royal Warwickshire Regiment (RWR) ‘from the 
militia’ April 1900; lieutenant RWR August 1900, captain RWR July 1908; adjutant Special 
Reserve May 1912; served South Africa 1899-1901, Queen’s S.A. Medal (4 clasps); major 
RWR September 1915; 2iC 12
th
 Battalion South Wales Borderers, December 1915; temp CO 
10
th
 Battalion Royal Welsh Fusiliers, 4
th
 Oct 1916; CO 17
th
 Battalion Welsh Regiment, 27 
October 1916; Acting Lieutenant-Colonel 2
nd
 Battalion Royal Welsh Fusiliers, March - 
September 1917; Company Commander No. 5 Officers Instructional School December 1918; 
major RWR, retired pay November 1926. 
 
Robert Ingelow Bradshaw Johnson (1874 – 1955): educated All Saints College, Bathurst, 
Sydney; second-lieutenant New South Wales Defence Force 2
nd
 Regiment, 1895; transferred 
to UK to Loyal North Lancashire Regiment, June 1896; transferred to 2
nd
 Battalion Royal 
Welsh Fusiliers, September 1896; lieutenant, August 1898; served Crete (1898), China (1901-
2), India and Burma (1902-14); captain, June 1905; retired , December 1913; major 8
th
 
Battalion Royal Welsh Fusiliers, September 1914; lieutenant-colonel 8
th
 Battalion Welsh 
Regiment (Pioneers), November 1915-November 1917; served at Gallipoli and in 
Mesopotamia; MiD and DSO 1917; CO 13
th
 Battalion East Lancashire Regiment, June-
November 1918; killed in car collision with a train in New Zealand, 1955.  
Personal File TNA WO 76/230/31. 
 
James Gwyther Jones (1887-1965): a commercial traveller / draper from Swansea. He 
enlisted in the Glamorgan Yeomanry as a private in September 1914 but was recommended 
for commission by Grant-Thorold and joined the 18
th
 Battalion Welsh Regiment in March 
1915.  He was wounded at Bourlon Wood on 23 November 1917 and left the army in March 
1919.  
Personal File TNA WO 339/27676.  
 
Brian John Jones (1874-1918): a grandson of Sir Theophilus Shepstone and the son of a 
Royal Artillery officer, after a private education Jones was gazetted second-lieutenant (1894); 
lieutenant (1896); captain (1900); major ( 1915); lieutenant-colonel (November 1915). He 
was awarded the Queen’s South Africa Medal (3 clasps) and the King’s Medal (2 clasps), 
mentioned in despatches for his Great War service twice (London Gazettes, 14 January 1916 
and 25 May 1917) and awarded the DSO (London Gazette, 14 January 1916) and Bar 
(London Gazette , 10 March 1919). He took command of the 6
th
 Battalion Leinster Regiment 
on 28 August 1918 just before their disbandment, then took over the 15
th
 Battalion Royal Irish 
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Rifles and was killed in action on 22 October 1918.  His second wound probably occurred 
during the Second battle of Ypres when the 1
st
 Leinsters were heavily engaged but the 
battalion war diary is sparse for this period. According to Beynon Davies, (Ar Orwell Pell, p. 
35) Jones was respected and was an authority on Marlborough’s wars.  
De Ruvigny’s Roll of Honour, 1914-1919, Volume 5, p.94. 
 
William Kennedy (1885–1917): an unlikely soldier; son of a Lanarkshire textile 
manufacturer; educated at the High School of Glasgow and Glasgow University.  He shone 
academically, winning prizes at school and university; graduated MA, 1907; First-Class 
Honours Economic Science, 1909; research student London School of Economics, 1910; DSc 
(Econ) London University; studied in Germany 1913; taught at Wren’s College and the LSE 
1914; Inns of Court OTC, December 1914; captain, 18
th
 Battalion Highland Light Infantry, 
April 1915; MC October 1916 for action near Longueval – “He handled his company with 
great skill in the defence of his part of the line.  He organised men from various regiments 
who were retiring before a counter-attack.  Though himself wounded, he remained at his post, 
and was mainly responsible for repulsing a counter-attack”; major, February 1917; acting 
lieutenant-colonel, July 1917; killed at Bourlon Wood, 23 November 1917.  
Glasgow University Roll of Honour at http://www.universitystory.gla.ac.uk/ww1-
biography/?id=478. Personal File TNA WO 339/29287. 
 
Charles Henry Kitching (1881-1952): commissioned from RMC as second-lieutenant 
Worcestershire Regiment, January 1901; lieutenant, 1902; captain, 1910; resigned 
commission February, 1912; major, 15
th
 Battalion Hampshire Regiment, March 1916; CO (as 
major) 12
th 
(Reserve) Battalion East Surrey Regiment, September-October 1916; lieutenant-
colonel 18
th
 Battalion King’s Royal Rifle Corps, December 1916-September 1917; DSO, June 
1917; 2iC Officer Cadet Unit (unidentified), March-April 1918; CO 12
th
 Battalion  North 
Staffordshire Regiment, July-August 1918; CO 4
th
 (Extra Reserve) Battalion West Yorkshire 
Regiment, October-November 1918; Commandant Reception Camp, November 1918. 
 
Rowland Broughton Mainwaring CMG (1850-1926): of Park Hall, Longton, Staffs, had an 
active career with the Royal Welsh Fusiliers, serving in the Ashanti, Burmese and Hazara 
campaigns and the Second Boer War and was the author of Historical Record of the Royal 
Welch Fusiliers…(London: Hatchlands, 1889). He retired with the rank of colonel in 1905 but 
found employment as GOC 68
th 
(Welsh) Division from January-November 1915. He was 
declared bankrupt in July 1916. 
 
Reginald Walter May (1896-1969): educated at Towcester Grammar School and 
Westminster College; second-lieutenant 12
th
 Battalion Suffolk Regiment, August 1915; 
transferred to 18
th
 Battalion Welsh Regiment, April 1916; lieutenant, March 1917; 119 
Brigade Acting Intelligence Officer, April 1917; 119 Brigade Intelligence Officer, June 1917; 
MC, January 1918; MiD;  Acting Staff Captain 119 Brigade, February 1918; Staff Captain, 
119 Brigade, May 1918; dismissed the service by sentence of a General Court-Martial found 
guilty of ‘scandalous conduct’, October 1928.  
TNA WO 90/8 Register of General Courts Martial. Northampton Mercury, 11 January 1918. 
 
Herbert Charles Metcalfe (1864-1940): RMC Sandhurst 1884-85; lieutenant, 2
nd
 Battalion 
Northamptonshire Regiment 1885; ADC to Governor of Hong Kong, 1886-87; seconded as 
lieutenant 1
st
 Perak Sikhs (an ‘armed police force’ in NW Malaya), 1892-1895; Deputy 
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Commissioner, Perak Police to 1897; captain, Northamptonshire Regiment 1894; District 
Inspector of Musketry, Scottish Command, 1899; District Inspector of Musketry, Irish 
Command, 1900; retired, November 1902; Chief Constable of West Suffolk, 1902; Chief 
Constable of West Riding of Yorkshire, 1905; Chief Constable of Somerset, 1908; major, 3
rd
 
Battalion Northamptonshire Regiment, December 1914; Staff Officer, Musketry, 1
st
 Thames 
and Medway Special Reserve Brigade, July 1915; duty on lines of communication, France, 
August 1917; CO 20 Infantry Base Depot, Etaples, September-December 1917; CO 21
st
 
Battalion Middlesex Regiment, 18 December 1917; seriously wounded 11 April 1918; DSO, 
May 1918; Bar to DSO, May 1918; MiD November 1918; CO 3rd Battalion 
Northamptonshire Regiment, November 1918; demobilised, May 1919; King’s Police Medal, 
1931; Deputy Lieutenant, Somerset, 1932; retired as Chief Constable of Somerset, 1939.  
Metcalfe had tried to get a command early in the war when he wrote to Sir Ian Hamilton 
“Dear Sir Ian – You may not remember me as Asst D.I.M. to Congreve at Aldershot in 1898 
when my name was submitted to you for a musketry appointment.  I left the service in 1902, 
after holding two such appointments, to take up a County Chief Constableship because being 
then 13
th
 on the list of Captains in my Regiment with 17½ years service I saw no chance of 
ever commanding a battn.  In response to the enclosed WO letter I have offered my services 
and have said that I would be glad to take up a musketry staff or other staff billet.  Forgive me 
for troubling you when I know you must be busy, but if you have a chance, will you very 
kindly say a word for me.  The county authorities have given me leave to take up a military 
duty if I am wanted.  I send you copies of my testimonials. Yours v. truly, H.C. Metcalfe – 
PS, General Chapman, Cmdr Scottish District, gave me a very good ‘chit’.  It is now at the 
WO with my offer.  [signed] HCM” – Kings College, London: Liddell Hart Archive: 
Hamilton Correspondence, letter, 25 October 1914.  Hamilton replied “I shall be glad to take 
an early opportunity of reminding people of your existence.  Personally I am purely a 
Training and Operations man for Territorials and have no patronage at my disposal. Hoping 
you will get something suitable in due course”. – Hamilton Correspondence, letter 26 October 
1914. Metcalfe’s eventual arrival at 119 Brigade seems to be due entirely to John Ponsonby: 
“Metcalfe from the Base who was on my staff at Chatham has joined me.  I wrote for him to 
come out and command a battalion – I hope he will be able to stick it. He is a hard nut, but as 
he is now well over 50, it will be a bit of a trial for him, but he is just the right sort that I 
want” – TNA: WO 95/2594 War diary 40th Division GS, Ponsonby Diary, 13 Decembers 
1917.  
TNA WO 95/2615, War Diary 21
st
 Middlesex; Obituary, Somerset County Gazette, 20 
January 1940. 
 
David Watts Morgan (1867-1933): a miners’ leader and politician active in the Rhondda 
Labour and Liberal Association. He was a Glamorgan County Councillor from 1903 and a 
magistrate from 1914. He joined the 10
th
 Battalion Welsh Regiment (1
st
 Rhondda) as a private 
and was commissioned in October 1914.  He was active in promoting recruiting to several 
South Wales battalions. See Oxford Dictionary of National Biography: Morgan, David Watts 
for a detailed biography and his service after 1916.  He became a MP in 1918. 
 
Anthony John Muirhead (1890–1939): educated at Eton and Magdalen College, Oxford; 
University of Oxford OTC; second-lieutenant, Oxfordshire Yeomanry, August 1914; 
lieutenant, Oxfordshire Yeomanry, March 1915; ADC to Major-General R. Fanshawe, 48
th
 
(South Midland Division), October 1915; lieutenant, June 1916; captain, May 1917; MC, June 
1917; GSO3, 48
th
 Division, September 1917; BM, 119 Brigade, April 1918; bar to MC, 
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February 1919; MiD three times; brevet major, January 1919; ‘Chief of Staff’ with Crozier, 
Lithuania, 1919-20; appointed to DAA & QMG’s Department, TF, April 1920; major, 100 
Field Brigade, RA, Territorial Army, December 1924; elected MP for Wells, 1929; 
Parliamentary Private Secretary to Minister of Agriculture, 1931-35; Parliamentary Secretary 
to Minister of Labour, 1935; lieutenant-colonel, 100 Field Brigade, RA, August 1936; Under-
Secretary of State for Air, 1937-38; transferred as Lieutenant-Colonel to 53 Anti-Tank 
Regiment, TA, November 1938; Under-Secretary of State for India and Burma, 1938-39; 
committed suicide, 29 October 1939.  
Obituary, The Times, 30 October 1939.  
 
Ernest Robert O’Connor (1886 - ?): started the war as CSM 2nd Battalion Grenadier Guards 
after 14 years and 119 days in the ranks; second-lieutenant Manchester Regiment, January 
1915; lieutenant, June 1915; adjutant, January 1916; captain (supernumerary) Royal Munster 
Fusiliers, July 1916; acting major/Chief Instructor, Musketry and Reinforcement Camp, 
September 1917 – June 1918; acting major/2iC 13th Battalion Royal Inniskilling Fusiliers, 19 
August 1918; acting lieutenant-colonel 12
th
 Battalion North Staffordshire Regiment, 24 
October 1918 – 23 June 1919; MC, October 1918; captain 3rd (Reserve) Battalion Royal 
Munster Fusiliers, August 1919. 
 
Thomas Kenyon Pardoe (1873-1946): second-lieutenant 2
nd
 (Volunteer) Battalion 
Worcestershire Regiment, 1899; South Africa (Queen’s Medal 3 clasps, King’s Medal 2 
clasps); second-lieutenant 1
st
 Battalion Worcestershire Regiment from 2
nd
 (Volunteer) 
Battalion, 1901; seconded as Adjutant of Indian volunteers, June 1907; captain, September 
1908; BEF, November 1914; wounded Neuve Chapelle, March 1915; major, September 1915; 
Assistant Embarkation Staff Officer, January 1916; CO 2
nd
 Battalion Worcestershire 
Regiment from June 1916 – July 1917 (wounded) and again from April – June 1918 
(wounded); CO 12
th
 Battalion North Staffordshire Regiment, June 1918; Assistant 
Embarkation Staff Officer, December 1918; Embarkation Staff Officer, January 1919; 
Assistant Embarkation Staff Officer, July 1919; retired, 1920; lieutenant-colonel Movement 
Control Staff March 1924; no longer eligible for recall, 1928. 
 
William Elliot Peyton (1866–1931): educated Brighton College; enlisted 7th Dragoon 
Guards, 1885; second-lieutenant, 1887; lieutenant, 1892; adjutant, 1892-96; captain 15
th
 
Hussars, 1896, Egyptian Army, 1896-1898; Dongola Expedition, 1896; MiD, 1896; Nile 
Expeditions, 1897 (wounded) and 1898; DSO, 1898; Special Service Officer, South Africa 
1900; MiD, 1901; brevet lieutenant-colonel, 1905; colonel, 1907; AQMG, HQ India, 1907-8; 
CO Meerut Cavalry Brigade, 1908-12; Military Secretary to C-in-C India, 1912-14; GSO1 1
st
 
Mounted Yeomanry, TF, Home Defence, 1914; CO 2
nd
 Mounted Division, Gallipoli, 1915; 
MiD twice, 1915; GOC Western Frontier Force, Egypt, 1916; Military Secretary GHQ BEF, 
May 1916-April 1918; KCB, 1917; GOC Reserve Army; April-July 1918; GOC 40
th
 Division, 
July 1918-March 1919; later served Rhine Army, India and again as Military Secretary; 
lieutenant-general, 1921; full general, 1927; GOC Scottish Command to retirement, 1930. 
 
James Frederick Plunkett (1878–1953): the son and grandson of rankers; probably joined 
Royal Irish Regiment as drummer boy c.1891; attended Kneller Hall (proficiency as cornet 
player ‘good’), left October 1893; RSM, 2nd Battalion, Royal Irish Regiment by 1914; DCM, 
December 1914; MC, January 1915; second-lieutenant, Royal Irish Regiment, June 1915; 
captain, Middlesex Regiment, February 1916; major, Suffolk Regiment, October 1916; 
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lieutenant-colonel, Royal Welsh Fusiliers, August 1917; DSO, January 1918; bar to DSO; 
February 1918; second bar to DSO, July 1918; lieutenant-colonel, Royal Inniskilling 
Fusiliers, June 1918; MiD ten times 1914-18; brevet major, June 1919; captain and brevet 
major, East Lancashire Regiment, October 1920; to half pay list on account of ill-health, 
November 1922; retired December 1922; Military Knight of Windsor, May 1930. 
Information on Plunkett at Kneller Hall from Stephen Mason, personal communication. 
 
John Ponsonby (1866–1952): educated Eton; second-lieutenant, Royal Irish Rifles from 3rd 
Battalion Sherwood Foresters (Derby Regiment), 1887; second-lieutenant, Coldstream 
Guards, 1888; lieutenant, 1891, captain, 1898; major 1904; lieutenant-colonel, 1
st
 Battalion 
Coldstream Guards, October 1913; brigadier-general 2
nd
 Guards Brigade, August 1915; GOC 
1
st
 Thames and Medway Reserve Brigade, December 1916; GOC 21
st
 Brigade, 30
th
 Division 
8-18 March 1917; GOC 2
nd
 Guards Brigade, 21 March 1917; GOC 40
th
 Division, 24 August 
1917; GOC 5
th
 Division, July 1918; GOC Madras District 1922-26; colonel, Suffolk 
Regiment, 1925-1939; CO 7
th
 Cumberland Battalion Home Guard, 1940-41; Uganda, 1888-
89; Matabeleland, 1893-94; South Africa 1889-1902; DSO, 1900; CMG, 1915, KCB, 1927. 
 
Robert Emile Shepherd Prentice CB CMG DSO (1872-1953): a professional soldier. He 
was commissioned into the Highland Light Infantry from Sandhurst in 1892, served on 
India’s North West Frontier 1897-98 and as a major was Staff Captain, Eastern Counties 
Regimental District, 1905-8, and No.9 District Eastern Command, 1908-9. After his service 
with 119 Brigade he commanded 2nd Battalion Highland Light Infantry until 16 July 1916 
when he left to be GOC 1
st
 Naval Brigade (later 188 Brigade), 63
rd
 Royal Naval Division, 
until 15 December 1917. He retired from the army in 1928.   
The Scotsman, 20 February 1915. 
 
Charles Stewart Pritchard (1861-1942): for his work in South Africa Prichard was awarded 
the Queen’s Medal (4 clasps) and the King’s Medal (2 clasps). His DSO was gazetted on 26 
June 1902.  He was promoted to Major in 1901, Lieutenant-Colonel in 1911 and Colonel in 
December 1914.  After his service with 119 Brigade he was briefly placed on the half-pay list 
before being ‘Attached to Hd-Qtr Units’ on 18 September 1916 – presumably within Northern 
Command as he was fined nineteen guineas for having an unshaded light on an air-raid night 
on 13 October 1916 at Patrington, East Yorkshire (Flight, 19 October 1916, p.10). On 22 May 
1918 he was placed in command of No. 9 District, Eastern Command until 7 November that 
year when he reverted to half-pay.  
Buckinghamshire Herald, 26 June1942. 
 
Sidney Walter Pugh (1883-1943): born in Talgarth, Brecon and emigrated to Canada in 
1903, passed through the Canadian Military School in 1908 and was lieutenant in the 90
th
 
Winnipeg Rifles. He returned to Wales before the start of the war and acted as Canadian 
Government Special Representative for Wales and European Inspector of Canadian 
Government Agents.  He was invalided back from France in July 1917, presumably returned 
to Canada and made at least one more trip to the UK in August 1918.  He returned to Canada 
with his family in February 1923.  
Brecon and Radnor Express, 17 January 1918 and ‘Canadian Ocean Arrivals, 1919-24’ at 
www.ancestry.com. 
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John Edward Bernard Seely (1868-1947): educated at Harrow and Trinity College 
Cambridge. Joined Hampshire Yeomanry and served for eighteen months in South Africa. 
“His remarkable courage, although it occasionally brought hi into conflict with authority, won 
him distinction and several decorations”. Elected MP for Isle of Wight in 1900. DSO 1900. 
Lieutenant-Colonel Hampshire Yeomanry 1907. Appointed Secretary of State for War 1912 
and resigned the office following his poor handling of the Curragh Mutiny. Brigadier-General 
1915. Commanded Canadian Cavalry Brigade 1915-1918.  Major-General July 1918. CB 
1916; CMG 1918.  Resigned from the Army 1923. Created first Baron Mottistone, 1933. 
Oxford Dictionary of National Biography: Seely, John Edward Bernard, first Baron 
Mottistone (1868-1947). 
 
Arthur Granville Soames (1886-1962): after his time as Brigade Major 119 Brigade he 
served as a GSO2 (unit unknown) and Brigade Major, No.2 Training (Reserve) Brigade. He 
retired on grounds of ill-health on 3 December 1919.  He was Sheriff of Buckinghamshire in 
1926 and 1927.  He divorced twice and married three times.  His son Arthur Christopher John 
Soames (1920-1987) was a prominent Conservative politician (later Baron Soames) who 
married Mary, youngest daughter of Sir Winston Churchill, in 1947.  Their son Nicholas 
(1948- ) is the current Member of Parliament for Mid-Sussex. 
Oxford Dictionary of National Biography: Soames, (Arthur) Christopher John, Baron Soames 
(1920-1977). 
 
Harold Stuart Tew (1869-1945): educated at Clifton; second-lieutenant, East Surrey 
Regiment, March, 1889; lieutenant, June 1891; captain, June 1896; South Africa (Queen’s 
Medal 5 clasps, King’s Medal 2 clasps), MiD, February 1901; brevet major, October 1901; 
adjutant, 1
st
 Surrey Rifle Volunteers, July 1902; transferred from 2
nd
 East Surrey (India) to 1
st
 
East Surrey (Plymouth), February 1909; BEF, August 1914, wounded at Le Cateau; OC 1
st
 
Battalion East Surrey Regiment (as Major), September-October 1914; brevet lieutenant-
colonel, February 1915; lieutenant-colonel 1
st
 Battalion East Surrey Regiment, June 1915-
June 1916; CMG, January 1916; CO 9
th
 Battalion East Surrey Regiment, September-October 
1916 (invalided); CO a Yeomanry Cyclists Battalion (unidentified), October 1917 – February 
1918; CO 3
rd
 (Special Reserve) Battalion East Surrey Regiment, February-July 1918; CO 12
th
 
Battalion North Staffordshire Regiment, July 1918; (remainder of career not traced); reached 
age limit and ceased to belong to Reserve of Officers, February 1924. 
 
Herbert Lawton Warden (1877-1946): educated at George Heriot’s School, Edinburgh 
1889-92; second –lieutenant, Queen’s Rifle Volunteer Brigade, the Royal Scots, 1903; 
lieutenant, 1905; captain 1907; Signalling Officer, Lothian Territorial Infantry Brigade, 1908-
10; resigned commission, 4
th
 Battalion Royal Scots, TF, 1912; major, 16
th
 Battalion Royal 
Scots, December 1914; lieutenant-colonel while Commandant, Divisional School, October 
1916 – January 1917; CO 25th Battalion Northumberland Fusiliers, July 1917; CO 13th 
Battalion East Surrey Regiment, August 1917; DSO, February 1918; Bar to DSO September 
1918; MiD three times; relinquished commission, March 1919; Regional Director, War 
Pensions 1919-25; CBE 1924; Deputy Lieutenant, County of Edinburgh, 1942; solicitor; 
freemason.  
TNA WO 339/18296. The Scotsman, 28 November 1942, 
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Eric Edward Allen Whitworth MC (1889-1971): left Radley School in 1908, graduated 
MA, Cambridge (Trinity College) 1912 and was Assistant Master at Rugby 1913-28. He was 
commander of the school OTC from 1919-28, Headmaster of Bradfield College, 1928-39 and 
Headmaster of Tonbridge School, 1939-49.   
Obituary, The Times, 8 January, 1971. 
 
Charles Joseph Wilkie (1869-1916): born in Australia 8 January 1869 but his mother had 
Welsh connections and he married into a Welsh family; educated at Brighton and at Owen’s 
College, Manchester; commissioned from the 3
rd
 Battalion Sherwood Foresters (Derbyshire 
Regiment) as Second Lieutenant in the Oxfordshire and Buckinghamshire Light Infantry in 
1892; Lt. 1893; Capt. 1894; Tirah Expeditionary Force 1897-8; Commandant Convalescent 
Depot, Commandant Discharge Depot; Station Staff Officer; Acting Bn. Quartermaster for 
two years; invalided home with malaria and dysentery 1899; OC Details Limmerick and 
Buttevant; OC mixed troops Buttevant 1900; Adjutant 6
th
 Provisional Bn Ox & Bucks Light 
Infantry, Fermoy 1901; Brigade Major Cork District for 1901 manoeuvres; Adjutant South 
Middlesex Volunteers and 26
th
 Middlesex (Cyclists) 1902; retired 1907 to Reserve of 
Officers; Brigade Major  South Wales Infantry Brigade (TF) 1908; 1909-14 Secretary 
Glamorgan TF Association; Major 9
th
 Battalion Welsh Regiment, 8 October 1914; 
Lieutenant-Colonel 17
th
 Battalion Welsh Regiment, 26 November 1914; KiA 18 October 
1916.  
De Ruvigny’s Roll of Honour, 1914-1919, Volume 3, p.285. 
 
Arthur Charles White: second-lieutenant, 7
th
 Battalion King’s Own Yorkshire Light 
Infantry, September 1914; captain, December 1914; acting lieutenant-colonel, 7
th
 KOYLI, 
October – November 1916 (invalided); DSO, January 1917; acting lieutenant-colonel, 18th 
Battalion Welsh Regiment, May – June 1917; major, KOYLI “from a service battalion”, 
December 1917; relinquished commission on grounds of ill-health, August 1918. 
 
Hugh Reginald Wood (1880-1958): was by 1914 a Valuer and Boundary Surveyor, Irish 
Civil Service. He was gazetted second–lieutenant, 18th Battalion Welsh Regiment, April 1915; 
lieutenant, June 1915; captain, August 1915; major, September 1915; MiD, April 1917; DSO, 
June 1917.  He was replaced as CO 18
th
 Battalion Welsh Regiment in May 1917 and reverted 
to 2iC.  Just a month later he was wounded and lost his right eye. After his time with the 18
th
 
Welsh he was major in the Training Reserve, May 1918 and relinquished his commission in 
August 1919.  In the Second World War he was Lieutenant-Colonel, 26
th
 Battalion Sussex 
Home Guard and received the OBE.  
Western Mail, 24 May 1917. 
 
 
 
  
335 
 
BIBLIOGRAPHY 
 
Unpublished Sources 
Blair Archives, Blair Castle, Perthshire 
Blair Papers, Bundle 880 - Correspondence of Sir Harold Goodeve Ruggles-Brise 
 
The Imperial War Museum, Department of Documents 
01/9/01 H.A.J. Lamb, Lieutenant RE, Diary 1915-18 
 
07/63/1 C.L. Morgan. Lieutenant, 21st Middlesex. Account written 1972 
 
07/12/1 C.M. Dunn, Captain 17
th
 Welsh.  Account of his death at Bourlon written 1918 
 
66/257/1  Papers of Major-General R. Pinney 
 
66/298/1  Papers of Captain H.J.C. (Harry) Graham 
 
72/11/1 B.D. Gibbs, Captain 18
th
 Welsh.  Letters to his sweetheart and ephemera 
including list of names and addresses for 18
th
 Welsh Officers Association, 
1919 
 
79/35/1  D. Starrett, ‘Batman’ – unpublished typescript of his time as Crozier’s Batman, 
1914-1918 
 
80/28/1 Wolff, C.H., Brigade Major, 120
th
 Infantry Brigade. Desk diary Jan – Oct 1915 
 
83/23/1 F. Turner. Account of sniper attached to 119
th
 Brigade then 19
th
 RWF, written 
in 1982 
 
94/46/1 K. Fraser. 94 ms and ts letters from surviving ‘bantams’ or their families. 
1980s 
 
99/58/1 A.L. Bonsey, 13
th
 East Surrey Regiment – ms account written in 1923 
 
 
The Imperial War Museum, Sound Archive 
AC4581 Oral History of Ronald Mallone, recorded January 1980 
 
336 
 
Liddell Hart Centre for Military Archives, King’s College, London 
Hamilton: 6/3  Letter from H.C. Metcalfe to General Sir Ian Hamilton requesting employment 
with the army 
 
Liddell Hart:  LH1/207 Correspondence with Frank Percy Crozier 
 
Liddle Collection, University of Leeds 
Lieutenant F. Hargrave, 19
th
 Royal Welsh Fusiliers, photo album 
 
 
London School of Economics Archives 
 
M3383 Coll. Misc. 1155: Papers from F.P. Crozier including draft of a political pamphlet 
 
The National Archives, Kew 
CAB 45 Historical Section, drafts and correspondence relating to the Official 
History  
 
WO 71/450 James Crozier, Court Martial papers 
 
WO 86  Judge Advocate General’s Office: District Courts Martial Registers 
 
WO 95/110  War Diary D Battalion, Tank Corps 
 
WO 95/1857 War Diary 8
th
 Royal Fusiliers 
 
WO 95/1979 War Diary 2
nd
 Royal Irish Regiment 
 
WO 95/2468  War Diary 35
th
 Division HQ General Staff 
 
WO 95/2503  War Diary 9
th
 Royal Irish Rifles 
 
WO 95/2491    War Diary 36
th
 (Ulster) Division HQ General Staff 
 
WO 95/2539  War Diary 38
th
 (Welsh) Division HQ General Staff 
 
WO/95 2552   War Diary 113 Brigade HQ 
 
WO 95/2592   War Diary 40
th
 Division HQ General Staff 
 
WO 95/2594  War Diary 40
th
 Division HQ, A&Q 
 
WO 95/2604-05 War Diary 119
th
 Infantry Brigade HQ 
337 
 
 
WO 95/2606 War Diary 12
th
 South Wales Borderers, June 1916 – Jan 1918 
 
WO 95/2606 War Diary 21
st
 Middlesex, February-June 1918 
 War Diary 13
th
 East Surrey, February –July 1918 
 War Diary 12
th
 North Staffordshire, June 1918 – June 1919 
 War Diary 13
th
 East Lancashire, June 1918 – April 1919 
 War Diary 13
th
 Royal Inniskilling Fusiliers, June 1918 – April 1919 
 
WO 95/2607 War Diary 17
th
 Welsh, June 1916 – February 1919 
 War Diary 18
th
 Welsh, June 1916 – June 1919 
 War Diary 19
th
 Royal Welsh Fusiliers, June 1916 – February 1919 
 War Diary 119
th
 Machine Gun Company 
 War Diary 119
th
 Trench Mortar Battery 
WO 95/2608-10 War Diaries 120
th
 Infantry Brigade 
 
WO 95/2611   War Diary 11
th
 Cameron Highlanders 
 
WO 95/2612 War Diary 13
th
 East Surrey, June 1916 – January 1918 
 
WO 95/2613-16 War Diaries 121
st
 Infantry Brigade 
 
WO 95/2615 War Diary 21
st
 Middlesex, June 1916 – January 1918 
 
WO 95/2617 War Diary 41
st
 Division HQ General Staff 
 
WO 95/2746  War diary 48
th
 Division HQ General Staff 
 
WO 95/2967  War Diary 57
th
 Division HQ A&Q 
 
WO 95/5460 War Diary 13
th
 East Surrey, August 1918 
 
WO 114/26-27  Weekly Return of the British Army (exclusive of Territorial Force) and 
Dominion contingents at home  
 
WO 158/388  Report on Operations Carried Out by 40
th
 Division During the Period 
November 21
st
- 28
th
 1917 
 
338 
 
WO 213 Judge Advocate General’s Office: Field General Courts Martial and 
Military Courts Registers. 
 
WO 339 Personal Files Officers 
  
WO 374  Personal Files Officers (includes 374/16997 F.P. Crozier) 
WO 394 Statistical abstracts of information regarding the armies at home and 
abroad 
 
 
The National Army Museum, Chelsea 
1994-05-398 ‘Diary of the war by J.F. Plunkett. Copied from my rough notes taken in the 
field’ 
 
6306-69 Sir John Ponsonby.  Documents and maps relating to his command of 2
nd
 
Guards Brigade and 40
th
 Division on the Western Front, 1917-18 
 
8002-40 Harold Ruggles-Brise. Ms account ‘Some records of the 40th Division prior to 
arriving in France’ and ledger inscribed ‘40th Division Honours and Rewards’, 
1916-1919  
 
 
The National Library of Scotland, Edinburgh  
 
Haig Papers. Douglas Haig Manuscript Diary 
 
 
Random House Archive, Rushden 
 
Correspondence and contracts with F.P. Crozier 
 
 
National Library of Wales, Aberystwyth 
Records of the Executive Committee, Welsh Army Corps 
 
Public Record Office of Northern Ireland, Belfast 
D2794  Montgomery Family Papers, Correspondence of Captain William Montgomery 
T 3217  J.L. Stewart-Moore, ‘Random Recollections’ 
 
D 3835 Farren Connell Papers [Contain the correspondence of Sir Oliver Nugent] 
 
 
339 
 
University of Oxford, Bodleian Library 
 Lugard MSS 9/7 Papers of Lord Lugard 
C679/147  Ponsonby Papers 
 
 
Royal Regiment of Wales Museum, Brecon 
Papers of W.E. Brown, 12
th
 SWB 
Memoir Harold Jones  
Diary of Captain J. Gwyther-Jones, 18
th
 Welsh 
 
Memoir Captain E.E.A Whitworth 
 
 
University of Reading, Jonathan Cape Archive 
 
MS 2446 Sales ledgers 
 
Author’s Collection 
Platoon Roll Book, 16 Platoon, 17
th
 Welsh 
Guns and God, copy of unpublished (incomplete) typescript by Grace Crozier c.1939 
 
 
Published Sources 
Books 
Allinson, Sidney The Bantams: The Untold Story of World War 1 (London: 
Howard Baker Press, 1981) 
 
Anon  A Book of Remembrance: being a short summary of the Service 
and Sacrifice rendered to the Empire during the Great War by 
one of the many Patriotic Families of Wessex, the Popes of 
Wrackleford, Co. Dorset (London: Chiswick Press, 1919), 
privately printed 
 
Anon History of the 50
th
 Infantry Brigade, 1914-1919 (London: 1919) 
 
340 
 
Anon Soldiers Died in the Great War 1914-1919 (London: HMSO, 
1921) 
 
Anon A Short History of the Welch Regiment (Aldershot: Gale & 
Polden, 1929) 
Anon  The Great War 1914-1918: Ulster Greets Her Brave and 
Faithful Sons and Remembers Her Glorious Dead (Belfast: 
Books Ulster, 2015, first published 1919) 
 
Anon The Welch Regiment 1719-1960 (London: Malcolm Page, 1960) 
 
Ashworth, Tony Trench Warfare 1914-1918: The Live and Let Live System 
(London: Macmillan, 1980) 
 
Atkinson, C.T. The History of the South Wales Borderers 1914-1918 (London: 
The Medici Society, 1931) 
 
Babington, Anthony  For the Sake of Example: Capital Courts Martial 1914-18, the 
Truth (London: Leo Cooper, 1983) 
 
Baguley, Margaret (ed.) World War One and the Question of Ulster: The 
Correspondence of Lilian and Wilfred Spender (Dublin: Irish 
Manuscripts Commission, 2009) 
 
Baker, Chris The Battle for Flanders: German defeat on the Lys 1918 
(Barnsley: Pen & Sword, 2011) 
 
Barlow, Robin Wales and the First World War (Cardiff: University of Wales 
Press, 2006) 
 
 Wales and World War One (Llandysul: Gomer Press, 2014) 
 
Baron, Nick King of Karelia: Col. P.J. Woods and the British Intervention in 
North Russia 1918 - 1919 (London: Francis Boutle, 2007) 
 
Beach, Jim  Haig’s Intelligence: GHQ and the German Army, 1916-1918 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013) 
 
Becke, A.F. Order of Battle of Divisions, 4 Parts (London: HMSO, 1934, 
1938 and 1945) 
 
Bennett, R. The Black and Tans (Stroud: Spellmount, 2006, first published 
1959) 
 
Bet-El, Ilana R. Conscripts: Forgotten Men of the Great War (Stroud, Sutton, 
1999) 
 
341 
 
Bilton, D. Hull Pals: A History of 92 Infantry Brigade, 31
st
 Division 
(Barnsley: Pen and Sword, 1999) 
 
Boff, Jonathan Winning and Losing on the Western Front: The British Third 
Army and the Defeat of Germany in 1918 (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2012) 
 
Bond, Brian Survivors of a Kind (London: Continuum, 2008) 
 
Boraston, J.H. (ed.)  Sir Douglas Haig’s Despatches (December 1915 – April 1919) 
(London: Dent, 1979 first published 1919) 
 
Bourne, J.M.  Britain and the Great War 1914-1918 (London: Edward 
Arnold, 1989) 
 
Bowman, Timothy Irish Regiments in the Great War: Discipline and Morale 
(Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2003) 
 
Bowman, Timothy Carson’s Army (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 
2007) 
 
Buitenhuis, P.  The Great War of Words: Literature as Propaganda, 1914-18 
and After (London: Batsford, 1989) 
 
Brinton, Henry The Peace Army (London: Williams and Norgate, 1932) 
 
Brown, Malcolm Tommy Goes to War (London: Dent, 1978) 
 
Cherry, Bruce They Didn’t Want to Die Virgins: Sex and Morale in the British 
Army on the Western Front 1914-1918 (Solihull: Helion, 2016) 
 
Clifford, Brendan The Men I Killed: A Selection from the Writings of General F.P. 
Crozier (Belfast: Athol Books, 2002) 
 
Conan Doyle, Arthur The British Campaign in France and Flanders 1917 (London: 
Hodder and Stoughton, 1919) 
 
Connelly, Mark Steady the Buffs! A Regiment, a Region & the Great War 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006) 
 
Cook, H.C. The North Staffordshire Regiment (London: Leo Cooper, 1970) 
 
Corns, Cathryn and   Blindfold and Alone: British Military Executions in the Great 
Hughes-Wilson, John  War (London: Cassell, 2001), pp. 304-307 
 
Crookenden, A. History of the Cheshire Regiment in the Great War (Chester: 
W.H. Evans, 1939) 
 
342 
 
Crozier, Frank Percy A Brass Hat in No Man’s Land (London: Jonathan Cape, 1930) 
 
Impressions and Recollections (London: T. Werner Laurie, 
1930) 
 
A Word to Gandhi: The Lessons of Ireland (London: Williams 
and Norgate, 1931) 
 
    Ireland for Ever (London: Jonathan Cape, 1932) 
 
    Five Years Hard (London: Jonathan Cape, 1932) 
 
    Angels on Horseback (London: Jonathan Cape, 1932) 
 
    The Men I Killed (London: Michael Joseph, 1937) 
 
Crutwell, C.M.R.F.  A History of the Great War 1914-1918 (Oxford: Clarendon  
   Press, 1934) 
 
Dallas, Gloden and  The Unknown Army (London: Verso, 1985) 
Gill, Douglas 
 
Davies, Evan Beynon  Ar Orwel Pell (Llandysul: Gomer Press, 1965) 
 
Davson, H.M.   The History of the 35
th
 Division in the Great War (London:  
   Sifton, Praed &Co., 1926) 
     
Delafield, E.M.  Diary of a Provincial Lady (London: Howard Baker, 1930) 
 
Denman, Terence  Ireland’s Unknown Soldiers: The 16th (Irish) Division in the 
   Great War (Dublin: Irish Academic Press, 2008) 
 
De Ruvigny, Marquis  De Ruvigny’s Roll of Honour 1914 – 1918 (London: Naval and 
   Military Press reprint of 1922 edition) 
 
Dudley Ward, C.H. Regimental Records of the Royal Welsh Fusiliers (Late the 23
rd
 
Foot), Volume 3, 1914-1918, France and Flanders (London: 
Forster, Groom & Co., 1928) 
 
Dugdale, Geoffrey ‘Langemarck’ and ‘Cambrai’: A War Narrative, 1914-1918 
(Shrewsbury: Wilding and Son, 1932) 
 
Dungan, Myles  Irish Voices from the Great War (Dublin: Irish Academic 
Press, 1995) 
 
Edmonds, James E.  Military Operations: France and Belgium 1916 Vol.1 (London: 
HMSO, 1932) 
 
343 
 
 Military Operations: France and Belgium 1918, Vol. I, The 
German March Offensive and its Preliminaries (London: 
Macmillan, 1935) 
 
Military Operations: France and Belgium 1918, Vol. II, March-
April 1918: Continuation of the German Offensives (London: 
Macmillan, 1937) 
 
 Military Operations: France and Belgium 1918, Vol. IV, 8th 
August-26
th
 September 1918: The Franco-British Offensive 
(London: HMSO, 1947) 
 
 Military Operations: France and Belgium 1918, Vol. V, 26
th
 
September-11
th
 November 1918: The Advance to Victory 
(London: HMSO, 1947) 
 
Emden, Richard van Boy Soldiers of the Great War (London: Bloomsbury, 2012) 
 
Ewing, John The History of the 9
th
 (Scottish) Division 1914-1919 (London: 
John Murray, 1921) 
 
Executive Committee  Welsh Army Corps 1914-1919 (Cardiff: Western Mail Ltd., 
1921) 
 
Falls, Cyril  The History of the 36
th
 (Ulster) Division (London: Constable, 
1922) 
 
 War Books (London: Greenhill Books, 1989. First published 
1930) 
 
 Military Operations: France and Belgium 1917 Vol. 1 (London: 
Macmillan, 1940) 
 
Farrar-Hockley, A.H.  The Somme (London: Batsford, 1964) 
 
Fox, F. The Royal Inniskilling Fusiliers in the World War (London: 
Constable, 1928) 
 
Fuller, J.G. Troop Morale and Popular Culture in the British and Dominion 
Armies, 1914-1918 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1990) 
 
GHQ Instructions Regarding Recommendations for Honours and 
Awards 1918 (Reprint, Naval and Military Press, no date) 
 
General Staff  Field Service Regulations Part 1, Operations (London: HMSO, 
1909, Reprinted with Amendments 1914) 
 
 SS107 Notes on Minor Enterprises (March 1916) 
344 
 
 
 SS135 Instructions for the Training of Divisions for Offensive 
Action (December 1916) 
 
 SS137 Recreational Training (January 1917) 
 
 SS143 Instructions for the Training of Platoons for Offensive 
Action (February 1917) 
 
 SS152 Instructions for the Training of the British Armies in 
France (June 1917) 
 
 SS210 The Division in Defence (May 1918) 
 
Gibson, Craig Behind the Front: British Soldiers and French Civilians, 1914-
18 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014) 
 
Graves, Robert Goodbye To All That (London: Cape, 1929) 
 
Grayson, Richard Belfast Boys: How Unionists and Nationalists Fought and Died 
Together in the First World War (London: Continuum, 2009) 
 
Greenhalgh, Elizabeth The French Army and the First World War (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2014) 
 
Grieves, Keith  The Politics of Manpower, 1914-18 (Manchester: Manchester 
University Press, 1988) 
 
Griffith, Paddy Battle Tactics of the Western Front: The British Army’s Art of 
Attack 1916-18 (London: Yale University Press, 1994) 
 
Griffith, Paddy (ed.) British Fighting Methods in the Great War (London: Frank 
Cass, 1996) 
 
Griffith, Llewelyn Wyn  Up To Mametz (London: Faber, 1931) 
 
Hammerton, J. (ed.) The Great War, I Was There (London: Amalgamated Press, 
1938-9) 
 
Hammond, Bryn Cambrai 1917: The Myth of the First Great Tank Battle 
(London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 2008) 
 
Hart, Peter The Somme (London: Cassell, 2005) 
 
Harvey, A.D. A Muse of Fire: Literature, Art and War (London: The 
Hambledon Press, 1998) 
 
Henry, L.E. Napoleon’s War Maxims (London: Gale and Polden, 1899) 
345 
 
 
Hicks, Jonathan The Welsh at Mametz Wood: The Somme 1916 (Talybont: Y 
Lolfa, 2016) 
 
Hodgkinson, Peter E.   British Infantry Battalion Commanders in the First World War 
(Farnham: Ashgate, 2015) 
 
 ‘Glum Heroes’: Hardship, Fear and Death – Resilience and 
Coping in the British Army on the Western Front 1914-1918 
(Wolverhampton: Helion, 2016). 
 
Holmes, Richard Tommy: The British Soldier on the Western Front 1914-1918 
(London: Harper Collins, 2004) 
 
Hone, Percy F. Southern Rhodesia (London: George Bell, 1909) 
 
Horsfall, Jack and  Battleground Europe: Bourlon Wood (Barnsley: Pen & Sword, 
Cave, Nigel    2002) 
 
Hughes, Clive ‘The New Armies’ in Ian F.W. Beckett and Keith Simpson 
(eds.), A Nation in Arms: the British Army in the First World 
War (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1985) 
 
 ‘Arm to save your Native Land’: Army Recruiting in North-
West Wales, 1914-1916 (Llanwrst: Gwasg Carreg Gwalch, 
2015) 
 
Hughes, Colin Mametz: Lloyd George’s ‘Welsh Army’ at the Battle of the 
Somme (Norwich: Gliddon Books, 2
nd
 Edition, 1990) 
 
Intelligence Section of  Histories of the Two Hundred and Fifty-One Divisions of 
the General Staff,   the German Army Which Participated in the War 1914 - 1918 
American Expeditionary  (London: London Stamp Exchange, 1989 reprint of 1920  
Forces    edition) 
 
James, E.A. British Regiments 1914-1918 (Dallington: Naval and Military 
Press, 1998 reprint of 1929 edition) 
 
James, H.L. (ed.)  Sixteenth, Seventeenth, Eighteenth, Nineteenth Battalions, the 
Manchester Regiment: A Record 1914-1918 (Manchester: 
Sherratt and Hughes, 1923) 
 
James, Robert Rhodes  Gallipoli (London: Pan, 1984) 
 
Jerrold, Douglas The Lie about the War (London: Faber and Faber, 1930) 
 
Johnson, David  Executed at Dawn: British Firing Squads on the Western Front 
1914-1918 (Stroud: Spellmount, 2015) 
346 
 
 
Jones, David In Parenthesis (London: Faber, 1937) 
 
 
Jones, Mair Saunders  Letters to Margaret Gilcreist (Cardiff: University of Wales  
Thomas, Ned and  Press, 1993) 
Jones, Harri Pritchard (eds.) 
 
Justice, Simon M.  ‘Vanishing Battalions: The Nature, Impact and Implications of 
   British Infantry Reorganization prior to the German Spring  
   Offensives of 1918’ in LoCicero, M. et al (eds.) A Military  
   Transformed? Adaptation and Innovation in the British Military 
   1792-1945 (Solihull: Helion & Company, 2014) 
 
Keating, J and Lavery, F. Irish Heroes in the War: The Story of the Tyneside Irish  
   Brigade (London: Everett, 1917) 
 
Kendall, Paul   Somme 1916: Success and Failure on the First Day of the  
   Battle of the Somme (Barnsley: Frontline, 2015) 
 
Kitchen, Martin  The German Offensives of 1918 (Stroud: Tempus, 2005) 
 
Laffin, John   Damn the Dardanelles (Stroud: Sutton, 1989) 
 
Leeson, David M.  The Black & Tans: British Police and Auxiliaries in the Irish 
    War of Independence, 1920-1921 (Oxford: Oxford University 
    Press, 2011).  
 
Lengel, Edward G.  World War 1 Memories: An Annotated Bibliography of  
   Personal Accounts Published in English Since 1919 (Oxford: 
   Scarecrow Press, 2004) 
 
Lock, Ron   Hill of Squandered Valour: The Battle for Spion Kop, 1900  
   (Newbury: Casemate, 2011) 
 
McCall, Ernest  Tudor’s Toughs (Newtonards: Red Coat Publishing, 2010) 
 
McCue, Paul   Wandsworth and Battersea Battalions in the Great War 1915-
   1918 (Barnsley: Pen and Sword, 2010) 
 
McGreal, Stephen  Cheshire Bantams: the 15
th
, 16
th
 and 17
th
 Battalions of the  
   Cheshire Regiment (Barnsley: Pen and Sword, 2006) 
 
Mainwaring, R.B.  Historical Record of the Royal Welch Fusiliers (London:  
   Hatchlands, 1889) 
 
Marden, T.O. The History of the Welch Regiment, Part 2 1914-1918 (Cardiff: 
Western Mail and Echo, 1932) 
347 
 
 
‘Mark VII’ (Max Plowman)  A Subaltern on the Somme (London: Dent, 1927) 
 
Messenger, Charles Call to Arms: The British Army 1914-18 (London: Cassell, 
2005) 
 
 Broken Sword: The Tumultuous Life of General Frank Crozier 
1879-1937 (Barnsley: Praetorian Press, 2013) 
 
Middlebrook, Martin The First Day on the Somme, 1 July 1916 (London: Allan Lane, 
1971) 
 
Miles, Wilfred. Military Operations France and Belgium, 1916, Vol. II, 2
nd
 July 
1916 to the End of the Battle of the Somme (London: 
Macmillan, 1938) 
 
 Military Operations: France and Belgium 1917, Vol III, The 
Battle of Cambrai (London: HMSO, 1948) 
 
Mitchinson, K.W. Villers Plouich and the Five Ridges (Barnsley: Leo Cooper, 
1999) 
 
Moore, William  The Thin Yellow Line (London: Leo Cooper, 1974) 
 
 A Wood Called Bourlon: The Cover-up After Cambrai, 1917 
(London: Leo Cooper, 1988) 
 
Mowat, C.L. Britain Between the Wars, 1918-1940 (London: Methuen, 1955) 
 
Munby, J.E. (ed.)  A History of the 38
th
 (Welsh) Division (London: Hugh Rees 
   Ltd, 1920) 
 
National Executive  Welsh Army Corps 1914-1919, Report of the Executive 
Committee   Committee (Cardiff,: Western Mail Ltd, 1921) 
 
Nicholson, L. and History of the East Lancashire Regiment in the Great War 
McMullen, T. 1914-1918 (Liverpool: Littlebury Brothers, 1936) 
 
O’Farrell, Padraic Who’s Who in the Irish War of Independence and Civil War 
1916-1923 (Dublin: Lilliput Press, 1997) 
 
Oram, Gerald  Death Sentences Passed by Military Courts of the British Army 
1914-1924 (London: Francis Boutle, 1998) 
 
Orr, Philip  The Road to the Somme: Men of the Ulster Division Tell Their 
Story (Belfast: The Blackstaff Press, 1987) 
 
348 
 
Orr, David R. and  “Ulster Will Fight…”: Volume 2, The 36th (Ulster) Division 
Truesdale, David  From Formation to the Armistice (Solihull: Helion, 2016) 
 
Pearse, H.W. and  History of the East Surrey Regiment 1914-1919 (London: 
Sloman, H.S.   The Medici Society, 1934) 
 
Perry, Nick   ‘Politics and Command: General Nugent, the Ulster Division 
    and Relations with Ulster Unionism 1915-17’ in Bond,  Brian et 
    al, ‘Look to your Front’: Studies in the First World War by the 
    British Commission for Military History (Staplehurst:  
    Spellmount, 1999) 
 
Perry, Nicholas (ed.)  Major-General Oliver Nugent and the Ulster Division 1915-
    1918 (Stroud: Sutton, for the Army Records Society, 2007) 
 
Philpott, William  Bloody Victory: The Sacrifice on the Somme and the Making of 
    the Twentieth Century (London: Little Brown, 2009) 
 
    Attrition: Fighting the First World War (London: Little Brown, 
    2014) 
 
Pretty,  David A.  Farmer, Soldier and Politician: The life of Brigadier-General 
    Sir Owen Thomas, MP, Father of the ‘Welsh Army Corps’  
    (Wrexham: Bridge Books, 2011) 
 
Putkowski, Julian  British Army Mutineers 1914-1922 (London: Francis Boudle, 
    1998) 
 
Renshaw, Michael  Mametz Wood (Barnsley: Pen and Sword, 2006) 
 
Richards, Frank  Old Soldiers Never Die (London: Faber, 1933) 
 
Richards, J. (ed.) Wales on the Western Front (Cardiff: University of Wales 
Press, 1994) 
  
Robbins, Simon British Generalship on the Western Front 1914-18: Defeat into 
Victory (London: Routledge, 2005) 
 
 British Generalship on the Western Front 1914-18: The 
Military Career of Sir Henry Horne (1861-1929) (London: 
Ashgate, 2010) 
 
Rowan, E.W.J. The 54
th
 Infantry Brigade, 1914-1918: Some Records of Battle 
and Laughter in France (Aldershot: Gale and Polden, 1919) 
 
Samuels, Martin Command or Control? Command, Training and Tactics in the 
British and German Armies, 1888-1918 (London: Frank Cass, 
1995) 
349 
 
 
Sassoon, Siegfried  Memoirs of an Infantry Officer (London: Faber, 1930) 
 
Saunders, Anthony Dominating the Enemy: War in the Trenches 1914-1918 
(Stroud: Sutton, 2000) 
 
 Raiding on the Western Front (Barnsley: Pen and Sword, 2012) 
 
Scott, Caroline   The Manchester Bantams: The Story of a Pals Battalion and a 
    City at War; 23
rd
 (Service) Battalion The Manchester Regiment 
    (8
th
 City) (Barnsley: Pen & Sword, 2016) 
 
Senior, Michael Haking - a Dutiful Soldier: A Study in Corps Command 
(Barnsley: Pen and Sword, 2012) 
 
Sheen, J. Tyneside Irish: A History of the Tyneside Irish Brigade Raised 
in the North East in World War One (Barnley: Pen and Sword, 
1998) 
 
Sheffield, G.D. (ed.) Leadership and Command: The Anglo-American Military 
Experience since 1861 (London: Brassey’s, 1997) 
 
Sheffield, G.D. Leadership in the Trenches: Officer-Man Relations, Morale and 
Discipline in the British Army in the Era of the First World War 
(London: Macmillan, 2000) 
 
 The Somme (London: Cassell, 2003) 
 
Sheffield, G.D. Douglas Haig: From the Somme to Victory (London: Aurum 
Press, 2016) 
 
Sheffield, G.D. and   Douglas Haig, War Diaries and Letters, 1914-1918 (London:    
Bourne, J.M. (eds.)    Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 2005) 
 
Sheffield, G.D. and   Command and Control on the Western Front: The British  
Todman, Dan (eds.)  Army’s Experience 1914-18 (Staplehurst: Spellmount, 2004) 
 
Sheldon, Jack   The German Army at Cambrai (Barnsley: Pen and Sword,  
    2009) 
 
Sheppard, H.R.L.  We Say No: The Plain Man’s Guide to Pacifism (London: 1935) 
 
Simkins, Peter Kitchener’s Army: The Raising of the New Armies 1914-1916 
(Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1988) 
 
 ‘British Divisions in the ‘Hundred Days’, 1918’ in Paddy 
Griffith (ed.), British Fighting Methods in the Great War 
(London: Frank Cass, 1996), pp. 50-69 
350 
 
 
  
 ‘Building Blocks: Aspects of Command and Control at Brigade 
Level in the BEF’s Offensive Operations, 1916-1918’ in Gary 
Sheffield and Dan Todman (eds.) Command and Control on the 
Western Front: The British Army’s Experience1914-18 
(Staplehurst: Spellmount, 2004) 
 
 ‘“Each One a Pocket Hercules”: The Bantam Experiment and 
the Case of the Thirty-fifth Division’ in Sanders Marble (ed.), 
Scraping the Barrel: The Military Use of Sub-Standard 
Manpower (New York: Fordham University Press, 2012), pp. 
79-104 
 
Simpson, Andy Directing Operations: British Corps Command on the Western 
Front, 1914-18 (Stroud: Spellmount, 2006) 
 
Simpson, Keith  ‘The Officers’ in Ian F. W. Beckett and Keith Simpson (eds.), A 
    Nation in Arms: the British Army in the First World War  
    (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1985), pp. 63 – 96 
 
Stanley, F.C.   The History of the 89
th
 Brigade (Liverpool: Daily Post, 1919) 
 
Starling, John    No Labour, No Battle: Military Labour During the First World 
and Lee, Ivor   War (Stroud: Spellmount, 2009) 
 
Stedman, Michael  Manchester Pals, 16
th
, 17
th
, 18
th
, 19
th
, 20
th
, 21
st
, 22
nd
 and 23
rd
 
    Battalions of the Manchester Regiment: A History of the Two 
    Manchester Brigades (London: Leo Cooper, 1994). 
 
 Battleground Europe, Somme: Thiepval (Barnsley: Pen and 
Sword, 2005) 
 
Stevenson, David With Our Backs to the Wall: Victory and Defeat in 1918 
(London: Allen Lane, 2011) 
 
Stewart, G. and Sheen, J. Tyneside Scottish: A History of the Tyneside Scottish Brigade 
Raised in the North East in World War One (Barnsley: Pen and 
Sword, 1999) 
 
Tendulkar, D.G. Mahatma: Life of Mohandas Karamchand Gandhi. Volume 3, 
1930-1934 (Bombay: Jhaveri and Tendulkar, 1952) 
 
Ternan, T. The Story of the Tyneside Scottish (Newcastle: Northumberland 
Press, 1919) 
 
Thomas, H. The History of the Royal Welsh Fusiliers late the Twenty Third 
Regiment (London: T. Fisher Unwin, 1916) 
351 
 
 
Townsend, Charles The British Campaign in Ireland 1919-1921 (London: OUP, 
1975) 
 
Turner, Alexander Cambrai 1917: The Birth of Armoured Warfare (Oxford: 
Osprey Publishing, 2007) 
 
Walker, Stephen Forgotten Soldiers: the Irishmen Shot at Dawn (Dublin: Gill 
and Macmillan, 2007) 
 
War Office  Infantry Training (London: HMSO, 1914) 
 
Watson, Alexander Enduring the Great War: Combat, Morale and Collapse in the 
German and British Armies, 1914-1918 (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2008) 
 
Williams, Chris ‘Taffs in the Trenches: identity and military service 1914-1915’ 
in Matthew Cragoe and Chris Williams (eds.), Wales and War: 
Society, Politics and Religion in the Nineteenth and Twentieth 
Centuries (Cardiff: University of Wales, 2007), pp. 126-164 
 
Winter, Denis Death’s Men (London: Allen Lane, 1978) 
 
Whitton, F.E. History of the 40
th
 Division (Aldershot: Gale and Polden, 1926) 
 
Wyrall, E. The Die-Hards in the Great War (London: Harrison and Sons, 
1926-1930)  
 
Zabecki, David T. The German 1918 Offensives: A Case Study in the Operational 
Level of War (London: Routledge, 2006) 
 
 
Journals and Periodicals 
 
Beach, Jim ‘Issued by the General Staff: Doctrine Writing at British GHQ, 
1917-1918’, War in History, 19:4 (2012), pp. 464-491 
 
Bowman, Timothy ‘Officering Kitchener’s Armies: a case study of the 36th (Ulster) 
Division’, War in History, 16:2 (2009), pp. 189-212 
 
 ‘Review of Broken Sword by Charles Messenger’, History 
Ireland, 22 (July/August 2014), p. 63 
 
Butcher, Bob ‘The Nine Battalion Controversy’, Stand To! The Journal of the 
Western Front Association, 68 (2003), pp. 47-49 
 
Graves, Robert ‘Review of A Brass Hat in No Man’s Land’, Then and Now 
(Summer 1930), p. 5  
352 
 
 
 
 
 
Hall, Lesley A. ‘Impotent ghosts from no man’s land, flappers’ boyfriends, or 
crypto-patriarchs? Men, sex and social change in 1920s 
Britain’, Social History, 21 (1996), pp.54-70 
 
Harari, Yuval Noah ‘Martial Illusions: War and Disillusionment in Twentieth-
Century and Renaissance Military Memoirs’, The Journal of 
Military History, 69 (2005), pp.43-72 
 
 Harvey, A.D.   ‘A Good War: Wartime Officers who Rose to Command Level 
in the First World War’, RUSI: Royal United Services Institute 
Journal, 153:1 (April 2006), pp.76 - 80 
 
Hughes, Clive ‘The Welsh Army Corps, 1914-15: shortages of khaki and basic 
equipment promote a ‘national’ uniform’, Imperial War 
Museum Review, No.1, 1986, pp. 91-100 
 
Maury, Brooke ‘Review of The Men I Killed’, The Field Artillery Journal, 
May/June 1938, p.252 
 
Oram, Gerard ‘Pious Perjury: Discipline and Morale in the British Force in 
Italy, 1917-1918’, War in History, 9:4 (2002), p.412-430 
 
Phillips, Gervase  ‘Dai Bach y Soldiwr’, Llafur, 6:2 (1993), pp. 93-105 
 
Pittock, M.    ‘Max Plowman and the Literature of the First World War’,  
    Cambridge Quarterly, 33 (2004), pp. 217 – 243 
 
Senior, H.   ‘Review of Richard Bennett, The Black and Tans’, Irish  
    Historical Review, 47 (March 1961), pp. 277-280 
 
Staunton, Martin G. ‘Soldiers Died in the Great War 1914-19 as historical source 
material’, Stand To! The Journal of the Western Front 
Association, 27 (1989), pp. 6-8 
 
 
Theses 
 
Fox, Aimée E.  ‘Military administration and the role of brigade staff, 1916-
1918’, MA Thesis, University of Birmingham, 2010 
 
Harvey, Trevor Gordon  ‘‘An Army of Brigadiers’: British Brigade Commanders at the 
Battle of Arras 1917’, PhD Thesis, University of Birmingham, 
2015 
 
353 
 
Hughes, Clive ‘Army Recruitment in Gwynedd, 1914-1916’, MA Thesis, 
University of Wales, Bangor, 1983 
 
Pyles, Jesse   ‘The Portuguese Expeditionary Force in World War 1: From 
    Inception to Combat Destruction, 1914-1918’, MA Dissertation, 
    University of North Texas, 2012 
 
Williams, Dennis   ‘British Second Army and Coalition Warfare in Flanders in the 
    Hundred Days, 1918’, MPhil Thesis, University of    
    Birmingham, 2015 
 
 
Newspapers 
 
Aberdeen Journal 
 
Belfast Telegraph 
 
Brecon and Radnor Express 
 
Buckinghamshire Herald 
 
Colwyn Bay News 
 
Cambria Daily Leader 
 
Cambridge Daily News 
 
Daily Express 
 
Daily Mirror 
 
Daily Sketch 
 
Daily Telegraph 
 
Edinburgh Evening Dispatch 
 
Edinburgh Gazette 
 
Evening Standard 
 
Glamorgan Gazette 
 
Gloucester Journal 
 
Irish Times 
 
354 
 
Larne Times 
 
Liverpool Daily Post 
 
Liverpool Evening Express 
 
London Gazette 
 
Manchester Guardian 
 
Monmouthshire Evening Post 
 
Morning Post 
 
New Statesman and Nation 
 
New York Times 
 
North Wales Chronicle 
 
Nottingham Journal and Express 
 
Peace News 
 
South Wales Daily News 
 
South Wales Echo 
 
Sunday Dispatch 
 
Sunday Express 
 
The Cambrian News, Merioneth and Welsh Farmers Gazette 
 
The Chronicle 
 
The Globe 
 
The Scotsman 
 
The Spectator 
 
The Times 
 
Times Literary Supplement 
 
Western Daily Press 
 
355 
 
Western Mail 
 
Yorkshire Post and Leeds Intelligencer 
